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**Bell's Colonial Editions**

**CECIL RHODES**  
**HIS POLITICAL LIFE AND SPEECHES**

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C. J. Rhodes

# CECIL RHODES

## HIS POLITICAL LIFE AND SPEECHES

1881-1900

BY

VINDEX

*WITH PORTRAIT IN PHOTOGRAVURE  
AND A MAP*



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TO THE  
CITIZENS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE  
THE LOYALISTS OF THE COLONIES, AS  
WELL AS OF THE MOTHER-COUNTRY, WHO  
HAVE REALISED, UNDER THE PRESSURE OF  
A GREAT WAR, THE EMPIRE'S UNITY, THIS  
RECORD OF THE MAKING OF THAT  
EMPIRE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
IS INSCRIBED.



## PREFACE

IN this volume are collected for the first time the speeches of the Right Hon. C. J. Rhodes, from his first appearance in the Cape Legislative Assembly early in 1881 up to the present time.

The history of Mr. Rhodes's political work I have written to serve as an introduction and commentary to the speeches, which thus accompanied will, it is hoped, be more easily and fully understood.

For the correction of the facts connected with Mr. Rhodes's school life I have to thank the Rev. R. Geare, of Bishop's Stortford Grammar School, and for a correction in the date of Mr. Rhodes's matriculation, the Tutor of Oriel College, Oxford.

The map has been coloured to show the increase of British territory made through Mr. Rhodes since 1881, almost the whole of which territory was rescued by him from Transvaal annexation, attempted in defiance of treaties and of the Paramount Power.

The speeches have been carefully collated. The varying reports in the newspapers of South Africa and England have been compared, and, except in unimportant passages which are occasionally summarised,

a full text is given. In this work help has been obtained in newspapers too numerous to name, from the chief Cape Town journals, the *Cape Argus* (to the managing director of which in London special thanks are due for his courtesy in placing the files in his office at my disposal) and the *Cape Times*, to excellent local organs, such as the *Bulawayo Chronicle* and the *Diamond Fields Advertiser*, while in some of the later speeches help has been obtained from the *African Review*. The reports of the Chartered Company's and De Beers meetings have supplied the text of the speeches made on such occasions.

No one has suffered more from the shortcomings of reporters than Mr. Rhodes. In part this is due to the imperfect state of reporting in South Africa, in part to the fact that the speaker does not help the reporters with typewritten or printed copies of his speeches, for the simple reason that he never prepares what he has to say but throws his ideas and facts before the public in such words as come on the spur of the moment. 'No one ever accused me of preparing a speech, though, no doubt, it is the proper thing to do,' is his own admission in one of his speeches.

The speeches, except for obvious verbal corrections of reporters' errors and repetitions, have purposely been left unchanged in their natural careless form. In these speeches the ideas and the facts on which they are based are the valuable things, the ideas

being the growth of years, the language the work of a moment ; yet the speaker has sometimes struck off sayings that will not easily be forgotten, such as 'the Suez Canal of the trade of this country,' for Bechuanaland in 1883, 'the North is my thought,' 'unctuous rectitude.' There is also a certain general form to be found in many of the speeches, unpremeditated though they are, like the sculptor's first rough blocking out of a statue, in which the idea is plain enough to the seeing eye, though the completeness of the finished work is left to the imagination.

Deeds, not words, are the natural expression of the Empire-maker's energies, and though he has so often held immense audiences spellbound, his success is not due to the art of the orator, but to the effect on his hearers of the great record of a life devoted to the Empire, and to the magnetism of a big personality talking to thousands in the same direct, familiar, homely language he would employ to one. This large simplicity of manner, backed by absolute conviction of the value of his matter, carries him to the heart of an audience, and his power as a popular speaker is best understood by those who have been present in the crowd on such occasions as the last Chartered Company's meeting, or, better still, at the enthusiastic meeting which welcomed him back to South Africa at the Drill Hall in Cape Town in July 1899.

These speeches are of special value and importance at the present time, being the authoritative account by the chief statesman of South Africa of the progress of political ideas in general, and of the ideas of Imperial expansion and unity in particular, in South Africa, from 1881 to 1899. Mr. Fitzpatrick has given us 'the Transvaal from within'; these speeches give us the more important knowledge of 'South Africa from within,' and trace every phase of its growth and development. They give the inner history of nearly twenty years. They lay bare the working of the two rival ideas—the Imperial idea, with equal rights for every civilised man without distinction of race, the true democratic idea; and the so-called Republican, or rather, exclusive Dutch idea, with political rights reserved for an oligarchy of Dutch farmers, on the ground of priority of occupation, that is, really on the ground of race. They disclose in their proper order and true relations the real causes, and show the significance of the present war, as the conflict of the two ideas—the Imperial idea, progressive and democratic; and the Republican, reactionary and aristocratic, its aristocracy of ignorance being the helpless prey of a resolute and crafty fanatic, supported by a clique of corrupt politicians and hare-brained enthusiasts.

In the growth of this exclusive Dutch idea, which for convenience one is forced to misname republican, the idea of an independent South Africa under

Dutch supremacy and under the hegemony of the Transvaal, we find the key to the whole external and internal policy of the Transvaal and the attitude of its allies, the clique of politicians at Bloemfontein, and the clique at the Cape, since 1881. This idea, for instance, explains the Transvaal's appeal to the Free State in February 1881, which I quote here from Chapter II.: 'Come and help us. God rules and is with us. It is His will to unite us as a people, to make a United South Africa, free from British authority'; it explains the warnings of President Brand that the appeal would be accepted, and the threats and warnings of the Hofmeyr party that there would be a rebellion at the Cape. It explains the formation of the Afrikaner Bond by Mr. Reitz and Mr. Borckenhagen in 1881. It explains, again, the Transvaal's attempt to seize the key to the interior, Bechuanaland, in 1883-4, and the help it had in this daring aggression from its allies the Cape Dutch Republicans and their leaders, the same warnings as before of a rebellion at the Cape being employed, when the Imperial troops were ordered up under General Warren. This explains the steady application of the same policy, the support given to the Transvaal by the same Cape Dutch politicians with the same threats and warnings, when the Transvaal attempted to seize Zululand, and by their help did actually retain three thousand square miles of



territory. This explains the Transvaal's repeated attempts to 'rush' Mashonaland, and the persistent opposition of Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond party to Mr. Rhodes's policy of northern expansion, their opposition to the northern railway, and their attempt to drive its extension into the territory of the South African Republic. This explains the steady and successful effort of President Kruger to make the Transvaal a centre of anti-British influence, and, as the wealth of the mines supplied the funds, to make it the paramount military power in South Africa. This explains the condition of vassalage to which by deliberate enactments the Transvaal reduced the Uitlanders, for to the advocates of this idea all South Africa is 'Ons Land,' our land, the proper possession of the Dutch race alone, and the Transvaalers are the fighting vanguard of this exclusive idea. This idea explains the attitude of the Bond party not only on all the occasions enumerated above, but immediately before the invasion of Natal and Cape Colony by the Republics in 1899. Furthermore, their very practical sympathy with this idea explains the action of the Bond Ministry in allowing munitions of war to pass through the Cape to the Free State shortly before the present war, and the refusal of Mr. Schreiner, the Premier, in June 1899, and again in August, to allow the battery of artillery and the rifles stored for Kimberley at

King William's Town to go up to Kimberley, when the Mayor of that town represented its defenceless state. This idea explains clearly enough why an important and wealthy centre, the chief place on the Transvaal border, was left undefended; and if Kimberley held its own, thanks chiefly to Mr. Rhodes and its own citizen soldiers, it is certainly not the fault of the Bond Ministry or its chief. Thus the Bond in 1899 again maintained its consistent record (broken only during the years when Mr. Rhodes thought he had almost won them to Imperialism), and did its best for its allies in the Transvaal, and for Mr. Hofmeyr's long-cherished idea of a United States of South Africa under its own flag. For the vigorous growth of that idea England's ill-timed magnanimity after Majuba is, of course, primarily responsible, for from that time dates the deep-seated conviction that the Transvaal had beaten and could always beat the British army, and Roberts in 1900 has to teach a far sterner and severer lesson than Roberts would have had to teach in 1881. It was as early as 1883 that the idea showed itself openly in the Cape Colony, for in July of that year Mr. Rhodes in the Cape House compared the then recently declared policy of the head of the Afrikaner Bond (Mr. Hofmeyr) with his own. 'I would like to know whether he (Mr. Hofmeyr) is still in favour of a United States of South Africa under its own flag.

I have my own views as to the future of South Africa, and I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire.' This idea was, of course, behind the accumulation of the vast armaments, including the most powerful modern artillery, which took a new departure after the Drifts Ultimatum, with its threat of war, in 1895; for that ultimatum was the immediate occasion of the great increase in preparations for war, and of the mission of Dr. Leyds to procure support on the Continent, not as has been often asserted, the futile Jameson Raid, which never really endangered President Kruger's power at all. One of the unnoted reasons which probably influenced President Kruger to declare war in 1899 will be found several times alluded to in Mr. Rhodes's speeches, *e.g.* 'I have one-eighteenth of his burghers, and if he does not mind, I shall have half of them before long.' That is to say, President Kruger's best fighting men, the Boers of the Northern Transvaal, were gradually emigrating and settling in Rhodesia in spite of the efforts of General Joubert and the President. The first burghers who went in found the broad pastures of Rhodesia so attractive, and the rule of the Chartered Company so pleasantly bearable, that all the warnings and entreaties of Pretoria could not prevent their kinsmen from following them. His old guard was leaving the President's dominions, and to wait for a better opportunity for

declaring war than 1899 was to wait for an uncertainty, while there was no uncertainty about this yearly and steady leakage of the Transvaal's best fighting men.

It is in the ending once for all of this impossible idea of an Independent Dutch South Africa, freed from the British Empire, that the hope for the future lies. This the war and a proper settlement will effect; and if it be argued that the sword cannot make a stable and firm union, a united people, it may be answered that we have only to look to the United States of America and the German Empire to remember that American unity and German unity are the work of the sword, and there is no reason why South African unity should not be brought about in the same way.

Mr. Rhodes in his latest speech (February 19, 1900), at the annual De Beers meeting at Kimberley (the report has just reached England, too late to include in my book), is fully persuaded that South African unity will follow the war. These are his words: 'All contention will be over with the recognition of equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. That principle, for which we have been so long striving, is the crux of the present struggle, and my own belief is that when the war is over a large number of Dutch farmers in this country will throw in their lot with us on this basis,

that neither race shall claim any right of preference over the other. We have no feeling against them. We have lived with them, shot with them, visited with them, and we find, owing, I suppose, to the race affinity, that there is not much between us. But they have been misled by these gangs at Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and even Cape Town.'

Again, he says: 'This is not a conspiracy on the part of England to seize the neighbouring Republics; but it has been a long, long conspiracy of the neighbouring Republics to seize British South Africa. They call themselves Republics. They are not Republics. Each Government consists of a small political gang. They humbug the poor Dutch people by appealing to their patriotism, and they divide the spoils among their coteries.' . . . 'I venture to predict that the day of reckoning is coming between the Dutch farmer and these people who have misled him.'

There is another less urgent but still not unimportant purpose that will be served by the publication of Mr. Rhodes's speeches. They will enable the British public to learn for themselves the plain truth about Mr. Rhodes's career, the unchanging consistency of his policy of Imperial expansion and unification, the liberal and broad-minded nature of his staunch Imperialism from the first day he came into politics till this day. The knowledge of the truth about Mr. Rhodes is necessary, for he has been very grossly

and persistently misrepresented. It is easy to show, from the most recent and able of these attacks, the reliance that can be placed on the knowledge and fairness of its author, who poses as an authority on South Africa. This attack is contained in an article by Mr. J. A. Hobson, entitled 'Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa,' which occupies the first place in this year's January number of the *Contemporary Review*. The Capitalists, according to Mr. Hobson, are the causes of the present war, and Capitalism has simply used Imperialism for its own purposes in South Africa. Mr. Rhodes, the leader of Imperialism in South Africa, went into politics, according to Mr. Hobson, simply to safeguard the interests of Capitalism. 'When that district (Griqualand West) was annexed to Cape Colony in 1880, it was very necessary that some tactful man, not too scrupulous, who well understood the needs of the diamond industry, should represent Barkly West, and hold the fortress of a monopoly worth a quarter of the capitalised value of the Colony.' This is a single sentence of Mr. Hobson's, and it contains as much original history, of Mr. Hobson's own manufacture, as one is likely to find in any sentence, even in Mr. Hobson's writings. 'It was very necessary that some tactful men should represent Barkly West.' Why? Barkly West, Mr. Hobson is perhaps not aware, is not a diamond field constituency at all—it is a rural constituency, for

which Mr. Rhodes has been member since 1881 as the representative of farming, and of farmers, largely composed of Dutchmen. If Mr. Rhodes had been put in by the diamond interest, he would have been returned for Kimberley. But a far 'worse blunder follows : 'And hold the fortress of a monopoly worth a quarter of the capitalised value of the Colony.' This was in 1880, at a time when there was no diamond monopoly in existence and no prospect of one. The amalgamation which established the monopoly did not take place till 1888, so that it would have been a little difficult to go into politics to represent what at the time had no existence and no prospect of existence. That is an excellent euphemism of Mr. Hobson's, 'not too scrupulous,' and I think before my readers leave the next statement I shall examine, they will have no difficulty in fitting the description to its author. Up to this I have certainly proved that he is 'not too well informed.' 'The first public post,' I quote Mr. Hobson's words, 'occupied by Mr. Rhodes was that of Deputy-Commissioner in Bechuanaland in 1884-5, at the time when bodies of Transvaal Boers, presumably with the connivance of the Transvaal Government, had entered that country and established the Republics of Stellaland and Goschen (*sic*). The possession of Bechuanaland by the Transvaal would have closed the road to the North against British Imperialism : this was clearly

understood by the rival claimants, and when remonstrances had failed Sir Charles Warren was sent up with an Imperial force to assert the Imperial interest and establish the Imperial control. What part did Mr. Rhodes play at this critical juncture? He threw all the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal, and against the Imperial authority. The following extract from a speech delivered in the Cape Assembly, and reported in the *Cape Argus*, July 16, 1884, deserves attention.'

I will examine, as briefly as I can, Mr. Hobson's statements in this passage, which certainly deserve attention. One may perhaps observe that the passage begins with a misstatement. Mr. Rhodes's first public post was not that of Deputy-Commissioner in Bechuanaland in 1884-5. Mr. Hobson, I suppose, is unaware that Mr. Rhodes, when he became Deputy-Commissioner in 1884, had already occupied the following posts—a Commissionership for the Compensation of Loyal Natives in Basutoland, 1882; a Commissionership on the Northern Boundaries of Griqualand West, 1882-3, in which capacity he obtained the offer of the key of South Africa for the Cape Colony through the chief Mankoroane and the Stellalanders, and proposed annexation in an important speech in the Cape House, July 18, 1883, a proposal which would have given the reversion of the North to the British Empire, had it not been rejected



by the Cape House, Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond holding that the Transvaal Republic was to have the North, and the rest of the House being blind to the importance of the territory. Mr. Rhodes had also, earlier in the year, been Treasurer-General in Mr. Scanlan's Government. Moreover, at the time when Mr. Rhodes agreed to represent the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland at the request of the High Commissioner, who found Mr. Rhodes's policy exactly in harmony with his own, Mr. Rhodes had already made himself the leading, though not the sole exponent of the policy of Imperial expansion in the North through the Cape Colony. He was well known already as a strong Imperialist, who had the year before boldly taken Mr. Hofmeyr to task in the Cape House for his belief in an independent South Africa, 'A United States of South Africa under its own flag,' in other words, a Dutch Republican Confederation, while Mr. Rhodes had at the same time declared his own uncompromising belief in the establishment of 'a United States of South Africa as a portion of the British Empire.'

The speech which Mr. Hobson advances in support of his astonishing assertion that Mr. Rhodes, the untiring advocate of Imperial expansion, was a supporter of the Transvaal's ambitions in Bechuanaland was made before, not (as Mr. Hobson seems to think) after Mr. Rhodes went up as Deputy-

Commissioner for Sir Hercules Robinson, and instead of supporting Mr. Hobson's assertion that 'he (Mr. Rhodes) threw all the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal and against the Imperial authority,' the speech absolutely contradicts it. I hasten to explain, I mean the speech as fully reported in the *Cape Argus* (July 16, 1884), not the extract of the speech designed by deliberate omissions to support Mr. Hobson's assertion. The purpose for which the speech was made would, if it had been stated, have at once overthrown this gross misrepresentation. The speech was made in support of Mr. Upington's motion in the Cape House to take action for the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape. It was Mr. Rhodes's last urgent appeal to the House to annex Bechuanaland, an appeal which he had made in vain the year before. It was the appeal of an advocate of Imperial expansion through the Colony, a believer in the fitness of the man on the spot to carry on Imperial expansion rather than the man at Downing Street, and this appeal addressed to a house largely composed of Dutch members, who were supporters of the Transvaal's claim to the territory, was based in part on the danger of the Imperial Government dealing with the question directly, and a war ensuing between the Empire and the Transvaal. This danger to the Transvaal might be prevented (Mr. Rhodes urged) if the Cape

annexed Bechuanaland, an annexation which Mr. Rhodes hoped to carry out by an amicable arrangement with the Transvaal; for at this time (July) he had not yet gone up as Deputy-Commissioner and discovered (as he did before the end of August) that President Kruger and General Joubert were the wire-pullers behind the raiders of Rooi-Grond, and were bent on acquiring through them the road to the North. When Mr. Rhodes made this discovery he at once set to work to bring in the Imperial factor, being quite willing to use force, when peaceful negotiations had failed, and the expansion of the Empire was in danger.

The significance of Mr. Hobson's extract of the speech lies in his omissions. This is his extract, to which from want of space I am unable, as I intended, to add the full report. His extract is taken from the *Cape Argus* report, July 16, 1884 :—

Mr. Rhodes said :—He proposed (last year) to the House to enter into negotiations in connection with this territory, and he warned the House that he feared the Imperial factor would be introduced into the question before long, and with the chance of a recurrence of the unfortunate affairs which he had seen in this country. . . . The House and the country was at this moment plunged into what he then foresaw—that if we did not move in this question of Bechuanaland in connection with the Transvaal Government, the Imperial Government would interfere, and possibly the interference of the Imperial Government might lead to a repetition of those unfortunate occurrences which they had had in connec-

tion with the Transvaal. . . . They were running the risk at any moment of a collision (*between the Imperial Government and*) with the Transvaal. It might be said that he was one of Imperial instincts, but he could ask those members of the House who were present last year to support him, for he said then that we must not have the Imperial Factor in Bechuanaland. He implored the House then to pass a resolution for acting in conjunction with the Transvaal, and he said that if they did not pass it they would regret it. He said once more to them that they must act. . . . They should at once negotiate with the Imperial Government, and with the people of the Transvaal, and first and foremost they should (*try and*) remove the Imperial factor from the situation. He believed that if they did not, there was on the border of the Transvaal great danger for South Africa.

I will now take from the same report a few of the sentences omitted by Mr. Hobson, and I ask whether they do not absolutely prove the falseness of his statement that Mr. Rhodes 'threw all the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal.' These are Mr. Rhodes's arguments to stir the self-interest of the colonists in favour of Imperial annexation through the Cape, and against annexation by the Transvaal. 'Was this House prepared to say, after the debt we had incurred, that we should allow these republics to form a wall across our trade route?' Again, 'Were we to allow a neighbouring state (*i.e.* the Transvaal) to acquire the whole of the interior.' 'Bechuanaland was the neck of the whole territories up to the Zambesi, and

we must secure it, unless we were prepared to see the whole of the North pass out of our hands, and our railway system to be shut in at Kimberley.' 'He did not want to part with the keys of the interior, leaving us settled just on this small peninsula. He wanted the Cape Colony to be able to deal with the question [of the union of South Africa—ED.] as the prominent and dominant state in South Africa.' All these passages are among Mr. Hobson's omissions, and they are enough alone, not only to dispose of his assertion that Mr. Rhodes 'threw the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal,' but to show the deliberate nature of the misrepresentation. The question now is not 'Is Mr. Hobson ignorant of South African history?' but 'Is he possessed of common honesty?' Of course the evidence is, if possible, stronger against Mr. Hobson when one remembers that this is only one of several of Mr. Rhodes's speeches, all strongly urging Imperial expansion through the Colony. The history of the Bechuanaland question will be found in Chapters iv. and v. of this book, where Mr. Rhodes's dispute with General Warren, in which he was supported by the High Commissioner, is fully explained. Briefly, it was his devotion to the honour and pledged word of the Empire which was the cause of that dispute. It may be added that in the debate on Bechuanaland annexation, in which the speech quoted by Mr.

Hobson was made, Mr. Hofmeyr and the Transvaal party poured cold water on the idea of annexation, while ardent Imperialists like Mr. Leonard strongly supported the annexation advocated by Mr. Rhodes.

Did space permit, Mr. Hobson's ridiculous theory that Imperialism has been the instrument of Capitalism in South Africa, and has made the war—really made by the corrupt Kruger clique at Pretoria—might be easily demolished. The truth is exactly the reverse. The leading representative of Imperialism, Mr. Rhodes, has used his capitalist friends to assist him in carrying out Imperial expansion, and Capitalism has been the instrument of Imperialism in South Africa for the last decade. Does any one suppose that Mr. Beit, for example, whose interests are centred in the Rand, guaranteed half a million last year for any other purpose than the satisfaction of helping his lifelong friend's ambition to carry his Rhodesia railway to Tanganyika on its way to the Nile?

A few extracts from Mr Rhodes's speeches may, at this point, be admitted to show the fervent and consistent Imperialism, which has been the mainspring of his action from the day, some twenty-two years ago, when, moving his hand over the map at Kimberley from Cape Colony to Egypt, he declared his purpose: 'All that English; that's my dream,' and which has directed his policy since then throughout his public life—an Imperialism the nature of which can be

known by its fruits in the devotion to the Empire which has inspired the grand resistance of Mafeking, largely due to Mr. Rhodes's young men from Bulawayo, and the successful defence of Kimberley, mainly carried on by the citizen soldiers of De Beers, encouraged by Mr. Rhodes's personal influence, and fired by the daring of the heroic Rhodesian, Major Scott-Turner.

(1) 'I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire.'—Speech in Cape House, *July 18, 1883*.

(2) 'I think all would recognise that I am an Englishman, and that my strongest feeling is loyalty to my own country.'—Speech in Cape House, *June 30, 1885*.

(3) 'The hon. member for Stellenbosch (Mr. Hofmeyr, the advocate of an independent South Africa under its own flag) has no bait that can tempt me.'—Speech in Cape House, *June 23, 1887*.

(4) 'We must endeavour to make those who live with us feel that there is no race distinction between us; whether Dutch or English, we are combined in one object, and that is the union of the States of South Africa, without abandoning the Imperial tie.'—Barkly West, *Sept. 28, 1888*.

(5) 'I know myself I am not prepared at any time to forfeit my flag. . . . If I forfeit my flag, what have I left? If you take away my flag, you take away everything.'—Kimberley, *Sept. 6, 1890*.

(6) 'Well, we have made mistakes in the past in reference to the neighbouring states, and if I had my will I would abolish that system of independent states, antagonistic to ourselves, south of the Zambesi.'—Kimberley, *March 20, 1891*.

(7) 'He (Mr. Borckenhagen) said, "Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa," and I said, "So do I." "Yes," I said, "I am with you entirely; we must have a united South Africa." He said, "There is nothing in the way," and I said, "No, there is nothing in the way." "Well," I said, "we are one." "Yes," he said, "and I will tell you, we will take you as our leader." He said, "There is only one small thing; we must, of course, be independent of the rest of the world." I said, "No; you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to forfeit all my history and my traditions, and I would be a fool, because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by yours." . . . That was the overpowering thought in his mind, an independent South Africa. . . . But it is an impossible thought, an impracticable thought. It is only a fool that would indulge in it now. . . . The only chance of union is the overshadowing protection of a supreme power. Any German, Frenchman, or Russian would tell you that the best and most liberal Power in the world is that over which Her Majesty reigns.'—Cape Town, *March* 12, 1898.

I have said that the hope for the future lies in the ending once for all of the impossible idea of Dutch Supremacy. I may add that the fusion of the races will be aided by a generous attitude on the part of the victors, an ungrudging recognition of the magnificent fighting and generalship of the Dutch in their misguided struggle for a lost cause. The memories of many a hard-fought battle, where Englishmen and Dutchmen have learned to respect and admire their antagonists, will help to weld them together into one united people, as has been seen in the case of the great struggle between the North and the South in



America. The loyal Boers of the future may feel somewhat the same pride in the achievements of Joubert and Botha, as loyal Scotsmen take to-day in the deeds of Wallace and Bruce; and the Empire will rejoice in the national feeling and the warlike renown of one more of the many races united in fervent loyalty under the Imperial flag. This generous attitude has been always Mr. Rhodes's attitude to antagonists; for instance, to his great rival, President Kruger—*e.g.*: 'It was at that time I began to acquire my admiration for the man who was then ruling the Transvaal, for had he not conceived the noble scheme, from his point of view, of seizing the interior and stretching his Republic across to Walfisch Bay?'

Admit that the Dutchman, though he underestimated our power when he staked his independence against our supremacy, has played the war-game bravely and skilfully (if also with occasional forgetfulness of such rules as that, of the white flag), and he is too good a sportsman to nourish a grudge because he has to pay his stake.

To those who still assert that the Transvaal's preparations for war were defensive and began with the Jameson Raid, I may point out that as far back as 1889 President Kruger was continually urging on the burghers the necessity of preparedness for war, and it was perfectly well understood against whom alone that preparedness was directed, though

loyal South Africans then regarded the idea as mere 'bluff.' The *Cape Argus* of March 9, 1889, notes the fact: 'There has not for some time been a public occasion of meeting the burghers in the Transvaal, on which President Kruger has not said something about preparedness for war.' It is now plain that over ten years ago President Kruger was gradually educating burgher opinion for the attempt to expel the British flag from South Africa, which was made somewhat prematurely, though with astonishing resources and ability, in 1899.

In dealing with Mr. Hobson's attack on Mr. Rhodes I have dealt with a typical case of gross misrepresentation. Mr. Rhodes, in his careless contempt for such attacks, leaves them unanswered, when, and this is very rarely, he knows of their existence. The frequent repetition of these misrepresentations cannot fail to influence the general public, and I shall therefore deal rather somewhat fully with the chief of them. As an instance of the parrot-like repetition of the charge of disloyalty made against the greatest Imperialist of his time, one has only to look at the *National Review* for April 1900, where 'Coloniensis' appropriates, without any acknowledgment, one of Mr. Hobson's weapons, the garbled extract of the speech in the Cape House (July 1884), the gross dishonesty of which I have exposed, and repeats some of Mr. Hobson's charges.

It is amusing to observe that 'Coloniensis' so exactly adopts all Mr. Hobson's deliberate omissions, that it is evident he has taken the extract of the speech directly from Mr. Hobson's article, not from the original report. The points of attack are that Mr. Rhodes wished to remove the Imperial Factor from Bechuanaland, and that he gave '£10,000 to Irish rebels'—that is, of course, to Mr. Parnell. Now this charge of desiring to remove or eliminate the Imperial Factor from Bechuanaland, which I have explained to bear beyond question the perfectly innocent meaning that Mr. Rhodes desired to carry on Imperial expansion through the Cape Colony, not through Downing Street, is so often advanced, that it may be worth while to point out who is the author of an intensified version of the much misrepresented and, apparently, misunderstood phrase.

If such a statement as 'the idea of the permanent presence of the Imperial Factor in the interior is simply an absurdity' were to be found in any of Mr. Rhodes's speeches, one can fancy with what delight it would be pounced on by Mr. Hobson, by 'Coloniensis,' and by Mr. Hobson's weekly organ, the *Speaker*, and what an indictment they would frame of black disloyalty against the traitor to the Empire who uttered it. The words, however, were spoken by a man whose loyalty even these critics will hardly question, Her Majesty's Governor and High Commissioner at

the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson. Sir Hercules Robinson, in his farewell speech at the great banquet given to him at Cape Town (April 27, 1889), described with admirable lucidity the political situation in South Africa. 'There are three competing influences at work in South Africa. They are: Colonialism, Republicanism, and Imperialism. As to the last it is a diminishing quantity, there being now no permanent place in South Africa for Imperial control on a large scale. With responsible government in the Cape, and Natal soon likely to attain that status, with the Independent Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and with Germany on the west coast, and Portugal on the east, *the idea of the permanent presence of the Imperial Factor in the interior, of a South African India in the Kalahari, is simply an absurdity.*' (The italics are mine.) That is to say, Her Majesty's Governor and High Commissioner ridiculed the idea of direct control by Downing Street over the interior of South Africa, which is exactly what Mr. Rhodes opposed in his speech in 1883 advocating the annexation of Bechuanaland by the Cape Colony: 'We want to get rid of the Imperial Factor in this question,' etc. The Imperial Factor is by Sir Hercules Robinson taken to be direct Imperial rule, and is so explained by Mr. Rhodes in a speech of June 23, 1887, which I give in full in its proper place. Sir Hercules Robinson continues: 'There being, as I

have shown, no longer any permanent place in South Africa for direct Imperial rule, 'it is to be viewed 'simply as an aid to colonial expansion.' Sir Hercules believed in and supported Colonialism, that is, the expansion of the Empire, and its development through the men on the spot, the colonists, and this was and is Mr. Rhodes's view, with which the loyal colonists of Australia and Canada, as well as South Africa, would be found in complete agreement. All our difficulties in South Africa have come from the blunders of Downing Street, its ignorance and vacillation, its disregard for the loyal colonial sentiment and the larger colonial knowledge. Colonialism is, in short, the firm foundation of our Empire, and the ardent loyalty and splendid courage and capacity of the colonial members of the Empire will scarcely be questioned with the proofs before our eyes in the present war. The colonists are our staunchest Imperialists ; and, as such, must often oppose the too frequent feebleness and muddling of Downing Street—that is, of the Imperial Factor—which has repeatedly sacrificed Imperial interests to party considerations. Like all our colonists, Mr. Rhodes, himself a colonist, is as staunch an upholder of local self-government, of the capacity and the right of the man on the spot to decide on colonial questions, as he is a loyal upholder of the Empire.

And now a word as to the other charge so often

repeated against Mr. Rhodes. 'Those,' says 'Colonien-sis,' 'who still believe implicitly in Mr. Rhodes's good faith, should not forget his subsidy of £10,000 to the Irish rebels.' The whole story of the gift of £10,000 offered and paid by Mr. Rhodes to Parnell in 1888 is given in full, with copies of the original letters, as Appendix iv. of this book. I will content myself here by pointing out briefly the conditions required by Mr. Rhodes and the terms agreed to by Parnell. Mr. Rhodes's conditions were Parnell's support of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster in any future Home Rule Bill, and the support, or, at any rate, acceptance of a clause giving to the Colonies permissive representation at Westminster in numbers proportional to their contribution to Imperial expenditure. The first condition was, it may be remembered, the very crux of the struggle over the Home Rule Bill of 1886 between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Gladstone, of course, being for the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster, or, as Mr. Rhodes once plainly told him, for creating 'a taxed Republic,' Mr. Chamberlain being resolute in insisting on the retention of the Irish members, as a safeguard against separation, on which point he left the Gladstone Ministry. Mr. Rhodes furthermore desired a reduced Irish representation at Westminster, that is, a representation proportionate to Ireland's contribution for Imperial purposes; but Parnell

refused to admit this principle unless he first got all he asked, including constabulary and<sup>1</sup> judiciary, in which case he would have been willing to accept it. Mr. Rhodes's aim in helping Parnell with a gift of £10,000 was, as his letters and the conditions he made plainly prove, the furtherance of Imperial Federation. The retention of the Irish members at Westminster, with a local Parliament at Dublin, would be, Mr. Rhodes saw, the beginning of a workable scheme of Imperial Federation. Local questions would be dealt with at Dublin, Imperial at Westminster. The permissive clause asked for by Mr. Rhodes in the Home Rule Bill would allow any colony to send representatives to Westminster in proportion to its contribution to Imperial purposes, that is, Army, Navy, and Diplomatic; and Mr. Rhodes considered that the Irish representation ought to be calculated in the same way, and to be in proportion to Ireland's Imperial contribution. Lord Rosebery, now the one great Liberal statesman left in England, had already at that time (1888) proposed, in a speech at Inverness, a reduced Irish representation at Westminster, to be based upon the amount of the Irish contribution to the Imperial revenue. This demand of Mr. Rhodes, that Irish representation should be proportionate to Ireland's Imperial contribution,<sup>1</sup> was omitted at Parnell's request

<sup>1</sup> The omissions will be found in brackets in the copies of the letters in the Appendix.

from the letter ; which Mr. Rhodes followed up with a definite offer of £10,000. A draft of the letter in which the offer was eventually made was submitted to Parnell and his omissions accepted. This was after Mr. Rhodes had met the Irish leader and talked over his views. Parnell would not agree himself to insert the clause for permissive colonial representation at Westminster, but promised that if any one in Committee would propose a permissive clause for colonial representation in proportion to Imperial contribution he would accept it. Parnell wrote to Mr. Rhodes, three months after his visit to Hawarden in November 1889, to say that Gladstone had come round to the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, but intended to reduce the numbers, a reduction which was almost exactly Mr. Rhodes's original proposal to Parnell, and was very much the same as Lord Rosebery's still earlier suggestion in his speech at Inverness. And so one finds at last, when the history of the gift of £10,000 to Parnell is mastered, and the reasons for it understood, that so far from showing disloyalty, that gift is a fresh proof of that far-sighted devotion to the Empire which is the distinguishing characteristic of Mr. Rhodes's statesmanship ; for he has been always ready to lavish time, thought, and money on the advancement of Imperial interests, and always keenly watchful to find, in the most unexpected directions, fresh opportunities for such service.



One more instance of misrepresentation, based on a curious misunderstanding of Mr. Rhodes's somewhat careless use of the coin of current colloquialism. In a speech to the Chartered Company in 1892 Mr. Rhodes said 'The line to Egypt, provided that the Mahdi is "squared," will cost,' etc., and 'I do not propose to fight the Mahdi, but to "deal" with him. I have never met any one in my life whom it was not as easy to deal with as to fight.' This has been actually taken to mean that Mr. Rhodes proposed to buy the Mahdi, and that he boasted that he could buy any one. Such an interpretation is obviously ridiculous. There was no idea of bribery or corruption in dealing with the Mahdi or any one else. The passage really sets forth one of Mr. Rhodes's strongest convictions, gained in the experience of a life of active work, that people, however keen their antagonism, could generally arrange their disputes peacefully if they were to meet and discuss them. His idea is that most of the conflicts between man and man, or nation and nation, might be brought to a peaceful termination if only the opponents were to meet. Thus he pointed out in a speech in 1898 that the true solution of the Transvaal difficulty was for him and President Kruger to meet and arrange matters peaceably by mutual concessions. The most notable instance of his faith in this principle is the famous Council with the Matabele chiefs, when he succeeded in 'dealing' with

the leaders of the rebel host, instead of fighting them, and in a few hours arranged terms which brought a terrible and costly war to a peaceful conclusion, and saved thousands of lives. Mr. Rhodes's method of dealing with the native chiefs is his method in every conflict, and is so often successful because he is always reasonable, is ready to make concessions, and does not insist on having everything his own way, because, in short, he has the rare gift of imagination by which he sees things from his opponents' point of view as well as from his own.

Before leaving this question of misrepresentation one would like to point out the latest and most laughable instance by asking the *Speaker* first for the evidence of its remarkable discovery of 'Mr. Rhodes's saying that "every man has his price,"' a saying which I have heard ascribed to somewhat earlier authorship. One would like next to ask the *Speaker* for the name of the lady journalist who 'was cleverly taken with him to depict a conference with the Matabele chiefs,' and 'whose description was telegraphed all over Europe.' Can the *Speaker* have made the tremendous discovery that one of Mr. Rhodes's three companions at the celebrated conference was a lady. We suppose the *Speaker* does not make this soft impeachment against Dr. Hans Sauer or Mr. Colenbrander. There remains Captain Stent, the actual writer of the report. Captain Stent is, I

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believe, at Mafeking with Baden - Powell, from whom the *Speaker* might ascertain the correctness or otherwise of this remarkable revelation, which bears a family resemblance to all the *Speaker's* facts.

## ERRATA

*Read throughout* Scanlen *for* Scanlan, *and* Barkly West *for* Barkley West.

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THE POLITICAL LIFE AND SPEECHES OF  
THE RIGHT HON. CECIL RHODES



# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTORY

A BRIEF sketch of the early years of the statesman whose speeches are collected in this book, up to the date at which he entered on his political work, will prepare readers for a better understanding of that work by revealing the unchanging purpose which has inspired it ever since it began. Moreover, the present absorbing interest in our South African Empire makes all Englishmen anxious to know anything that concerns the man to whom chiefly we owe its possession and development.

Some account of the origin of the Rhodes family may be admitted here, for the view that Mr. Cecil Rhodes's solid business ability and strong taste for farming and the country life are inherited from an ancestry of graziers and successful business men of the eighteenth century will be found to have not a little foundation. An ancestor of the family, William Rhodes, came to London early in the eighteenth century, and settled near the Gray's Inn Road as a farmer and grazier. The farm included the estate of the Foundling Hospital and the neighbouring squares, and apparently the Regent's Park. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, Samuel Rhodes, the representative of the family at that time, bought suitable land and established a very successful brickfields business, which under his sons became the foremost

in the trade. A part of Samuel Rhodes's estate, a property at Dalston, still belongs to the Rhodes family, and is held as to three-quarters by Mr. Cecil Rhodes.

One of Samuel's sons, Thomas, is now represented by Mr. William Rhodes, of West Haddon Hall, Northamptonshire. Another son, William, settled at Leyton Grange in Essex, bought a good deal of property, and was succeeded by his son, the late Rev. F. W. Rhodes, formerly Vicar of Bishop's Stortford, who by his second wife, one of the Peacocks of Sleaford, Lincolnshire, became the father of the South African statesman. This account of the Rhodes family is taken from the researches made and published by Mr. G. H. Sawtell.

Cecil Rhodes was born on the 7th of July 1853 (the year—in South African chronology—after the signing of the Sand River Convention established the independence of the Transvaal, the year before the independence of the Orange River Free State was recognised), the fourth son of the Rev. F. W. Rhodes, Vicar of Bishop's Stortford. He was one of seven brothers, all of whom have served the Empire as soldiers or colonists. Four are soldiers, and of these Colonel Frank Rhodes, D.S.O., who has seen much active service in Egypt and the Soudan, is the best known; while Major Elmhirst Rhodes, D.S.O., has followed closely in his elder brother's steps. One of the three civilians, Herbert, with whom his younger brother Cecil was associated in Natal and on the diamond fields, died early, accidentally burned in his hut in 1877 while elephant-hunting in the neighbourhood of the Shiré River. Cecil Rhodes's schooldays began as a day-boy at Bishop's Stortford Grammar School in 1861, and

ended in 1869. He was fond of athletics and a hard-working and fairly successful scholar, winning numerous prizes in classics, mathematics, divinity, and French; a first-class at the Cambridge junior examination, and finally, in 1869, a senior classical scholarship. A love of thoroughness in anything he took in hand, a capacity for steady work, distinguished his schooldays; but he had not yet found an object in life to which to devote himself, or yet chosen a profession, when, in September 1870, he reached Durban, on his way to his brother Herbert, who was working a cotton-plantation in Natal.

In 1871 Cecil followed Herbert from Natal to the Diamond Fields, and settled with him at the dry diggings at Colesberg Kopje, now known as Kimberley, then in the earliest stage of their existence.

In 1873 Cecil returned to England and matriculated in October at Oriel College, Oxford; but a chill caught after rowing settled on his lungs, and so swift was the progress of the disease, that the best medical opinion did not give him more than a year to live, even with the advantage of residence in the climate of South Africa, to which he went back in 1874, apparently a doomed man.

At Kimberley, however, in the clear, dry, rainless air of the veldt, Cecil Rhodes's health gradually became completely re-established, and there he remained, working hard as a diamond digger, at first in partnership with his brother; afterwards, when Herbert Rhodes quitted the diamond fields for the more adventurous life of a hunter in the far north, in partnership with Mr. C. D. Rudd, an old Harrovian, who, like his friend, had come out to South Africa for his health, owing to a breakdown, the result of over-training at Cambridge. The two young under-

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graduates formed a close friendship and carried out together numerous financial enterprises in addition to their regular work on the claim. At one time they made money by contracts to pump out the De Beers mine; at another they set up an ice-making machine, which met an unsupplied demand in that thirsty mining camp, with its eight months in the twelve of blinding sunshine and drought.

From the small beginnings of a share in a single claim Cecil Rhodes gradually extended his operations and built up the foundations of a fortune. A rare faculty for finance, great powers of concentration, with untiring application to business, were soon known to be characteristics of the young Englishman. Men who saw much of him in those early days in the rough camp-life of the diamond fields noticed his business ability, his industry and perseverance, but noticed nothing else except a certain eccentricity, a habit of silent thinking or dreaming, not often found in combination with successful application to money-making.

Thus for years the outward life of Cecil Rhodes went on at Kimberley. At first he seemed to live only to superintend his Kaffir labourers as they hauled up in buckets the diamond-bearing blue ground, beat it into gravel, and sorted the gravel in sieves; or only himself to pick out with keen-eyed watchfulness the diamonds from the gravel at a table in the open air. Then when the old limit of a single claim was extended in 1874, to permit the possession of ten, and afterwards abolished, the hard-working diamond digger seemed to have no other object but to become (as he soon did) the ablest speculator in claims at the diamond fields. But all the time, unnoted by the little world of men around, the inner life of thought

went on, the slowly working, massive intellect planning the future amalgamation of the mines which with the establishment of the great monopoly was only to be accomplished after above fifteen years of arduous and persevering labour, in 1888. Of the success of his great financial achievement he never had any doubt; he saw the end from the beginning, and felt in himself the power to bring it about; but big as the scheme was, it was not the main subject of his long and solitary meditations.

Coming to many ways in the wanderings of thought,<sup>1</sup> he gradually found the path of destiny for himself—the extension of the British Empire, and all that higher civilisation which the Empire means, over the last unoccupied continent in the world. The extraordinary far-sightedness which has made him so successful in finance, so invariably justified in the long-run as to enterprises apparently most Utopian, was a main factor in his discovery of a purpose in life sufficiently big to occupy his powers, and sufficiently practical to satisfy his sound common-sense. Looking on to the future, and seeing himself at last a millionaire, conscious of his strength in finance and confident of his ultimate success, he saw that to him at any rate the mere possession of wealth was not in itself a good at all. Luxury, ease, and the reputation of wealth he valued, as he does now, at nothing; but he saw clearly that while money as an end in life was not worth labouring for, yet money as an instrument was supremely well worth getting, being the true lever of Archimedes to move the modern world. The millions he saw himself in a fair way to making became important as he found an object of real and permanent value on which to employ them. When once he had

<sup>1</sup> 'Πολλὰς δ' ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνους.'—*Æd. Tyr.*



found this purpose in life for himself, money-making became no longer a fascinating exercise of ability for the mere enjoyment of overcoming difficulties and attaining success, but a necessary step on the upward way that conducted him to an end he felt to be worth striving for with all his powers, and at the same time felt would demand his best exertions to attain.

That Mr. Rhodes keenly enjoyed the struggle for success in money-making, in the days when he had not yet found scope for his immense energies in political life, is indicated in one of those little unconscious passages of self-revelation which now and then slip into the utterances of one who generally avoids personal reminiscences. At the Annual Meeting of the De Beers Mines (1896), he observed: 'The only trouble with regard to the industry is that it is becoming a matter of course and uninteresting. It goes like clockwork. There is an element of certainty there was not in the past; but I will admit that to my mind it has not the interest it had in the past, when one had to use one's mind and brain.'

The enjoyment of the struggle for itself changed, as the ideas of expansion to the north, and of the subsequent federation of all the states in a united British South Africa, developed, till it became a conscious effort to secure financial success and financial influence, simply as a means to the end he had set before himself. The money he had valued so lightly in itself thus became absolutely invaluable as an engine to bring to its hoped-for terminus his scheme of empire-making. As he remarked years after to General Gordon in 1882, 'It is no use to have big ideas, unless we have got pounds, shillings, and pence to carry them out.'

Thus the great idea of extending our Empire in

Africa, of taking first all the territory possible, and then developing in it a British civilisation, under the British flag and British institutions, became the chosen life-work of the young English adventurer, grew with his growth and influence, and ennobled a struggle for wealth, in which self was forgotten, and everything made subservient to the gradual preparation for the practical carrying out of the occupation of the vast unclaimed interior. Mr. Rhodes describes his aim in his own plain way : ' Having read the histories of other countries, I saw that expansion was everything, and that the world's surface being limited, the great object of present humanity should be to take as much of the world as it possibly could.' Considering the British Empire the vanguard of human progress, Mr. Rhodes had no difficulty in deciding that the best thing that could befall a territory, in the interests of humanity as well as of the English race, was that it should come under the British flag, and he might contend, with a great deal of reason, that to paint as much of the map red as he could was, from a practical point of view, the truest philanthropy, a view which the natives, who can compare British rule with Belgian, French, Boer, or German tyranny, would unanimously endorse. That Mr. Rhodes very early began to arrange his financial schemes so as to contribute to the future support of his plan of Imperial expansion is evidenced by the way he changed the Trust-Deed of the great mining corporation De Beers, so as to gain power to employ its money and its influence in the acquisition and development of the Empire he intended to secure for England in the unclaimed north.

Over twenty one years have passed since Mr. Rhodes, a young man of five-and-twenty, unknown

beyond the circle of the mining-camp at Kimberley, met a young and brilliant Scotsman, a doctor who had studied in London, and carried all before him at University College Hospital and London University, and had come out as a partner to Dr. Prince of Kimberley, in search of health, like Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Rudd. The young Scotsman, Dr. Jameson, who had just arrived at Kimberley, quickly became one of the closest friends of the successful diamond digger, and it was not long before the isolated thinker began to unfold his dreams of Imperial expansion to sympathetic ears.

'From the day when I fell in with him at Kimberley,' says Dr. Jameson, 'we drew closely together. Then, and for years after, we lived like college chums in rooms opposite the club at Kimberley, took our meals together, and in long rides together exchanged our views on men and things.' This simple life, as simple and inexpensive as that of a hard-working student in college rooms, was the chosen life for years of this wealthy mine-owner, who cared nothing for luxury or for appearances, wore an old coat, spent nothing on himself, and heaped up wealth only for the future realisation of his Imperial idea. Mr. Rhodes was about the same age as his friend, and Dr. Jameson remembers well the wonder and admiration which he felt, when introduced to the South Africa of the future, as it was to be according to the shaping imagination of this daring young political dreamer, who avowed that his purpose in life was nothing less than himself to carry out a vast expansion of our Empire and our civilisation that as yet existed only in his busy brain. Attracted by the magnetic personality of this strangest of diamond diggers, and dazzled by the magnificence and the completeness of

his plans, Dr. Jameson ended by believing in the feasibility of schemes which would have seemed to older and more experienced men the merest day-dreaming. The whole northern policy, which has since become history, was then mapped out by young Rhodes's glowing imagination, and the strong, self-reliant Anglo-Saxon was just as certain that he would successfully carry out his plans, as if they were already on the very verge of accomplishment.

Though he had studied books as well as men, it was not from books, but actual life, that his views were derived; he had thought out his conclusions independently, and his continual success in every financial enterprise he undertook, increased his confidence in his own strength, and his conviction that, whatever he set before him to do, that he would be able to accomplish. He had proved himself so far an undefeated man of affairs, and he never questioned his own ability to give his big ideas their proper expression in action. His policy, then, as thus revealed to Dr. Jameson in 1878, was to occupy the Hinterland of the Cape, and all the territory he could beyond, and to do this through the Cape Colony, and thus gradually to effect the occupation of the northern empire, and afterwards the unification, through it, of South Africa, which he saw in the future one great people possessed of full self-government, yet united to our other colonies as a loyal member of one vast Imperial Federation.

He was perfectly aware, says Dr. Jameson, that he would have to win over the Cape Dutch, and he used to say that he recognised the conditions of the problem, and was willing to make all needful concessions. 'I mean to have the whole unmarked country north of the Colony for England, and I know

I can get it and develop it at present only by the co-operation of the Cape Dutch colonists, and I am perfectly willing to pay the price.' Mr. Rhodes was then, as he always has been, an optimist and a Progressive, and the price he knew he should have to pay was patient endurance of, and large concessions to, an unenlightened Dutch conservatism; to which it would have been perilous in the extreme to reveal the far-reaching nature of his aims till he had gradually educated them to trust his judgment and accept his policy, as if it were their own.

Mr. Rhodes had already at the time Dr. Jameson met him (1878) acquired an invaluable education in the knowledge of men, and how to deal with men of all nationalities, in the rough school of the mining-camp; but though this Kimberley education was still going on, he had found time to supplement it with the more orthodox, though far less valuable, education of English university life. By 1878 Cecil Rhodes, who had had to save his life by exchanging Oxford for Kimberley in 1872, had returned to Oriel College, and was some way advanced in the keeping of terms and passing of examinations necessary to enable him to take his degree.

It is characteristic of Mr. Rhodes that he should have faced all the difficulties and disadvantages of leaving his work at Kimberley and going back to Oxford, a hard-headed and successful man of the world, who had emerged triumphant from the struggle with the keenest business brains, Jewish or Teutonic, and of submitting to the discipline of the university, which to his big, unconventional nature must have been irksome enough. For such a man to mix with raw lads fresh from school, possessed perhaps of knowledge of books, but the merest tiros in the warfare of

life, was sufficiently unattractive ; nor was the patient study of the appointed books a very palatable task for the strong, independent thinker, accustomed directly to study life, and form his opinions for himself. Furthermore, the time that he gave to keep his terms at Oxford was a specially high price to pay for one who had developed in his years of solitary thought at the diamond fields a deep and abiding sense of the shortness of life, and of the difficulty of carrying big ideas to a successful conclusion in the few years of man's brief existence on earth.

But from the time he set before him his life-work of duty to the Empire Mr. Rhodes never looked back. 'Ohne Hast ohne Rast' was his practice, though he knew nothing of Goethe's words. Whatever price had to be paid of time and labour, as of money, he was ready to pay it, with the great end in view. He wished to know the best that had been thought and said in the world, and Oxford was a step in that direction. He kept his terms at Oxford, where he developed a taste for history, which has remained his favourite reading in after-life, and in the long vacation at Kimberley he read steadily in the intervals of his work on the diamond fields. Then it was (in 1877) that he met Charles Warren, when they travelled together for days in the post-cart to Kimberley, and the future General's curiosity was aroused by the silent absorption of the younger man in his Prayer Book, till, reserved as Warren was, he could not help asking what Rhodes was studying, and learned that it was the Thirty-nine Articles, which, with characteristic economy of time, Rhodes was steadily learning by heart for his next examination at Oxford, while the post-cart bumped slowly forward day by day over the endless veldt.

At Oxford Mr. Rhodes studied men as well as books, and made some close friends, of whom perhaps the most useful to him in his political career has been Mr. Rochfort Maguire, who has been closely associated with Mr. Rhodes in the prosecution of his schemes of Imperial expansion.

No doubt Mr. Rhodes's school-life helped to form his character, and Oxford had its influence, but it was in the university of the miniature world of the diamond fields, in the working out of the law of the survival of the fittest, that his real education was obtained; and he is himself an illustration of the truth of his favourite Gibbon's wise saying, 'Every one has two educations, one which he receives from others, and one, more important, which he gives himself.' At Kimberley he developed that habit of concentration on the work in hand which his sense of the shortness of life, and his possession of an object in life far bigger than mere personal ambition, has intensified till it has become an integral part of his personality, for to him at any rate Seneca's words do not apply, 'We complain that our days are few, and act as if there were no end of them.'

At Kimberley he dreamed his dream of empire to the north; at Kimberley he won the wealth and financial influence which made it possible to translate that dream into action; at Kimberley he made the friends whose co-operation has been so effectual in the building up of our Empire in South and Central Africa. There, at the diamond fields, he gained the ablest of lieutenants in Dr. Jameson, the future successful administrator of Rhodesia, the most trustworthy of fellow-workers in Mr. Rudd, and the most powerful and loyal of financial supporters in Mr. Alfred Beit, a member of an old Hamburg family,

then a diamond merchant in the firm of Porges and Co., now Wernher, Beit, and Co., who had settled at Kimberley in 1875.

Mr. Rhodes came out to South Africa young enough to be receptive of the influence of the Great Continent. South Africa took the grey-eyed, dreamy, delicate English lad into its confidence. There at Kimberley he received the impressions of one who lived on intimate terms with the spacious South African veldt, and the clear South African skies. The magnetism of the great Dark Continent, with its vast unknown interior, which had touched even world-worn warriors like Cambyzes and Napoleon, was brought to bear on him when young enough to feel its full influence, and he became a genuine South African, and thus gained that sympathy with, understanding of, and influence over Dutch as well as English South Africans, over natives as well as white men, which has given him his unique place as the maker of our Empire in South Africa, not only by occupying territory, but by conciliating and amalgamating the two white races, and teaching them (I do not forget the temporary difficulties of the present and the immediate past) that their common interests are served by their union under the conditions of British Empire, with perfect equality and fair-play for all, without difference of race, and with kindly and considerate paternal government and gradual education for the black man.

It is interesting to note that it is to Kimberley as the place where he learned to know South Africa, as well as the place from which his life-work has been done, that Mr. Rhodes instinctively returns at the critical periods in his career. It was to Kimberley he returned after the Jameson Raid, when his life-work



seemed wrecked, and it was to a crowd of Kimberley workmen at the station that he made, in that darkest hour, the famous fighting speech, summed up in one statement, 'My political life has only now begun.' And so, when President Kruger, in his ambition to establish a Dutch supremacy, appealed to the arbitrament of war, it was in Kimberley that Mr. Rhodes was found, encouraging and supporting the inhabitants by the example of his cheerful confidence in the future, and his deliberate and fearless participation in the dangers of the successful defence, of which in a very practical way he was himself one of the chief supports.

## CHAPTER II

## THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1881

MR. RHODES's political life began with his appearance in the Cape Legislative Assembly, where he made his first speech on April 19, 1881. The Crown Colony of Griqualand West, taken over by Sir Henry Barkly in 1871, under the cession from the chief Waterboer, and as a result of arbitration, had become an integral part of the Cape Colony only a short time before, in October 1880. Mr. Rhodes was elected as its first member by the rural constituency of Barkly West, not far from Kimberley, and he has held the seat ever since.

In order to understand the significance of much of the earlier period of Mr. Rhodes's political life, it is necessary to realise the situation in South Africa at the time when his political life began. His policy, which had been formed in long years of patient thought at Kimberley, has in its essentials remained the same up to the present day; but his attitude towards minor questions, as a man who came into politics with the big idea of making a South African empire and a South African nation, primarily by expansion, ultimately by unification, was necessarily conditioned by the circumstances in which he found himself.

A brief survey of those circumstances will assist towards the understanding of Mr. Rhodes's political

speeches and his political work, especially the very practical and important political work in which he was almost from the first actively engaged. Expansion was his first aim, and he saw that only by expansion which would give new territory to the British flag and a new British population, could he hope to bring about unification. The occupation of the interior, of what is now Bechuanaland and Rhodesia, was the line of least resistance along which he saw his way to reach the more distant goal of South African confederation.

Now, the difficulty of the expansion he had mapped out was this. It was to be effected through the Cape Colony, and the Dutch electorate in Cape Colony were in sympathy with the aims of the Transvaal. The interior was in their opinion the rightful heritage of the Transvaal, and the aims of the Transvaal were diametrically opposed to Mr. Rhodes's scheme of expansion and unification. They too aimed at a united South Africa, but it was to be Dutch and republican, whereas, from the first, Mr. Rhodes aimed at an extension of the Colony which would add a united South Africa, like a Canada and an Australia, to that union of states which composes the British Empire.

That the aim of the Transvaal has long been a united and independent South Africa there is ample evidence to prove, and that as early as 1881, when Mr. Rhodes was entering upon public life, it was the object of the insurgent Boers I shall now show.

A little before Mr. Rhodes's first speech in the Cape Parliament, that is to say, in February 1881, the Transvaal insurgents issued a solemn appeal to the Free State to throw in its lot with them. The Free State was, of course, independent, and it was asked to assist the Transvaal in securing independence for the whole of South Africa. The

appeal, which expressed the aims and is couched in the language of the Transvaal leader, Mr. Kruger, was addressed: 'To our companions and fellow-countrymen in the Orange Free State'; and the language of the appeal was this: 'Come and help us. Consider our case. God rules, and is with us. It is His will to unite us as a people, to make a united South Africa, free from British authority. The future brightens for us. His will be done.'

Here we have at this early date, a little before Majuba, the very same idea which, energised by experience of the weakness of Mr. Gladstone's Government and of the easy and uniform success of the Boer forces, was to be the guiding-star of President Kruger's political life; which was to direct his filibustering expeditions outside the confines of the Republic, and his repressive legislation to keep the Uitlanders in vassalage within. The same idea might be found not long after this time in some of the speeches of the great wire-puller Mr. Hofmeyr, who even then controlled the Dutch political organisation in the Cape Colony. It is interesting also to note that the opposition to the extension of the railway to Kimberley, the opposition later on to its extension northwards, the opposition to the Cape interfering in Bechuanaland, the opposition to any Imperial interference by sending up troops to overawe the Transvaal freebooters of Rooi-Grond, the opposition to any interference with President Kruger's raiders when they seized North Zululand, all came from the same circle of Cape Dutch politicians; and this opposition frequently found expression in the form of solemn warnings that there would be rebellion in the Colony, if President Kruger's advance was interfered with. Not to multiply evidence, one comes finally to the

last Cape election, fought by the same politicians in the Transvaal interest, and with the Transvaal secret service fund at their back, and the position of official neutrality, with individual disaffection, which has been taken up in the present war.

The idea, then, of a United Dutch South Africa free from the British Empire was alive and vigorous in 1881. How had this idea come into existence, and already become the warcry of the Transvaal in its appeal to the Free State? It may be safely said the idea is mainly one of the consequences of British misgovernment in the past, in its dealings with the colonists at the Cape.

The Cape came under British rule, firstly, by conquest, and secondly and finally, by a payment of six millions to the Dutch Government in 1814. The British Government at that time was in its colonies, as in Great Britain and Ireland, arbitrary and thoroughly unsympathetic. The Dutch Government had sufficiently exasperated the colonists by much misrule, but the British Government went further. Among other mismanagement, it over-hastily anglicised the system of local government and the law-courts, and changed the official language before there was any considerable influx of English colonists to justify the change. Then the Colonial Office upheld a missionary crusade on behalf of the black population and against the colonists, without giving a hearing to the latter. Unwise and ill-directed generosity to the black man was accompanied by the denial of common justice or protection to the white. Of course, this policy of sympathy with the natives, the outcome of humanitarian sentiment, would have been admirable if it had been directed by knowledge and discretion: the fault was, it was not so directed.

Years of misrule culminated in a most serious, practical confiscation of property. The Emancipation Act of 1833, which came into force at the Cape in December 1834, while in itself a just act, was carried out with the utmost injustice to the slave-owners. A million and a quarter was the sum awarded as compensation for over three millions'-worth of property. A financial crisis followed, and the widespread distress among the colonists was intensified by the ruinous arrangement that the compensation was not payable in cash at the Cape but in stock in London, where every claim had to be proved. A horde of agents poured in who bought up the claims at an enormous discount; so that colonists often received only a fifth of the value of their slaves. The Dutch colonists, not without reason, considered that a foreign government had robbed them of the bulk of their property, and the injustice and its results were never forgotten.

That was in 1834-5, and the latter year was not ended when Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, announced to the Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, that the sovereignty over the country between the Keiskamma and the Kei River must be abandoned. This territory had been very properly annexed by the Governor, as the necessary sequel to a successful repulse of an unprovoked and formidable Kaffir invasion in which the colonists had suffered severely. The reasons given for this surrender of territory to the Kaffirs bear a curious resemblance to those put forward to justify the surrender of the Transvaal in 1881. The territory was to be abandoned on high moral grounds, because the sovereignty rested 'upon a war in which justice was on the side of the conquered, not of the victorious party,' because 'the

Kosas had ample justification of the war in the conduct which was pursued towards them by the colonists and the public authorities.' This great mismanagement, following on the unprovoked savage invasion and the sufferings of the colonists by murder and rapine, was the climax. In vain the English settlers protested, in vain the British Governor remonstrated. The colonists found the Home Government the resolute encouragers and upholders of these savage foes, about whom, of course, they were completely misinformed.

Savagery it seemed was to be supported against civilisation. Life and property were in danger. There was only one way to escape from misrule—to leave the country; and the exodus into the interior of the Dutch colonists, known as the Great Trek, began. While the preparations were going on, the Governor pointed out that the only way to stop the exodus was persuasion and attention to the wants and necessities of the farmers. The man on the spot, however, was powerless before the man at Downing Street. The Governor was reproved, and afterwards dismissed. The whole unfortunate action of Lord Glenelg was the work of the Rev. Dr. Philip and the missionaries, who utterly misrepresented the facts in London. A political missionary has been ever since the pet aversion of the South African colonist.

The territories which are now the Free State and the Transvaal had been devastated and depopulated by Moselekatse and his Matabele hordes. Into this and the adjoining wilderness, a portion, of course, of the British sphere of influence, the Dutch colonists poured, taking their families and possessions with them. After great hardships the emigrants finally

defeated and drove out the Matabele from the vast region they had depopulated, and a section of them successfully grappled with, and, under Pretorius, finally overthrew the bloodthirsty Zulu power, and founded a republic in Natal. These heroic achievements of the men of the Great Trek had not, however, freed them from British interference. They were still, as they had been warned before the Trek, within the sphere of British influence. The missionary societies successfully urged the Government to intervene and protect the natives, as being under British protection; and Sir George Napier, the Cape Governor, sent up a force to the border, and finally took possession of Port Natal. Here the first encounter took place between Boer farmers and a few British soldiers, and the Boers were victorious. Fresh troops arrived, the farmers retired, and Natal became a part of the British Empire.

Every effort was made, by subsidising and supporting the native chiefs against the emigrants, to force them to return to the colony; but the policy proved ineffectual, and naturally deepened their hatred of British rule. In 1848 Sir Harry Smith annexed the vast territory south of the Vaal River under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. The emigrants rose in defence of their independence, but were defeated at Boomplaatz. A few years later the same Sir Harry Smith was obliged by the attitude of the Home Government to acknowledge the independence of the Transvaal Boers, in order to save the Orange River Sovereignty, threatened with their interference, and already hard pressed by the Basutos. This was effected by the Sand River Convention with Pretorius and the Transvaal delegates in 1852. This retrograde policy was followed by the abandon-



ment of the Orange River Sovereignty and the establishment of the Free State, in spite of the protests of the loyal inhabitants in 1854. The British Government were at this time and long after determined not to allow any extension of our Empire in South Africa, and the only important conditions imposed on the two Free States were the entire abandonment of slavery, a condition virtually broken from the first in the Transvaal, and freedom for missionaries and traders, a condition very ill observed by the same State.

At last the emigrant Boers had attained their purpose. Their one aim had been to be free from the British Government and its arbitrary rule, and live their own free life, with their curiously literal reading of the Old Testament to guide them in their somewhat severe dealings with the natives, as in everything. They had been long in attaining their purpose; for wherever they went the Government followed them, claiming them as British subjects, because claiming, as within the British sphere of influence, the territories they occupied. This treatment, and the memory of what they had suffered at the Cape, inspired a deep hatred of British rule, a hatred inherited by their children. President Kruger himself is a child of the Great Trek, and it is not difficult to understand why his feelings towards the British Empire resemble Hannibal's towards the Roman Republic.

The Transvaal Boers, at first divided into several rival republics, gradually amalgamated, after much disturbance and some civil war, into one community in 1864, but even after that time there was practically no settled government able to enforce the law. Born fighting men, they loved to exercise their talent, and

when there were no British or natives to engage, they kept it from rusting by exercising it among themselves. Mr. Kruger himself led a raid into the Free State at this period. Mr. Pretorius, forced to resign in 1872, owing to his acceptance of arbitration on the Transvaal claim to part of the Diamond Fields territory, was succeeded by Mr. Burgers, a Cape colonist, a Progressive in policy, and one of the first to advocate the then visionary idea of a United Dutch South Africa, free from British rule. Unsupported by his burghers in his schemes of development (which included a railway to Delagoa Bay), disliked for his latitudinarian views, assailed by the Doppers (or Dippers), the extreme Calvinists, who backed Mr. Paul Kruger, Mr. Burgers found himself unable to deal with the Kaffir chief Sikukuni, while Cetewayo and the Zulu power threatened an invasion. The state was practically bankrupt, and when Sir Theophilus Shepstone, sent up as British Commissioner to inquire into the condition of the Transvaal, proclaimed the annexation (acting on secret instructions he had previously received from Lord Carnarvon, whose hobby was then South African confederation), Mr. Burgers was privately a party to the action of the British Government, though publicly he identified himself with the protest that was made. This was in 1877.

The error of the annexation was over-haste. Had Shepstone waited, the Transvaal (menaced by the Zulus, and bankrupt) must have itself asked for annexation. Even as it was all would probably have turned out well, for the majority of the Boers, though they protested, acquiesced readily enough, and not the slightest disturbance had followed the annexation, though Shepstone had no armed support; but the

promises of self-government made at the annexation were not carried out (the Colonial Office being anxious to complete confederation without risk of opposition from the Volksraad), and Sir T. Shepstone, who understood the Boers, was succeeded by a military ruler, whose arbitrary and unsympathetic government incensed the people and confirmed their suspicions that the absence of the promised self-government was part of a deliberate policy of bad faith.

In 1879 the Zulu power had been crushed by the British army, Sikukuni had been subdued by Sir Garnet Wolseley, bankruptcy had been exchanged, under the influence of British credit, for comparative prosperity, the advantage of annexation had been gained, and independence now looked doubly desirable. Moreover, the malcontent Boers were greatly encouraged by Mr. Gladstone's denunciations of the annexation in his Midlothian campaign. When Mr. Gladstone came into power in April 1880, the Boer leaders were certain that the annexation would be revoked. Mr. Gladstone was their advocate, and Mr. Gladstone, with his lofty love of justice, would do right. But they did not understand the veering policy of an old parliamentary hand. Out of office annexation was an iniquity. As head of the Government he, in his own words, found it possible to accept the consequences of the policy he had condemned. Accordingly he absolutely refused to reconsider the annexation. 'Our judgment is,' he wrote to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, the Boer leaders, 'that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal.'

This fresh instance of British bad faith was too much for the Boers, cheated (as they not unnaturally considered) of the promised full self-government, and on

December 16, 1880, the Triumvirate (Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius) proclaimed the restoration of the Republic. The campaign that followed might have been foreseen. The British troops were too few to have the slightest chance of success. In four successive actions, in only one of which, Laing's Nek, were there more than a few hundred British soldiers engaged, the Boers were successful, and the last of these actions, the taking of Majuba Hill, was a really daring feat of arms.

The disaster of Majuba, February 26, 1881, was to all appearance the last blow required to make immediate and abject the surrender of Mr. Gladstone's Government. Of course a large army was now on its way to the seat of war, but the war, it was now clear, would cost much. The Free State and the Cape threatened to give trouble. Therefore the Transvaal must be abandoned. An armistice on March 6, 1881, a few days after Majuba, was the first step to terms of peace based on the surrender of the Transvaal before the month was over. It was not till August that the convention was signed, and in the meantime the loyal inhabitants, who had been deceived by repeated assurances of no surrender, petitioned in vain against the retrocession.

Before the surrender of the Transvaal the Boers had hated British rule; but at any rate they had a great respect for British power. When the success of their arms had been followed by this, in their opinion, abject surrender, the most profound contempt for the British Government and the British army was added to their old antipathy. Mr. Gladstone's lofty reasons for the surrender, though generally accepted in England, and actually held by many of the Cabinet, did not commend themselves to them. If

the reasons were genuine, why had he first refused them independence, and why had he used the troops against them? They did not know England's strength, they were unable to understand such self-sacrificing generosity as acceptance by a big nation of defeat by a small community, and were naturally enough quite certain that magnanimity was only a euphemism for pusillanimity. The refusal to reconsider the annexation had been too definite. 'Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be relinquished,' had been Lord Kimberley's statement of the Cabinet's decision. The Boers had other and weightier reasons, not then generally known, for their conviction. Lord Kimberley has revealed quite recently the influence which the warnings of President Brand of the Free State had on Mr. Gladstone's Government, coupled with threatenings of rebellion in the Cape Colony: 'So far as he was concerned and, to a great extent, Mr. Gladstone,' says Lord Kimberley, 'the reason was not, as some people thought, a mere sentimental reason. They found themselves in this position: The Free State was then very friendly; there was at its head President Brand, as good a friend of ours as any man in South Africa. President Brand used his utmost influence with the people of the Free State to keep them back from joining the Transvaal in the event of the war going on. At last Mr. Brand sent a message, in which he said he had done his utmost, that he had gone to the end of his tether, and could not hold his burghers in any more, and that if England went on she would have the Free State against her. More than that, the Government had plain indications from the Colony itself that there was sympathy there which might give rise to an extreme and serious difficulty;

and the conclusion they came to, whether it was wise or not, was that, painful to the last degree as it was to them to make peace under such circumstances, they were taking the right steps to avert the calamity they saw impending.'

The action of the Free State and the action of Mr. Hofmeyr's pro-Boer party at the Cape were the subsidiary causes, and the prowess of the Boer leaders and riflemen the main cause, which, in the opinion of the whole of Dutch South Africa, brought about the British Government's submission. One consequence of that submission was that the idea of a United Dutch South Africa, freed from British rule, advanced at a bound from the position it had occupied in President Burgers's nebulous dream, and even from the far more stable position of the Transvaal appeal to the Free State, which I have given above, into the position of something, not immediately attainable, of course, but within the range of practical politics in the future. This idea was not long in making itself felt in the Cape Colony in the gradual attempt of the Bond party to establish their domination in the Cape Parliament.

Moreover, among the loyal British colonists at the Cape, as well as among the deserted loyalists of the Transvaal, the most bitter feeling of humiliation was rife at this abandonment of British citizens, this base repudiation of solemn pledges, this destruction of British prestige in South Africa. The feeling thus produced for some considerable time affected their attitude towards the British Government, the untrustworthy and pusillanimous Imperial factor, and though they remained loyal to the mother-country, yet, had not a worthier policy at the Colonial Office effected a gradual reconciliation, the alienation might

have become so pronounced as to remove the strongest barrier to Mr. Kruger's ambition, for the establishment of South African unity under a Dutch republican flag.

This was the situation when Mr. Rhodes entered upon political life in 1881. The advocates of a United Dutch South Africa were exultant at their triumph, and full of contempt for England and Englishmen; the Free Staters as well as the Transvaalers had learned their own power and England's weakness; and even the crestfallen loyalists, fresh from their bitter experience, feared that a Government which had betrayed its trust so shamefully might yet come, under further pressure, to contemplate a yet more complete and ignominious surrender.

Mr. Rhodes took no part in discussions of the Transvaal settlement, made no declaration of policy, but quietly set to work to find an opening for the development of his big scheme of empire in South Africa, the first step in which was to be territorial expansion through the Cape Colony. The addition to the loyal element in South Africa of the vast unexplored regions to the north, of the realm that is now Bechuanaland and Rhodesia, was, in Mr. Rhodes's scheme, to outweigh the Transvaal and the Free State, and effect a gradual and peaceful settlement of the question of supremacy by giving the actual room for growth, and by degrees the actual supremacy in population, as in territory, to the British Empire.

Against him he was soon to learn he had not only the condition of feeling in Cape Colony produced by the success of the Transvaal, which made the Cape Dutch and their supporters ear-mark the whole interior as the rightful heritage of the Transvaal, but also the formidable difficulty of putting some zeal for

the Empire into the apathy of Downing Street, and above all, though he did not learn this till later, the sleepless rivalry of President Kruger, the resolute, strong-willed, and crafty champion of a United Dutch South Africa freed from the British Paramount Power.



## CHAPTER III

1881-3

## EARLY POLITICAL WORK

**MR. RHODES** entered on political life, as has been seen, with the ambitious and far-reaching scheme of winning the Empire of the North for England, and thus of building up a United South Africa in which the hegemony, at least, was to belong to the British Empire. This he believed he could effect by the gradual expansion of the territories under the British flag over the vast unclaimed regions of savagery to the north. This expansion was to go on through the Cape Colony, because only through the colonists, he believed, could he obtain the support necessary to carry it out. The Imperial factor, that is, Downing Street, after the recent experience of its feebleness and mismanagement, seen in its abandonment of the Transvaal, in the teeth of its own solemn pledges to British subjects, was a negligible quantity. Help might be got for Imperialists in England, but Downing Street could not be relied on. Accordingly the Cape Colony had to be imbued with the desire for expansion, and the motive-power Mr. Rhodes had to rely on for this purpose was the appeal to self-interest, as potent with the Cape Dutch as the English colonists. The commerce of the Cape Colony, he had to show, must depend on trade, and as the Transvaal trade was

always a doubtful asset from President Kruger's early adoption of President Burgers's old scheme of getting an opening to the sea by a railway to Delagoa Bay, the Cape Colony must develop the trade of the interior through Griqualand West and the region which is now Bechuanaland. The Dutch electorate in the Cape Colony were encouraged and organised by the British Government's surrender of the Transvaal to aim shortly after at dominating the Cape Legislative Assembly under the leadership of Mr. Hofmeyr and his powerful caucus, the Afrikaner Bond. Their sympathy with the Transvaal, not yet weakened by full experience of President Kruger's policy of hostile tariffs, went so far as to include a strong sympathy with the Transvaal idea of ultimate Dutch supremacy. They would certainly have had nothing to do with supporting Mr. Rhodes's big idea of expanding the British Empire up to the Zambesi; but they were possibly amenable to the appeal to their natural desire for greater prosperity, and this appeal he set himself to work to use skilfully and persistently to advance his plans. He was willing to move gradually and advance step by step, here a little and there a little, towards the translation of his Kimberley dream of empire into the actuality of accomplished facts.

His maiden speech (April 19), which was of no significance or importance, dealt with the question of Colonel Griffith's views upon native disarmament in Basutoland, to which he was opposed as unjust to the natives, and is a mere adumbration of his next speech on the same question (April 25, 1881), which is here given in full. The Basuto War, just over when he took his seat, was in his opinion a mistake, for he considered that the disarmament should never have been attempted. Four millions were wasted on

it, and what, as he pointed out afterwards, was more serious, a civilised power was beaten by a savage race.

‘I wish to defend my attitude as an independent member, and I thank the House for the cordial welcome they have given to the Griqualand West members. I am in nearly the same position as the senior member for Kimberley, in saying that the Disarmament Act ought not to have been applied to Basutoland. We are well aware at the Fields that there will be war. Our boys tell us so. I have a hundred of my own, so I know. My boys say, “We cannot help it, Baas; we mean fighting.” We have been charged with localism in Griqualand West, but so far from the charge being true, it is my belief that localism is the curse of South Africa. The honourable member for the Paarl may prefer a railway to Bloemfontein, but where else should any railway extension go than to Kimberley? It does not matter to the Griqualand West members which party is in power; any railway extension at all must come to Kimberley. The Opposition say they are in favour of a “moderate extension,” and even a moderate extension must come to Kimberley. I thank the honourable member for Stellenbosch for taking such action with respect to the Dutch question, of which we have heard so much, and I would have voted for his loyal address had he been present. We have heard a great deal about the rabid Anglo-Saxonism of Kimberley. I have seen it stated in a very able letter in the *Cape Argus*, but the truth is

we are quite cosmopolitan at Kimberley, having men of all nations there.

‘My vote on this occasion will greatly depend on the explanation which the Colonial Secretary may have to offer as to the alleged suppression of information which the House had a right to have at the end of last session. I venture to quote from a despatch of Sir Bartle Frere’s to show that he said it had been represented to the Government by Colonel Griffith that they could, if they would act cautiously, proceed with disarmament. The Colonial Secretary said he was assured that it could be done before he attempted it. What I want to know is whether Colonel Griffith did telegraph that disarmament could be done with safety, and if it can be shown that Colonel Griffith gave this assurance, I am bound to say that my opinion would be greatly influenced. The disarmament in my opinion is like the greased cartridges in the Indian Mutiny; there would probably have been a mutiny all the same without the greased cartridges, although they were the immediate cause of the outbreak. The Colonial Secretary has been charged with descending into a “valley of humiliation,” but if he did so with the desire to make peace, I rather like such a valley of humiliation. The Basutos, by rejecting his offers, showed that they were determined to fight.

‘For myself I would have accepted the position of leaving the settlement of affairs to the mother-country; but when I say that, I do not mean that the mother-country should have the settlement and

this country the responsibilities. I believe that if we go on much longer and the proposal that the mother-country should take the extra-colonial territories were to be put to the country, it would be agreed to unanimously. Look at it on practical grounds. Are we a great and independent South Africa? No; we are only the population of a third-rate English city spread over a great country. The colony has undertaken enormous public works, and, in addition to that, has to face the burden of the defence of the country. It is not as if white colonists could be settled in those territories; the policy of the Imperial Government would not allow that. The Parliament would never allow Basutoland to be confiscated; no colonist could go there; the land would simply be peopled with the native races. How could this weak colony retain those territories? There seem to be certain overtures made to us from the mother-country; as if the Home Government were inclined to take over the native territories. There will probably be a new native territory formed out of the Transvaal Settlement, and there is Natal, taking all which together the Imperial Government could have a compact and important black settlement under its sway.

‘Can we afford to go on spending an amount on defence which is equivalent to England spending 200 millions a year? England would not let any feeling of pride force her to spend such an amount as that every year, nor should we. I believe that there will soon be an independent party in this House who

will support these views; who will come to accept the position that we must get rid of responsibilities which are too heavy for us to bear. The late Attorney-General has warned us that we shall have a black Alsatia around us for the refuge of stock thieves; but I prefer even that to the present condition of things. Is Natal an Alsatia? We are bound to have something around us. We in Griqualand West have natives on our own borders. It is not that I consider the intentions of the colonists other than kind or liberal, but native policy ought not to be subject to the continual change of Ministries involved in having responsible government. I much prefer that native races outside our border should be subject only to Imperial rule.'

Mr. Rhodes's advocacy of the extension of the railway to Kimberley, of course with an immediate view to the advantage of the Diamond Fields population, but also, as he saw clearly, as a first step towards his goal, the North, will be noted. It will also be noted that he was then, as since, in favour of a uniform native policy, and at that time, and for some time after, looked to the Imperial Government to undertake it, the Cape Colony being, as a matter of fact, unable to face the expense.

His next speech (June 21, 1881) had to do with an important step of the Dutch party in the House of Assembly, which was one of the first signs of the racial ambition awakened by the success of the Transvaal revolt and the surrender of the British Government. It was made in the debate on the motion of the Rev. W. P. De Villiers for amending

the 89th section of the Constitution ordinance by allowing the use of the Dutch language in Parliament. Mr. Rhodes seconded Mr. Fuller's amendment, 'That this House, while willing to give the fullest consideration to the proposed change in the 89th section of the Constitution ordinance, is not prepared at this late period of the session to adopt the same.'

Mr. Rhodes said :—

'I am not prepared now to discuss the advisability of using the Dutch with the English language in Parliament. We shall have a debate upon that next session. Before I express any opinion on the subject I wish to obtain a knowledge of two facts. The first is that I wish us to be fully informed, as we might be during the recess, whether it is the desire of the respectable portion of the Dutch population that this change should be made. I do not know of any such desire. We know that petitions have been got up; but we know also where those petitions come from. We all know that petitions can be got up upon any subject. It is a mere question of agents and organisation. Let the members representing Dutch constituencies say that they have attended meetings, each in his own district, and that they have assured themselves they are advocating what their constituents desire. The honourable member for Swellendam has told us that he knows nothing of this movement among his constituents; so has the honourable member for George; and so have several other honourable members representing Dutch constituencies.

'The honourable member has told us, "You will

have to grant it." It is not a case of "have" at all. If the country really desires it, the House is as willing to grant it as anything else; but we do not want to be dictated to by the honourable member. He says we shall "have" to do it; I say: No—but we shall do it if we think it right to do it. The honourable member has deprecated agitation. I say that we ought to have agitation. We ought to learn whether the constituencies are really desirous of this change. The honourable member tells us he does not want this to be a hustings cry; but, judging by the ordinary course of human affairs, this Parliament will last for two years longer; so that there is plenty of time for members to meet their constituents and report to the House what their opinions are. If the House were to divide on the question now, and a majority were in favour of the resolution, that majority would not be above one-sixth of the House. If the Government is not prepared to come before the House with a bill next session, we could have the question fairly discussed on the introduction of a private bill, when we would know what is the real feeling of the country. I am not going into the Transvaal question; but I think that just now a great many signatures might be obtained to these petitions, because of the injudicious conduct of England in the Transvaal. Later on we shall be able to ascertain what are the true feelings of the people of this country. It has been asserted that this resolution will be a mere form, and that Dutch will seldom or never be used in Parliament. If it is a mere form,



why place it upon the statute-book? I do not think that this motion ought to be pushed in a thin House.'

Of the next speech, delivered at Kimberley, I am obliged to content myself with a summary, which I take from the *Cape Argus* of August 3, 1881, and which is noteworthy as showing an early popular estimate of his powers. The comment upon this speech is interesting, as indicating that the speaker's power of actually swaying public opinion was making itself felt. The *Cape Argus* observes: 'Those whose only knowledge of Mr. Rhodes's powers as a speaker is derived from a perusal of the reports of his speeches in the Cape Town papers were certainly not prepared for the exhibition of oratorical skill and dialectic power with which they were favoured by the youthful member for Barkly.'

'Beginning with a dexterous use of the "old digger" *argumentum ad hominem*, Mr. Rhodes proceeded to assert that from the beginning he had opposed the application of the disarmament policy to the Basutos. He had known their loyalty, their industry, and their potential civilisation; and as many a brother-digger had said to him: "After all, we sold them the guns; they bought them out of their hard-earned wages; and it is hard lines to go now and make them give them up again." But the speaker continued; whatever his private opinion about the policy, he felt bound, in face of overt rebellion, to support the Government, which staked its existence on suppressing it. When, however, Mr.

Sprigg, after protesting to the last, till his majority was safe, that he would carry his policy through at whatever cost, coolly told his supporters that he had referred the whole matter to the discretion of the Governor, knowing perfectly well in what manner this discretion would be exercised—there was really no policy which still remained to fight for.

As for Mr. Sprigg personally, there was no reason for the members for Griqualand West to regard him as the only possible "saviour of society." His management of previous Railway Bills had not been such as to inspire confidence, and by throwing up one measure in a pet, simply because he could not get a junction at Aberdeen Road, he had needlessly retarded for two years the realisation of a project in which the Diamond Fields were most deeply interested. As for his idea of borrowing twelve millions, such a scheme was most reckless in a colony like this, which mainly depended for its wealth on the export of luxuries. In point of fact, it was notorious that Mr. Laing would never have consented to so reckless a proceeding, and the late Ministry were so divided among themselves, that it was impossible for them to carry any Railway Bill at all. The idle chatter about the "factiousness" of the Opposition, Mr. Rhodes dismissed in the summary manner it deserved. An Opposition, he pointed out, had a right to be what the previous speakers had called "factious" when a Ministry clung to office which had no adequate support in the House, and which did not dare to appeal to a country eager to get rid of them. After pointing

out that the estimates, with which the Kimberley members had found fault, as far as public works in this province are concerned, were the estimates not of the present Ministers, but of their predecessors in office, and making a few general remarks about the course taken by himself and his absent colleague, Mr. Rhodes sat down amid a perfect tempest of cheering, having made what even his political opponents admitted to be distinctly the speech of the evening, and having, we believe, had the gratification of converting several influential citizens to his view of public affairs.'

The subject of these speeches, however, is of far less interest than that to which I shall now turn. Mr. Rhodes had already spoken (June 15, 1881) on the report of the Select Committee on Griqualand West boundaries. Of this speech there is no report.

It may not be immediately recognised that this subject of the Griqualand West boundaries involved the immediate practical purpose of Mr. Rhodes's entrance into political life, I mean, the expansion of the British Empire to the north. It was through the territory in question that the trade route to the north, the way to the hinterland, was to be secured, the territory, that is, through which now runs the railway to Bulawayo. On this question, on Thursday, May 3, 1882, Mr. Rhodes moved the adjournment of the House. 'The boundary,' he said, 'laid down by the Government was totally different from that provided by Sir Henry Barkly. He believed that the chosen line was laid down from political considerations with regard to native questions. Without saying any-

thing offensive to them, it was (he said) well known that parties of freebooters were anxious to establish a new republic on the border, and this colony ought not to alter the boundaries of the country as handed over to us.' This brief report is interesting because the freebooters referred to were President Kruger's Transvaalers, sent out to seize and occupy the trade route to the north, 'the key of South Africa,' as one of these very freebooters afterwards called it to Mr. Rhodes, when he went up as commissioner in pursuance of his policy, and negotiated with them to bring them under the British flag. President Kruger was already at work, and this inroad of freebooters was the first step to secure the territory which would shut out Bechuanaland and the North from the Cape, and secure the reversion of them to the Transvaal. It is only right to say that Mr. Rhodes was not at this time aware of the guiding brain behind this incursion of freebooters. While he knew that he was preserving the all-important territory from occupation by freebooters for occupation by British subjects, under the British flag, he had no suspicion of the formidable antagonist who lay behind them. He was crossing swords with President Kruger in the dark. Neither Mr. Rhodes nor any other Englishman knew the largeness of the stout old Dopper President's ambitions at that time; nor, indeed, was the truth generally recognised until long afterwards when President Kruger issued a proclamation and annexed the territory.

This is plain from an ill-reported speech delivered by Mr. Rhodes on the same subject in the Cape House, May 25, 1882, when he said that the effect of the change had been to cut off territory belonging to us, and to leave it in the hands of freebooters, who were, he added, worth nothing but the rifles they carried

with them. 'The Transvaal,' he said, 'had kept a commando on the borders,' a statement of the significance of which he had evidently at that time no conception.

The question of the boundaries of Griqualand West remained some time in abeyance, and, in the meantime, General Gordon was appointed by the Cape Government to go to Basutoland to arrange the difficulties with the Basuto chiefs, and Mr. Rhodes was sent up as one of the Compensation Commission to compensate loyal natives who had lost heavily in the recent war, in which they had sided with the Cape Government. While Gordon, who was in favour of a policy of justice to the Basutos, visited Masupha at Thaba Bosigo, Sauer, the Cape representative, planned an expedition against the chief, to thwart Gordon's peace negotiations—at least that was Gordon's view of the affair. Gordon thereupon wired to the Colonial Secretary to say he was in a false position, and proposed to return, and hoped the Government would accept his resignation. This was in September 1882. Before this time, Rhodes, who was greatly interested in the Basuto question, saw much of Gordon, and the two Imperialists used to take long walks together and discuss Imperial and other questions, generally with the result of vigorous argument between them. Rhodes was just as independent in his own views, and as unwilling to defer to another's, as Gordon himself. They became, nevertheless, close friends; and when Rhodes, having completed his work, told Gordon he was starting for Kimberley, the great man (his pacification of China was already accomplished) urged him to stay and work with him in Basutoland. Rhodes refused, pointing out that he had already mapped out his life-work, and that for the present that work took him to Kimberley. Gordon,

who would take no denial, pressed him hard, but at last was forced to give in, saying, 'There are very few men in the world to whom I would make such an offer, very few men, I can tell you; but, of course, you *will* have your own way.'

The strong-willed hero of China and Soudan fame found in the young Kimberley diamond-miner as strong a will and as independent a mind as his own, and frequent were the differences of view between the two friends. Gordon, who was rather dictatorial, used to object strongly to the same quality in Rhodes. 'You always contradict me,' he would say; 'you think you are always right, and every one else wrong.' The difference of Rhodes's point of view from Gordon's came out very well when Rhodes heard from Gordon the now well-known story of Gordon's refusal of the roomful of gold offered him by the Chinese Government for his magnificent success in dealing with the Tai-Ping rebellion. 'I would have taken it,' observed the practical young Cape politician, 'and as many more roomfuls as they would give me. It is no use to have big ideas if you have not the cash to carry them out.'

Rhodes went back to Kimberley to continue his work in the preparations for that expansion of the Empire which now bears his name. Gordon went back to Europe (disgusted with the Cape Government's treatment), but he remembered his strong-willed young friend with the big ideas of Imperial expansion, and when he was starting for Khartoum on his dangerous mission, wired (1884) to invite Rhodes to come and help him in his last struggle with the Mahdi in the Soudan; and though Rhodes would not relinquish his own work, then pressing in the Cape Parliament and in Bechuanaland, and refused, yet the

invitation remains a tribute to what Gordon's insight into character saw in Rhodes at a time when the world had discovered little except extraordinary business ability.

The next important speech was made in the Cape House on the Basutoland Annexation Bill, July 18, 1883. Mr. Rhodes's work as Compensation Commissioner in Basutoland had given him a personal knowledge of the natives and their circumstances, while the allusions to the foreign monopolies in the Transvaal, and their effect on the Cape trade, reminds us to-day how early President Kruger's financial policy of hostility to the British colonies found expression in action. The speech is also specially notable for the distinct statement of Mr. Rhodes's Imperial policy, from which he has never deviated since. 'I believe,' said Mr. Rhodes, 'in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire'; and this he contrasted significantly with the opposite belief of the member for Stellenbosch, Mr. Hofmeyr, 'A United State of South Africa under its own flag,' for which belief of Mr. Kruger's and Mr. Hofmeyr's South Africa is deluged with blood to-day.

'I have my views as to the future of South Africa, and I must say that in the consideration of the question there has been a great deal of discussion directed rather to the faults of the other side than to the question which is now facing the country—what are we going to do with Basutoland? I really think that that is the subject before this House—what can the Colony do, with honour to itself, to free us from the liabilities under which we are at present? Sir, the portion of this Colony to which I am attached has

only been a portion of the Cape Colony during the last two years. We were amalgamated with the Colony at the time of a great crisis. We came down as members for Griqualand West at a time when this Colony was at war with the Basutos. We had our private feelings on that question, for we believed that the enforcement of the Disarmament Act was a mistake on the part of the honourable member who was then in charge of the affairs of the Colony; but there was a greater feeling than that. We thought, all of us, that as the Colony was at that time at war with a native race, it was our bounden duty to support the Government. I shall ask this House to remember that at that time the Griqualand West vote was a unanimous vote in support of the honourable member for East London in the policy he was then pursuing. The advice of the honourable member to the gentleman then in charge of affairs was to enter into a settlement, and he accepted an award on the basis of defeat. I think it was clear in the minds of some of us that, having been defeated in carrying out his policy, it was better that a new régime should carry out the new arrangement, rather than a man whom the Basutos looked upon as the cause of their troubles. The new Government proceeded with their policy of amicable arrangement.

‘If I were to express an opinion on the policy of disarmament, I should say it was in its essence a good one; but I also think that the application of it was a mistake. The best comparison I know on that question I have gathered from a story by Bulwer Lytton, in



which he describes Squire Hazeldean in his model parish, where everything went happily until one unlucky day he discovered the stocks cast away in a bush. He then thought his village was not complete without the stocks, and so he had them erected. But what happened? The best boy in the village got into the stocks, and there was a most frightful row over having got the wrong boy in the stocks. That is just what has happened here. The best boy amongst the native races of the country has got into the stocks.

The disintegration of the Basuto tribe set in when its responsible head, Moshesh, died. The jealousies of his various sons and their families have ultimately brought about disunion, and have placed the country face to face with the Basuto question. I have been there, and have asked myself what does moral persuasion, what does Home Rule mean? How are we permanently to effect a settlement when the chief central authority has disappeared, and the jealousies of the Royal House would in time have brought about a war? How are we to restore order? I have spoken of disarmament, which caused us disaster and a pecuniary loss of from three to four millions. I have referred to the change of Government, when the honourable member for Cradock took charge of affairs. I am not dealing with the five gentlemen in their places there; we must dismiss them entirely from our consideration. We are dealing entirely with Basutoland. The Governor's agent reported that authority in Basutoland had failed, and that no arbitration could

be satisfactory until the Basutos had been beaten. Well, the Secretary for Native Affairs went up to Basutoland, and had, how many interviews, goodness only knows, but could he obtain a settlement? He could only get the surrender of the lean kine. When I got to Basutoland, I found that this delivery of cattle did not really mean submission to the Government at all. The chiefs used the fact of the surrender of cattle to get all the fat kine into their hands and sent the lean kine to Government. What have we got out of this partial settlement? Nothing. The plain fact is that you have here a native race which has been victorious, and you cannot make them return to a civilised Government without the enforcement of order. . . .

I was in Basutoland three months ago, and three ideas occurred to me as the different modes of attempting to solve the question. One was moral force, which Colonel Griffith has told us cannot be applied without a prior appeal to physical force. The Government tried a second plan, which is that of coercion of the Basutos by the Basutos. There is one thing I wish, and that is, that when the honourable the Secretary for Native Affairs gets up to speak, he will say that Mr. Orpen did everything loyally under his orders. Let us be clear as to that. He was exposed to the impudence of Letsie and Masupha and Joel Molappo, and he stayed through it all, and did his best, and I would like the Colony to hear that that man did everything under the authority and under the orders of the Government. But as to coercion of the

Basutos, the Basutos themselves recognise that their success was due to the chiefs who came between them and the Government and saved them, and saved their guns to them, which they consider to be the sign of manhood.

'We have one plan more to consider, and that is Home Rule. I was intrusted by the Government with a responsible task, in the execution of which I visited Basutoland, and I gathered the opinion current there on the subject. I am supported by the opinion of my friend Mr. Burgers, a member of the Council, in coming to the final conclusion that nothing can be done with this uncivilised race until we show them that we are masters. The difficulties of Home Rule are varied in the extreme. It is not so in New Zealand, where the natives have for their boundary only the sea and the colonists. Here you have the Free State and the obligations of the Aliwal North Convention. If under the name of Home Rule you simply mean leaving these natives to themselves, you will be putting great difficulties in the way of the Free State, and leaving the country to anarchy.

'Now, sir, what are the issues before this House? I say candidly that in the speeches of the honourable member for Stellenbosch and the honourable member for Fort Beaufort those issues have not been thoroughly presented. I say that one of the issues is war. What does that mean? We had the statement of the Treasurer-General yesterday, showing a deficit of £600,000. He provides for that partly by re-borrowing, and partly by taking sums on war expendi-

ture which stand to the credit of the Colony, so that the new taxation is only £250,000; but still the real deficit is £600,000. Is the Colony ready for war? The land and loot policy, I must tell you, is really the most expensive kind of war. The Mapoch War will have cost the Transvaal £400,000. The burgher system in these days of civilisation is most expensive. It costs just as much as volunteers, or even more. We have got into civilisation now; the old days are past, and the brighter ones have made war too expensive. We cannot have war, then; well, will you wait and leave the Basutos to take their chance? Have you no feeling for your brethren in the Free State? Here we have a despatch. You will say President Brand was put up to it, but does anybody believe that? He is plainly in a state of the most terrible alarm on account of the danger to the safety of the border. I can tell you something about the border. There are two feelings in the Free State—that of President Brand, whom I consider the truest Afrikaner in South Africa. There is that feeling, and there is another. There is the feeling of men without any large stake in the country, who live along the border, and sell guns and liquor to the Basutos, and encourage them to rebel. These, I say, have the false Afrikaner feeling. The feeling of Afrikanerism in this House must be guided by President Brand's true feeling, and not by the false Afrikanerism. It is our duty to consider what the responsible advisers of the Free State lay before us, and not allow the question to slide. I put to the House the position of these two parties, and ask

which we are to follow? In the Volksraad, on the nomination of a future president, I believe thirty-six votes were given for President Brand, and six for a gentleman called Judge Reitz. What the Free State says is simply—"We want security on our border." That is what we have to decide upon. My view is, then, that we are not capable now of war, and yet we must not let the matter run on, that is, do nothing, and at the same time we must remember that there is a volcano in Basutoland. We have tried every scheme of settlement, and every scheme has failed; we cannot fight, and we must not abandon. Abandonment is not re-transfer to the Imperial Government. It would mean anarchy.

'The next thing I have to say is that the Free State has not accepted the plan proposed by the honourable member for Stellenbosch, nor has the Colony. I fear the honourable member has not convinced the Volksraad, although he admires their sable clothes. I am still in Oxford tweeds, and I think I can legislate as well in them as in sable clothing.<sup>1</sup> I ask the honourable member if in his heart he believes that his proposed alliance will work. The true interest of the Free State demands simply the observance of the Convention of Aliwal North. You may say, "No, we want safety and security, we want peace in South Africa."

'As regards the Transvaal resolution I have this to say to you: Do you know it is high time that we

<sup>1</sup> This alludes to Mr. Hofmeyr's proposal that black for the future should be the costume *de rigueur* in the Cape House, as it was in the Volksraad.

began to think something of the Cape Colony? We have heard so much about the Free State and so much about the Transvaal that I begin to think it is just time to think of the interests of the Cape Colony. By the accident of birth I was not born in this country, but that is nothing—I have adopted the Colony as my home; and in reference to the affairs of this country, I look upon the interests of the Cape Colony first, and those of the neighbouring states second. While sympathising with the Transvaal, I think that the Transvaal should return something of that feeling of sympathy to this Colony, instead of shutting out our industry by leasing everything to foreigners for ten, twenty, and thirty years. At Kimberley your Transvaal trade is ruined by being shut out through foreign monopolies.'

'The honourable member for Stellenbosch has objected to the presence of the Imperial Government because it would lead to complications with the Free State, and for that he asks us to risk the chance of anarchy in Basutoland. Is that consideration for the Free State? The people of the Free State are surely the best judges of the question, and they say they want to be protected by the Imperial Government guarding their border. I have seen in certain newspapers statements with regard to Tembuland as to which I should be glad to hear the honourable member for Stellenbosch. It has been said somewhere that they (the trekkers) were perfectly right, and that if they were prevented, what had occurred in the Transvaal might occur again. These things

have caused a certain amount of alarm in the country, and I would like to hear the opinion of the honourable member for Stellenbosch in the resolution passed at the Richmond Congress, and would also like to hear some expression as to what he is reported to have said about a United States of South Africa under its own flag. I want to hear the honourable member for Stellenbosch give a reply to these things. I have read the remarks of Mr. Van der Heever at the same congress, and he said that it was a very good thing that the English flag was here. I have, perhaps, misrepresented the honourable member, but I would be glad to hear whether there is anything behind this resolution, and what is the honourable member's policy in this country. I would like to hear whether he is still in favour of a United States of South Africa under its own flag.

'I have my own views as to the future of South Africa, and I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire. I believe that confederated states in a colony under responsible government would each be practically an independent republic, but I think we should also have all the privileges of the tie with the Empire. Possibly there is not a very great divergence between myself and the honourable member for Stellenbosch, excepting always the question of the flag; though I have read in some paper that the honourable member for the Paarl (Mr. Marais) objected to the whole resolution passed as having a disloyal tendency.

'We are now at the junction of two paths—one

path leads to peace and prosperity in this country, by the removal of native difficulties, leaving us free for the development of the country; the other path leads to ruin and disaster. Every member who votes for the second reading of the bill will feel that he has taken the true and patriotic course, while I feel sure that every member who votes with the honourable member for Colesberg, if he persists in his amendment, will regret that for the sake of a paltry party triumph he forsook the real interests of the country.'

Mr. Rhodes, who had in 1881 advocated the transfer of the natives to Imperial rule, saw his wish effected in Basutoland, which the Imperial Government took over in 1883, and he has, of course, done more to bring about his aim in 1883 of 'a United States of South Africa as a portion of the British Empire' than any man living.

A speech which introduces the reader to Mr. Rhodes's views on taxation was made in the Cape House, August 1, 1883. This speech was made on the taxation proposals of the Government in support of an amendment of Mr. Fuller that this House, 'while agreeing that some additional revenue may be raised by a revision of the stamps and licences and by house-duty, and by a partial revision of Customs, as well as by a moderate duty on colonial beer, is of opinion that, under the circumstances of financial depression and embarrassment in which the country is placed, it would be more equitable to increase the Excise-duty on spirits than to place novel and excessive burdens on the industrial, trading, and professional classes.'



Mr. Rhodes said :—

'The taxation proposals of the Government seem to be aimed at those classes of the community who do not shout. I myself am most decidedly in favour of an income-tax. The proposals of the Government affect the professional and trading classes, and leave untouched the larger portion of the community, which is quite able to meet the burden.

'I ask you, have the predictions of the Treasurer-General, which he made in proposing the last Budget, been fulfilled? The Treasurer-General looked for the most satisfactory results from the loyal hearts of the colonists, and the knitting together of our nationalities, which was to carry us through all our difficulties in the English market. I ask, has anything of the kind taken place? What I feel is that the finances of the country are thoroughly mixed up. The Government keep putting off our liabilities by raising loans, and it is high time that they faced our true position. The deficiency really to be met is about £600,000, taking the Treasurer-General's own figures. The Treasurer-General said we would have to borrow £550,000, but, as a matter of fact, we would require £1,150,000. Then there are taxes not brought to account, so that the figures are altogether misleading. The Treasurer-General seems to put his borrowing-powers under various Loan Acts on one side and call them assets, and to place on the other side the liability for different public works, and deducting the one from the other, tells us that he has an asset of £420,000. But he

has taken his remaining borrowing-powers at the full amount, and has not allowed anything for discount on loans. The three million loan cost £131,000 to raise, and in the same way we shall not realise the full amount of this £420,000. We shall have to pay about nine per cent. on the £1,500,000 still to be raised, which will cause a deficiency of £130,000, for which the Treasurer-General has made no allowance. How can the House come to any conclusion upon such misleading figures? Our revenue is estimated at £3,240,000, of which the Treasurer-General estimates that the railways will yield £1,100,000. But up to the present the railway returns have only been £80,000 a month, and if that rate continues, you will have a serious deficiency upon the Treasurer-General's estimate.

'Then how can the Customs keep up? A good deal has been said about the Diamond Fields, but I feel certain, and am bound to say so, that our diamond industry is dwindling as far as its effect on the trade of the Colony is concerned. In scrip there may be a considerable improvement, but with regard to the trade through the ports the takings must diminish. Now we know how sensitive this country is, without speaking of Kimberley and its champagne and days of success; we know that, not on account of itself, but from circumstances, Kimberley has been a most important trade centre, but we cannot now look for any considerable revival of trade there.

'I am glad that the House has arrived at the

conclusion that we must retain our trade with the interior, or they might have found that it would be entirely removed from us. I say this not in any spirit of hostility to the Transvaal—if we are to do anything, it must be done jointly with the Transvaal; but unless we do something, we shall have our trade with the interior removed, first to Natal, and then to Delagoa Bay, owing to the prohibitive tariff of the Transvaal.

I do not think that we can look for any increase in our Customs for a long time. I have shown you that you cannot look to the Diamond Fields, and I do not think you can look to the frontier, certainly not to the interior. For several years we must have very bad times, and our estimates of revenue must not be too sanguine. I will not weary you with citations from Adam Smith, but this, I think, would be at once accepted, that your exports should equal your imports and also the amount of interest upon your indebtedness. Now from 1850 to 1876 the Colony imported £75,000,000 worth of goods, and exported only £62,000,000. Our debt would be represented by the difference, but for the diamonds. That was the position up to 1876, but since that time we have greatly increased our borrowing, and, of course, have greatly increased our imports and exports. Now we feel where the shoe is beginning to pinch. During the last two years our imports have been about £18,000,000, and our exports only £8,000,000, exclusive of diamonds. Whenever there was the slightest deficiency in our Estimates the diamonds

were always brought in. In times past we had to do this, but now we have the means of forming the strictest calculations as to our diamonds, and we find that the export is from three to three and a quarter millions. One of the most serious things for the Colony to consider is this, that during the last ten years our wool and ostrich feathers, and other staple articles, have not increased in the slightest degree. If we consider that with diamonds our exports are only about £7,000,000, and our imports about £9,000,000, and that the time for borrowing has almost ceased, it is obvious that we shall have to export more or import less. We shall have to cut imports down to £6,000,000, as it would require £1,000,000 of exports to meet the interest on our indebtedness. Mere retrenchment of salaries will not meet the case. You may cut off the salaries of a few poor clerks here and there, but you are not going to meet an enormous deficiency in that way. This year you have a deficiency which is going to be met by borrowing £324,000, and by additional taxation amounting to £250,000. The only solution of the difficulty is this: you will have to make up your minds whether you are going to keep the Transkei or not. If you make up your minds to undertake your obligations there, you will at once have to tell your constituents to accept largely increased taxation.

'I would like an income-tax, and I look also to the Excise. I have a plan of my own as to the Excise, but, being assured that it is impracticable, I

have not proposed it. I think it might be levied through the canteens and bottle-stores. I would like the bottle-stores to be compelled to sell with a stamped label on each cork, and the canteens to pay two shillings per gallon on liquor sold. It is certain that you will have to look for new methods of taxation unless you can get rid of the natives. You want to annex land rather than natives. Hitherto we have been annexing natives instead of land. If we could get rid of the Transkei we could get rid of our defensive forces. We are now paying £216,000 per annum for defensive forces, and £50,000 for management of the natives. I advocated the transfer of the natives to Imperial rule the very first year I was in this House. We are not in a position to do like England, and to take another India. Let us attend to the development of the internal resources of our own Colony. If the House will not accept this policy, you must go to your constituents and put plainly before them the consequences of retaining the natives, and tell them that, if they wish to retain them, they must prepare for large additional taxation. You cannot go on borrowing as you have done to make up the amount.'

In this able financial speech it may be noted that we have the much-criticised preference of Mr. Rhodes for annexing land to annexing natives, together with the accompanying explanation, that the Cape, then running into debt every year, and with no prospects of immediate improvement, could not afford the expense of administering and policing the natives; and for

that reason Mr. Rhodes said, 'We want to annex land rather than natives,' and for the same reason, and also in order to have a uniform native policy, impossible with changing Ministries, he was strongly in favour of the transfer of the natives to Imperial rule. Mr. Rhodes's favourite plan to deal with the Excise, so as to remove the direct tax from the producer, will also be noted.

## CHAPTER IV

1883-4

## THE BEGINNINGS OF NORTHERN EXPANSION

THE question of the boundaries of Griqualand West, or the Mankoroane question, as it has been called, was the point at which Mr. Rhodes had found the line of least resistance to the advancement of his main policy of expansion to the north. The Colony had, owing to an error in the surveying, taken unknowingly a portion of the territory of Mankoroane, a native chief. Mr. Rhodes made this question his own, and carried a Commission to inquire into the boundaries of Griqualand West, of which Commission he was made a member. There were, the Commission discovered, seventy farms in this territory, and the solution of the difficulty which Mr. Rhodes aimed at was to obtain a cession of the territory to the Cape Colony from Mankoroane himself. In this object, Mankoroane being already hard pressed by Transvaal Boers bent on bringing about by force a rival annexation, Mr. Rhodes was successful. He also obtained a petition from the white settlers on the farms in this territory (known as Stellaland) asking to be annexed to the Cape Colony, thus ensuring both native and white approval for the annexation. The key of the interior was, as he thought, safely secured, and he returned to the Cape exultant. But

he had reckoned without the Cape Parliament. A section of these politicians, sunk in parochialism, saw not an inch beyond the existing Cape territory or the present session. Mr. Hofmeyr's followers considered the territory the heritage of the Transvaal. The Cape Parliament declined to have anything to do with Mankoroane's offer, and the matter dropped.

Mr. Rhodes went back to Kimberley, thoroughly disheartened and disgusted. There, reflecting on what he had seen and heard while visiting Mankoroane's territory, he came to the conclusion that President Kruger was behind the whole freebooting movement, and that he was aiming at shutting in the Cape Colony by securing first the way to the interior, and then the interior itself; while Mr. Rhodes thought he also saw that the Transvaal President was aiming at gradual advances towards Delagoa Bay, with a view to acquiring that also, and thus shutting out the Cape from trade as well as expansion, and securing the ultimate supremacy for a Dutch Republican system in South Africa.

It is characteristic of Mr. Rhodes that, on arriving at these conclusions, he was filled with admiration for the stout old Boer President, who, without a penny in his treasury, and no immediate prospect of even meeting his obligations, yet aimed so high, and set to work so promptly and vigorously to translate his purpose into action. Contrasting the foresight and daring of the advocate of Boer supremacy with the purblind parochialism of the Cape House, one can understand this admiration. It was the admiration of a strong, fair-minded Englishman for a rival builder of empire whom he felt to be worthy of his steel.

With this introduction I will give a most important speech made by Mr. Rhodes in the Cape House on



this question, August 16, 1883. Mr. Rhodes moved to Mr. Scanlan's motion 'that Her Majesty's Government should be requested to allow the Colonial Government to be represented on the occasion of the visit of the Transvaal Deputation to London, etc.,' the following amendment:—

“And that in the meantime this Colony should place a Resident with the chief Mankoroane.”

‘In moving this amendment, I do so as an addition rather than an amendment to the Government's proposal. I feel that the House has not yet risen to the supreme importance of this question, which is far more important than the disposal of Basutoland or the Transkei. You are dealing with a question upon the proper treatment of which depends the whole future of this Colony. I look upon this Bechuanaland territory as the Suez Canal of the trade of this country, the key of its road to the interior. The House will have to wake up to what is to be its future policy. The question before us really is this, whether this Colony is to be confined to its present borders, or whether it is to become the dominant state in South Africa—whether, in fact, it is to spread its civilisation over the interior.

‘Last year I moved for a Commission on the Northern Boundaries of Griqualand West, and pointed out that the boundary which had been laid down was not in accordance with the proclamation of Sir Henry Barkly. In accordance with the resolution of the House, the Government appointed a Commission, of which I was one of the members. The Commission

arrived at the conclusion that the boundary as laid down went further than we were entitled to go under the cession of the country we had taken over from Waterboer. The Commission pointed out that seventy farms in the territory that we had taken were really outside the Colony, and were the property of Mankoroane. We are, then, in this position—that this Colony is already in possession of seventy farms which belong to a neighbouring native state. That is one reason, though a minor one, why the Colony has a practical interest in the settlement of this Bechuanaland question. I call it a minor reason, because a much larger reason is the future of the trade of this Colony. The Colonial Secretary has appealed to me to give some statistics with reference to the trade of the Colony with the interior. In a privileged communication from two or three firms in Kimberley, whose names I am not allowed to mention, one firm alone tells me that in their line—soft goods and so on—their trade amounts to £100,000 per annum. As they point out, it is not merely a question of what this trade may be now; the question that we must look to is what it will be in the future. There are honourable members here who know what this Colony was when the settlement extended but a very few miles north of Cape Town, and honourable members know what the Colony has grown to now. The honourable member for Cradock expressed surprise when I referred to Basutoland. I will explain what I mean. Whatever we may do with Basutoland, whether we

retain it ourselves, or whether the Imperial Government takes it, it will still be there ; and so it is with the Transkei, whether we part with it for ten years or not, it will still be there for us.

‘ But this question of Bechuanaland will not be in our hands,<sup>2</sup> and that is why the House should now approach very seriously the consideration of this question. If we part with this question now, we shall find that the limits of the Colony will be Griqualand West.

‘ Now as to this question of the seventy farms. One solution is a cession by Mankoroane. But Mankoroane says, “ I will not take money for the territory. If you will take the whole of my territory, do so ; otherwise I want my territory back again.” Now, ought we wrongfully to seize the territory, or ought we not to accept the only fair solution, the offer of this native chief ? I am no negrophilist, and I hold to the distinct view that we must extend our civilisation beyond our present borders.

‘ We come now to the second factor in the question, which is Stellaland. The Republic of Stellaland also has offered us their territory. Some honourable members may say that this is immorality—to deal with these men at all after what has occurred. “ The lands,” they may say, “ belong to the chief Mankoroane. How improper ! How immoral ! We must not do it.” Now I have not these scruples. I believe that the natives are bound gradually to come under the control of the Europeans. I feel that it is the duty of this colony, when, as it were, her younger

and more fiery sons go out and take land, to follow in their steps with civilised government. Is not this also the principle of the British Government? I refer you to a despatch of Sir Peregrine Maitland to show that this is exactly what was done nearly forty years ago by the British Government in the case of the Free State farms taken from the Basutos; and, therefore, you will not be making any new departure in recognising the people of Stellaland. The people of Stellaland have offered to come under our rule. When I use the words "the people of Stellaland," I own that there are only about one hundred signatures to the petition, whereas there are in Stellaland about two hundred and fifty burghers; but I may tell the House that in the work of the Commission, after having seen Mankoroane in connection with the decision as to the boundary of his land, I went to see the people of Stellaland. I had heard that they were hostile to us, and I felt it my duty to go and ascertain their views, and I am bound to say that I was received with extreme attention. Whether it was quite in order or not under the terms of my commission, I think it was the right thing to do. I met the people of Stellaland and the President of their Volksraad, Mr. Niekerk, a very able man. They pointed out that they wished to do one of two things—either to be annexed to the Transvaal or to the Cape Colony. Mr. Niekerk said that he himself was inclined to the Transvaal, being an old subject of that state, but said he had not any very strong views. He only wanted the Cape Colony and the Transvaal to settle the question. Now I would

point out to the honourable member for Cradock, and the honourable member for Stellenbosch, that we must deal with this question, if only for one thing. We knew that all sorts of "fuel" are said to be in the country, and Imperial interference in Bechuanaland would be one source of fuel. If we do not settle this ourselves, we shall see it taken up in the House of Commons, on one side or the other, not from any real interest in the question, but simply because of its consequences to those occupying the Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of the Imperial factor in this question, and to deal with it ourselves, jointly with the Transvaal. The House may ask, What does the Transvaal think of this question? Well, we can only judge of the views of the Transvaal by the written minutes on the subject by the President and his Executive. [Mr. Rhodes here quoted from the blue-books to show that they supported his view.] Of course we must not disregard any legitimate interests of the Transvaal; but we are bound to think first of the interests of this Colony. When I arrived at the town of Mankoroane—Taungs—I found five or six native boys. They called themselves, by the way, "Pullinger," or "Rothschild," or "De Beers," after the companies for whom they had worked. They said they could not go home, as they would be robbed. I inquired into the matter in the Republic of Stellaland, and there they politely gave me passes for the boys, but frankly owned that if they had arrived without passes, there might have been a transference of steeds.

‘We have our depression here in Cape Town. What does it mean? The natives who come to work at the Fields now go home with gold concealed about their persons, and nothing else, for fear of being robbed. Here is a tremendous drain of gold from the Colony. These men used to spend all their money in goods, which they took home, and so advantaged the colonial trade. What did we build railways for? To secure the trade of the interior. Suppose we lie down oppressed with present difficulties, and say, “We will not extend our railways any further; our liabilities are too great, and we will do no more.” What will happen? I respect the Transvaal, but as politicians we have to look to our position as the future paramount state in South Africa; and we see, therefore, that any settlement must be made jointly with the Cape Colony, which must retain the trade of the interior, and must remain the dominant state in South Africa. I noticed the other day—I think it was in the *Cape Argus*—that Senor Castilho had met the Chamber of Commerce, and had informed them that at Delagoa Bay an *ad valorem* duty of six per cent. would be levied on goods generally, but that only three per cent. would be levied on goods for the Transvaal. Under such a tariff as that, our trade to the interior would be annihilated, and I claim the development of the interior as the birthright of this Colony. With a tariff at three per cent., goods would pass through the Transvaal, as everything west of Kuruman is desert. One large firm at Barkly informed me that if our one road to the interior were

closed, they would have to go to Pretoria, as the Transvaal tariff was prohibitory for the passage of our goods. I appeal to Western members whether they have not already lost the trade in spirits with the Transvaal through the spirit monopoly there? The spirits from the Western Province, with a free trade route, would go to the interior, but now that trade is stopped entirely. If we are stopped by a prohibitive tariff, what are we to do with our railways? Here we have a debt of £14,000,000 for railways, incurred in view of the gradual development of the Colony; and if the prospects of that development were taken away it would be a gloomy look-out for the future.

‘I hold I am perfectly consistent in having voted for the transfer of Basutoland, and in now holding these views. We have spent £250,000 in the last few years governing natives; but, as I said the other day, what we now want is to annex land, not natives. The districts I represent are frequently marked as desert on the map; but the land is suited to the farmers of this country. Some of it has been sold only lately at enormously high quit-rents; and the land behind Griqualand West, which is supposed to be desert, is capable of great development by the farmers of this country. It is not much use to natives; but the farmers could go there and preserve the water and make use of the land. The reason why I have put this motion on the paper is that I fear disturbances may break out between Mankoroane and the Stellaland people, and these disturbances could be checked

if Mankoroane had an adviser with him. When I was there I asked Mankoroane what he was frightened at. He said, "Stellaland." I asked the Stellaland people what they were frightened at, and they said, "Mankoroane." I am assured that the presence of a Resident would be most beneficial, as, pending the settlement of this question, I fear there may be a rupture. As to the effect of this question on general South African affairs, I would say that I perceive the high aim of much that has been said by the honourable member for Stellenbosch. His aspirations are for the union of South Africa. The question of the union of South Africa is bound up in this Bechuanaland question ; but I regard this question first in its consequences to the interests of the Cape Colony. I have been favoured with reports from Tati, and I have learned how great are the prospects of the territory beyond the Transvaal [*i.e.* the territory which is now Rhodesia.—ED.]. If this Colony were to be checked by the prohibitive tariff of the Transvaal, our burden of £20,000,000 would become greater than ever. The question before us is, Are we to maintain the trade with the interior, or to give it up? I solemnly warn this House that if it departs from the control of the interior, we shall fall from the position of the paramount state in South Africa, which is our right in every scheme of federal union in the future, to that of a minor state.'

Here we have Mr. Rhodes, well aware that his policy of Imperial expansion must be kept in the background, pressing the retention of what he happily



called the 'Suez Canal' to the interior, by means of the appeal to the self-interest of the Colony and its representatives, and very carefully avoiding any hint of rivalry as to this territory with the Transvaal, with the ambition of which for expansion a large section of Dutch members, headed by Mr. Hofmeyr, were in full sympathy. At the same time Mr. Rhodes dwelt sagaciously upon the mischief to Cape interests which would result from the prohibitive tariffs of the Transvaal, designed to divert the whole trade to itself. He wished the House to get rid of the Imperial factor, that is, of the need of Imperial intervention, the irritating and feeble muddling of Downing Street, by settling the matter themselves and taking over the territory, which would have saved a million and a half spent on the Warren Expedition, which expedition Mr. Rhodes himself was the means of getting sent up, being quite ready to bring in the Imperial factor when he could not save the territory to the Empire through his own conciliatory and peaceable means, annexation by the Cape, acquiesced in by the Transvaal. By this time the Transvaal was hard at work, with the help of the chief Massouw, to secure the key to the interior, as the following proclamation will indicate:—

'Proclamation, *6th Aug.* 1883.

'I, Gerrit Jacobus Van Niekerk, Administrator of Stellaland, duly authorised and empowered by David Massouw, the territorial paramount chief, declare the Republic of Stellaland, with Vryburg as its seat of government.'

Of course, Mr. Van Niekerk's preference for the Transvaal was stronger than he represented, as he

afterwards told Mr. Rhodes he was sent up to secure the country for the Transvaal.

Mr. Rhodes's amendment had not been successful, and no one realised the importance of the territory except the resolute supporters of President Kruger's idea, the Hofmeyr party. Mr. Rhodes was really in despair as to accomplishing anything at this critical moment, when he found an unexpected and invaluable ally in the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, saw the force of Mr. Rhodes's reasoning. He used his influence with Lord Derby, and induced him to take action on the question, and he also assisted in persuading Sir Thomas Scanlan, then the Cape Premier, to undertake a share of the responsibility. Thus time was gained (though the Cape afterwards rejected the arrangement), and the key to the interior, though not yet safe, was not absolutely lost to the Empire. Mr. Rhodes had still to expend much effort and much time before the key was safe in British keeping.

Expansion to the north, though his chief concern, did not entirely occupy Mr. Rhodes's mind at this period, as the next speech, a speech on the Liquor Licensing Bill, Sept. 10, 1883, will show. Mr. Rhodes spoke (and voted in the minority) in support of Mr. Robertson's amendment to insert 'or sell, supply, or give any liquor to any aboriginal native within a circuit of five miles from any proclaimed diamond mine.' The object of the amendment was to keep liquor from the natives, liquor being, according to Mr. Rhodes's native policy, the same then as now, the curse of the black man. On this subject Mr. Rhodes had the advantage of years of intercourse with the natives, in whose welfare he had always taken a special interest.

‘This is no new legislation. You are only being asked to confirm what was the law of Griqualand West when it was a separate province. Seeing that so many honourable members have voted for the clause giving\*the Government power to prohibit the sale of liquor to natives in any proclaimed area, I am surprised that there should be any opposition to giving them the right to apply this clause to one small area. Many members have spoken in a rapturous manner of the rights of the black man; but I have always held a different position from that which has been advanced to-day. The views of the honourable member for Stellenbosch are extraordinary. I can tell him that the poor coloured man in Kimberley is only anxious that he should be deprived of the chance of drinking. The coloured man does not want these privileges you are so anxious to give him; he does want some other privileges, which, perhaps, the House would not be so ready to grant him. The honourable member for Stellenbosch has not presented any petitions from the coloured men of Kimberley in support of his contention, or demanding equal drinking rights with the white man.

‘To those who say that the clause will not work, I say that they may then safely vote for it; it will not hurt on their own showing. We (I mean my friends) believe that it will answer. It is all very well to say that natives will walk five miles on Sunday to get drink, but will you try and picture to yourselves twenty thousand natives tramping five miles out and five miles home again on Sunday, when

you remember that they could not go without passes from their masters. My idea is that the natives will drink liquor when it was almost forced down their throats by the presence of the canteens, but not otherwise, and I am certain they would not walk five miles out and five miles back to obtain it. Every member who represents wine-growing districts is fully aware what this legislation means—the stoppage of drinking. That is a natural conclusion. It is very well known what the effect will be; as a proof of which I may say that the wine-merchants in town have refused lately to purchase Cape Smoke, because they know that, if this amendment passes, the sale of it at Kimberley will be damaged. Wine-farmers, too, know that the amendment, if passed, will be successful in hampering their trade. I say that our duty is to stop the trade, although the effect may be injurious to some western farmers. On this trade depends the morality of the natives. Every employer in Kimberley desires to see this practice of drinking stamped out. I think that the House should support the amendment of the senior member for Kimberley.

'It is said that you will lose revenue, but what revenue will you lose? The natives drink Cape Smoke, not imported brandy, and there is not a very great revenue derived from Cape Smoke. The total revenue from that source is only about £30,000, and that is drawn from every part of the country. I do not believe that the canteens in Kimberley will be shut up as a consequence of this amendment. There will still be a large trade with the white population

of Kimberley. The argument of the honourable and learned member for Colesberg as to the enormous expense of the police force at Kimberley I hold to be entirely in favour of my view of the case. For how are we to remedy this enormous charge? Every report we have shows us that the immense number of crimes in Kimberley is chiefly due to drink, and if we prevent the sale of drink, so large a police force will not be required. I hope that you will now endorse by your vote the vote given the other evening, for I cannot understand how honourable members can reverse that vote.'

Early in 1884 Mr. Rhodes had his first experience of office, being for a short time (some six weeks) Treasurer-General in Sir Thomas Scanlan's Government, about the time when he refused Gordon's invitation to join him at Khartoum. On Scanlan's resignation, the Bond party under Mr. Hofmeyr, though they had brought it about because of Scanlan's expansion policy, refused to take the responsibility, and put in a warming-pan Ministry under Mr. Upington. Mr. Upington, who was simply a puppet of Mr. Hofmeyr, the strong man who directed everything, gave up the railway to Kimberley at the dictation of the Bond leader. Mr. Hofmeyr was strongly against expansion to the north, which he held to be the heritage, not of the Cape Colony, but of the Transvaal. The temper of this Government may be understood by the fact that when in this year Boer filibusters from the Transvaal seized North Zululand (afterwards establishing the New Republic, in due course incorporated with the Transvaal), they used their power

and influence by threats of a rebellion at the Cape to prevent Imperial interference with the raiders.

The 'warming-pan' Ministry was really a necessity. It enabled Mr. Hofmeyr's party to grasp the advantages of office without the responsibilities. Mr. Hofmeyr alleged his defective eyesight as his reason for not forming a Ministry, but the real reason was the lack of trained men in his party to perform the duties of office. The Upington Ministry performed the bidding of the Bond (the Afrikaner organisation which sprang out of the excise agitation in the Western districts, the wine-growers' stronghold), and a great lowering of excise duties was one of its performances. Conscious of their strength, the Bond members carried a bill for the use of the Dutch language, and insisted on speaking in Dutch. Proposals were also submitted for the election of justices of the peace by the people, and for the flogging of servants after a summary process, and the rest of the reactionary Bond programme.

I conclude this chapter by giving a speech delivered by Mr. Rhodes in the Cape Parliament, June 9, 1884, a criticism of the Budget of the Treasurer-General of the rival Ministry, which had succeeded Scanlan's.

'At the adjournment of the debate on Friday, I felt the same difficulty as the honourable gentleman who has just moved the amendment, namely, that I was not aware of any proposals of the Government in regard to a rebate. There are various amendments before the House, that, for instance, of the member for Port Elizabeth, who has suggested the reference of the financial proposals of the Government to a select committee, amongst the members of which were to be

myself, as the late Treasurer-General, and the present Treasurer-General. I do not know—for I am young to constitutional government—but it appears to me that it is an extraordinary position that the financial proposals of the Government should be submitted as it were to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer with the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. It certainly appears to me that the taxation proposals should always be maintained by the Government, who should be prepared to abide by them. You are all aware of the enormous deficiency: that nearly half a million has to be provided, and that the taxation of the country is to be the question of the session. Taxation is a matter upon which the Government should stand and fall. If the motion of the honourable member for Port Elizabeth were carried, I could not agree to serve on that committee, because I think that a question of this sort is purely a Government question, upon which it must either stand or fall. There is, however, a definite question before the House, upon which the Government of the country has already declared in clear and distinct language. There was no faltering in the words of the Treasurer-General when asked by the honourable member for Cradock whether it was the intention of the Government to accept a rebate in regard to the customs tariff and excise. The honourable Treasurer then replied in clear and distinct language that the Government would accept no rebate in regard to customs and excise, and that left a clear and distinct question before the House.

‘The question is whether, in connection with these customs proposals, and excise taxation, this House is of opinion or not that a rebate should be made in reference to our interior trade. I must confess that I feel a certain amount of soreness in regard to the Budget proposed by the Treasurer-General. I am not prepared to state here that the Budget consists of stolen matter, but yet I do feel a certain hardship about it. One naturally feels a hardship when one’s clothes are stolen; but there is a greater hardship when one sees the thief walking about in those clothes; and the hardship is greatest when one sees the thief walking about with the clothes on the wrong way. In the Governor’s speech it has been proposed to raise money on the customs and licences, and the present Treasurer-General has accepted that position. The honourable Treasurer has adopted taxation on excise, customs, and licences, which had been proposed in the first instance by the late Government. Those are the proposals of the late Government, and so far their clothes have been stolen. The proposals are those of the late Ministry, but the manner in which they are to be worked out I distinctly repudiate, both on my own behalf and on behalf of my late colleagues, and I will point out how detrimental I believe that working out will be to the best interests of the country.

‘Before, however, proceeding to that, I will make a few remarks upon the figures submitted by the Treasurer-General. I think that the Treasurer-General, equally with myself, has found the difficulty



of starting from any clear or distinct balance in taking the estimated balance of last year. I think that the Treasurer has seen that the best method of dealing with the financial position of the country would be to take the cash-balance on the 31st March, after the loan had been raised, and when he knew more or less what was the balance in London, what was the balance in the Colony, and what were the liabilities of the Treasury at the time. In this I agree with the honourable Treasurer, and I too have found some difficulty in going back to the balance of the 30th June last. But where I differ, and where I would ask for light from the Treasurer-General, is that so far as I could estimate the balance on the 30th March, it was about £1,231,000 after providing for liabilities. I notice that the Treasurer has issued from his own office a statement that the balance on that date was no less than £1,128,628, after providing for liabilities under various votes of Parliament. But yet in the Budget I find that the Treasurer makes a statement that the balance on the 31st March was £1,181,000, or a very considerable difference from the balance that he had issued from his office. I would ask for more light upon this question. But taking the Treasurer's balance at £1,181,000, I find that the Treasurer has estimated the revenue at £2,896,000. For nine months the Treasurer-General has received £2,161,000, and therefore the balance still to be received for the year is £735,000. Thus the Treasurer-General should have a balance at the end of the year of £1,916,000,

as against his estimate of expenditure for the year of £3,305,000. The Treasurer has received for nine months £2,257,000, and provided for expenditure the sum of £1,247,000. Now, this would leave the Treasurer for the year a balance of no less than £669,000, as against his statement of £603,000. I am not aware how that difference is caused, and I have not had a very clear explanation from the Treasurer-General, whether he has provided in that balance for the amount required for the completion of railways.

'Now, I must differ from the Treasurer, and I must say that so far as I can see, the revenue for the year will exceed the sum of £2,896,000. As far as I can gather, I should estimate the revenue of the country at a sum beyond £2,896,000. You will find, on reference to the return of the Treasury for ten months, that the revenue of the country was £2,455,000. For the month of April you have received £293,000. It would be unfair to May and June to suppose that the revenue would be less than £250,000 per month—unless of course the Government financial proposals are likely to paralyse trade. This indeed we hear from every side. But taking the estimate for May and June at £250,000 per month, I find that the revenue for the year will be £2,955,000, as against the revenue estimated by the Treasurer-General at £2,896,000. Taking my balance on the 31st March last at £1,231,000, after providing for the liabilities for railways, the Treasurer-General should have a

balance of £2,024,000, as against the expenditure of £1,247,000. This would leave a balance of £780,000 on the 30th June, but from that must be deducted the amount required to complete the railways, £280,000, and when the Treasurer has taken that out, he should have half a million of money on the 30th June in the Treasury of the country. I really believe that that will be about the balance this country will have after providing £280,000 for the completion of the railways. I think the honourable Treasurer will find on the 30th June that there will be a sum of about half a million of money in the Treasury, and I will ask the honourable Treasurer-General what he proposes to do with that?

‘He has told the House that he is going to keep it and look at it. He is not going to let it go until he is assured that his hopes of what will occur will be realised. What is the use of locking up £500,000 in a stocking? That sum of money is costing the country five and a half per cent., and you are receiving for it one and a quarter per cent. What, then, did the late Government propose to do with it? They proposed to complete their railway system to Kimberley. The honourable member for Fort Beaufort asks, ‘Who gave us leave?’ The late Government was going to wait until the House gave them leave. They were not going, like his honourable friend opposite, to spend two millions of money on war without the leave of the House. What they proposed was to complete the railway system with that half-million.

When the question arose, the feeling of the House was not that the system ought not to be completed—it was the unanimous opinion that it should be completed. The question was, Where was the money to come from? The honourable member for Namaqualand told the House that the money was there. The debate on the subject was forced through, and a false impression left on the House that the money did not exist. Even lately, the honourable member for Beaufort West stated at Stellenbosch that he did not believe this money existed. I say deliberately, it is far better to spend that money in making the railway than to lock it up in a stocking, pay five and a half per cent. for it, and get one and a quarter per cent. There is one point upon which some of the members may disagree with me, and that is, that there is the liability to the Standard Bank to be paid off, but that liability does not commence to be payable until the 1st January next. The honourable Treasurer in his estimates does not provide for the excess on the completion of the railways, but if that amount were allowed, I believe that on the 30th June there would remain as a balance, after the completion of the railways, a sum of half a million.

There has been another statement made to the House, a statement in reference to the conduct of affairs by the late Ministry of Sir Thomas Scanlan. I do not know whether the honourable member for Stellenbosch intended it, but it left an unpleasant feeling on the House. He said that the Scanlan Ministry, instead of spending four millions on rail-

ways, had spent another eight millions. The spending of the four millions was the measure of the honourable member for Stellenbosch, who was on the late Ministry, and I regret that he ever left it. The four millions were spent upon railways, and the eight millions existed only as the capitalised amount of the deficiency. What really represented that? Was it the conduct of the Scanlan administration? No; it was the conduct of these wars. Ever since the honourable member for Cradock has been in the Ministry, he has tried to reduce this wasteful expenditure. I think that the honourable member for Cradock would not repudiate the fact, that the customs have decreased owing to the stoppage of war.

‘Another question raised has been this, that the honourable member for Cradock has plunged the country frightfully into debt on public works, far beyond the means of the country. Now, so far as I can gather, the figures are these: railways costing £10,000,000 odd, earning £265,000; bridges with an expenditure of £407,000, earning £16,000; and telegraphs costing £347,000, earning £23,000; so that roughly, on an expenditure of £11,642,000, we have earned over £200,000 per annum, or between two and a half and three per cent. Taking it that the money costs us four and a half or five per cent., the loss to the country would not be more than £200,000. Then we have a permanent war debt of £4,175,000, on which we have to pay £200,000. Now, which was the best for the country, a permanent war debt, costing the country £200,000 a year, or the money

expended on public works now nearly completed, on which we have to pay a similar amount, with every chance in future that they will pay their working expenses? It is true that we have a debt on the Colony of over £20,000,000, and in reference to that we had reproductive works costing £15,000,000, other public works costing another £1,000,000, and then the frightful war debt of £4,750,000. Altogether, £6,000,000 have been spent with reference to the native wars this Colony has entered upon since the introduction of responsible government. I do not think the member for Cradock need be ashamed that his administration has been connected with the public works of this country.

‘One of the most satisfactory things at the present time is our position with regard to imports and exports. During 1882 we imported for consumption to the extent of no less than £8,545,000. In 1883 we imported only £5,491,000, being a difference of £2,984,000 as compared with the previous year. This question was very fairly brought home to this House about two years ago by the member for Stellenbosch, when, on speaking of the financial condition of the country, he pointed out to this House that we could not go on importing one or two millions more than we exported, but that we must pay for the imports by our exports, and, further than that, we must pay the interest on our indebtedness. But during all those years of prosperity, there is the harsh fact that we were importing a couple of million pounds’ worth more than we exported. As I have shown,

however, between 1882 and 1883 there was a falling-off of £2,948,000, and I may state that this year shows even a greater contrast, for so far as I can gather, the exports of the country remain about the same and the imports are still further falling off. In referring to our exports, I may mention that wool has maintained its position, and although there has been a fall in value, there has been an increase in the quantity exported. We are also beginning to export wine, there being £61,000 worth this year, as against £46,000 last year, and we also hold our own in feathers. With reference to diamonds, I may point out that the exports are as large from Griqualand West now as they have been in the past, and I take exception to the remark made in his financial speech by the Treasurer-General, when he said he thought the diamond industry had brought as much evil as good. All that has been taken out of the country was contained in four holes, and for that we have got a return of £30,000,000. The diamond trade has been the source of great wealth to the Colony, and if the honourable member for Stellenbosch had supported me in getting the railway to Kimberley, we should have been able to benefit the wine farmers by having Cape wines there, instead of the wretched foreign sherry they now get. Well, then, as I have pointed out, there has been a falling-off of nearly two millions in the imports, but against that has to be put our indebtedness of £1,200,000, leaving a comfortable £800,000 to the credit of the Colony, which no doubt has been used to pay off the private

indebtedness of the country. This year we shall still further improve our position in this respect, and this is one of the most satisfactory points in connection with the financial position of the country.

‘Passing next to the question of the revenue and expenditure of the country, I am aware that there had been a considerable falling-off in revenue during the last few years. This year it was estimated at £2,896,000, but I think the Treasurer-General, should have made it £2,950,000. The estimated expenditure was £3,572,000, but according to the new calculation of the Treasurer-General, the revenue would be about £3,100,000 while the expenditure would be £3,546,000, therefore there would be a necessity of raising money by taxation to the extent of £445,000. With reference to the estimated expenditure by the late Government of £3,572,000, the honourable Treasurer-General says he thinks it possible to make a great deal of reduction on the administrative establishment of the country. I myself do not think it possible, if we wish to maintain an efficient administration. I notice that the honourable member for Cape Town wishes to reduce the salaries of the civil servants, but in my opinion that would be a most unfair reduction. The Civil Service have to keep up a certain social position in this country, have to give subscriptions to various objects, and set an example in certain districts, and I do not think any one can say that the civil servants of this country are overpaid. It might be suggested that the salaries on the Treasury bench might be



reduced. Well, I and my colleagues had almost considered that question, but in view of the probability of our early departure from office, we took no action in the matter, considering that such a course would be indelicate. I may point out that there are certain salaries you cannot touch, and I would ask the House which of the items it is proposed to reduce. There is one thing you might touch, and that is the native department and defences of the country. (Mr. Marais: 'The Transkei.') Quite so, but the House showed at the late election that it will not part with the Transkei. My policy has been to develop the northern territory, where there are pastoral districts and no natives, as much as possible, and by that policy a reduction can be made in the expense of colonial defences, and by the sweeping away of the office of Secretary for Native Affairs.

'Coming next to the important question of taxation, it is noticeable what few things there are to be taxed, and how few sources of revenue exist. As I take it, my honourable friend the Treasurer-General intends to raise £445,000 per annum by taxation; I do not accept his statement of £330,000, which is not calculated on the proper basis. We find that the proposal of the honourable Treasurer is not to proceed with public works—I beg his pardon—with the exception of East London and the Kowie Harbour works. No one can therefore charge my honourable friend with an entire disregard for public works—that is, of a certain class. But I would point out that a stoppage of public works will cause a fall-off in

customs duties, and the fifteen per cent. duty would entirely wipe out our trade with the interior. If you pass those proposals, the trade of the Free State will pass to our sister-colony, Natal. Well, I like my sister well enough, but I object to her getting our trade. There is also to be considered the duty on beer. Last year the increased duty had the effect of reducing the duty received on imported beer from £900,000 to £700,000. The further duty now imposed would simply be prohibitive, and the Treasurer's calculation of obtaining another £56,000 from imported beer would not be realised. I do not think, then, that increased customs tariff will yield increased revenue. Of course, there has been an encouragement of colonial industries, and I must say for myself that of the recommendations last year I see no reason to complain. I do not think any one would object to give a chance to the production of certain materials here by a duty of thirty or forty per cent., and I think my honourable friend might have included the jam manufacture, and have given sugar free, when he included tin ware. My honourable friend has made a great deal of a free breakfast-table, and I suppose that must have been working in his mind when he reduced the duty on coffee. Goodness only knows what that has been reduced for! Every one in this country drinks coffee, including the coloured classes, who should be made to pay their share of taxation. In other colonies, Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and other places, there is a heavy duty on coffee, and yet it is proposed to

reduce it here, and lose £15,000 a year. Is this to gain the Natal trade? I can assure the honourable Treasurer-General that twelve shillings and sixpence will not gain the Natal trade, for Natal is practically the port of a native reserve, for which the Imperial Government are responsible, and Natal can afford those low duties. When we are considering these customs duties, we must consider this colony as compared with other colonies. What I object to is that no provision is made for competition with Natal.

‘I will now make a few remarks respecting another portion of the present Government’s stolen clothes, namely, the excise proposals. I am glad to see that the Government proposes to tax existing stocks, and I hope they will adhere to that, or they will have no revenue at all. I hope the pressure from behind will not cause them to forego that. I object, however, to the differential duty of two shillings and four shillings on distilled spirits. I cannot see why a man who has invested his capital in distillation by other means than the grape should be suddenly stopped. My opinion is that such a differential duty would materially lessen the revenue. As to the taxation on licences, I cannot say much for this, as it was proposed when we were in office, but it is like taking stolen clothes and not knowing where the buttons go, such errors have been made in the taking-over of our proposals. I am strongly opposed to the tax on copper, for there are many other mines besides those now in Namaqualand to be developed, which people are anxious to put their capital in. One part of my

scheme I am glad to see that the Premier is prepared to adopt, and that is the taking-over of the territory right up to the Portuguese settlement, for that is a country without natives.

‘In my opinion, the grave objection to the taxation proposed by the honourable Treasurer-General has been that he has not considered the question of rebate. He has, in fact, distinctly declared against it. He has told the House he will have none of it, and I suppose his voice is the voice of the Government. I feel most strongly that unless a rebate is granted, the Colony will lose the trade of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic. What have the railways been built for, unless we intend to get the trade of those countries? Now, if by a sudden change in the taxation proposals you are to lose this trade, I do not think, much as has been talked about party, that any party in this House would support these provisions. I contend that the proposal before us would divert the trade of the Colony. I have had the good fortune to meet several Bloemfontein merchants, and I find that even with the increase proposed by the late Government, the merchants of Bloemfontein are more and more turning their faces towards Natal. You may say that it is only sugar and coffee, but I think that commercial men know that up-country merchants may choose where they will take their trade. They are supported either from Natal or Port Elizabeth, and they must choose one place or the other, and Natal having had a taste of the trade, the competition will grow and the

trade go to Natal. I have had letters from Port Elizabeth stating that they are shipping stuff from there to Natal.

‘I may tell the House, that though the late Government intended to raise the tariff, they did not intend to propose this tariff. Their main idea was to allow a rebate. They were not going to give this rebate because they wished the farmers of the Free State to live more cheaply than the inhabitants of their own colony. They were going to give it because they wished to get the trade ; they wished to get the carriage of it for their railways. They considered it essential to get the trade of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic. The late Government proposed to introduce an increase of customs and an excise tax, but the present Government has mangled those proposals. The great objection that has been brought against a rebate is that it would be abused by traders on the colonial side of the border, that if there were a rebate, traders would have a temptation to get their goods through the Free State. We hear so much of smuggling, we read so much of it in the books of our youth, that we get the idea that there will be smuggling ; but smuggling in times past was carried on in articles which were a hundred to two hundred per cent. above the original cost, and people are not likely to run the risk of the forfeiture of goods for eight or nine per cent.

‘The only objection which appears to me reasonable is the objection which has been made to the

extension of the Kimberley railway, and that is that the late Government proposed it. Surely the present Government may give us credit for having some common-sense in our heads. The only solution of the difficulty is that a rebate should be given. I can hardly think that the House will pass the taxation proposals of my honourable friend when they know that it will not give an increased amount of duty; nor that they will agree to the excise duty which will ruin the distiller; nor yet to the duty on copper, which will practically strangle the copper-mining industry. Parties may change, but a vote given can never be recalled, and the honourable members of this House will have to account to their constituents for their votes on an important question like this. The honourable member for Cape Town, indeed, has been liberally enough provided for. He is to get his corks and bungs duty free. The real question before the House, which the members of the House have to consider, is whether they will divert the trade of the Colony. Whatever the party vote of the House may be, I am sure the voice of the country generally is not with the taxation proposals. If they are passed, they will not add to the revenue of the country; and they will drive away the trade of the interior to the sister colony of Natal.'

It will be observed that Mr. Rhodes had already advocated the taking-over of the territory (now German South-West Africa) from the Orange River to the Cunene River; but though his advice was attended to, the Cape Colony was too late.

## CHAPTER V

NORTHERN EXPANSION—THE BECHUANALAND  
SETTLEMENT, 1884-5

IN 1884 the struggle to secure the interior, involving the ultimate supremacy in South Africa, actually began; and the rivals were the Transvaal, led by President Kruger, and the British Government, fortunately represented at Cape Town by Sir Hercules Robinson, who worked with and through Mr. Rhodes. Sir Hercules Robinson, though not possessed of the daring and enterprise of Mr. Rhodes, was a statesman, and saw the importance of Bechuanaland quite clearly; he saw also that President Kruger was the moving spirit behind the Boer raiders in Bechuanaland.

But Sir Hercules would have found it impracticable to arouse the Colonial Office, then tenanted by Lord Derby, had not the German Empire discovered to England its ambitions in a neighbouring region of Africa. The discovery was certainly not premature; for the British Government had the fullest reason to perceive Prince Bismarck's intentions more than a year before.

From his correspondence with Lord Granville as to the protection of a Bremen merchant on the coast of Namaqualand, about 150 miles north of the Orange River, the coming annexation might easily have been foreseen. On the 1st of May 1883 the German flag was raised over a German colony at Angra Pequena.

When an English warship was sent from Cape Town, it was met by a German corvette with the formal intimation that it was in German waters and the coast was German territory. It was not, indeed, till August 1884 that the coast from Portuguese territory to the Orange River was formally annexed; but possession had been taken long before, and with a Bismarck against invertebrates like a Granville or a Derby, the result was never doubtful.

This advance of Germany, long before it was officially completed, gave the Cape a formidable neighbour, and awoke the slumbering Colonial Office to the importance of Bechuanaland, so that Lord Derby listened to Sir Hercules Robinson as he would not otherwise have been at all inclined to do. On Feb. 27, 1884, the Convention of London was signed, and on the same day the Colonial Secretary telegraphed to the acting Governor at the Cape, together with the news of the Convention, the news of the Protectorate and its boundaries. The Protectorate was established with the consent of the Transvaal delegates, and the boundaries fixed to the east of the trade road into the interior. Mr. Mackenzie, a political missionary, went up, under a commission from Sir Hercules Robinson, as deputy-commissioner. Mr. Mackenzie, a staunch but narrow Imperialist, visited Stellaland and Rooi-Grond. In Stellaland, thanks to Mr. Rhodes's former visit, he was well received at first, but accomplished nothing in the way of a permanent settlement. At Rooi-Grond he was openly defied, the freebooters attacking Montsoia, and raiding his herds in naked contempt of the British Protectorate. Mr. Mackenzie's proclamation of a policy of land confiscation soon alienated the Stellalanders, and the Rooi-Grond people simply



ignored him. He made, in short, no impression, except on a knot of Jingoës in the little town of Vryburg. He was practically recalled by a summons from Sir Hercules Robinson to meet him at Cape Town.

In August 1884, Bechuanaland being in a state of anarchy and confusion, Mr. Rhodes was persuaded by Sir Hercules Robinson to go up in Mr. Mackenzie's place as special commissioner. Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond tried in vain to stop him, well aware of his staunch though enlightened Imperialism. Mr. Rhodes went first to Stellaland, where he had been before, but naturally found the settlers in a very threatening temper. By fearlessly throwing himself upon their hospitality, and meeting them in their own houses, man to man, he won over the stoutest freebooters one by one. His plan was simple and perfectly fair. They were to keep their farms—the land titles as registered in the land register—and to accept the British Government. They were to have local self-government pending annexation to Cape Colony. Cattle thefts were to be left to arbitration. The settlement ended with loud cheers for the Queen and Sir Hercules Robinson.

From Stellaland Mr. Rhodes went to Rooi-Grond (August 25) to meet General Joubert, who was to come from the Transvaal and assist in a settlement. General Joubert was all-powerful with the Rooi-Grond freebooters, who were all Transvaal Boers, but he was working, as Mr. Rhodes soon discovered, to get Montsoia's country for the Transvaal, and the freebooters were his instruments. Naturally he would do nothing. The Rooi-Grond people would not listen to Mr. Rhodes, and in open defiance deliberately attacked Montsoia while the Queen's Commissioner was on the spot. Mr. Rhodes afterwards exposed

Joubert's conduct at the meeting between Kruger and Warren at Fourteen Streams.

I give Mr. Rhodes's own words: 'As soon as I found it impossible to deal with Piet Joubert, I made up my mind. I saw that Joubert had allowed me to settle with Stellaland, but was determined to keep the interior by retaining Montsoia's territory, and would not, therefore, allow the freebooters to make any agreement with me as to the land.' The attack and the firing on Montsoia<sup>1</sup> began while Mr. Rhodes was there, and to his request that it should be stopped he got a flat refusal. Mr. Rhodes then solemnly warned the freebooters that they were at

<sup>1</sup> A sketch of what had taken place at the Cape before Mr. Rhodes was sent up to Bechuanaland in August 1884 may here be admitted.

The Transvaal delegates had just returned from negotiating the Convention of London; but, mindful of 1881, were confident that the Imperial Government would not check their advance by force in Bechuanaland. Exactly what Mr. Rhodes had predicted in his big Bechuanaland speech of 1883 was taking place. The annexation by the Cape he had urged had been rejected. The Suez Canal of the interior was in danger. The 'fuel' in Bechuanaland was taking fire.

The Cape Premier, alarmed at the danger of war, now accepted Mr. Rhodes's policy, and on July 15, 1884, proposed a resolution leading up to annexation by the Cape Colony. The resolution was carried, being heartily supported by imperialists—for instance, by that vigorous loyalist Mr. Leonard. Mr. Rhodes made a strong speech in support of the resolution, a speech which is placed in my preface for reasons there explained. Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond members disapproved of the resolution, supporting openly enough the Transvaal's claim to the interior. The High Commissioner, thoroughly at one with Mr. Rhodes, immediately after this asked him to go up as Special Commissioner to Bechuanaland.

war with the British Government, inspanned, and left them. His despatches to Sir Hercules Robinson, together with the Transvaal's action through Mr. Du Toit, who succeeded Joubert on the frontier, led to Warren's expedition. Sir Hercules Robinson was well satisfied with Mr. Rhodes's arrangement with Stellaland, and wrote to Lord Derby (Oct. 8, 1884), 'Mr. Rhodes made a new agreement with Mr. Niekerk and the leaders of the Losasa meeting, which is, I think, more favourable than that concluded by Mr. Mackenzie at Taungs.'

Mr. Du Toit, now representing the Transvaal on the borders of Rooi-Grond, or, strictly speaking, Land Goshen, of which the dorp or town was Rooi-Grond, proceeded to settle the difficulty in Transvaal fashion. General Joubert would not attempt to control the raiders' freebooting attacks on Montsoia in British territory. Mr. Du Toit went further; he annexed Montsoia's territory to the Transvaal by proclamation published in Pretoria, Sept. 16, 1884. This open defiance of the British Empire by the state it had just obliged with a new Convention, expressly confining it within fixed boundaries, was the direct work of President Kruger, who thought it simpler (as he afterwards said) not to interfere to restrain his raiders, but to end the matter by taking over the country. Of course, the raiders were Transvaal subjects, and persons in high office in the Transvaal were among them. The natives killed and the cattle driven off as loot were in British territory and under British protection.\* The cattle raided were driven off into the Transvaal. And now, to crown all, Mr. Kruger annexed the territory.\*

This was daring, yet by no means so rash as it looks; for the Bond and the Bond 'warming-pan'

Ministry at the Cape were secretly backing the President with all their power. Mr. Upington's Government, on the House being informed that in accordance with the arrangement with Scanlan's Government a vote of money was required for the Protectorate, had repudiated the arrangement.

And now the Bond party was pressing upon the representative of the British Government, that, if the troops were sent up to maintain the British Protectorate and effect a settlement in Bechuanaland, there would be open rebellion in the Cape Colony. Mr. Kruger had about a thousand Boers in Land Goshen, a Transvaal commando was at the other side of the border, of course, to restore order, and the resolute dictator at Pretoria believed in the policy of accomplished facts. The coveted Hinterland once in his hands, he could easily appease Lord Derby. Possession, as he has repeatedly found, is more than nine parts of the law, and no doubt he remembered how well his raiders were getting on in Zululand. This time, however, Mr. Kruger had gone too far. Three weeks after (on Oct. 8, 1884), the High Commissioner sent the following communication to the Government of the Transvaal in reply to President Kruger's annexation through his freebooters' so-called republic: 'I am desired by Her Majesty's Government to call upon the Government of the Transvaal to disallow the recent acts by which the South African Republic has assumed jurisdiction over Montsoia as a violation of the Convention of 1884.' This document, being backed by the movement of the troops, showed the British Government was not this time to be trifled with. The Proclamation by which President Kruger had annexed a part of the British Protectorate, after

first raiding it through his Boer freebooters, and carrying off into the Transvaal the herds of cattle from the natives under our protectorate, and killing those owners who resisted, was promptly withdrawn, and the withdrawal, of course, approved by the obedient Transvaal Volksraad.

A few of Mr. Rhodes's speeches contain vivid reminiscences of those eventful days when he did the big work to the importance of which he had long called attention in the Cape House, and thus saved the way to the interior for the British Empire. This is a memory of those days from a rough election speech. It records his conversation with Sir Hercules Robinson before he went up. 'Mr. Rhodes,' said Sir Hercules, 'I am afraid Bechuanaland is gone; these freebooters will take the country, and Kruger, of course, is behind it all.'

'Well, I did not accept the view that we were going to lose the whole interior of South Africa, and I asked that I might be allowed to go up and look into matters. The Governor said: "Oh, you can go up, but I can give you no force to back you up. You must use your own judgment." I replied, "Will you allow me to do what I like?" "Yes," said the Governor, "but if you make a mess of it, I shan't back you up." I said, "That is good enough for me." And so I proceeded to this part of the country. I found Van Niekerk with a commando from the Transvaal on the Hartz River. Montsoia was fighting with Manikoroane, and there was a pretty kettle of fish. It seemed to me that the best thing to do was to go into the camp of my opponents, and so I went on a visit to Van Niekerk and De la Rey of the Trans-

vaal. I shall never forget our meeting. When I spoke to De la Rey, his answer was, "Blood must flow," to which I remember making the retort, "No, give me my breakfast, and then we can talk about blood." Well, I stayed with him a week, I became godfather to his grandchild, and we made a settlement. Those who were serving under De la Rey and Van Niekerk got their farms, and I secured the government of the country for Her Majesty the Queen, which I believe was the right policy, and so both sides were more or less satisfied.

The action of the High Commissioner in calling on President Kruger to withdraw his proclamation annexing Montsoia's country took place on Oct. 8, 1884; but the Imperial Government had in the interval of three weeks required and received the assurance of the support of the loyal population of Cape Colony. Their number and power has been too often forgotten in England's anxiety to conciliate the Bond party. The disregard of Cape interests as well as of the Imperial Protectorate shown by President Kruger's action roused the Colonists; and a great meeting at Cape Town on Sept. 24, after a big speech by Mr. J. W. Leonard, passed strong resolutions in favour of Imperial intervention. A failure to do so would, the resolutions insisted, be fatal to British supremacy in South Africa. The Warren Expedition followed, after a belated attempt by Messrs. Upington and Sprigg to stop its advance by annexing Land Goshen to the Colony.

The coming up of the troops under Warren put an end to the disturbances in Land Goshen, known as

'Gey's War,' from Mr. Nicholas Gey Van Pittius, the freebooters' leader, while the natives—even those who had sided with the Transvaal raiders (Moshette as well as Montsoia)—were delighted to be under the British flag. 'General Warren came up to Kimberley (January 1885), and settled that President Kruger should meet Mr. Rhodes and himself at Barkly West. At this time, it is interesting to note, a certain young Mr. Leijds (in whom may be recognised the now well-known Dr. Leyds) appeared on the scene as the adviser and right-hand man of President Kruger. The negotiations were fixed to take place at Fourteen Streams. At this meeting the apologetic and humble tone in which President Kruger tried to prevent the troops going up was very noticeable, after his daring attempt to secure the territory by means of his Boer freebooters and his still more daring Proclamation. At the meeting Mr. Rhodes asked a plain and pertinent question of the baffled moving spirit of this attempt to secure the interior for the Transvaal. 'May I put one thing to the President? I blame only one man for the events that followed my arrival at Rooi-Grond, and that man is Joubert. If he had come with me we could have prevented what occurred, and now, when the matter comes up before us, where is Mr. Joubert? Why is he not here to answer for himself?' President Kruger replied quite humbly: 'What is done cannot be helped.' Mr. Rhodes had asked Joubert to come with him and use his influence or use force to recall the Transvaal freebooters. President Kruger's naïve explanation was this: 'I did not see my way clear to send armed men to oppose them (*i.e.* in raiding the British Protectorate from the Transvaal). I thought it better to take over the land by proclamation.'

There was another reason for President Kruger's unusual pliability and meekness on this occasion. The British Government had warned the Transvaal that it would have to bear the expenses of the expedition (the payment was very generously not enforced), and President Kruger received the warning at a time when a financial collapse was impending at Pretoria. Towards the end of July 1885 that collapse took place, and the treasury had temporarily to suspend payment. The reason is simple. The burghers, though willing to fight for independence, were not willing to pay taxes to maintain it. Yet the British Government, against which they had been plotting, and whose territories they had tried to seize, actually postponed the interest due to it, out of consideration for the distress of the Republic, then borrowing money, to tide over the crisis, on usurious terms.

After the settlement of the border question at Fourteen Streams, Mr. Rhodes's next business was to meet Dr. Leyds on the borders of Stellaland, and finally settle the responsibility for the David Massouw cattle thefts question, the Transvaal Government engaging to enforce the award.

As regards its main object, the rescue of Bechuanaland from Transvaal aggression, Warren's expedition was a complete success; but in the settlement of the country he attempted, the gallant general was not so happy. The ablest military commander is not often an adept in the art of governing men in a civil community, and General Warren was too close a student and too sincere an admirer of the principles of German military rule to deal successfully with an independent population, under the British flag, like that of Bechuanaland. His arbitrary arrest of Van



Niekerk, and the still more arbitrary imprisonment ; his openly shown racial preferences ; and, above all, his reversal of Mr. Rhodes's settlement of 1884 with the people of Stellaland, which they had loyally kept, were enough to wreck the usefulness of any administration.

The essence of Mr. Rhodes's arrangement was the different treatment he provided for the people of Stellaland, who, under his persuasion, surrendered all claim to independence, and peacefully accepted the British flag, and the people of Rooi-Grond, who openly defied the Queen's representative, and attacked before his face the natives under Her Majesty's protection. Mr. Rhodes's settlement had been approved by Sir Hercules Robinson, and endorsed by Lord Derby, who telegraphed to the High Commissioner, 'Your recommendation to adhere to conditions fully approved.' Moreover, General Warren himself had telegraphed to Van Niekerk from the Cape before he came up, 'I desire to acquaint you that I am prepared to adhere to the settlement arranged between you and the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes.' Yet, in the teeth of his own words, Warren deliberately repudiated the settlement. The breach of faith involved in this overthrowal of the Stellaland settlement was more than Mr. Rhodes could stand. He was pledged, the British Government was pledged, to maintain the settlement. He fought hard with General Warren, and when he could produce no effect, resigned. In the end Mr. Rhodes came off victorious. His agreements were carried out in their entirety, the High Commissioner supporting him in his unwavering fidelity to plighted engagements.

This arbitrary military rule in Bechuanaland bore a strong resemblance to the arbitrary military rule in the Transvaal which was one important moving cause of the revolt of 1881. The Bechuanaland Blue-book (C—4432) gives a full account of the circumstances, and I will merely select from it a part of Mr. Rhodes's long letter of resignation, together with the High Commissioner's official summing up of the truth of the occurrences he had personal knowledge of.

The following is a portion of Mr. Rhodes's letter of resignation to the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson :—

‘From the time of Sir Charles Warren's arrival in the neighbourhood of the border, communications of such a nature began to reach me day by day that I deemed it advisable to proceed to Barkly West for the purpose of personally conferring with the Special Commissioner, and with the hope of removing misconceptions under which it was quite evident he was labouring. I reached Barkly West on the 21st of January, and at once perceived that the General's palpable irritation was due to an impression on his part that, being your Excellency's deputy, I was not acting in a sufficient degree of subordination to himself. Sir Charles went so far, indeed, as to threaten resignation if some change were not made in my official status. Such an event I should at that time have regarded as a calamity, and as my sole desire was to assist General Warren in his task, and promote the success of an expedition which the Imperial Government had undertaken at great expense and in the face of many difficulties, I had no hesitation, in the hope that the General's *amour propre* would

in this way be restored, in assuring him of my perfect readiness to act in direct subordination to him instead of to your Excellency, whose commission as deputy I held, but always upon the understanding that the engagements entered into with the people of Stellaland should not be disturbed.

‘With the General at Barkly was the Rev. John Mackenzie, who had just contributed to a colonial newspaper a series of articles on the Bechuanaland question, in the course of which he had thought well to make certain references to me which were generally held to convey imputations of a very gross character. I accordingly demanded explanations at the hands of Mr. Mackenzie, who said that he did not admit the general interpretation of his articles to be fair and correct. He protested that he had no charge to bring against my integrity, and, having regard to the public interests, I deemed it expedient that the matter should there be allowed to drop.

‘From Barkly West I proceeded with the Special Commissioner, at his request, to meet President Kruger at Fourteen Streams. Mr. Mackenzie was also of the party, and I ventured upon representing to Sir Charles Warren that I did not think the presence of that gentleman at the conference would be calculated either to forward negotiations or promote a good personal understanding between ourselves and the representatives of the South African Republic. The General, in the exercise of his discretion, did not think well to be guided by my advice, but in the result it became fully apparent that the presence of Mr. Mackenzie at the conference was provocative of much suspicion and irritation on the part of President Kruger and his advisers. The President, again, had invited us to a friendly confer-

ence, and it had been agreed that both parties should be accompanied to Fourteen Streams by nothing more than a personal escort. There was never the slightest reason—none, at any rate, with which I was made acquainted—to fear that an act of treachery was in contemplation, and the fact of our moving to the place of meeting as though we were in an enemy's country, with scouts in advance, and skirmishers thrown out on either side, was not only to my mind ridiculous in itself, but suggested a feeling of distrust which was deeply wounding, and justly so, to the susceptibilities of Mr. Kruger and the officers of his Government by whom he was accompanied.

The Special Commissioner arrived at Vryburg on the 7th of February, and on the 14th he met the burghers who had come into camp in response to his invitation. His speech on that occasion was devoted mainly to the question of land titles, and here again I found it utterly impossible to concur in the line which the Special Commissioner pursued. Stellaland, with the exception of its southern boundary, had never been accurately defined, and on that side where a line had been laid down, on the recognition of which the integrity of the Commando Drift agreement to a great extent depended, Sir Charles publicly intimated his intention of prescribing an entirely different boundary. The effect of this intimation was to nullify to the extent of a considerable number of farms the assurances of the 8th September frequently repeated, that all duly issued land titles within the recognised limits of Stellaland would be regarded as binding and valid. What Sir Charles said was that he "would be right" if he took as the limits of Stellaland the lines of a sketch map submitted to Lord Derby by the Transvaal deputation, and published in

Blue-book C 3846, pp. 154, 155. This map was never intended to show the boundaries of Stellaland, but was a rough sketch drawn by the Transvaal delegates for the purpose of illustrating their views as to an amended boundary of the Transvaal. It had no pretensions to accuracy ; and not only was it not intended to show the limits of Stellaland, but those limits, as far as I can find from the published correspondence, were never discussed by Lord Derby or the delegates.

‘I regret to be obliged to state my conviction that Sir Charles Warren’s statement as to the sketch-map was most uncandid. Your Excellency is aware that I had promised the people of Stellaland that their land titles would be recognised. I understood, and still understand, that this promise was strictly to land which had belonged to Massouw either by conquest or previous possession, and that no titles to land belonging to Moshette could be recognised. I would have been prepared to assent to an explanation in this sense, but I am obliged to record my dissent from the explanation given by Sir Charles Warren as inaccurate and unfair. The action of Sir Charles Warren in repudiating the line agreed upon by a joint commission representing Mankoroane and Massouw long prior to Her Majesty’s interference in Bechuanaland, and thus cutting off from Stellaland a number of farms as much under guarantee of title as any of the remainder, I could only regard as a deliberate and unqualified breach of faith. I subsequently made representations to this effect to Sir Charles Warren ; but they did not unfortunately have the effect of inducing him to announce any modification of his plans. The correspondence which took place between the Special Commissioner and myself

just prior to my departure from Vryburg, and included in the annexures hereto, will explain to your Excellency more fully my views upon a question which most assuredly goes to the root of the settlement made with the people of Stellaland at Commando Drift.

‘In acknowledging the receipt of Sir Charles Warren’s proclamation, I was careful to place on record my emphatic dissent from its terms, and I prepared to leave Bechuanaland for the purpose of consulting with your Excellency upon the situation. At the Special Commissioner’s request I submitted to him a statement in detail of what I held to be infractions of the Commando Drift Agreement, and those proceedings of which I was not prepared to share the responsibility. In reply I received from Sir Charles the communication dated the 22nd of February, which with my answer will be found amongst the correspondence hereto annexed. Whatever may have been my differences with the Special Commissioner upon public grounds, I was at all times anxious to avoid even the appearance of a personal feud or misunderstanding ; but I feel that I should be entirely wanting in self-respect if I did not bring specially to your Excellency’s notice the terms of this communication, addressed to an officer who had been humbly but loyally endeavouring for several months past, without any of the ordinary inducements which such service offers, to promote such a settlement of difficult affairs as would tend to the maintenance of British interests and the settled peace of this portion of Her Majesty’s dominions.

‘Under the circumstances which had arisen, I felt that I could no longer retain my position with honour. Every promise which I had made to the

Stellaland people as regards their form of government, their land grants, and their losses from cattle thefts had, although ratified by Sir Charles Warren, been repeatedly violated; whilst proceedings almost ludicrous in their illegality had been instituted against Mr. Van Niekerk, who had been made use of by us for our own purposes almost up to the moment of his arrest. I accordingly hastened to Cape Town for the purpose of placing in your Excellency's hands, which I do now, the commission with which you did me the honour to intrust me.

'In reviewing the whole of the circumstances which have transpired, I claim that my efforts throughout have been directed to the ends which I understood Her Majesty's Government to have in view when I consented to return to Bechuanaland, and I further submit that the course pursued by Sir Charles Warren has been in all its essential particulars diametrically opposed to those ends. It is not difficult for a General with 4000 troops in the field to answer for order amongst a few hundreds of undisciplined Boers, but I believe it will be found that the breach of faith in Stellaland will necessitate the retention in that country of a considerable force for a period longer by far than would have been necessary if we had adhered to our engagements.

'Although dated the 14th, therefore, it may be said that the notification was not actually promulgated until the 20th ult., and I do not think it came into my hands till I received one under cover of a private note from the General. With every desire not to embarrass the Special Commissioner in proceedings for which it was fair to assume he had gauged the full measure of responsibility, I felt on receipt of this proclamation that personal honour required that I

should take a step which would conclusively show that I was not a consenting party to the measures which were being employed. So far as I was able to appraise the situation, there was no necessity whatsoever for the proclamation of military rule, and certainly there was nothing to justify the issue of a public notification couched in such terms as to give a handle to the enemies of order, who were quite ready to point out that Goshenites and Stellalanders were classed together in this proclamation as "freebooters" whom it was necessary to expel by military force.

'Without any apprehensions of the ulterior measures which Sir Charles Warren had in view, I had, upon his invitation, placed before him my own views as to the undesirability of continuing the shapeless system of government which then prevailed.'

To Mr. Rhodes's letter I add here the High Commissioner's authoritative account of the action of Sir Charles Warren, and the truth of the dispute between Warren and Rhodes :—

'On the afternoon of the 6th December (not the morning) Sir Charles Warren had an interview with me which lasted for more than an hour, during which we discussed very fully in all its bearings the mission on which Sir Charles Warren was proceeding. I pointed out what I understood to be the position in Goshen, and the possible assistance which might be given to the freebooters of Rooi-Grond by their sympathisers in the Transvaal and Free State. I then alluded to Stellaland, which was at that moment in a quiet state, and remarked upon the importance of preventing the Stellalanders either joining the Goshenites or interfering with the troops passing through their country for Rooi-Grond. Sir Charles Warren inquired how this



very desirable result could best be effected, and I replied that if I were in his position I should at once take two steps—(1) I should invite Mr. Rhodes, who had come down to Cape Town, to return to Stellaland with a view of keeping that country quiet until the troops had passed through on their way to Goshen; (2) that I should telegraph to Mr. Niekerk that we were prepared to adhere to the terms of the agreement of the 8th September, provided it was respected by the people of Stellaland. I added that I thought if the Stellaland people saw that their land titles which had been promised to them were safe, they would not jeopardise their claims by interfering with the passage of troops through the country. Sir Charles Warren at once replied that he was prepared to adopt both suggestions; but added that he feared Mr. Rhodes, whom he had seen, would not care to return to Stellaland. I said I thought he would consent to do so; that he had undertaken so far a disagreeable and thankless duty at great personal inconvenience, and without remuneration; and that if he were told that he could still be of public service, I felt sure he would not allow any personal considerations, such as a contemplated visit to England, to interfere.

‘It was arranged that Mr. Rhodes should be asked, and Sir Charles Warren then inquired as to the terms of the telegram, which I had suggested should be sent to Mr. Niekerk. I drafted a telegram, with which he expressed himself satisfied, and said he was ready to transmit it. I suggested he might take a night to consider it, as I was not anxious to hurry him into decision. He replied that he had made up his mind, and required no time for consideration. I commenced pointing out to him the nature of the

agreement of the 8th September, and the points upon which it differed from Mr. Mackenzie's previous agreement, which was cancelled by it. He appeared a little impatient with these explanations, and said he knew all about Mr. Rhodes's agreement, having read it carefully in the Blue-book on his passage out. I again suggested that he should think well over the telegram before despatching it, at which he evinced a little irritation, remarking that when he had come to a decision he was not in the habit of reconsidering it.'

This settlement of Bechuanaland and the battle that followed with Warren brought Mr. Rhodes's policy into the party arena, where it was assailed with equal virulence, though from opposite sides, by violent Jingoës and bigoted Bondsmen. The cross-fire of criticism and misrepresentation surprised and disgusted him, though he might have remembered Burke: 'It is in the nature and constitution of things, that calumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph.' On the one hand he was accused of being no Englishman, and of pandering to the Dutch (because he insisted on justice to the Stellalanders and fidelity to pledges); on the other hand he was denounced by the Bond for preventing President Kruger from taking Bechuanaland for the Transvaal, first by pressing the policy of Imperial expansion, and secondly, by bringing up the troops. His Bechuanaland settlement, like his settlement of Rhodesia, shows the quality of Mr. Rhodes's Imperialism, which is free from all racial animosity, looking on all nationalities under the British flag as one people. A rather long speech made at this period (June 30, 1885) in the Cape House gives a

clear idea of Mr. Rhodes's aim in politics, and of what he means by Imperialism, and gives also the main facts of the Bechuanaland settlement, then fresh in the minds of his hearers. Mr. Rhodes, following Sir Thomas Scanlan's motion 'for copies of correspondence between his Excellency and the Ministry with regard to Bechuanaland, and also for copies of correspondence relating to the resignation of Mr. Rhodes as Deputy-Commissioner for Bechuanaland,' said :—

'I have listened with much attention to my honourable friend the member for Cradock, because no one could be more aware of the race difficulties and other dangers that surround this question of a right or a wrong settlement of Bechuanaland. I can at least appeal to the House from the fact that I have for the last three years been trying to deal with the question, not with the idea of stirring up difficulties with neighbouring South African states; not with any desire to embroil ourselves with colonists of Dutch descent, but with a real feeling that in Bechuanaland lies the future of South Africa, and that upon our right dealing with this question will depend the union in the future of South Africa. It will be within the recollection of the House that two years ago I moved for a Commission to inquire into the question of the northern boundary of Griqualand West. I did this, not from any desire to add a few more acres to the Colony, not from a desire to embroil us with the Batlapin chief on the boundaries, but rather with a desire to open that great question of

what should be the future of the Cape Colony in South Africa. I obtained that Commission by the assistance of the member whose absence from that House we all regret—I refer to Mr. Saul Solomon,—and the Commission was granted, and went fairly into the question. It appears to me, rightly or wrongly, that if the Transvaal were to be allowed to spread across our northern border, and to absorb all the country up to Kuruman, it would be giving up to them the whole interior; and that our future would be limited, so far as the Cape Colony was concerned, to our present boundaries. It also appears to me that if we look to our history in the past, our ancestors, had they taken the same view, might have been limited to the Liesbeck river. I feel that, as we were the dominant state in South Africa, it is our duty at all hazards to keep open the route to the interior, which is to be found in Bechuanaland.

‘I feel even more than that. Some members on the other side may be inclined to say that it is better that the Transvaal should absorb all the interior, and that the Transvaal has a right to do it, as being the state nearest to the interior. It is not that they want to aggrandise the Transvaal, but because they feel that the absorption of native territory is more suitable to the Transvaal Government than to our own. I feel further this—that there is a real danger owing to the outlet at Delagoa Bay, and the policy initiated at Pretoria, by which numerous adventurers had been able to obtain concessions and bring about a prohibitive tariff. What I feel is that, with these influences

at Pretoria, our interior trade is seriously threatened ; and with the influences I speak of allowed to block the way to the interior, we shall lose all desire for the future union of South Africa. The only possibility of union is in our being able to regard the inhabitants of the Transvaal just as we regard our own fellow-colonists.

‘This union is not to be reached as the late Sir Bartle Frere wanted to reach the Zambesi—all in a moment : I say it with all respect to that name. It is with this idea that I went into politics ; this is what I have steadily advocated throughout my political life. I have entered into various local questions ; but I have kept this end steadily in view as the ultimate goal of my politics. Very briefly I will set forth to the House what has come of these views.

‘I saw my first light in a despatch of the Governor’s, who evidently perceived the ultimate bearings of this question—that it is the one question for South Africa. It is not the Transkei that is the main question ; whether the Imperial Government has it, or we have it, that is a minor question altogether by the side of this question of the Suez Canal of the interior. At that time I did not think that any European Power would come into the country ; but all that has since happened has shown me that I was right.

‘Do you think that if the Transvaal had Bechuanaland it would be allowed to keep it ? Would not Bismarck have some quarrel with the Transvaal ; and

without resources, without men, what could they do? Germany would come across from her settlement at Angra Pequena. There would be some excuse to pick a quarrel—some question of brandy, or guns, or something,—and then Germany would stretch from Angra Pequena to Delagoa Bay. I was never more satisfied with my own views than when I saw the recent development of the policy of Germany. What was the bar in Germany's way? Bechuanaland. What was the use to her of a few sand-heaps at Angra Pequena, and what was the use of the arid deserts between Angra Pequena and the interior, with this English and Colonial bar between her and the Transvaal? If we were to stop at Griqualand West, the ambitious objects of Germany would be attained. There is then good ground for England's interference in this country. In consequence of the recommendations made by the above-named Commission, I pointed out to the honourable member for Namaqualand, who was then on the point of going to England to deal with Basutoland affairs, what I thought was the proper policy for us to undertake. That was to hand over Basutoland to the Imperial Government, and take our responsibility in Bechuanaland. That may have been right or may have been wrong, but that was the policy which I suggested. My honourable friend got rid of Basutoland, but did not undertake the responsibility of Bechuanaland. I am sorry that he did not do so.

'When we came down to Parliament next session, I laid before it a petition from the inhabitants of

Stellaland, praying for annexation. I maintain that I accomplished two difficult things. I obtained from Mankoroane a cession of his country to the Cape Colony, if we were willing to annex it, and I obtained a petition from the white inhabitants, who were equally ready to be annexed. These were two opposing factors in the situation, and yet they were reconciled by me at that time. I ask the House to consider what happened then. The House listened in silence to the desire of these people to be united to the Colony. I expected the assistance of the honourable member for Namaqualand; but I am sorry to say I did not have it. The honourable member for Cradock and myself stood almost alone. But the question was still agitated when the honourable member for Cradock went home, and made representations to the Imperial Government. You may blame the honourable member for Cradock for his pledges; but if any man deserves credit for his line of action, it is the honourable member. He dealt with Bechuanaland at the time as a South African question; and but for his action, the Transvaal would have stood right across our path, and have joined on to German territory. There are some questions on which you must wait for a right verdict, and this is one. The time will come when you will say that the honourable member for Cradock was right. There is not a member of this House who is not interested in the keeping open of our way to the Zambesi. And how has that been done? By the action of the honourable member for Cradock. But for that action

he would now have been sitting on the Treasury benches. He did not "go out on a bug." The honourable member for the Paarl said we retired on a bug, but I am in a position to say that we did not; we went out because we knew that the voice of the country was against us on this question. Parliament would not sanction his agreement; but some day it would be seen that he acted for the good of the country.

'Two years had passed when the Prime Minister opposite proposed and carried his resolution for the annexation of Bechuanaland. Thus we have two promissory notes given to the Imperial Government—the pledges of the honourable member for Cradock, and the resolution of my honourable friends. Many members of that House have spoken very fairly on the question, and pointed out the great dangers connected with it. They have agreed that something should be done in the matter, and pointed out the way. Since that time the question has been systematically misrepresented by the correspondence in the press. My political opponents have not shrunk from imputing to me motives affecting my personal honour. I have been fairly amazed at the personal animosity imported into this question; but having taken it up, I intend without flinching to see it through to the end, as I believe it is for the best interests of this country.

'I go on to the appointment of the Rev. John Mackenzie, which was one of the direst misfortunes that ever happened to this country. I am



bound to say that Mr. Mackenzie was sent up to Bechuanaland against the wish of the late Government; and I will say this for the honourable member for Namaqualand, that he protested most strongly against what he termed the appointment of a political missionary in matters affecting the politics of South Africa. The Rev. John Mackenzie has for a considerable period been abusing a large section of the people of this country for their conduct. His position when in London was a clear one, and as long as he kept to it, he was not to be blamed, however much I may differ from him. His position was that this is not a white man's country, but a black man's country. That is a consistent position; but what then? When the Rev. John Mackenzie proceeded to Bechuanaland, what did he do? He arrived there with a great flourish of trumpets. . . . The Rev. John Mackenzie found the state of things in Stellaland somewhat as follows: Stellaland had made its own arrangements for its government. The freebooters at Rooi Grond were not fighting Montsoia, and the country was quiescent. Mr. Mackenzie, however, proceeded to join Mr. Bethell, and what was the result? He had no force, so that he should have endeavoured to keep everything quiet; but we find Montsoia immediately sallying out to burn the houses of the people of Rooi Grond. It was Mr. Mackenzie's duty to restrain everybody, or at least to leave them alone for the time being. Now, how did he deal with the white settlers? He had some communications with them, in which he told them that he was willing

to consider their land claims. I wish this to be remembered, because a great many gentlemen have got up at meetings, and have declared that these men could have no claims. Having acted in this way at Rooi Grond, he returned to Stellaland. What was the position of the people of Stellaland? Lord Derby had already declared that the chiefs outside the Transvaal boundary were free to make their own arrangements, and the High Commissioner would not interfere with them. That was on the 14th August 1882. Nevertheless, when the Rev. John Mackenzie returned to Stellaland, did he inform these people that he could not recognise their settlement, and that they must be treated as freebooters? Nothing of the kind. He made an agreement with them which I wish to refer to, because my own subsequent agreement has been called a "disgraceful" agreement, and I want to show this House and the country that the Rev. John Mackenzie had entered into negotiations with the people, and had recognised their occupancy. So it is not true that they would have nothing to do with the Rev. John Mackenzie, because he would not give them their land, for he was quite ready to do that. The truth is that they wished to have nothing to do with him, although he was ready to give them their land. Then Mr. Mackenzie offered what I must call a bribe by way of inducement to the so-called murderer—Gert van Niekerk. I consider our good report as Englishmen in this country affected by means of Mr. Mackenzie's treatment of Van Niekerk. Van Niekerk was offered, by the

Rev. J. Mackenzie, a special commissionership at £600 to £1000 a year. Would you be surprised to hear that Gert Van Niekerk refused it? What I want you to see is how inconsistent this conduct of the Rev. J. Mackenzie's is by the side of his Exeter Hall position. When, however, Mackenzie found that Mr. Van Niekerk refused his offer, he rounded upon him, and held all his conduct for the future to be bad.

'Later on, a meeting of the people was to be held at Losasa, and there I came upon the scene. I almost wish I never had come upon the scene. Before I came on the scene I had some character; sometimes I am led to think now I cannot have a shred left. Reports had reached the governor, showing that the opposition to Mr. Mackenzie was most serious. Montsoia was closely invested, and we were mixed up in a local dispute with a section of the white population, who, from the English point of view, were freebooters. At that moment I was asked to go up to Bechuanaland by the High Commissioner. I was on the point of leaving for Europe. It has been stated that I intrigued for this position, but I can only say that nothing was further from my thoughts. I was asked to go. I found the people in a state of hostility to Mr. Mackenzie, and I found it at once my duty to deal with the situation. I found that Mr. Mackenzie had moved up 100 police to Montsoia. I agreed to a series of resolutions to which I have already referred. I then proceeded to Rooi Grond, and gave Van Pittius clearly to

understand that he could not invade the Protectorate with impunity, and that the way to the interior must be kept for the Cape Colony.

'I return to my agreement with the people of Stellaland in the treaty of the 8th September. My first clause was that the proclamations of the Rev. John Mackenzie should be cancelled. That has been called a brutal clause. Why did I allow it? When Mr. Mackenzie found that the people would not deal with him, he issued a proclamation confiscating their lands. How could I deal with them, without repealing this proclamation? You must remember that the country was not annexed, it was only a Protectorate, and you cannot hoist a flag in a Protectorate as you can when territory is annexed. To return to the agreement. It granted local self-government to the people, but what were they to do? They were not annexed, and they had to provide for the Government of the country. Further, there was a clause to the effect that every act of the Executive should be submitted to the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland. This was the disgraceful treaty! No. 3 clause was with reference to cattle thefts. Cattle thefts had been going on on both sides, and I agreed upon arbitration to find the owners and return the stock. What was there disgraceful about this?

'I stood up for this agreement before President Kruger at Fourteen Streams, and Sir Charles Warren agreed to it, yet he afterwards repudiated it altogether. I saw Sir Charles Warren on his

arrival in Cape Town, and Sir Charles then agreed entirely with my settlement — a settlement which should be carried out, not because it is my settlement, but because it has been ratified in Her Majesty's name, and should be fulfilled. I repeatedly pressed upon Sir Charles Warren that my work in Bechuanaland was at an end, but Sir Charles Warren wished that I should go, and telegraphed to Mr. Van Niekerk, ratifying the agreement that I had made. It has been said that Sir Charles Warren was inveigled into signing this telegram, but an Imperial officer of Sir Charles Warren's position does not sign papers without looking at them, and, moreover, Sir Charles Warren had had months to make acquaintance with the agreement, which was telegraphed to England. I went back, authorised by the High Commissioner and by Sir Charles Warren, to say that all Sir Charles Warren's pledges as to this agreement of the 8th September would be fulfilled. I am sorry to say that not one of those agreements has been fulfilled. It is all very well with 4000 troops on the ground; but I appeal to men on my own side [*i.e.* English Imperialist.—Ed.] to act so that our deeds shall stand, for hitherto, with the exception of the slave-transaction [*i.e.* compensation for the emancipation of slaves in 1834.—Ed.]—and in that the Imperial Government was discredited by the cheating of local agents—there has never been anything in the action of the Imperial Government of which they need be ashamed, and so I would have it always. I met these people and told them, as I was instructed

to tell them, that my agreement would be adhered to. I expected to be supported by Sir Charles Warren, but never was I more mistaken. We were pledged in the name of the Queen to support this agreement. Yet I found that regarding the agreement as to the cattle, after the arbitration had been joined in by Dr. Leyds, Sir Charles Warren repudiated it altogether. I would like every logical - minded member of the House to consider whether this was fair. The award I made on the 25th November was wholly repudiated ; but it was publicly set forth that I (the deputy commissioner) had repudiated the settlement ; that I had deliberately entered into an agreement, and then did not wish to enforce it. When I heard of this I could no longer place any confidence in Sir Charles Warren. When I arrived at Vryburg I found that the public documents had been signed. Subsequently Sir Charles Warren met Van Niekerk at Taungs, by invitation, and the latter said he was willing to have the charges which had been made against him submitted to a board of officers and investigated. To show that Van Niekerk had no bias against Sir Charles Warren, I may mention that, some time before the latter came into the country, he said that the only man who could settle affairs was Sir Charles Warren. Van Niekerk has done his best in every way to assist the British Government in settling Stellaland, even at the risk of great discredit among numbers of his own countrymen. Long before Sir Charles Warren arrived in Vryburg, it was resolved to arrest Van Niekerk. He

was arrested on a Saturday, on a charge made by one of his followers, who had been dismissed by the Commandant-General. This was on Saturday, and when Sir Charles Warren arrived, he announced to the people that he intended to proclaim military rule.

'I went back to my house, and came to a conclusion what was the only course I could follow, as every clause in the agreement made by me had been repudiated, every promise that I had made in Her Majesty's name had been broken. I went up to remonstrate, and pointed out that not only my own honour, but that of Her Majesty's Government had been compromised, but it was useless. Sir Charles Warren told me that he intended to impose a fine of £100 on Vryburg, and said that the German principle was a most excellent one, and that he was a most ardent admirer of German Government. For myself, as an Englishman, I may state that I have an intense horror of German Government. I then communicated with the High Commissioner, stating that every clause in my agreement had been broken, and that I wished to leave, as I could not stand by and condone these continuous breaches of the agreement I had made. Before I left I placed on record that I considered Sir Charles Warren had broken the agreement, and Sir Charles Warren went even further and said my presence was a danger to the peace of the country, when in reality I was working with one sole object, and that was the retaining of the trade route to the interior for the Capé Colony.

'I have fought for this at the risk of my political

position and personal relationship with all sections of the country, because I considered it would be for the best interests of the country, and of South Africa, that the territory should be British territory. I have spent a year of my life in that work without reward, and all I got was the expression by Her Majesty's representative of the opinion that I was dangerous to the peace of the country. Why was I a danger to the peace of the country? Because I would not stand by and see Her Majesty's pledges broken. Immediately after I left Vryburg a Bestuur was elected, military officers were placed in charge of all the polling-places, and the votes of thirty-seven registered voters from the country districts were recorded. The first act of the Bestuur was to inform the public that they preferred the Rev. John Mackenzie's settlement to that of Mr. Rhodes. You have only got to look at the telegrams which have been sent regarding the Bestuur, and you will be reminded of the old story,—'The hand is the hand of Esau, but the voice is the voice of Jacob.' I returned to Cape Town and laid my resignation before the Governor; but people would not leave me alone, and imputed certain motives to my action. I took no notice of this, however, and might have continued to sit still, if it was only the point of clearing my own character, and putting myself right before the country, that was in question; but I feel that the public mention in Bechuanaland that I have broken my pledges, is destructive to the interests of the people of this country.



'When I went to Kimberley I saw a report in the papers of the settlement proposed by Sir Charles Warren, which contained a provision that no men but those of English descent should have a grant of land in the country. If this question had been raised by my hon. friends opposite, they might have been charged with trying to get up a question of race distinction. I think all would recognise that I am an Englishman, and one of my strongest feelings is loyalty to my own country. If the report of such a condition in the settlement by Sir Charles Warren is correct—that no man of Dutch descent is to have a farm—it would be better for the English colonists to retire. I remember, when a youngster, reading in my English History of the supremacy of my country and its annexations, and that there were two cardinal axioms—that the word of the nation, when once pledged, was never broken, and that when a man accepted the citizenship of the British Empire, there was no distinction between races. It has been my misfortune in one year to meet with the breach of one and the proposed breach of the other. The result will be that when the troops are gone, we shall have to deal with sullen feeling, discontent, and hostility. The proposed settlement of Bechuanaland is based on the exclusion of colonists of Dutch descent. I raise my voice in most solemn protest against such a course, and it is the duty of every Englishman in the House to record his solemn protest against it. In conclusion, I wish to say that the breach of solemn pledges and the introduction of race distinc-

tions must result in bringing calamity on this country, and if such a policy is pursued it will endanger the whole of our social relationships with colonists of Dutch descent, and endanger the supremacy of Her Majesty in this country.'

A passage in this speech may be obscure to English readers, though perfectly clear to Cape Colonists. On page 117 Mr. Rhodes says of the member for Cradock, 'He did not "go out on a bug." The honourable member for the Paarl said we retired on a "bug"; but I am in a position to say we did not. We went out because we knew that the voice of the country was against us on this question.' This refers to the resignation of the Scanlan Ministry, of which Mr. Rhodes was Treasurer-General, in 1884. The nominal cause of this was a hostile vote, forced on by the Bond party upon an unimportant question of protection, to keep out the phylloxera, familiarly termed 'a bug.' The real cause was the objection of the Bond to let Scanlan's Ministry carry out its pledges to the Imperial Government with regard to Bechuanaland. In a speech of Sept. 28, 1888, page 215, a further allusion is added: 'I retired nominally on a bug, whose nasty leg entirely covered the Transkeian map.' This refers to the immediate cause of the hostile Bond vote, a wild speech made by a member of the Ministry, Mr. Merriman, with regard to the Transkei.

## CHAPTER VI

## PREPARATIONS FOR THE NORTHERN EXPANSION

IN the period between 1885 and 1888, Mr. Rhodes did not take a very active part in politics at the Cape, partly because these politics were largely merely local, and partly because he was otherwise engaged. There was much and varied work to do, enough to have deterred a less indefatigable man of business, before he could put in a fair way towards completion the preparations necessary to enable him to carry out the occupation of the interior from the Cape, of which he had brought about the beginnings in Bechuanaland.

He had, among the more important of these preparations, to carry on the yet incomplete amalgamation of the diamond mines; and although he had been at work for years, 'pegging away,' as he would say, patiently, yet there was very difficult work still to accomplish before he carried his scheme to its completion early in 1888. He had to win over one by one the men who controlled or owned a large number of independent mines; he had personally to use all his powers of persuasion, and all his unrivalled talent for dealing with all sorts and conditions of men. The example of gradual absorption of minor companies which had gone on under Mr. Rhodes for a long time before in the De Beers mine was copied in the Kimberley; and at last there were practically only two great rival interests left—the De Beers mine and the Kimberley

Central. Difficult and wearisome as the earlier work of amalgamation had been, Mr. Rhodes had a still more difficult and protracted struggle to overcome the powerful opposition of the Kimberley Central, that is, of Mr. Barnato and his group; but by sheer persistency and the weight of the unanswerable logic of accomplished facts, the enterprising and unwearied Anglo-Saxon, who never knew when he was beaten, overcame the Jew, and in 1888 the amalgamation was formally completed. In this big work Mr. Rhodes had very valuable help, especially from Mr. Beit, but as the amalgamation was his own conception, so was really the accomplishment of it. The political object Mr. Rhodes had in view all along was to gain power to use the vast resources of De Beers, to aid his own private fortune, in securing the whole interior up to Lake Tanganyika for the British Empire, and thus insuring the ultimate supremacy of that Empire in South and Central Africa. Accordingly he was obliged to win over Mr. Barnato not only to amalgamate but afterwards to agree to a change in the De Beers Trust Deed to enable Mr. Rhodes to employ the profits in the northern expansion. On their final meeting for this purpose the three men who held the controlling interests in the great diamond corporation, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Beit, and Mr. Barnato, sat up all night discussing the proposal of Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Beit backed Mr. Rhodes, but Mr. Barnato did not think the proposal good business—in fact, he resolutely opposed it. In the morning, however, he gave way, observing, ‘Some people have a fancy for this thing, some for that thing, but you have a fancy for making an empire. Well, I suppose we must give it you.’ The fact is, Mr. Rhodes obtained his extraordinary demands as a sort of bonus for his labours in the

amalgamation, and as such Mr. Barnato agreed to the proposal.

Returning to the earlier portion of this period of preparation, we find that in 1886 an event occurred in the Transvaal which, while it was to give President Kruger the funds he had so long desired to carry out his rival scheme of a United Dutch South Africa, to which the Transvaal had invited the aid of the Free State in 1881, was to give also to Mr. Rhodes's Imperialist scheme of South African union, new and very strong grounds for encouragement—I mean, of course, the gold discoveries in that year in the Transvaal. No doubt the discoveries of the Lydenberg and De Kaap quartz-reefs had brought in a considerable number of miners before this time; but it was the successful opening up of the Sheba mine near Barberton in 1886 which really began the great change in the population of the Transvaal caused by the arrival of thousands of diggers, mostly English or colonists of English descent and speech. Finally, the ultimate passing away of the old order was practically insured (though, of course, not actually proved until the successful treatment of the refractory pyritic ores was discovered at a later date) by the proclamation, in September 1886, of the Witwatersrand Goldfield, the most permanent and valuable goldfield in the world.

Mr. Rhodes, whose most striking characteristic in politics as in finance is the extraordinary range and accuracy of his vision into the future, perceived at once the bearing of this influx of English-speaking immigrants on his ultimate aim of establishing a United South Africa under the British flag. Expansion was his immediate method for securing the foremost place, the actual hegemony of South Africa to the British Empire. But the problem was complicated by the

formidable rivalry of President Kruger, the head of a hostile and independent community of Boers, with the support he could count on from the Free State and from the Bond party at the Cape. With the advent and increase of a friendly English population in the Transvaal, Mr. Rhodes saw that he had the natural forces on his side, and they would probably solve for him the Transvaal difficulty in due process of time. As the mining industry brought in a civilised population it would gradually outnumber the old burghers, and the anti-British barrier would be weakened by the growth of modern ideas and modern civilisation among the Boers themselves, and also by the inevitable exodus into the unsettled regions of the interior of the more independent, adventurous, and conservative section of the Transvaal farmers.

The true policy then was, Mr. Rhodes was convinced, to cultivate in every possible way friendly relations with the Transvaal, and to trust to commercial intercourse to melt away the strong racial animosity which existed there. Accordingly, during the period 1886-88 and, of course, long after, Mr. Rhodes directed his political labours to win the confidence of the Bond party at the Cape, and at the same time to draw closer to the Transvaal by means of a railway union and a customs union, which would advantage the material interests of the Cape as well as the Transvaal. This is the key of his policy of unification from this time, and the key to the understanding of his political attitude and his public utterances, as may be seen from the speeches of this period.

Against him he had the Boer ideal of exclusiveness and isolation, with the intense natural suspiciousness of the Boer and his hereditary dislike and distrust of

the British Government; and at the head of these antagonistic forces he had, of course, the unrelenting rivalry and ambition of the strong representative of the Great Trek—President Kruger.

At first, no doubt, President Kruger did not perceive the real trend of the proposed railway union and commercial union with the Cape, and was not opposed to them, and would have come to terms, had the opportunity not been thrown away by Sir Gordon Sprigg's Cabinet. Mr. Rhodes was not then a power in Cape politics, and almost alone he fought for the acceptance of the Transvaal proposals. The offer of free trade and railway communication with the Transvaal was refused, in spite of Mr. Rhodes's efforts, and when the Cape Government afterwards attempted to get what they had refused, the result was a humiliating failure. As early as the first half of 1886, Mr. Rhodes was at work to carry through this policy of commercial and railway union with the Transvaal, in the hope that the contact of civilisation and the influence of closer intercourse would act on the Boer State and gradually remove its keen racial feeling, as the following speech in the Cape House (May 20, 1886) will show.

‘I will put the case before the House from two points of view—the sentimental and the commercial. The sentiment of the House is distinctly that the tendency of the action of the House should be to draw us closer together with the Transvaal and the Free State. But what is staring the House in the face at the present moment is, that unless action is taken at once, the Delagoa Bay Railroad will be carried out. That means that if the Delagoa Bay Railway is carried out we shall not get a continua-

tion of the line from Kimberley to Pretoria. Commercial people will be always inspiring or instilling into the rulers of the Transvaal hostile action against the Cape Colony. In other words, if the Delagoa Bay Railway is carried out, the real union of South Africa will be indefinitely deferred.

‘The point to consider is whether we should not act at once so as to connect our railway from Kimberley with Pretoria. If that is not done this session it will be too late; the interests of the Transvaal will be turned towards Delagoa Bay, and their commerce will go with their interests. From being connected in commerce union will come, and that is the only way in which it can come. I will also point out that if action is not taken, that railway will be made during the ensuing year; but if the House will but rise to the situation and act firmly, I believe that arrangements could be made for the extension of the railway from Kimberley, and that would at any rate unite us with Pretoria, and, as I firmly believe, would stop the Delagoa Bay Railway.

‘We should in the present circumstances save money if the Government of the Transvaal were willing to continue the line to Pretoria. That which is so earnestly desired by all—the union of the country—would, I believe, be seriously injured if we allow that railway from Delagoa Bay to develop. We shall be cut off from the Transvaal as far as our trade is concerned. Commerce should come first, and union will follow by having our interests in common. That is the point for the House to con-



sider. My hon. friend the member for Kimberley has read an extract from a newspaper containing the report of an interview with General Joubert. What is the tenor of it? Evidently he is annoyed with the Cape Government; he has not been received as he should have been, and he is turning his views to Delagoa Bay. If we take a statesmanlike view of the situation, we should deal with them in the first place about the internal customs, and then about the extension of the railway to Pretoria. The member for Kimberley has pointed out that his objection to dealing with the Transvaal in any way is that our natives in returning from Kimberley are made to pay duties on the goods they take with them. He wants to know the reason why the Transvaal deals with us in the way they have dealt. It is not that they have hostile feelings towards us, but that they want money. They are "hard up," and as they have no customs duties they say they must get their revenue some way, and the only way is to put a duty on goods from Cape Town and the Colony going through the Transvaal. The real duty is thirty-three per cent. added to the invoice, and then five per cent. on that; but the duty is not imposed out of hostility towards us, but because they must obtain a revenue somehow. I would like to draw attention to the premises laid down in the Attorney-General's speech in relation to this matter. The first is that we cannot give up our Customs duties; and the second is that we might approach them in so far as the question of internal duties is concerned; but he

points out very considerable objections to our yielding or giving way upon that point. Well, if we are going to approach the Transvaal and the Free State first by laying down the law that we will not give away any of our Customs duties, and yet are almost willing to allow discussion as to our internal duties, we shall only increase the feeling existing at present.

‘It is time to approach the question from a much wider point of view. We must do away with the internal duties, and if we are going to improve the feeling that exists we must deal with them on the basis of giving them some share of the Customs. It might seem as though I were asking the House to give up some revenue, but I would point out that if the Delagoa Bay Railway is going to develop—and I believe it is—that trade is bound to go either from Delagoa Bay or from Natal. Because if we do not make a Customs union with the Transvaal, the people of Natal are quite sharp enough to see that they must do something. Before we know what we are about we shall hear of a Customs union between Natal, the Orange Free State, Delagoa Bay, and Bechuanaland, and then what shall we do? We shall have to come down, and beg them to take us into the Union; but then they will say that it is too late, and that they have agreed as to terms, and can do nothing with us. When that comes to pass, I ask what will be the use of our railways? It is time that the House should consider the question, whether it would not be possible for the Free State and the Transvaal to allow our goods to go through

in bond, and collect at the different termini of our railways the duties for the Transvaal and the Free State on the goods passing through them; and in return for that we might ask them to impose, as against Delagoa Bay and the Natal border, duties of an equivalent amount, which if Natal had joined the Union, they might also collect for the Transvaal. I would point out that we might charge for that collection—our duties were now nearly twenty per cent., and we might charge for the cost of collection—(Mr. Merriman, Twenty-four per cent.)—twenty-four per cent., my hon. friend says; and we should see that our duties are not hostile duties. That is a question we must deal with; and I wish the House to observe, that if we do not do something of the kind, we shall get no Customs duties at all, we shall lose our trade, and we shall lose the takings of our railways.

‘Now is the time to act. We know that the feeling of the Transvaal towards us is that they would like to do something with us; and we know the sentiment of their rulers is that they would like to do something with us, and not to go to Delagoa Bay; and if we do not act, and act at once, they will make arrangements with Delagoa Bay; a treaty will be made with the Portuguese Government, and we shall find that we are too late in the field. We shall wake up and find our trade gone, hostile tariffs established against us, and the reason for which our railways were built, namely the development of the interior, swept away and destroyed.

'I think the House should weigh the question seriously, and meet it, not in a petty spirit, but in a broad spirit, and with the idea always before us that we should be the dominant State of South Africa, and should carry out the union of the South African States. If that were done, the authorities at Pretoria would co-operate with us rather than turn their views towards Delagoa Bay.'

With the closely related idea of winning political influence with the Cape Dutch and using it to diminish racial distinctions and racial feeling at the Cape, Mr. Rhodes had by this time begun to make practical concessions to the material interests of the Dutch farming electorate which was largely interested in wine-growing and brandy-making, as well as in the growth of corn. A speech made at the Paarl, June 21, 1886, illustrates this development of his policy, which was indeed absolutely necessary in order that he might get Dutch support for his northern policy, or at any rate weaken the power of the Bond in its opposition to the acquisition and development of the interior for the British Empire. His support of the repeal of Excise as being levied on the producer, and his attitude on Protection, which, for the purpose of keeping the farmer on the land, he had always favoured, were sufficient to make Mr. Rhodes a *persona grata* at the Paarl.

'Mr. Chairman and Gentleman, I am sorry that I am not sufficiently acquainted with Dutch to respond to the toast for the Legislative Assembly in that language. The Chairman, in his opening remarks, felt rather delicate in proposing the health of the Queen in the English language; I rejoice to see that

he has done so, and I give him credit for his judgment. I do not mean to make an elaborate speech. I have always felt that it was unjust to tax the producer. My opinion on that point has been steadfast, and I am glad to say that when I voted for the repeal of the Excise, I was supported by my honourable colleague, Mr. Paton. We were the two solitary members of the Opposition—and I believe the Opposition to be the best part of the House—who voted for the repeal of the Excise. We know that since the Excise has been repealed, brandy has gone up 50 per cent., whereas the duty paid by the producer during the time the Excise was in vogue was equal to 50 and 70 per cent.

‘But, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, there are questions of graver interest which have to be faced during the succeeding session. You might put a spur to your representatives to support the other great questions which are to be brought forward during the ensuing session of Parliament. I would submit to this meeting a subject of very great importance, namely the financial deficiency of this country. We cannot go on for ever borrowing—(A voice, Poll-tax). The honourable gentleman says “poll-tax.” Well, that is a matter for consideration. There is also the question of the franchise, a question which involves a great deal of thought. How are we to raise the franchise without creating any ill feeling? I say, this is also a question for consideration. I think the Paarl—and when I say ‘the Paarl I merely mention the centre of the intelligent portion of the community

—ought to put a spur to its members to give due consideration to these questions. And if I am allowed to go a step further, there is the question of Protection. It is a question of importance which we must face, whether things which can be produced here are not to be protected. And I can advance another step on Protection, and say that you should protect your grain and your wine. But I must be brief. Well, I say, then, that we must protect that which the country can produce. Where we perhaps fail is in the idea that we can produce our own blankets and dress-stuffs. There is time enough to think over that. First of all let us take in hand that which we have at present, so that when the farmer puts his plough into the soil he can see a chance of reaping a profitable harvest. These are, therefore, three subjects which I beg to submit to the intelligence of this community.

‘I was told this morning that the last time a banquet was given in this hall was on the occasion of the visit of the Transvaal deputation. I believe there is a feeling or sentiment when I mention the name of the Transvaal. Where we have gone wrong in our actions—and we have not a very admirable record to show—is our dealings with the Transvaal. We should draw closer with the neighbouring States. We should be very loath to allow our brandy and their grain to be taxed. Do you think it a good step that our Commissioner, who was deputed to the neighbouring States, should not mention anything about the customs dues? I can tell you, if I were

connected with the Free State or Transvaal, and the Commissioner came up, I should have nothing to do with him. We have sent a Commissioner only to create a feeling of irritation. I want to know whether, when we wanted a closer connection with these States, we have not made a false step in not meeting their desires? I have now submitted four questions for your consideration. If the House of Assembly did not deal with these questions as should have been done, then it is your duty to bring them to the notice of your representatives and not let another Parliament pass without a change. If you want to have these questions on a good basis, you must have a strong Government with strong supporters. I will leave these questions for you to think over during the recess, questions which I trust will tend to the future prosperity of South Africa.'

The great need for the successful development of farming in a large part of South Africa is irrigation. It is interesting to observe that Mr. Rhodes was at this early period a strong advocate of the desirableness of encouraging irrigation, which, it will be remembered, has been in later days his policy in Rhodesia, where the great irrigation works on his own farms—for instance, on Sauerdale, his 70,000 acre farm in the Matopos—are an example to Rhodesian agriculturists of what may be done by irrigation. Mr. Rhodes has all his life had the British love of farming; and probably nowhere has he been happier than in the peaceful life of a farmer, which he has of late years enjoyed while personally superintending his estates in Manica and Matabeleland. The following speech,

interesting also for its statement of his views on Protection, was made in the Cape Parliament on the Hartz Valley Irrigation Works, May 7, 1886 :—

Mr. Rhodes moved that the House go into Committee to consider the following motion : ‘ “That it is expedient to increase the area of land capable of being made available for agricultural purposes, and it is desirable to encourage the construction of works for placing land under irrigation ; and it is the opinion of this House that the recommendations of the hydraulic engineer for the irrigation of the Hartz River Valley, situated in the district of Barkly West, between the Vaal and Hartz Rivers, should be carried out if possible ; and that as the financial condition of the Colony will not warrant the expenditure of public money on the said work, this House is prepared to recommend a free grant of such Crown lands as are situated between the Hartz and Vaal Rivers to any joint-stock company or individual who may be prepared to execute or carry out, to the satisfaction of the Government, the plan No. 2 laid before Parliament by the hydraulic engineer for the irrigation of the said Hartz River Valley, at a cost not exceeding £120,000.”

‘ I wish to remind the House that this scheme is no new scheme. It has been attempted on various occasions by ministers, and also by the late Government of Griqualand West, in the period when Colonel Southey was Administrator. Colonel Southey made many attempts to induce the Home Government to advance the money for the



purpose of taking out the Vaal River and irrigating the valley, but he was unfortunately unable to obtain the funds, and the plan dropped. After Griqualand West was annexed to the Colony, the then Commissioner of Public Works obtained a grant from the House for the purpose of a specific survey, and a most favourable report was received, which can be found in the hydraulic engineer's report for 1882; but again the House was prevented from undertaking the scheme because of the magnitude of the cost. Two schemes were submitted, one with an estimated cost of £250,000, and a minor scheme to cost £130,000, but the matter was in the usual way sent to an Irrigation Commission; they presented a voluminous and able report, but nothing was done, and the matter was shelved.

‘I have since repeatedly attempted to get the work undertaken, but the finances of the country would not permit it. I do not intend to criticise the remarks in the Treasurer-General's budget speech; but the Treasurer-General has stated therein that he would not be prepared to recommend any particular irrigation scheme to the House, and that he himself, from the results of the past, was not favourably disposed towards them. It is on account of these remarks that the motion has been shaped in the form it now presents; it would be hopeless to expect the House to spend £130,000 upon the works at the present time. The value of the land could not be more than five shillings a morgen, so that the bonus for 20,000 morgen at five shillings would be only

£5000. If the rivers were taken out, the value of the land, of course, would be considerably increased, owing to the improvement effected. I know that the estimated cost is large, and I know also that even if the motion were agreed to by the House it is not certain that the scheme would be carried out; but I would do my best to make the scheme a successful one. Reference has been made to the fact that part of the valley was declared as River Diggings, but the scheme only included thirteen of the farms lying between the two rivers. It has also been said that the land asked for is at present used for native locations. Now the natives in the district have considerably diminished, and I have a return that there are only 130 huts left on the whole of the farms. I think there will not be much difficulty in arranging for locating them. I take the opinion of the House to be in favour of irrigation; and as we cannot afford to spend public money upon it, I think it is not asking too much to move for this bonus in land. If successful, the scheme means the placing of 20,000 morgen under cultivation, and the House would be assisting something which it very much desires to do, enabling the country to grow its own wheat. The House has been wandering year by year in the direction of improper Protection. A Bill has been put in to encourage cotton and woollen manufactures; we all know that this will be a total failure. The country is not adapted for such manufactures. The true Protection lies in the encouragement of the growth of our grain and wine. I maintain that this

country could produce its own grain; and if a slight protective duty on corn would so develop the agricultural interest of the country as to enable it to grow its own corn, the duty would be a right thing. In the years 1874-1882 the country paid no less than three millions sterling for foreign wheat and flour. In 1884 it was £343,000, and in 1885 £296,000, when, in the latter year, there was a fairer crop. There is not a piece of money in the whole civilised world small enough to represent the infinitesimal increase in the cost of a loaf of bread under a tax of one shilling on every 100 lbs. of imported corn meal. The Protection party has been led away by the cry for cotton and woollen manufactures; the real Protection is to stop the drain on the country by its payment for foreign corn, and produce our own. I am desirous of repaying my constituents for the confidence they have placed in me for years past; but I am still more desirous of passing a measure which would turn a barren desert into a fruitful cornfield.'

## CHAPTER VII

## THE PERIOD BEFORE THE NORTHERN EXPANSION

DURING this period (1886-88) Mr. Rhodes was quietly working to establish his political influence at the Cape, and to reconcile the sentiment of the Dutch electorate to the liberal and enlightened Imperialism of which he was the judicious and untiring exponent. This, as we have seen, was largely effected by his appeal to the self-interest of the people of the Colony in favour of his forward policy of territorial expansion. His growing political influence was also undoubtedly fostered by the strong attitude he had taken up against military despotism in Stellaland, and especially against the attempt to settle the country on the basis of racial distinction, which, aided by the High Commissioner, he had defeated in Bechuanaland. This insistence upon equal treatment for all races, won over even the Cape Dutchmen to accept the condition which has governed from first to last Mr. Rhodes's policy of expansion, that it should always be Imperial, always, that is, under the British flag. This work of conciliation, of course, took years to effect even imperfectly; and while Mr. Rhodes was thus engaged, in the intervals of his work of financial diplomacy at Kimberley, whereby he purposed to secure the financial support necessary for the carrying out of his plans, his strong antagonist, the Transvaal President, was not idle.

In 1886 the Transvaal proposed union to the Free State; but the proposal was rejected by the Free State on the ground of the existence of the British suzerainty. The Transvaal Volksraad then declared that the suzerainty did not exist; but—a significant fact—the union did not take place. This attempt at union with the Free State was a first step in President Kruger's carefully planned advances towards the purpose of his life, to establish the hegemony of the Transvaal in South Africa, to be followed by the union with the Transvaal, of course on Transvaal terms, of the other States, the practical carrying out of the policy to which the Transvaal had invited the Free State to give armed support in 1881, a United Dutch South Africa free from British rule, under the Republican flag.

Though baffled by Mr. Rhodes in Bechuanaland, President Kruger by no means gave up the idea of 'bursting his kraal' towards the north; but the Matabele warriors were not to be faced as lightly as Baralongs or Batlapins, and the President's advance-guard of raiders looked elsewhere; and knowing that the power of the Zulus had been completely broken by the English army in 1879, settled down on North Zululand like vultures on a dying ox.

President Kruger's men made rapid progress, and would have taken the whole of Zululand and secured an opening to the sea, had not the British Government interfered; very tardily and ineffectively indeed, but in spite of the threats and warnings of the Bond party at the Cape, who were still at that time backing Transvaal expansion, and amusing themselves by trying to 'bluff' the British Empire into giving the Transvaal a free hand, just as they had 'bluffed' it by threats of rebellion in Cape Colony when the

Transvaal revolt of 1881 began, into sending the British troops round by Natal, where they had to face with disastrous results the mountain barrier, then, as now, a natural vantage-ground for Boer riflemen. The Transvaal raiders, then, were allowed, largely owing to the Bond pressure at the Cape, to keep a trifle of 3000 square miles of territory, and were recognised in 1886 as the New Republic, to be duly incorporated (as Stellaland and Goshen would have been, had there been no Imperial interference) in the Transvaal in 1888.

1887, like 1886, was not without evidences that the Transvaal ambition for expansion was still unsatisfied. The Matabele prestige kept Boer raiders from crossing the Limpopo; but in Swaziland an easy opening was found, the drunken king and his court presenting a favourable field for Boer diplomacy. Generals Joubert and Smit accordingly set to work in Swaziland in 1887, and pressed the advantages of coming under the Transvaal upon Umbandine, to whom they offered £500 a year if he would do so. The Boers were assisted by a British M.P., who appeared as an emissary from the Queen to induce Umbandine to give up the concessioned ground to the Transvaal. Though the king saw through the plot and refused, he did not thus wholly escape the Transvaal, which, as it could not get his country in his life, attempted to secure it on his death by a very curious will, in which President Kruger was named as the administrator of government and executor of the king, a will which was not allowed to take effect.

Now all these efforts to take fresh territory were deliberate breaches of the London Convention, as Sir Hercules Robinson had warned President Kruger when he obliged him to disgorge the large mouthful

of Bechuanaland which he had just swallowed in 1884. But President Kruger, though he had meekly submitted to the High Commissioner's rebuff, was not deterred by it from carrying out his policy of Transvaal expansion in contempt of the London Convention and at the expense of the British Empire, and if he failed temporarily in Swaziland, had a large measure of success in Zululand.

At that time President Kruger had neither the armament nor the money to obtain it, which would have justified his risking an appeal to force; but with a singleness of purpose, magnificent from the Boer point of view, he kept steadily to his policy of overstepping his borders whenever he could, always persistently, and sometimes successfully, proceeding on the assumption that party government at Westminster, of which he had learned something during his visits to London, was helpless against an opponent shrewd enough not to openly defy, yet resolute enough to stick at nothing, wherever the removal of his neighbour's landmark could be expeditiously and safely effected. This policy may seem a little strange in a strict Dopper Calvinist, yet one must remember that, with the Old Testament for his guide, President Kruger has always regarded the Boers as the chosen people, and the English, like the natives, as Canaanites, whom it is the will of the tribal deity to deliver up on all occasions for the benefit of the true Israelites of Pretoria; and this conviction that God is on his side and against the English under all circumstances has been, and is, the backbone of the fighting-power of the Transvaal, as of the policy of its President.

During this period President Kruger had also made considerable progress in his policy of hostility to the

English immigrants whom the gold-mines had brought by thousands into the Transvaal. By the Convention of 1881 full citizenship was not expressly secured for all settlers in the Transvaal after the two years' residence then required, but it was undoubtedly implied in the *status quo* with which the British Government had to do when it agreed to the retrocession. In 1882 this two years' probation was increased to five, and this was the basis of the franchise when the mining population settled on the Rand; nor was it till much of this five years had elapsed that the period of residence required to qualify for a vote was increased to fourteen. President Kruger's anti-British feeling had shown itself strongly as early as 1885, when the Volksraad passed a resolution depriving the loyalists of the time of the revolt of political rights—a resolution which was withdrawn on the representations of the High Commissioner.

Already the preference of foreign interests to English, the predominance of the Hollander clique at Pretoria, the policy of concessions to foreign concessionaires, the policy of hostile tariffs against the Cape Colony (a part of a plan for reducing the Colonists to submission—the hard old Boer dictator having always preferred compulsion to conciliation) were, if still far from approaching later developments, yet sufficiently clear as integral parts of a policy of hostility to the paramount power in South Africa.

I will now give a few of Mr. Rhodes's speeches at this period (1887-88), with a letter on railways. These will show his attitude towards various questions not directly connected with his policy of expansion. The first of these is a long speech (June 23, 1887) in the debate on the motion for the second reading of the Parliamentary Registration Bill. In this speech



Mr Rhodes declared his attitude on the Native question as regards the franchise with the downright plainness of language of a man who sees things as they are, and has a hearty contempt for euphemisms.

‘I happen to be in a rather peculiar position. I happen to be out of touch on this question with the honourable gentlemen with whom I have acted year by year. I appeal to the House on this basis. I will deal with this question totally apart from the prejudices of the day. You shall have the real facts before you, and ask—Is this a right or is this a wrong Bill? I cordially agree with the honourable member for Stellenbosch that it is a perfect farce to call this Bill an interpretation of the Constitution Ordinance. I prefer to call a spade a spade. This is not an interpretation of the Constitution Ordinance, but it is the basis upon which we shall have to govern the country, if the country is to be governed as it should be. That is the proper view to take of this question. We ought to ask—Do you believe that the native population of this country should vote or not? Do not let us humbug ourselves by calling the Bill an interpretation of the Constitution Ordinance. Let us boldly say : In the past we have made mistakes about native representation. Let us boldly say : We intend now to change all that. Do not let us say for one moment, in order to court the amended view of the Eastern Province, or in order to palliate the changed position of the honourable member for Fort Beaufort, that we shall call this Bill an interpretation of the Constitution Ordinance. Let us say that with our

ripe judgment and experience of the question we are now going to make a change. Let us honestly say we are going to change the Constitution Ordinance. Do not let us cloak the question before the House in order to save the political principles of the gentlemen now in charge of the country; do not let us cloak it, I say, by calling it an interpretation of the Constitution Ordinance. Let us rather say that, with the fuller knowledge we possess, we wish to change the Constitution Ordinance. That is the real question before the House. And the crucial question is whether this is a good Bill or a bad Bill.

‘There are, however, a few outside tendencies which I should like to deal with in putting the matter before the House. What, I ask, is Parliamentary government? Parliamentary government is that the people who are returned to Parliament should be representative of the different districts of the country, and that they should be returned upon definite lines. But what is Parliamentary government in the Cape Colony? Parliamentary government in the Cape Colony is conditioned by social representation. . . . We have never had definite political lines in this colony. Now, in the Parliamentary government of the other colonies there are definite lines of division. I suppose, if I turned to the Parliamentary government of the Australasian colonies, I might say that it begins with a Land Bill and ends with a Land Bill: the political system of the Australian colonies is centred in Land Bills. Our posi-

tion is really more hopeful. I am perfectly well aware that the honourable member who represents what I have always called the Rosebank party (Mr. Wiener) would define the politics of Cape Colony as a matter of differential tariffs for the introduction of cargoes of deals and flour. But I feel that South Africa has higher politics than that.

'If I were asked upon what we can divide, I would tell the House that there is one great crucial question upon which we can divide—the Native question. If we are to have parties dissociated from any question of race, it must be upon this question. Upon this Native question I can claim that I have the Attorney-General with me, and I can claim that I have the honourable member for Namaqualand with me. If I turn to my friends here (turning to the Opposition benches), I would say that I differ from them on the Native question. Fortunately, I have no speeches to repudiate. All that I say is, that we have to govern the natives as a subject race. I do not go so far as the honourable member for Victoria West, who would not give the black man a vote. All I say is, that you must govern natives living under communal tenure as a subject race. Now we are getting clear in our politics. At last we are reaching party lines.

'There have been some disputes on this question. The honourable member for Stellenbosch is too hard on the honourable member for King William's Town. Look at the honourable member for Namaqualand. Has not he said that it would be better to have a Kaffir war every ten years than keep up the

C. M. R.? Look at my honourable self. Why, I once spoke of eliminating the Imperial factor. Now will the House allow me to say what I meant by that expression? What I meant, was, that if Bechuanaland was to be occupied by Boers, it could not stand direct Imperial Government. When I went home, however, I was regarded as a most horrid individual. Now, my friend (Mr. R. Solomon) has been making a statement about the native vote being used against the Dutch. We talk a great deal about there being no race question, when there is a very serious race question. What if the honourable member did let out that he wanted the native vote to counterbalance the Dutch? I myself have been burned in effigy in colonial towns—and what for? For trying to defend English interests in South Africa. I have great respect for the Dutch party for one simple reason. I fought it upon the question of expansion to the interior, but they have borne me no enmity for it, although I attained my object. . . . All I am trying to impress upon honourable members opposite is, that they must not be too severe upon members of this House if they make unhappy mistakes.

‘It is by good luck rather than by discrimination that there are no speeches of mine upon which I can be attacked, for I came down here a most rabid Jingo. No doubt, if the Honourable the Premier could quote against me my own past feeling, there would be plenty to quote. I passed through the fire in Bechuanaland, where I found that there are many

people whose sentiment is extremely rabid, but it will carry them no further than their pockets. I have tried to deal with the South African question. On the basis of this question we ought to give each other credit for some good intentions. Suppose I were to go to the speech of the honourable member for East London, in which he cast the imputation of disloyalty upon the inhabitants. One would have supposed that they (the gentlemen opposite) would have consigned the Treasurer-General to eternal political oblivion for that speech, but they did not. Oh no. They said: We will put him in charge of the affairs of the Colony, and make him recant every principle he has ever held.

‘To come back to the question. What we have to decide is whether this is or is not a good Bill. What is the use of indulging in the grossest of personalities against the honourable member for Aliwal North, or the honourable member for Cradock. If the supporters of the Government were asked to speak from their heart of hearts, they would say that there is no member more entitled to respect than the honourable member for Cradock; but that he is not in touch with them, and they are perfectly right not to be in touch with him. But do not let us indulge in such personalities as we have had from the Secretary for Native Affairs. Give the Opposition credit for what they have done, give them credit for desiring something higher than place. I differ from the Opposition entirely on this question of native policy. Let the question be dealt with as

it exists. Dismiss the Constitution Ordinance, and go on the clear issue. Is it right or wrong that the natives on communal tenure should have a vote? Is that the question? If there were not a Dutch and an English question, this question of the native franchise would have been settled long ago. My honest opinion is that we would have given the native his vote because we are afraid of him.

‘But taking it on the question of precedents, what has been the practice in other parts of the British Empire? I have listened to the honourable gentlemen in charge of the Government; and I am surprised at the poverty of the case made out for the Bill. There is a most excellent case for it if it were only put properly. The Premier has not put it; shall I put it? I did it for you on the Excise; I was not thought an authority then; I was looked upon with suspicion; but I will venture to do it again. Take, then, the precedents. What does the British Empire do? Is not that the way to put it? The case for the Bill is simply this. You (addressing the back benches) are a European minority; you have got the question rather mixed, on account of an antagonism with the English, but really behind you there is a huge mass of barbarism, and you say, “We are going to be lords of this people, and keep them in a subject position”; and you say, “They should not have the franchise, because we don’t want them on an equality with us.” By the last census there are 1,250,000 natives in the Colony, and 250,000 Europeans. Under the present franchise, if they

were to exercise it, the natives would have a majority of votes. Well, I will give the House some precedents. Go to other Colonies. Have you (Mr. Rhodes pointed to the back benches) noticed that the speeches of the Opposition have been barren and silent on the question of precedent? I will tell you why. Do you know the Constitution of Natal? Are you aware that Natal has a Constitution Ordinance, by which the whole of its natives are deprived of the franchise? Are you aware that in Act 28 of 1865, when it was thought that there might be some intelligent natives who were entitled to the franchise, a most elaborate ordinance was passed by which such natives could get the franchise? And this is what they have to do to get it, to give first their names, length of time in the Colony, trade or calling, whether married or unmarried, number, sex, and age of children, whether able to read or write, whether now or at any time subject to any native chief, name of the chief, etc. Now, my honourable friends (Mr. Rhodes was still addressing the back benches on the Government side) are right in their views on the Native question, and they know it; but they do not, in their rude way—if they will excuse my plain manner of putting it—take the trouble to get their facts. They should have proved that in the Colony of Natal the whole of the native races are disfranchised, that by the Act of 1865 a few are given rights of citizenship, although even after going through the form I have mentioned a considerable period of time must elapse before the application is granted. That is the unanimous opinion of the

Natal people, because there is no race question, of English and Dutch there to divide them; and if we in this Colony had had no race question, we should have had the franchise put on a proper basis before now. It is this horrid race question which has interfered with the whole of our political life. Then, again, Natal has introduced a large coolie population, and it has been found necessary to disfranchise those people too by a unanimous vote. The misfortune, I again say, of this House is that the Native question is made a race question. The Premier asks who is the cause of the split? I answer, the Premier. Look at his speeches in England and at East London. He has been forgiven by his followers, but the reporters have made a note of them, and here they are. Does my honourable friend opposite know what the franchise in New Zealand is? Every Maori has to be the owner of real property of the value of £25. This is all in favour of the Bill; for my honourable friends opposite also say that if natives own property to the value of £25 they shall have a vote. There are four Maori representatives to the four native districts, and I am told it is a hopeless failure. On account of an extreme philanthropic sympathy, there are those who wish to endow the native at once with the privileges it has taken the European eighteen hundred years to acquire. This Bill would have passed fifteen years ago without a murmur if there had not been this race question to divide us. Is it to be supposed, again, that if representative government were conferred upon India, the full and complete franchise



would be given to the native population? Not a bit of it.

‘So much for precedent; now I come to the question of justice. I read an article in a paper the other day which stated that the Bill would be doing an injustice to subject races. I maintain it would be doing nothing of the kind. It was not intended by the spirit of the Ordinance, whatever interpretation Mr. William Porter may give, that these people should have a vote; and whether it was intended or not, the crucial test remains, is it right that they should have a vote? Does this House think it is right that men in a state of pure barbarism should have the franchise and vote? The natives do not want it. Special cases have been put to me by the honourable member for King William’s Town, who is thoroughly sincere on this question, and by the honourable member for Victoria East; hard cases are given of individual natives losing their vote. But the answer to all this is, they have only to spend £25 and build a house, and they will then have the privilege of a vote. But there is a deeper thing than that. There is a novelist called Miss Braddon, and in her works may often be found cases of women who have suffered by the judgment of society. One gets up from the story with a feeling that the lady ought to have been received in society, and that there is something wrong in society’s laws. But though there are hard cases, reflection convinces one that society is right in its principles. So it is with the application of this Bill to the natives. It is contended that a

native using an enclosed piece of land, with a large number of cattle grazing, should have a vote, but there is the broad principle. All such a man has to do is to build himself a house worth £25, and so to become an ordinary citizen of the country.

‘I will lay down my own policy on this Native question. Either you have to receive them on an equal footing as citizens, or to call them a subject race. Well, I have made up my mind that there must be class legislation, that there must be Pass Laws, and Peace Preservation Acts, and that we have got to treat natives, where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way to ourselves. We are to be lords over them. These are my politics on native affairs, and these are the politics of South Africa. Treat the natives as a subject people as long as they continue in a state of barbarism and communal tenure; be the lords over them, and let them be a subject race, and keep the liquor from them. If the honourable member for Grahamstown was not utterly demoralised by the promises held out to him by Government, he would stick to his motion for the retention and extension of the liquor areas; and I would be with him. The native is to be treated as a child and denied the franchise; he is to be denied liquor also; and upon the principle of the honourable member for Stellenbosch himself, I call on him to go with me in this, and I appeal to the honourable member for Grahamstown not to withdraw that motion. It is only thus far that missionaries have any right to interfere in the question. I have suffered much at the hands of

missionaries myself, but I have the greatest respect for the missionary in charge of Lovedale, because he has not taught the natives nothing but religious doctrines, but has taught them also to be useful citizens, and any useful citizen has a right to the franchise. The £25 is literally nothing.

'You (Mr. Rhodes still addressed the members on the back benches) have been kind to the natives. I could, if I wished, show how well the Dutch have behaved to the natives; how in the Transkei the natives rebelled, yet their land was given back to them; and how in Basutoland they were given over to the Imperial Government. I could also show what has been done to natives in other parts of the world. The missionaries are wrong on this question. When they turn out men who are capable of administering the telegraph and postal system, and of doing carpentering and managing machinery, these are the men who will get the franchise without difficulty. In this the Opposition agrees with those whom I am particularly addressing. I would have liked to have seen the missionaries come down to the House on the important question of liquor; not on this trivial question of franchise.

'I wish to tell the Bond some home-truths. It is stated that the Bond will not interfere with elections, but I cannot help remembering that when my present colleague stood for the seat of Barkly West, the Bond adopted a foreign doctor to oppose him. My honourable friend, Mr. Paton, had been thirty years in the country; he was intimate with President Brand; he

held the Bond views ; but the Bond issued an edict that he should not be returned. They did not select one of their own countrymen, but took a foreign doctor from Kimberley without a shilling of stake in the country. But something happened in the district of Barkly West ; the members of the Bond refused to follow the dictation of the Bond, and voted for my honourable friend. Are you not now grateful that the honourable gentleman is a member of the House, instead of the strange doctor from Kimberley ? For myself, I tell the Bond, if I cannot keep my position in the country as an Englishman on the European vote, I wish to be cleared out, for I am not going to the native vote for support. Now the honourable members (he pointed to the back benches) shall see the whole of my views. I do not trust the honourable gentlemen implicitly ; but I hope they do not distrust me for the reasons I once heard a Dutch elector express, that, in the first place, I was too young, and in the second, I “looked so damnably like an Englishman.” I am aware that such feelings do exist in South Africa. The French, when they came, assimilated and amalgamated with the Dutch people in the Colony ; but there was something despotic about the English character which would not amalgamate. This is the critical question, and I sometimes think the native is at the bottom of it all. Why should we not settle all these grievances that exist between Dutch and English ? I offer to the opposite benches the pomegranate ; I ask you to clear away all grievances between me and you, and the native question is the

greatest. Do not let the real interests of the natives of South Africa be complicated with the question of the franchise. I repeat, they do not want it. And the chiefs and more educated ones do not want the natives to be destroyed by liquor. Why, Mr. Speaker, let the natives be protected from liquor and the missionaries would be ousted; they would not have a word left to say, for what right has the missionary to interfere about the franchise? Let the missionaries be taught a lesson. Let them be shown that they have no occasion to mix themselves up in the politics of the country. The liquor ought to be kept from the natives, and there the missionary sphere ends. The natives on communal tenure must be kept as a subject race.

I have given precedents for the Bill; I have shown the justice of the Bill; I will proceed to show that it is policy to pass the Bill. I am not a Jesuit, and I would not support the Bill if I did not think that not only does it lead to a good political end, but that it is good in itself. If I am right on the question of precedents and the question of justice, there can be no question that it is good policy also. We have lived in the past under what I may call the mists of Table Mountain. The politics of this House have somehow resembled the cloud that drifts round the mountain. But many of our legislators have wandered of late beyond the bounds of the Colony, and have begun to consider seriously, what is the policy of South Africa? What is the use of talking about a united South Africa if the native question remains

undealt with? Does the House think for one moment that the Republics of the Transvaal and the Free State would join with the Colony with its native franchise infinitely beyond the native franchise of Natal? It is impossible. Do you realise how inexpedient and improper it would be to wait until negotiations for union were opened with the Transvaal before introducing a Bill to settle the native question? It is nonsense, I may here say again, to say this is not a change in the Constitution Ordinance. Call a spade a spade; it is a change in the Ordinance. The way has got to be cleared for South African union. That union is impossible under our present native system. Go one step further. Suppose the Imperial Government were desirous of getting rich, after it has had enough of the expense and responsibility of Bechuanaland, and suppose it offered this Colony a *quid pro quo* for taking it over, are we going to give the franchise to the natives of Bechuanaland? Are Mankoroane and Montsoia to come down to this House with their attendant followers? No, they are not. We must adopt a system of despotism, such as works so well in India, in our relations with the barbarians of South Africa. It is my duty and my desire to awaken in this House an interest in politics greater than can be felt in the municipality of Port Elizabeth, which the honourable member who represents that constituency has often told the House is the sole policy of South Africa. I hold that there is something beyond that. If the positions I put before the House were on a Jesuitical basis, that the end

sanctified the means, I would have no right to urge them. I have shown that those propositions are founded on precedent and on justice, and if they are a right policy, now is the right time to undertake it. I am not going to say that you could make a united South Africa to the Zambesi to-morrow, but I do say that this thing could be done gradually by promoting the means to the end. There is an enormous population flocking to the Transvaal. The President of the Transvaal has looked for assistance to the Free State in preference to us, whom he regards as foreigners, and he has deprived us of the franchise; but time will alter that opinion, and we shall share that franchise, and then he will invite the assistance of the Colony in a system for governing these enormous mining populations. Let us then at once clear away this native question; it stands between us and the other States of South Africa.

‘I have been styled a free lance by the Attorney-General, but I have the satisfaction of knowing that in the disorganised state of this House, I can come down session after session with an object and an idea. To express it a little more clearly, it is as if I were a little sailing-boat on Table Bay, and knew exactly what port I am aiming for. The honourable member for Stellenbosch (addressing Mr. Hofmeyr pointedly) has no bait that can tempt me. I know exactly what I am after. I have got my interest in this country, I have my mining speculations, I have my interest in its future, and coupled with all this, I am a member of the House. Every year I can come down here and work at my problem.

It took me fifteen years to get a mine, but I got it. Though my boat may be slow in the race, I know exactly what I am starting for. There are honourable members opposite who have racing<sup>2</sup>boats, but I dare to challenge them, and to say that they do not know what ports they are sailing for; and though they may be manned with a smarter crew, what with their backing and filling, I am not sure they will not scuttle and go to the bottom. I have an object, and I can wait to carry it out. It is to me a matter of sorrow that I am separated on this question from those gentlemen with whom I have usually acted, but I think they will give me the credit of fighting for my principles. I have weighed what I think South African politics are, and I have decided on the course I will pursue.

‘It has been my lot in this life to travel through many regions of this country, and it has been my fortune to see a solitary springbok separated from the herd. I have often pitied his feelings and wondered how he works out the day; but I have a sort of idea that the time comes when he returns to his old associates, and perhaps the temporary dissociation will have strengthened the original ties. I am sorry I am separated from the Opposition on this question, I repeat, because, whatever honourable members on the Government side may say, you will at least give the Opposition credit for this, that although they may be wrong, they have done nothing merely for place or power. They are hopelessly wrong on this question, but they are certainly not working for place or power.



It is for the reasons I have given, of precedent, justice, and policy, in reference to the greater question of a united South Africa, that I shall vote for the Bill. Whatever source it comes from, whatever motives have dictated it, and whatever recantations it represents, it still is a good Bill; it meets the desires of the country, and it extends justice to the natives, leading the House to deal with the liquor question. Though I am isolated in my position as a member of the Opposition, I shall be doing my best in the interests of the people by voting for the second reading of the Bill.'

The speech on the Labourers' Wages Bill (June 30, 1887) contains a defence of the compound system at Kimberley, by which Mr. Rhodes had at once stopped diamond thefts and put an end to the drunkenness of the natives employed in the diamond mines. The removal of temptations to intemperance and theft from the natives by the compound system, and the practical training of living a peaceful and orderly life together thus given to thousands who come from all parts of Africa, attracted by the high wages and the way in which the wages accumulate, from Pondoland in the south up to Lake Tanganyika in the north, have made the De Beers compound system a practical education in civilisation which has a widespread, good influence in South Africa. The favourable testimony of Mr. Bryce, in his charming *Impressions of South Africa*, is all the more valuable, as coming from one who is a critic, rather than an admirer, of Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Bryce noted among other things the school where the native labourers

learn to read and write, the hospital, the encouragements to honesty by a bonus to labourers who bring to the overseer any stone they find. Here Mr. Rhodes, who gets on capitally with the natives, likes them, and is liked by them, used in those days to spend much of his leisure time talking to the natives in their own languages, of which he knew enough to make himself understood, and gaining that knowledge of native character, and native ideas, and native capacity for civilisation, which he was afterwards to use so successfully in his Glen Grey Bill, and in his memorable negotiations with the Matabele Indunas, by which he peacefully ended the bloodshed of the great revolt of 1896. This speech is notable also for an appeal to the consciences of his hearers to stop the liquor traffic, which betrays Mr. Rhodes's own deeper view of this question, too rarely put forward, partly because Mr. Rhodes hides his real feelings under a veneer of cynicism, one of the results of natural shyness, and partly because he sees too exclusively the rule of self-interest, and hates humbug and cant.

'I would like some of the gentlemen who have visited Kimberley, and who have seen the natives in the compounds, to tell the House what are the merits of the question. This is something beyond a mere party question. My honourable friend (Mr. Rudd) has put the case well, as representing the mining interest, when he says that they have so few votes in the House. On that very account they might fairly claim the consideration of the House. But I think I might appeal to the Treasurer-General whether, when he comes to the consideration of the finances of the

country, the mining industry does not appear of more account than when judged by the number of its votes.

' If there had been any doubts upon this subject, they had been removed since last year. You have had all kinds of prognostications and warnings as to what would be the effect of this system. You have now had the system at work nine months longer. I will appeal on that point to what had been said by the honourable member (Mr. Rudd). The Bill is not brought in with regard to present circumstances, but with regard to what might happen at some future time. Is it not time enough to move when these possibilities occur? It is perfectly true that the companies have to sell blankets and knives and some other articles which the boys could not do without; but if you ask whether the companies are abusing their position, I say again, "Appoint a Government Commission." Such a Commission will find that the amount of "truck" sold by the companies is very small. Directly they allow the boys to go out of the compound to make purchases, they lose their diamonds. The honourable member (Mr. O'Leary) is really asking members to shut the stable door before the horse is there. I may tell the House that so great is the effect of the compound system on diamond thefts, that if I could retain my compounds, I would not mind letting go the special legislation to prevent diamond thefts to which exception has sometimes been taken.

' If there is one class in the House that might be

expected to object to the Bill, it is those members who represent the wine-farming interest, for that interest, I freely admit, would feel some loss by the diminution of the liquor traffic. I hope, however, that many of them will be with me on the liquor question, and give their votes even though their interests may suffer. I put it to their consciences whether this liquor traffic to the natives should not be stopped. The compound system does check the liquor traffic in Kimberley, but the commercial classes do not complain. No people engaged in any legitimate interest complain. I put it to the House, to let us deal with our natives in our own way so far as diamond mining is concerned.

'If the Bill were really what it purported to be, "A Bill to prohibit the payment of the wages of artificers and labourers in goods or otherwise than in the current coin of the Colony," there would not be the least objection to it; but that is not the real meaning of the Bill. It is like many other things that come before the House—the purification of the native registers, for instance, which was a new departure, but was concealed under a most harmless guise. So it is in this Bill: the first five clauses are most proper and harmless, the sting of the Bill is in the sixth clause. I submit to the House that it is a fair thing to reject the Bill. There can be no more honest offer than the suggestion of myself and my mining colleague that Government should appoint a commission to inquire. The mining interest is sure to win on the facts. I ask the Secretary for Native Affairs and the

honourable member for Swellendam (Mr. Barry) to give their impressions of the compound system on their recent visit. I took them over my compound, never asked them for their vote, and simply said, "See everything."

We have now reached the place for a letter on railways addressed to the editor of the *Cape Argus*, dated July 6, 1887, and published in that paper July 7. This is one of those rare things, a long letter by Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes has a dislike, which amounts to a practical incapacity, for letter-writing. Even to get an answer to a letter from him was, in the days when he had not got a secretary at his elbow, an unwonted experience for his correspondents, but here one sees that Mr. Rhodes, who never puts pen to paper if he can possibly avoid it, can, if he choose, use his pen with very good effect. The letter proposes the best means of coping with the Transvaal isolation and checkmating the Delagoa Bay extension railway.

#### To the Editor of the *Cape Argus*.

'SIR,—Private affairs take me to England before the close of the session, and before any opportunity has arisen for discussing a question in which the future prosperity of the country is, to a great extent, bound up. I trust Parliament will not rise without giving it to be clearly understood by all whom it may concern that serious business is meant, and I should not like to leave without putting on record views which I myself strongly entertain. It is no good crying over spilt milk, so there is very little now to be gained by saying that the Transvaal connection

might have been saved if the Government had but followed the course which I ventured to point out to them last year; but I earnestly hope that they will not repeat their error and allow the present opportunity to pass of repairing, so far as it may now be repaired, the mischief which ensued on the blunders which they made at the close of last session. The Free State is in the way with us now, just as the Transvaal was when its Government was so hard pushed, as we know it to have been, for the means to prevent an administrative collapse. The Free State has met with a rebuff at the hands of the sister Republic, which has said in effect, that it will have no more to do with a deputation from Bloemfontein than it will have with a deputation from Cape Town. I deplore, as much as any one can deplore, this un-neighbourly attitude on the part of the Transvaal; but I do not think that either the Cape Colony or the Free State is bound quietly to remain in the position in which the gentleman for the time being in power at Pretoria would seek to keep them.

‘With the failure of the Bloemfontein deputation, the Colesberg extension line is generally conceded to have fallen to the ground; but the Free State is anxious, nevertheless, for a line to be constructed through its territory which will give access to the Transvaal and tap the trade of that country. It is obvious that the line which will best enable them to do that is one running from Kimberley, by as straight a route as possible, to some point on the Vaal River opposite Witwatersrand—say to Waal Drift. For reasons of high policy, it is not likely that the Free State will allow us to construct that line, though it would be a perfectly safe and legitimate venture if they would; but if we were to make known our

readiness to hand over to them a reasonable share of the Customs dues on condition that such a line were made, I have reason to believe that the Volksraad would forthwith empower the Executive to construct the line itself, and we might facilitate the matter by giving a guarantee of the interest, which would enable the Free State to obtain money on favourable terms.

‘Looking to the now assured future of the Transvaal, I am very decidedly of opinion that a line from Kimberley to the Vaal River would yield a satisfactory return; but the difficulty with all our lines is that of return loads, and gold is a product, from that point of view, not much better than the peculiar product of Griqualand West. There is, however, not alone gold in the Transvaal. A line to Waal Drift should provide return loads for trains from Kimberley to the extent of not less than 50,000 tons of coal per annum—this on the basis of present consumption, and estimating one ton of imported coal to be worth two tons of colonial. The Orange Free State would get the whole of the carriage of these 50,000 tons in addition to merchandise and other traffic, and I think there is no competent judge who will say that, with a traffic of such dimensions, there would be any shortfall on the line.

‘But then you will say, What about the interests which the Colony has in the line? What would become of the line from Port Elizabeth to Kimberley if there were no coal to haul? Well, I will point out that the coal and the merchandise both travel the same way over our lines. In our case, coal for Kimberley does not mean return loads. We should lose what is not got from the carriage of coal, not all that is got, of course, but so much as may be over and

above the cost of actual haulage and wear and tear. To meet this loss, I would impose a sort of octroi of say 15s. per ton on Transvaal coal at Kimberley. It would stand that, and the Colony would be protected from loss.

‘From the Kimberley point of view, I think the advantage is beyond dispute. Waal Drift coal can be put on the bank at 10s. per ton. Carriage to Kimberley (say 200 miles at 2d. per ton per mile) would be £1, 13s. 1d. per ton. The proposed tax would be 15s. per ton, say £2, 18s. 4d. in all; or for two tons (the equivalent of one ton of English coal) £5, 16s. 8d. as against £8, which is an average price for good English steam coal in Kimberley.

‘I am told that certain of the Bond members would not go in for a scheme of this kind, because it would mean the shutting out from Kimberley of Stormberg coal; but I would put it to the Bond members that they ought, above all things, to regard South Africa as a whole, for to them it ought to signify nothing whether the new industry that is to be developed is located at Cyphergat or on the banks of the Vaal. Furthermore, an extension from Kimberley would no doubt be coupled with a line to Bloemfontein, which would enable the farmers in the Conquered Territory to get better access to their market; and the line that would inevitably be made at no distant date thereafter, linking in Bloemfontein and Aliwal North, would enable the coal of the frontier districts to reach Kimberley by a better and less circuitous route than any of those which have been under consideration in recent discussions.

‘What I have now said would be the substance of what I should contribute to any discussion on the railway question if I were in my seat in Parliament



when it took place. I feel that the present is a golden opportunity which may not soon recur. The Free State is in the humour for joining hands with the Colony to mark its resentment by perfectly fair means, but with practical effect, of the policy of isolation which is now being pursued by the neighbouring Republic, and if the right steps are promptly and rightly taken, the Delagoa Bay extension railway, which would send all the traffic of Witwatersrand through Lorenzo Marques, will not for a good many years be made. It is emphatically a case of the first in the field. If we are first, and make good our grip, we shall not be soon or easily disposed of.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, C. J. RHODES.

‘HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, *July 6, 1887.*’

I think it will be most convenient for my readers to give in this chapter two speeches of 1888, one an attack on the Ballot Bill, described in the Cape papers as ‘killing it with ridicule,’ and one a speech on the Railway Extension Bill. As these speeches deal with other questions than the main work of 1888, the Northern Expansion, I place them in this rather than in the next chapter. The speech on the Ballot Bill, July 25, 1888, with its urgent appeal to the logic of facts, deals with an attempt to introduce special legislation for Kimberley.

‘With reference to the question before us, I should like to point out some harsh facts to the House. The first fact would be the feeling of the Government of the day, who, after twice bringing in the Bill, have felt that the sense of the House is against the measure. I do not look upon the Bill as a Government measure;

I look upon it as one of those measures which the Government has thought fit to introduce at the request of a certain portion of its followers. On finding the sense of the House was totally against the Bill, the Government decided not to proceed with the measure. Therefore I would impress upon the members of the House who are supporters of the Government, that the question is in no shape or form a Government matter. Then I would also submit this point to the House, that seeing what motions were moved on the last occasion when the matter was before the House, and that it was a clear and distinct fact that they were moved in order that Cape Town should not be included in the Bill, it becomes more and more a Bill simply for one community, and that is Kimberley. A pleasing admission of this is the fact that the Bill has been submitted to the House after consultation as to whether it could be introduced for one community, and on the discovery being made that the Bill could not be introduced for one community, our old friend, whom I referred to the previous night, has allowed the modern Athens, Grahamstown, to come to his assistance. Of the reasons for this I am not aware, but it is distinctly clear that it is proposed to submit the Ballot Bill to the House, purely and simply for Kimberley alone. That is the proposition, and nothing else; but on it being found that the Government was tired of the Bill, the idea occurred, "Let us make it a private Bill, and deal with one community, and none other." Fortunately, the forms of the House were against that. Then what has been

devised? Happy Grahamstown has been called in. I will make no imputations, for the Speaker has laid it down that no imputations are to be allowed; but it is a charming thing to consider that, for once in its life, the modern Athens has come to our assistance without a consideration.

‘Now there are some facts the House should consider that are good reasons why this matter should not be again dealt with this session. I would ask the House to consider what has been done in the past. The House was told, with regard to the compound question, that the employers of labour were doing the most dreadful things one could possibly conceive. Now what has happened? Time after time I have asked the House to send a commission, and find out whether the statements about the compound system are true or false. The matter has been brought in session after session, and I have been told that it is all very well for the employers to say that the statements are not true. Now, I would appeal to you on facts, because upon my statement of facts may depend your judgment on the motion before the House. I did not deceive the House, because the House finally adopted the attitude I suggested, that they should really inquire. You sent up a gentleman whom we all respect; I refer to the Chief-Justice of the Colony. What do we find in his report upon the compound question? That the Chief-Justice endorses every statement I made in the House, and says that the accusations and the charges which had been made respecting our conduct, so far as the compounds are

concerned, are utterly false. I would like the House to consider that. If, however, members of the House have been talked to and told certain things, I would repeat that those things are not correct, and I would ask them to send another commission. One would think that at the present moment, in the community of Kimberley, there was some class almost unrepresented. But what are the real facts? You all know that the Bill is directed purely and simply against the mining community. What is the representation of Kimberley? Does my honourable friend opposite (Mr. O'Leary) call himself a mining representative? Does my honourable friend opposite (Mr. Cornwall) call himself a mining representative? No, neither of them. Does my honourable friend (Mr. Goch) who has just left for the Transvaal call himself a mining representative? No. As matters at present stand, for a mining community producing £4,000,000 per annum, as against a total export of £6,000,000 for the whole Colony, you have one solitary member to advise you upon the mining conditions of the Colony, whilst you have three members for Kimberley who are commercial or nothing. Now, I will go one step further. Does the honourable House ask that this enormous wealth should not be represented? Do they think the present position is an unfair one, when they consider that for the wine industry there are twenty-two representatives, for the general farming industry twenty-two representatives, for the commercial interests twenty-two or twenty-three representatives, and that all these together are con-

ned with an export of £2,000,000? Then will you consider with reference to the balance—£4,000,000—of our export, what the representation is in this House? The House is apparently not satisfied with one man as a representative, so I suppose there must be something wrong to account for this persistent desire for a change. Is it then the feeling of the House that that one man should be removed? I must point out to the House that I represent a farming community. Yes, it is so; I have an interest in and represent farming. We are told that in the opinion of the House, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the Kimberley electorate, there should be a change. The peculiar circumstances are that there is one member in the Colony to represent an export valued at four millions of money. This is considered so peculiar, that in this community with three commercial representatives it is deemed advisable that the one mining member should retire from the House.

‘Now that is the proposition before the House, and I will proceed to deal with it seriously. I maintain that there is no grievance whatsoever, and I challenge any one to get up and say there is. Of course, we hear that the mining community will be able to send down four members. Even if that were so, I would put it to you that it would not be an unfair thing if four men were to represent £4,000,000 when sixty-eight members of that House represent £2,000,000. I do not believe we would return four members to the House, but even if we did, it would not be unfair.

I may say that I would never discharge a man for his vote. There are three commercial men and one mining man, and surely my honourable friend is satisfied, unless he wishes to eliminate the fourth man altogether. If he does, I appeal to the fair play of the House. Does the House wish that, whenever a mining question comes up, there shall not be a single representative who knows anything about it? When a commercial question comes up, you can always receive the instruction of the member for Rosebank or the member for Cape Town and other estimable members; and on the mining question, I may say with all frankness that I believe you require the instruction and knowledge of members specially connected with the mining industry. You run the risk by this proposed change that there shall not be one to come down to the House.

‘In so far as the statement goes that the community desires it, I will give an unqualified challenge, and on the following grounds. Why, when the Bill was in danger, was there not a public meeting? Grahams-town had its public meeting. I am told that it consisted of five people, but this, it is said, is a mistake, and it is immediately rectified in another telegram, which gives the number as forty. But I put it to the House, that considering it is an accepted fact that the whole of the Bill and the time of the House has been taken up simply for Kimberley, and that every other community named is mere padding and a blind, how is it that there has been no public meeting at Kimberley? Does the House consider

that telegrams have passed between my honourable friend (Mr. O'Leary) and Kimberley? If so, they have had no result. Common-sense teaches us that there must have been telegrams; and although the modern Athens has been able to muster a meeting of forty people, Kimberley, for which the Bill has been brought in, has not been able to hold one, and for this reason, I maintain that Kimberley does not require it. If Kimberley did require it, we should have had agitation.

'Why should we alter the present representation? Is there any injustice in it? I deny that Kimberley wants the ballot, and challenge any one to prove that it does. There is no proof offered, and I appeal to the House, and ask why should the present position be changed. My honourable friend, the member for Grahamstown (Mr. Douglas), tried the other day to prove that Kimberley, or Griqualand West, was an outcast from the Colony. I would, however, like the House to know that we do not desire to be outside the Colony. I am perfectly prepared to return to our old independent position, but that is not what I desire. I wish that when we legislate for one part of the community, we should legislate for another. Do not make a separation again on the ballot question. If you desire that it should be extended to the whole of the Colony, or even to the towns of the Colony, I would agree to that rather than support by my vote that which is worse, namely, sanction the Grahams-town sham. I believe the feeling of members of the Government is that they would like to watch the

next election to see if undue influence is used with our employees, and, in fact, to leave the question for the next Parliament. I am sure you will be able to come down to the House next session, and say that you are perfectly satisfied that we have not abused our position as employers of labour. It is just as in the past, when we were accused of the most atrocious conduct in the compound system, but the Chief-Justice has indorsed every word I then said. The only thing I have failed in is, that I would not go round to member after member and ask for his signature or promise, because I felt that, in all these questions, the meaning of a House of Parliament is, that every question should be discussed in Parliament, and that no vote should be given prior to its being given before the House. If the questions of the country are to be decided by a system of signing and promising, I do not see the use of a Legislative Assembly.

‘Ask the House to reject the motion of the honourable member for Kimberley, on the ground that it has not been asked for by the community, that the present representation is extremely favourable to the commercial classes, that the Bill is a blind so far as Grahamstown is concerned, and that it is unfair; and I will also ask the House to give us due consideration at the coming election to see if we treat our employees justly or unjustly.’

The speech on the Railway Extension Bill, then before the Cape Parliament, was made at the beginning of August 1888, and is a strong argument for a considerate and conciliatory policy towards the



Transvaal, no doubt largely conditioned by the natural desire, in view of the coming Northern Expansion, to substitute a railway to Mafeking for a railway to the Vaal River.

'I have listened with interest to the remarks of the honourable member for Cape Town, and I have come to the conclusion that if the commercial party had been a little more progressive in the past, we should not have been in our present position. We cannot help remembering that in 1885, when there could have been a settlement of the whole question, the commercial party was nowhere to be found. "Oh, we have nothing to do with the Transvaal; Delagoa Bay must have the trade; let us stop where we are," were the arguments then used. Did my honourable friend, the member for Cape Town, support me then? Now there is a demand for progress, and it would be well for us to be very cautious in deciding whether a hurried determination to advance is an advisable thing under present conditions. I look at it in this light. What would we have to gain by an immediate advance to the Vaal River in spite of the feelings and sentiments of the Transvaal? How long the delay would be is the question on which rests the whole case; how long it is to be, and what are the probabilities of gaining by it?

The honourable member for Oudtshoorn has taken up a definite position, and is not to be dictated to by any one. He says he feels sure that if once the railway reaches the Vaal River, the pressure of the diggers will bring about what we all desire. Now, I differ

from my honourable friend, for the following reasons. Paul Kruger will, in my opinion, be in charge of the Transvaal for the ensuing five years, and that there will be dissatisfaction with his policy there can be no doubt; but he is strong enough himself, and surrounded by sufficient supporters, to continue in his position. Therefore, when my honourable friend says that the digger pressure at the gold-fields will lead to our having an immediate advance from the Vaal River to Johannesburg, I beg to differ from him. I do not think any pressure upon a question of that sort will carry through a policy which is against the wishes of the Transvaal. I must point out to the House that there is a division amongst the mining community of the Transvaal. There is an enormous and influential section of the diggers called the Natal party, and they are more active than those who have gone there from the Cape Colony, for they have strong views and ideas as to the advancement of the Natal railways to Johannesburg.

‘In dealing with the Transvaal question, we have to deal, as I have said before, entirely with our natural position. Our trade would be passengers and light goods, the whole of which depends upon having immediate communication with their destination at Johannesburg. That is most material, as against our having a stoppage at the Vaal River. Is it, or is it not probable, that if we go to the Vaal River, we shall be detained there? I contend that it is most distinctly probable. I wish to point out what may be gained by a temporary delay. There are

many things the Government might do. In the Bechuanaland question we failed, because our movements were not quick enough ; so too, in the question of 1885. The Customs Union has failed, because the factors were not understood and dealt with beforehand. The marvellous three million railway scheme to the Free State has failed, because it was always hopeless. I will endeavour to sketch out a more possible course in negotiation. I believe it would be possible to place plainly before the Transvaal the fact that the Cape Colony intends to move, although it cannot go into the Transvaal without the consent of President Kruger. There is a great deal to be done in Pretoria at the present moment by negotiation, and I will presently tell you why.

‘If I had not gone to England, I might have voted for the extension to the Vaal River. But I noticed in England that the whole question of the Transvaal railways is hung up. In so far as Delagoa Bay is concerned, they have run their railway into a cul-de-sac, and have no means of carrying it forward, and the earnings of the line are practically nil. I have also ascertained that the gentlemen connected with the Dutch concession are unable to make their railway. It is a useless concession, and so long as there is a difference between the owners of the Delagoa Bay railway and the Dutch concession, the making of a railway is impossible.

‘Now I will put to the House the reason why I believe a delay in negotiation would be a most satisfactory thing for us. We have, on the one hand, the

Delagoa Bay railway, an incomplete line ; and on the other hand, the Dutch concessionnaires unable to make their railway and to agree with the Delagoa Bay owners. It seems to me possible that efficient negotiations at Pretoria might lead to a programme like the following : Is it impossible for the Government of the Cape Colony to step in between these two parties, and settle their differences by offering a scheme of extension from Bloemfontein to Delagoa Bay, or from the Vaal River to Delagoa Bay ? Surely it would be possible to say to the Transvaal Government, " If all you really desire is to be certain of a complete railway from Delagoa Bay, will you allow us to try and arrange between these diverse parties on the basis of Kimberley to Delagoa Bay or of Bloemfontein to Delagoa Bay ? Let us try to arrange between these disputants." I believe such a plan is possible, and at any rate the House could arrive at a clear position.

'Let us then try to amalgamate these diverse interests, and even go as far as this. If the Dutch concessionnaires are too weak, it would be much more expedient, instead of throwing three millions into the Free State, to take, perhaps, some small share in the refloating of their company. Such a programme is not impossible ; it is only improbable. Supposing after this delay and negotiation the plan fails, will the Colony be in a worse position ? I deny that it will. We will have found out whether the sentiment of the Transvaal is that we should not enter it or go near it at all ; whether its policy is to

be simply a connection between Pretoria and Delagoa Bay. If we find that that is the case, we have got an alternative programme in an extension of the line from Kimberley to Mafeking. What I want to put to the House is, that the delay would be a wise delay if it be limited to a few months. The remarks of the honourable member for Richmond have cleared the cobwebs off the mind of the House. I consider the motion means that we should make one last effort to deal with the Transvaal.

‘If we are capable of dealing with them upon a broad basis, let us do so. It all depends upon negotiation. I believe a great deal would come out of negotiation, and the worst that could happen would be to clearly know our position with the Transvaal for the future. What I feel is that we are now becoming a most restive House. Perhaps we are a little more progressive, and also a little too anxious to advance at once. I cannot understand why the whole future of the Colony depends upon forty-four miles of railway. I conceive that we might secure a great future by a few months’ delay. If we fail from Cape Town to Delagoa Bay, let us turn from Cape Town to Mafeking, in the north. What are the arguments on the side of an immediate advance? I have heard of none, except that the Bill has been hastily produced, that the Government has wandered from one point to another, and has put its foot down in the wrong place. At last we have made a firm stand, but I hold that the House ought to pause before it carries the Bill. I

am certain that, in the minds of many of the Opposition, there are now doubts arising as to the advisability of immediately pushing the line forward. I believe that many in the House consider that there is a good deal in my plan. The one unfortunate point that remains is, that some members have voted in a certain way, and they do not like, as it were, to change their views; but surely on a broad principle of that sort, members might think twice. I would, in conclusion, be glad of any practical argument to show that we are going to gain the trade of the Transvaal, and to retain it permanently by running to the Vaal River in spite of the sentiments of the Transvaal people.'

## CHAPTER VIII

## THE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN EXPANSION

THE great idea of expansion to the north, which had been the daydream of Mr. Rhodes's inner life during all the arduous years in which he was struggling to the front from the smallest of beginnings in the rough mining camp at Kimberley, began to approach realisation in the beginning of 1888. Fortunately for his dream and for the Empire, his policy and action in Bechuanaland, which had exposed him to so much adverse criticism from the extreme Jingo, as well as the extreme Transvaal or pro-Boer party at the Cape, had met with the complete approval of the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson. Sir Hercules from that time became the trusted ally of Mr. Rhodes in his policy of northern expansion. Sir Hercules was a man of broad sympathies and practical wisdom, and he saw plainly that the enlightened and liberal Imperialism of Mr. Rhodes, together with his extraordinary natural ability and skill in dealing with men, supplied just the leading that was wanted to secure the unclaimed interior for the Empire. Sir Hercules, like Mr. Rhodes, was anxious to reconcile the Dutch colonists to British rule, and for this purpose to carry out through them, as well as through men of British descent, the expansion towards the Zambesi. At the same time, Sir Hercules knew from long experience the difficulties

of our system of Party Government, and the chronic unwillingness at Downing Street to undertake responsibility or to spend money in adding new territories to the Empire. The eagerness of Mr. Rhodes to anticipate the Transvaal in securing the northern territory was thus necessarily checked by the official knowledge of the High Commissioner of the very limited extent to which the Home Government was likely to aid or even sanction expansion.

In 1885, however, the Bechuanaland Protectorate had been carried by a Proclamation of the High Commissioner up to the 22nd parallel of south latitude. The next step was the extension of the sphere of influence to the Zambesi. In 1887 Lord Salisbury had to protest against an official Portuguese map which claimed the territory. In 1887 the far more serious news that Mr. Rhodes obtained through his agents in the Transvaal of a contemplated trek, which was being planned by the Zoutspanberg Boers, into the coveted territory for the establishment of a pioneer republic, like that so successfully carried out in Zululand, was followed, but not until the year after, by the direct action of President Kruger in sending up a Transvaal Consul to Lobengula in Matabeleland, where as long ago as 1882 he had endeavoured to obtain a treaty with Lobengula.

Mr. Rhodes was now hard at work to secure the mineral rights of the territory in question, as this he could effect independently; and with this object, in conjunction with Mr. Beit, he sent up a well-known hunter, Mr. Fry, to Bulawayo in the first month of 1888. Mr. Fry went up to Bulawayo, but owing to the development of a fatal illness was forced to return without accomplishing anything.

Alarmed at what he learned of President Kruger's



plans to secure immediately a footing in Matabeleland, Mr. Rhodes hastened to Grahamstown, to Sir Hercules Robinson, and pressed him hard to obtain at once a protectorate over Lobengula's dominions. Sir Hercules saw the danger, and was willing to do what he could; but he pointed out that it was quite impossible to induce Downing Street to consent to a treaty with Lobengula which involved any responsibility. What was to be done? Mr. Rhodes thought he saw the way to meet the difficulty. He recommended an arrangement somewhat resembling what in city circles is known as an option. He pointed out, moreover, that there was a precedent for this kind of treaty in one of a similar nature which had been made a short time before by the Governor of Natal with the Queen of Amatongaland. The treaty proposed by Mr. Rhodes would merely secure from Lobengula the refusal of the first offer to the British Empire if at any time Lobengula were to desire a protectorate. This would create a situation with Lobengula somewhat like that which existed with Portugal from our right of pre-emption over Delagoa Bay. Sir Hercules saw the force of Mr. Rhodes's argument. The treaty would commit Downing Street to nothing, would involve no responsibility, and, while it would actually give us nothing immediately, would be effective in keeping out President Kruger and his Boers. The treaty, which was duly carried through by Mr. Moffat, the Assistant Commissioner in Bechuanaland, is known as the Moffat Treaty, and was signed February 11, 1888.

Immediately after the recently proclaimed agreement of the British Government with Lobengula came Mr. Kruger's last direct effort (already alluded to) to secure a footing, the sending up of Mr. Piet

Grobelaar as Transvaal Consul in Matabeleland. Of course President Kruger had been unable to act in his usual manner—the sending in of raiders to form a pioneer republic—because the formidable army of Lobengula, the reputation of which fell little, if anything, short of that which Cetewayo had formerly built up in Zululand, made the boldest Boers hesitate to translate into action their desire to establish themselves in his territory.

The power and prestige of Lobengula's Matabele regiments had been for years the deterrent to Transvaal expansion into their country. As far back as 1882 friendly overtures had been made to Lobengula by high officials of the Transvaal, and strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to secure the signing of a treaty with the Transvaal. The letter found in 1888 at Lobengula's kraal by one of Mr. Rhodes's representatives, whom he sent up immediately after Mr. Fry's return, is one of many proofs of this. The real object of the letter, with its fulsome expressions of friendship and respect for the Matabele monarch, was to set him against English advances by making known to him the dangerous greed of the English, and, furthermore, the weakness of the English military power as compared with that of the Transvaal Boers. The letter is too long to quote, but a single extract gives accurately enough the Boer view, which the writer sought to convey to the natives, of the Transvaal retrocession. 'Now you must have heard that the English took away our country, the Transvaal, or, as they say, annexed it. We then talked nicely for four years, and begged for our country. But no; when an Englishman once has your property in his hand, then he is like a monkey that has its hands full of pumpkin seeds—if you don't beat him to death, he

will never let go; and then all our nice talk for four years did not help us at all. Then the English commenced to arrest us because we were dissatisfied, and that caused the shooting and fighting. Then the English first found that it would be better to give us back our country.' The letter is signed by General Joubert, the Transvaal Commandant-General, and dated March 9, 1882. I take this extract from the translation in Mr. Fitzpatrick's able book, *The Transvaal from Within*.

The Moffat Treaty checkmated the Transvaal, and the Transvaal Consul, Mr. Piet Grobelaar, sent up after it was proclaimed, was killed by his own fault in a scuffle with some of Khama's men in the course of his expedition; and here it may be added that at the close of 1888 (November 28) President Kruger wrote to demand a payment from Khama of 1350 head of cattle, 1000 of them for Grobelaar's widow; and by the despatch of this demand direct to Khama coolly ignored the British protectorate over that chief.

As early as July 1888 Mr. Rhodes, in an important speech in the Cape Parliament, which I give in full at the end of this chapter, had plainly set forth the intention of President Kruger to seize the northern territory. This was indeed fully admitted by the Boer dictator when he produced to Sir Hercules Robinson a treaty which purported to be signed by Lobengula. Sir Hercules Robinson, however, was not to be 'bluffed' so easily, and resolutely insisted on the carrying out of Mr. Rhodes's northern scheme, and President Kruger found himself checkmated. By this time, Mr. Rhodes had secured a strong following of the more intelligent and moderate Dutch at the Cape, as well as most of the colonists of English descent, who openly expressed their

opinion, as they had done when President Kruger tried to seize Bechuanaland, that if the Transvaal must 'burst its kraal,' it should not be in that direction. They had quite come round to Mr. Rhodes's view, put forward long before in 1881-3, that the trade and possession of the interior were the heritage of the Cape, not, as the old Bondmen held, of the Transvaal. Mr. Rhodes had from the first appealed to the Cape through the motive of self-interest, based on the expectation of great material prosperity, as the result of trade with the vast territories south of the Zambesi, which had thrust into the background the old sentiment that the Transvaal should take the north, the satisfaction of which, with Pretoria joined by rail to Delagoa Bay, even before hostile tariffs against the Cape were felt acutely, would have involved a great financial sacrifice to the Cape.

Moffat's treaty with Lobengula headed off the Transvaal, but how was effective occupation to be brought about? The British Government was chary of taking any responsibility, and would certainly, as the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes well knew, have had nothing whatever to do with finding the money necessary for occupation, while Lobengula, in the heyday of his power, would never have consented to any interference with his absolute rule. The Cape had neither the inclination nor the funds to do the work—it had rejected even the insignificant responsibility involved in an acceptance of the territory offered by Mankoroane. There was no way to be thought of but private enterprise, and Mr. Rhodes, though he had formerly tried the Cape and the Imperial Government in the case of Mankoroane's territory, was not averse to a method which would give him personally the controlling power which he

had perfect confidence he would use for England to much better effect than any one else, not excepting Downing Street.

Private enterprise had given us India; why should it not give us South and Central Africa? Accordingly, as soon as Mr. Rhodes had decided himself to occupy and develop the northern territory, he lost no time in getting to work. Mr. Fry having returned unsuccessful, Mr. Rhodes sent up a more ambitious and numerous expedition, with three picked men at its head, to negotiate for the all-important concession of mineral rights which was to be the foundation of the company he had projected. It may be observed here that at this date the existence of payable gold reefs was purely hypothetical, being based, not on the testimony of experts who had examined the reefs, but on popular rumour and on the general observations of travellers and hunters, whose evidence amounted to a very dim probability. But Mr. Rhodes, like his friend General Gordon is somewhat of a fatalist, and never had the slightest doubt that he was the destined instrument of British expansion in Africa; and the progress of the gold-mines in the Transvaal satisfied him that the probability of similar finds in the realms of Lobengula was sufficient to justify him in giving a speculative financial basis to an enterprise that could not otherwise possibly be expected to pay. That there must be a business basis to the company was obvious, and there was no denying the fact that the business basis had to be speculative in the extreme.

Mr. Rhodes's three envoys, Mr. C. D. Rudd, his old Kimberley partner; Mr. Maguire, his Oxford friend; and Mr. F. R. Thompson, had a difficult task to win over to accept their proposals the able and shrewd old potentate who ruled the Matabele people.

It took months of negotiations before Lobengula signed the concession, and sealed it with his royal elephant seal. It was November 1888 before this was accomplished, and Mr. Rudd, after losing his way and nearly losing his life in the wilderness, brought back the concession. Lobengula, no doubt, thought then, and for a long time afterwards, that he had decidedly got the better of the English diplomacy; for a permanent income of one hundred pounds per month, payable every month in sovereigns, with 1200 Martini-Henry rifles and a million rounds of ammunition, seemed a very satisfactory exchange for mineral rights, that were a mere matter of conjecture, and had never been of any value to their Matabele owner.

The concession obtained, the next step was to apply to the British Government for a charter; but this was not done till the following year, July 1889. Before this time a rival interest, which had been acquired for another group by Mr. E. A. Maund by his personal influence with Lobengula, was amalgamated with the Rhodes-Rudd interest, and the amalgamated interests were the business foundation of the great company.

I will now give the speeches of 1888 which deal directly or indirectly with this practical realisation of Mr. Rhodes's old Kimberley dream of empire to the north.

The first in point of time, but not of importance, is a speech made in the Cape House on July 23, 1888, not long after the return of Mr. Fry, and his failure to secure the concession from Lobengula. The Rhodes-Rudd expedition had not yet done its work at Bulawayo; but Mr. Rhodes was evidently perfectly confident about the future. The Moffat Treaty had already been signed, and the interior was practically

secured, its trade for the Cape, its possession for the British Empire. The speech is interesting both for the confident attitude of the speaker, and for its allusions. It alludes to the changed feeling at the Cape, a feeling that the material interests of the Cape could not permit the Transvaal to occupy the interior. This new feeling it had been for years Mr. Rhodes's effort to build up, in place of the old sentiment that the interior was the heritage of the Transvaal. Mr. Rhodes's effort had been ably seconded by the experience of the Cape in dealing with President Kruger, that with him business was business, and he was never willing to sacrifice any material interest of the Transvaal through sentiment for the Afrikanders of the Cape. This speech contains also an interesting appreciation of President Kruger's position, 'that man is the dictator of the Transvaal,' and a generous expression of pity for the failure of the great champion of an Independent Republican South Africa, together with an allusion to his difficulties and his mistakes, among others the establishment of a Hollander clique in the administration at Pretoria. A conference, it may here be observed, had met some time before (January 31, 1888) to consider the practicability of establishing a Customs Union, and also the question of railway extension. Natal and the Free State joined, but President Kruger, for the Transvaal, refused to send delegates.

'It is with some difficulty that I address the Committee to-night on this question, for it has been somewhat suddenly sprung upon me, and I have not had time for consideration. But at the same time I have been referred to by the member

for Namaqualand, the member for Kimberley, and other members of the House, as having looked very carefully after the interests of the interior. It has been my object and hobby never to forget the expansion of this Colony, so that without some explanation of the vote I am going to give on this subject, it might be thought that I had abandoned the hobby of my political existence. I may say that with time I have ceased to have the same regard I once had for what is called public opinion. I can never quite understand what public opinion is. I have never forgotten how one of the representatives of a family at Grahamstown denounced the conduct of the present Ministry in regard to their action in the interior; and how this conduct of the historic family at Grahams-town wonderfully helped the Ministry in its administration of the Colony. I can, therefore, assure my honourable friend that I have been puzzled about the position of public opinion in reference to parliamentary life.

‘I have heard with extreme interest the remarks of the commercial member for Cape Town. What is the position of the commercial section? There is that great emporium of commerce, Port Elizabeth, which we have been told directs the aspirations of the Colony. Well, I cannot help remembering the action of that section of the commercial community, which should have stood up and by all means supported the suggestions for communication with the Transvaal and free trade, but which, instead of this, sat still. It is a matter of indifference to my political hobby whether



the goods are carried from Port Elizabeth or Cape Town. I will submit the subject to the House on the following basis: Whatever errors have been committed in the past, whatever has been said about the British Lion having been insulted, this is merely a business matter. Is the Colony in a secure position? Is the Colony in a dominant position as regards the future? That is the first consideration, and the second is, what are we going to lose in commercial position by one of the resolutions now before the House?

'I will first deal with the broader question—the political future of the country. I am not going to shake the flag of a united South Africa before the House. Four years ago it was decided that the Colony was to be the dominant state in South Africa, and I am able to say that on this point the Colony is now in a better position than it has ever been before. Three or four years ago the House was in this position: it believed that communication should stop at the Vaal River, that we should go no further, and it was averse to taking in that horrid community called the diamond diggers. Little thought was spent upon the interior, but by a fortunate accident the interior was not lost to the Colony. My friends and myself were anxious to extend into the interior, but there were others who said, "There are others of the same nationality as ourselves, nearer; let them develop it, and afterwards we will amalgamate." Fortunately the Home Government stepped in, and the road to the interior is now all right. A change of

feeling had come over some honourable members since that time. There has been an enormous development in the Transvaal, and when we approached the Transvaal for free trade and railway communication, we found out the commercial fact that sentiment was never considered, especially with a farming population—that good as our feelings might be to one another upon racial grounds, still business was business. You will always find, that dear as your friends may be, when it comes to a matter of business, your friends do not regard you. The result is there has been a total change of feeling on the question of sacrificing the Cape Colony to the Transvaal. I speak of the Cape Colony as the dominant state in South Africa, and I hold that the interior should belong to them as soon as they are prepared to take it from the Imperial Government. The position as to the interior expansion of the Cape Colony has changed entirely for the better, both as regards the English and the Dutch sentiment of the Colony. Instead of the feeling which prevailed four years ago, that the Transvaal should have the expansion of the interior, and then that we should join in with them, we now see clearly that, if we allow the Transvaal to take the interior, they will never join with us; and we now feel most distinctly that the interior is the one thing we must hold, and that no one is to be allowed to take the interior and to be the dominant state, except the Cape Colony. Now that being at present both the English and the Afrikaner sentiment of the Cape Colony, I have no doubt whatever as to the charge

that has been made, that a certain section of this House is striving to delay the extension of our railways northwards, in order to play into the hands of the Transvaal, and to abandon to them the control of the interior. I see, and I am fully persuaded that honourable members feel now, that they are Cape Colonists first, and that their consideration for the Transvaal is a secondary matter.

‘Now, given the assurance, as I have said, that the interior is secure to us, and that we shall have but one voice in retaining the interior for the Cape Colony, I will pass on to the next consideration. But first, to show that the interior is thus secured to us, I would refer to the attitude of the High Commissioner, who has taken up the matter, not from an exclusively Imperial point of view, but from the standpoint that he is ready to hand over the interior to us as soon as we are ready to take it. Remember there are three possible methods—direct Imperial Government, Colonial Expansion, and Republicanism. And the High Commissioner has taken up and supports the second method, Colonial Expansion. I believe that the House, both Afrikaners and English, are determined to retain the interior. In that respect this Colony is saved. The future of South Africa rests with the Cape Colony. That is the first portion of the question.

‘The second, which is the business portion, must be dealt with in the most cold-blooded fashion. Having rejected the opportunity of obtaining the full trade of the Transvaal, having rejected the opportunity of

running from Cape Town to Pretoria, and having thus impelled the Transvaal towards Delagoa Bay; having made these mistakes, this Colony has now to consider the best mode of extricating itself from its error. Well, what is it possible for us to do? How far can we go, and how is it possible to remedy our situation? We can extend fifty miles to the Vaal River, but by so doing at present we shall probably excite the animosity of the Transvaal. That is to say, we shall excite the animosity of an individual, for one of the most extraordinary things in that republican state is the extraordinary influence of that one man—I refer to Paul Kruger. I say it with all respect, that man is the dictator of the Transvaal, and when I refer to Paul Kruger as the Transvaal, I think I am speaking quite correctly. If we are to extend to the Vaal River for a distance of fifty miles during the next five years, we shall have the set policy of the Transvaal against us. Are we likely to gain sufficiently by immediately extending to the Vaal River to safely disregard the opposition of the man who is in charge of the Transvaal. This is a purely practical question. As the honourable member for Namaqualand (Mr. Merriman) so ably said, it is all bosh talking about interior extension; what we want is a railway to the gold-fields. That is the question before the House. I am perfectly clear in saying that this is not a question of northern extension through Bechuanaland. So far as northern extension up-country at present is concerned, I would not sacrifice our position with the Transvaal for the

sake of that railway; because, as the honourable member for Namaqualand has said, it is all bosh about the northern extension. Now, I will deal with the question of trade with the gold-fields. The trade with the gold-fields depends upon the consideration of the Transvaal; and why does it depend upon the consideration of the Transvaal? Because they hold possession of the country; we cannot go in there unless they allow us. Shall we gain our end better by flying in the face of the feelings of the Transvaal people? That is the question before the House. We must consider the future, and when the railways are all completed, what portion of the trade should go to Natal, what portion to Delagoa Bay, and what portion to the Colony. In considering what portion of the trade would fall to the Colony, we must consider if it is a class of trade necessitating complete communication. I will investigate this subject for a moment, and I will now explain what I mean by "a class of trade necessitating complete communication." Then if the House considers the question of complete communication, I will boldly state what I think should be our position with regard to railway extension now that we have delayed extending our railway northward to Pretoria. This question is one to be considered simply on a commercial basis.

'Looking to the future, we must consider our natural position, and in this inquiry we must consider Natal and Delagoa Bay. If Delagoa Bay has not the advantage of natural position with regard to the

gold-fields, I am sure Natal has. If we take the four hundred and fifty miles from Natal as against eight or nine hundred miles from the Cape, I feel certain that the heavy goods traffic to the Fields will go through Natal. Under the circumstances, what is the best thing for the Cape Colony? I would say, a perfectly splendid traffic, provided the Transvaal would admit it, in passengers and light goods. But passengers always desire to be put down on the spot of their destination. Whether we can do this depends on the sanction of the Transvaal, which is Paul Kruger. If we put our foot down too soon now, we may find Paul Kruger stopping railway extension beyond the Vaal River. Now Cape Colony is the only country in South Africa I am interested in, and in its progress alone I am concerned. What would the extended railway carry in the future, if passengers did not patronise it? It would carry Cape wines, and so forth, and perhaps some coals from the border, if the junction line was constructed. I need not linger here to impress upon the House that the essential condition of this railway extension to the Vaal River is that it should not stop at that river but should extend to Witwatersrand? But if we make that railway against the feeling of the Transvaal, that is of Mr. Paul Kruger, we shall run the risk of stopping our trade from the Transvaal. I do not think any honourable members should consider this question as one of our being dictated to by the Transvaal, when they think of what that man, Paul Kruger, has lost in his efforts to realise his dream of a republic for

his people and his people alone. I regard him as one of the most remarkable men in South Africa, who has been singularly unfortunate. When I remember that Paul Kruger had not a sixpence in his Treasury when his object was to extend his country over the whole northern interior, when I see him sitting in Pretoria with Bechuanaland gone, and other lands around him gone from his grasp, and, last of all, when he, with his whole idea of a pastoral Republic, finds that idea vanishing, and that he is likely to have to deal with a hundred thousand diggers who must be entirely out of sympathy and touch with him, I pity the man. When I see a man starting and continuing with one object, and utterly failing in that object, I cannot help pitying him. I know very well that he has been willing to sacrifice anything to gain that object of his. If you think it out, it has been a most remarkable thing that, not content with recovering his country, he wished to obtain the whole interior. His intention was to obtain the whole interior for a population of his own, and he has been defeated in his object.

‘I will inform the House, if the members will allow me, what is his present position. Can you conceive a worse one? There is a small farming population and a larger mining population pouring in, and in order to stem that torrent, the most extraordinary plan must be devised. The position is impossible under the rule of a republic; it is practically impossible under the rule of any other government, but more especially impossible under a republic.

But the gentleman to whom I refer, and who at present is in charge of the Transvaal, has to devise a scheme by which he is to benefit the Transvaal by the disregard of the major portion of its population. If there is a point I might urge upon him, I would say that he has devised the most extraordinary situation, that in the administration of his country no South African need apply. He has devised a scheme of taking his whole official administration from an older country. He has actually made an administrative scheme, the essence of which is that no South African may have a part in it. I ask you to think upon these facts, and if there are any members of the House who are influenced by them, they will understand the course I have pursued as regards the complaint that the Transvaal dictates too much. Altogether, so far as the Transvaal is concerned, there is no reason for envy, but rather for commiseration.

‘If we desire to have railway communication with the Transvaal, we will do well to consider her, and give consideration to her feelings, before we lose our position; and the only other remark I would make is that, in so far as losing our position is concerned, I would like us to deal with the proposition that the member for Richmond has submitted. The pith of the proposition is this, that it is only a question of nine months’ waiting. During the next nine months extraordinary things are going to happen. The only feeling which causes the Transvaal not to wish us at present to advance is that it is the Presi-



dent's desire to complete one hobby of his life, his separate communication with the sea, and he is afraid that if the Cape Government railways advance too far, the money for his railway will not be obtained. That is really the case. My friend the honourable member for Namaqualand, behind me, will bear me out, because I have always heard that, during his residence in Pretoria, there was no man for whom he entertained more admiration than the President of the Transvaal.

‘But to come back to the practical point. I have given the reason why President Kruger desires to prevent the railway being extended—his fear that the increased advantage on our side will once and for all destroy his hobby of the Delagoa Bay connection. I do not consider that, from a commercial point of view, we could obtain any better position than was afforded by the resolution of the member for Richmond. I wish to put this fact before the Committee, that Bloemfontein, in so far as transport is concerned, is as near as Warrenton, and we could not possibly go beyond Warrenton to obtain the trade of the Gold-fields without the sanction of the President of the Transvaal Republic. This resolution, then, will give us the nearest railway point to the Transvaal, whether by Bloemfontein or the Vaal River, and in addition to that, we shall keep in touch with the sentiment of the Transvaal, which I think is advisable for us to do. There is another factor. I do not know whether this House is acquainted with the feelings of Natal in the matter. I wish to point out

that the heavy goods must go by Natal, and if we pass a resolution which is absolutely against the feelings of the Transvaal, there will be a chance of that excellent Council at present sitting in Natal receiving the same offers as we have received. And if the Colony of Natal assents to the proposition of the Transvaal Government, it will then be the first colony to enter the Transvaal. Now, what do we lose by accepting this proposition? We get the nearest railway point so far as transport is concerned to the Johannesburg Gold-fields, while we establish a friendly feeling with the Transvaal, which commands the situation so far as the Gold-fields are concerned, and also as concerns the Transvaal free trade. If we agreed to this, it will only be a question of waiting, for the interior is ours. I think the House will agree with me that I am not particularly fond of the Government of the day, but I will throw out a suggestion that, to get the Transvaal trade, we should settle this question by taking the railway from Delagoa Bay into the hands of this Colony. The matter rests with Pretoria and M'Murdo's concession, and it will be a most delightful problem to deal with the two parties who are fighting, and very pleasant for this Government to come down next session and say, "We have settled the Customs question and the Railway question."

'These suggestions are my contribution to the debate, and in conclusion I would say that I shall vote for the amendment of the honourable member for Richmond, because, in my judgment, it gives the

utmost railway extension, with the greatest nearness to the Transvaal Gold-fields. It is an improvement on the Government proposition and the Government amendment: It is also a joint alliance with the free trade programme. I think it is most unfair that members should attack the free trade programme as ridiculous and as of no value, because it is within my recollection that in past sessions the very foremost point has been made of free trade on both sides of the House. But if we obtain the nearest point to the Transvaal, in so far as railway extension is concerned, we need have no fear for the future, because to my mind the Cape Colony is practically in possession of the interior. The interior belongs to the Colony, and we need have no fear that the Colony will not be the dominant state in South Africa. I do not attach much importance to the fact that there may, on that account, be some slight isolation in the spirit of the Transvaal.'

The most important speech of 1888, however, is that dealing with the whole question of northern expansion, by this time (Sept. 28, 1888) practically assured. It was made to Mr. Rhodes's own constituents at Barkly West, and enters very fully into the chief points of his own political life and political work up to that time. It was, in fact, the *Apologia pro vita sua* up to that time of the South African statesman. Among other things it will be noted that the gift of £10,000 to Mr. Parnell is explained. The somewhat obscure sentence, 'I retired nominally on a "bug," whose nasty leg entirely covered the Transkeian map,' is explained at the close of the fifth chapter.

‘I have come to-night to place my views before you, and to ask you to elect me as your member to represent you in the forthcoming Parliament. I have received requests from several places, asking me to stand as their representative in Parliament, notable amongst them being a requisition to stand for Oudtshoorn, in the place of Mr. Leonard, who is about to proceed to the Transvaal; but in each case I declined, stating as my reason that I intended standing for my old constituency, Barkly West. And the reason I come before you to seek re-election is because for the last eight years I have represented you, and I cannot forget that you were good enough to give me, as it were, the commencement of my parliamentary career and political life. I consider, then, it is my duty to remain your representative as long as you are willing to return me, but directly you can get some one else who will look after your interests better than I do, let me know, and I will retire in his favour.

‘There have been many things invented respecting my career: I have been told that my object is to obtain a seat in the English Parliament; but of course I give no heed to these rumours—there is no truth in them. It is my intention to remain attached to Cape politics, for I take a great interest in them; and I tell you candidly I have not the slightest idea of quitting South Africa for any other country. Here I can do something; but were I to go to England as a politician, I should be lost in obscurity. I have been told that my desire is to enter the English Parliament, and that my contribution to the Parnell

Fund was made with this object. I have the presumption to say that I believe I could at any time obtain a seat in the English Parliament without paying Mr. Parnell £10,000; and that if I ever stood for the English Parliament, I should not stand for an Irish constituency. I gave Mr. Parnell's cause £10,000 because in it I believe lies the key of the Federal system, on the basis of perfect Home Rule in every part of the Empire, and in it also the Imperial tie begins.

'I will briefly give you a sketch of Cape politics during the period I have had a seat in our Parliament; and you will see how you are concerned in them. You have only to remember what happened eight years ago, when I first entered Parliament, and to see what great alterations have been effected since then. I recollect once reading Mark Twain on Palestine. I had shortly before read a beautiful description of it—I think it was Thomson's *The Land and the Book*—and the whole object of the author had been to paint it as he desired it to be; but Mark Twain, in his brutality, described it as I suppose it is; and all one's illusions were once for all destroyed. So perhaps my views on Cape politics may place them before you in a different light from that in which you have fancied them.

When the Government had agreed to the terms of the Basuto peace, my colleague and myself stated to the leader of the house that we considered it better that he should retire, and leave the carrying out of the peace to the Opposition, who had always con-

tended that the war was a mistake, and who would be more likely to arrange the terms of the peace with the Basutos than those who had entered on the war. My feeling has always been that the Basuto war was a mistake ; that we should never have attempted to disarm the Basutos ; but, once having entered upon such a policy, we should have pursued it to the bitter end. When I first went down as your representative, there was that disgraceful Basuto war going on. No less a sum than four million pounds was spent upon it ; and we were virtually licked by the Basutos ; and the end of it was that a most disgraceful peace was made owing to which the country was greatly enraged, the Government lost support, and were unable to carry out their policy. Just at this time my colleague and myself took for the first time our seats in Parliament, and the power in the House was so equally balanced that but two votes decided the issue of the day. Well, gentlemen, owing to these occurrences, a new Government came into power ; and it had the most unhappy duties to perform.

‘Firstly, it had to patch up a peace with a conquering savage race. A peace, remember, not made by them, but by their opponents, who were the authors of the war ; and also, remember, the authors of the peace. The new Ministry did their best, under the circumstances ; they got rid of Basutoland, for government by us would have been impossible in our humiliated position ; and they scraped together the money to pay for the errors of their predecessors. In addition to this, they passed a Railway Bill, which was to place

Kimberley in communication with Cape Town. I felt that they had done their best under the adverse circumstances; but what had happened taught me that the whole key to the South African question was the supremacy of the white race; not on the basis of colour, but on the basis of a civilised power ruling. The continuance of the war was, however, impossible, through lack of funds; the country was burdened with a debt of four millions, making a charge of £200,000 per annum in perpetuity. But in my belief a still more serious burden than that was the record of a civilised power being beaten by a savage race, and on a question in which the rights were not on our side.

' Politics after this became very humdrum; it was a pure question of ins and outs. But a cloud rose on the sky. The Government, embarrassed by their obligations, felt that if they could get rid of the Transkei they could also get rid of the Cape defensive forces, and thus save the country a charge equal to the burden left to them by their predecessors. They advocated this policy, not out of a desire to promote a *quasi*-Imperial policy in South Africa, but because they felt, on account of the burdened condition of Cape finances, with the heavy obligation for defence, that the government of purely native territory, such as the Transkei, was better left to the Crown Colony system, as in Natal, whilst keeping our own future in the Cape Colony under responsible government pure and simple.

' It was at this time, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen,

that I found myself studying Cape politics from what I may humbly suggest was a broader platform. On looking at the map, the South African question appears to consist of a number of anomalies—an extraordinary mixture of direct Imperial interests, such as Natal; Republics, such as the Transvaal and Free State, coupled with a large native territory alien in race and sentiment; the Government of the Cape Colony in itself divided, owing to race divisions—all this seems a problem impossible to deal with; but you know that there are keys to every puzzle, and I long ago came to the conclusion—and I have the courage to challenge any one to deny it—that the key of the puzzle lay in the possession of the interior, at that time an unknown quantity.

‘I hope, gentlemen, if any of you think that I am egotistical you will excuse it, from the fact that in a humble way I have been mixed up with the politics of the interior during the last four years; and such politics, I contend, will be in future most intimately connected with the settlement of the South African question; for I believe that whatever State possesses Bechuanaland and Matabeleland will possess South Africa. In these politics I may say that a Bechuanaland freebooter coincided with me; for he told me one day that Stellaland was the *Sluitel van Zuid Afrika* (the key of South Africa); and I must say that I agree entirely with that humble adventurer. But to return to my description of South African politics—having decided that the interior was the key of the puzzle, I began to agitate the Mankoroane



**question.** I found out that the Griqualand West boundary was disputed; and we had taken a portion of Mankoroane's territory. This appeared to give me an approach to my object. I carried a Commission to inquire into the question of the boundary of Griqualand West, and was appointed one of its members. We found out that we had taken a portion of Mankoroane's territory; and we provided a solution of the difficulty by obtaining a cession of Mankoroane's territory to the Cape Colony, for he was at that time besieged by the Boers.

'This would have given the Cape Colony the key of the interior as far as Mafeking; and I returned to the meeting of the Cape Parliament, satisfied that I had done something; but I was mistaken as to the elements I had to deal with. Cape politics then were very localised; and the mist of the Table Mountain covered all. They repudiated the robbery of Mankoroane's territory and they declined the cession, and the question was allowed to slide. I returned home disappointed and disgusted; and it was at that time that I began to acquire my admiration for the man who was then ruling in the Transvaal—I mean "Oom Paul"; for had he not conceived the noble scheme—from his point of view—of seizing the interior, of stretching his republic across to Walfisch Bay, of making the Cape Colony hide-bound, and of ultimately seizing Delagoa Bay, and all this without a sixpence in his treasury?

'From my humble point of view I felt I was embarking upon a project without an atom of support

at my back. But, in my despair, a fortunate change of circumstances occurred. His Excellency the High Commissioner, with whom I was then utterly unacquainted, had grasped the fact that, if Bechuanaland was lost to us, British development in Africa was at an end. He persuaded Lord Derby to deal with the Bechuanaland question, and induced Sir Thomas Scanlan, the then Prime Minister of the Cape, to share in the obligations of the undertaking. Sir Gordon Sprigg, at East London, states that, by refusing the obligation, we saved the colony £8,250,000, which, he states, is the cost of Bechuanaland, forgetting entirely that £1,000,000 of this is due to the Expedition, which need not have been despatched if we had assumed responsibility. If the much-despised Sir Thomas Scanlan had not taken this responsibility, Bechuanaland would have passed to the Transvaal, as Lord Derby was neutral on the question. Even though the Cape Colony rejected this arrangement, its being made kept the matter open, and the interior was saved to us.

‘But to continue this history. Meantime a most respectable member of the Cape Ministry had lost his office, through loss of seat, and I had taken his place. It lasted six weeks, and I retired nominally on a “bug,” whose nasty leg entirely covered the Transkeian map, though another question, in reality, put us out. I have already discussed it. My chief resigned hurriedly, and the responsibility was thrown on the Country Party, who were not prepared to take it.

They gave powers to Sir Thomas Upington, and swallowed Sprigg.

‘Whilst these events were happening, the Bechuana-land question developed. To please Exeter Hall, a missionary was appointed, in the person of the Rev. John Mackenzie, to carry out an Exeter Hall African expansion; a pro-native, anti-Dutch policy, to cost nothing, and to do everything. It got into a mess, and, as a sort of last resort, I was asked to go up. When I went, I made up my mind as to my object, and that was, briefly, that we should have the interior. Shall I trouble you with my disputes with the reverend gentleman? No; I will not. I had a few police, and the whole country was in disorder; but I held to one cardinal point—that, no matter who held the land, the Cape Colony should have the government. I succeeded in Stellaland, but the Rooi Grond contingent were too much for me.

‘I may be wrong, but I believe that Oom Paul had inspired Joubert, who met me, to insist on the government of Montsoia passing to the Transvaal. As soon as I found it was impossible to deal with Piet Joubert, I made up my mind. I saw that Joubert had allowed me to settle with Stellaland, but was determined to keep the interior by retaining Montsoia's territory, and would not, therefore, allow the freebooters to make any settlement with me as to the land. The byplay I was greeted with was the firing upon Montsoia whilst I was there. I asked that it should be stopped, and of course got, as answer, a *non possumus*. I then saw clearly that I had the correct premises,

that the Stellaland settlement was a blind, and ~~that~~ Kruger was determined to have the interior through Montsoia's country. The "dummies," namely, the freebooters, had been firing all night on Montsoia, and after clearly stating that they were waging war on Her Majesty the Queen I inspanned and left, and my despatches, I am told by a high authority, brought the Expedition.

'Shall I weary you with the disputes that occurred? I was asked to return with the General in charge. He attempted to upset the arrangements I had made in Stellaland, when I had no thought of failure and had pledged my word. He fought me on every detail, and I am thankful to say that Her Majesty's Government, after considering every statement, carried out in their entirety the agreements I had made. I may say, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, and my old constituents, it was an unhappy time. The Jingoës on the one hand, without any knowledge of the facts of the case, were accusing me of being no Englishman, and of pandering to the Dutch. The Bond, on the other hand, who believed that the correct policy was to allow the Transvaal to take Bechuana-land, were indignant with myself for being the author of the sending of the troops, not perceiving that they had utterly misjudged Kruger—that if he got Bechuana-land, no united South Africa was possible, as he would have left the Cape Colony hide-bound. On the other hand, the Jingoës once having got Bechuana-land, advocated a purely native policy, and advocated in the settlement of the land the extraordinary and

disgraceful proposition that "no Dutchman need apply." In this position the representative of Her Majesty took the proper course—he repudiated the disgraceful suggestion for the settlement of the country on a race basis, and at the same time he differed with the Bond, who were in favour of the transference of the interior to the Transvaal. Fortunately for this country, he was the oldest servant of the Crown in charge of the colonies; and he won the day. He retained Bechuanaland, awaiting the acceptance of the colony, and he repudiated the policy of the settlement of a country with a race distinction.

'But we must hurry on. I retired from Bechuanaland. I was exposed to endless abuse; but, I think I may say honestly, I was perfectly happy. I had obtained my object. We had got the interior, under a policy of the High Commissioner, that as soon as the Cape Colony was willing to take the responsibility, he would hand these territories over—a policy, gentlemen, of colonial expansion, avoiding Republicanism on the one hand and direct Imperial control on the other.

'Bechuanaland was saved by "Grandmamma," I mean the Imperial Government; and the Bond to-day will own its mistake. The Transvaal proposed free trade and an arrangement as to the extension of the railway from Kimberley to Pretoria in conjunction with their State. Sir Gordon Sprigg's Cabinet rejected the whole proposal; and I may state that being aware of these proposals, which were concealed from the House, I almost alone

advocated the acceptance of them ; but they were rudely refused, and this left an undying distrust in the hearts of the present officials in the Transvaal. The balance of the history is a hideous and humiliating attempt to obtain connection with the Transvaal after the rejection of the proposals which the Transvaal had themselves submitted. The Free State also, even with the loss of £3,000,000 of expenditure in their pastoral territory, rejected these proposals, forgetting that the key of the Transvaal communication and trade must be in Pretoria, and that we can do nothing apart from an interior expansion as far as Transvaal trade is concerned, without a settlement with Oom Paul. I say, try and settle with him. We have the interior. Not only have we Bechuanaland ; but the sphere of British influence is extended over Matabeleland. We are told by the present Prime Minister that he is willing to take Bechuanaland, after a record of doing everything in his power to let it pass from us, of proceeding at the eleventh hour to Rooi Grond, to settle with the freebooters, in order to prevent the approach of the troops, humiliating himself to the Rooi Grond freebooters, and degrading himself to the English ; for it must be remembered that prompt interference by the Cape Government previously would have stopped the necessity of the Expedition, and would have made Bechuanaland a portion of the Cape Colony.

‘I think the Bond were wrong ; and for that reason I differed with them. They trusted Paul Kruger, and they have now found out that they must look

after themselves; and I believe in the future the Country Party will have the support and confidence of the country. They cannot feel any gratitude to a Ministry who at the eleventh hour interfered in Bechuanaland only to cover themselves and those connected with them with disgrace; who, when free trade and railway communication with the Transvaal were offered them, repudiated the offer without even so much as submitting it to the House; who, when they found the mess they had made, embarked on an impossible £3,000,000 railway scheme in the Free State to mend the railway mischief, and then held a Customs Union Conference with Natal in the Cape Colony, to deal with the Customs question, without dealing with the key of the question, which was the Transvaal. Both projects failed, and were bound to fail, from the conception of the question. Let me sum up: we saved Bechuanaland through the Imperial Government, not through the present Government; we lost free trade and railway communication with the Transvaal through the present Government; we exposed ourselves to disgrace in a hopeless railway scheme in the Free State, and a hopeless Customs Union, through the present Government.

‘But Sir Gordon Sprigg, at East London, tells us we deserve his confidence. I do not object to his railway tours and lunches at Government expense; but I do object to the whole future of the country being thrown away. If the Government had been wise, our railway whistle would have been heard in

Johannesburg, with the consent of Paul Kruger. As to Bechuanaland, we have retained our position in spite of their policy. It is amusing to me that the Premier, who would have had us hide-bound at Griqualand West, now steals my clothes as to colonial expansion, and is willing and ready to take the responsibilities of Bechuanaland. But there he stops. That "not" he has inserted seems almost impossible; but he states he does not entirely agree with the declaration of British control in Matabeleland. But whether the "not" exists, or does not exist, is a matter of small importance. He advocates a separate British formation in Matabeleland. I have held, gentlemen, but one view, that is, the government of South Africa by the people of South Africa, whilst keeping the Imperial tie of self-defence; and that Government, I am proud to feel, can rule Matabeleland equally with Bechuanaland. A period of transition may occur, during which the Imperial Government might hold a temporary responsibility, pending annexation by us. I have not a word to say against this; but I do object most distinctly to the formation of a separate British colony in the interior of South Africa, on the Zambesi, apart from the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. But if I continued this exposition of my policy on the question, my argument would be endless.

'Now, as to the future, my personal ambition has often been challenged by the statement that I am desirous to assume the responsibility of the government of Cape Colony, but I would like to deny such



a suggestion, To yourselves I would say that my feeling is that in the present state of South African politics there is the most urgent necessity that the Cape Cabinet should be the strongest coalition in South Africa. Any assumption of office by myself would make me dependent upon an irresponsible majority. I put no blame on the Scanlan Ministry in the past, or the Sprigg Ministry at present; but I do say that the people who have awakened to the responsibility of their position, and who have the control of the Cape Parliament, should not hesitate in this crisis in the country to take the responsibility of power. They can command in individual Englishmen a loyal support of their position. They are in a position to deal with the politics of South Africa, and arrange with the neighbouring states. If they fail at this moment to take the responsibility, they will expose themselves to the condemnation of all parties. I feel sure, if the leader of the National Party will now take responsibility, he will receive support from every section of the House. I admit in the past he has had a difficult and delicate part to play; but, if he now fails to accept this position, Cape politics will go on in their old groove. Weak amongst ourselves, we shall be still weaker to deal with the neighbouring states. We shall pass our time in mutual recriminations and a helpless policy. Meantime the development that nature has given us will pass into other hands. Never was there a time in which it was more necessary that the Cape Colony should be united under the strongest conceivable Government; for

whilst recognising the individual sentiment of the various races, still it must claim, by its age, by its expansion, and by its population, that it should be the predominant state in South Africa.

‘You have heard something of the Frontier Party, devised to counteract the influence of the Bond. Can that possibly succeed? Is it a party to form an English opposition as against a Dutch reforming party? Is it a party to adopt the repudiation of Bechuanaland? Is it a party to adopt the repudiation of Matabeleland? Is it a party to repudiate arrangements with the Transvaal? Is it a party to adopt hopeless expenditure of three millions for an expansion through the Free State? Is it a party to adopt a Customs Union apart from the Transvaal? Is it a party to adopt the formation of a British colony in the interior apart from the influence and dictation of the Cape Colony? If such is the party, I wish to have none of it.

‘My feelings are that we have made great mistakes in the past; that we are quite capable of taking the responsibility of Bechuanaland, and, when the time arrives, the responsibility of Matabeleland. The wise course for us to pursue is to admit our regret for the fact that we neglected the opportunity of railway communication and free trade with the Transvaal; to admit that we have lost that through our own fault, and that our future lies in the interior; to realise that whenever the Transvaal chooses to approach us we should do everything that lies in our power to connect Pretoria with Cape Town, and to assist its communication with Delagoa Bay.

I am not desirous to interfere with the freedom of the Transvaal, or the independence of the Transvaal; and therefore, if it be the desire of the Free State, through its republican sentiments and interests, to join with the Transvaal, it should be no desire of ours to interfere with this ambition. But the Cape Colony should claim to hold the keys of the interior; as soon as possible we should take control of Bechuanaland; we should state by our own policy that we are prepared to take the administration right through to the Zambesi; and that we feel that Cape Colony must be and shall be the dominant State in South Africa. If our possessions stretch from Cape Town to the Zambesi, no one can deny this assertion.

'Consider it, gentlemen; to you, who are "waiting by the river," I would say that such a policy is one which you must advocate and support. You are miners by birth, by education, and by profession; and I believe you are as capable of developing the far interior as you have been of developing the alluvial wealth of the Vaal River. If you have any faith in me as your member, it is because you know I have not confined my political attention to advocating a Barkly pump. My ideas have always been directed towards the broad question of South African politics, and I believe that, if I succeed in the object of my political ambition, that is, the expansion of the Cape Colony to the Zambesi, I shall provide for you in the future success in the prospecting for, and the production of, gold far beyond that which has occurred to you in the development of your property on the river.

I look on you as "waiting by the river," waiting for such an expansion as can only fall to this colony.

'When it has been said to me that my future lies in engaging in English politics, I reply that I consider that no grander future can belong to any statesman than that of dealing with the complicated questions of South Africa, and the enormous expansion that lies before us in the dark interior. With that I believe my life will be connected; and if I deal with that expansion I sincerely hope that many of you may share in that development. I am tired of this mapping out of Africa at Berlin; without occupation, without development, without any claim to the position the various countries demand. My belief is that the development of South Africa should fall to that country or countries which by their progress shall show that they are best entitled to it; and I have faith that, remote as our starting-point is, the development of Africa will occur through the Cape Colony; that, exempt from the risks of the unhealthiness of the East and West Coasts, we shall be able to obtain the dominant position throughout the interior, starting from the Cape Colony, passing through Bechuanaland, adopting the Matabele arrangement, and so on to the Zambezi; and I have confidence that the people of the Cape Colony have the will, and the pluck, and the energy to adopt this as their inheritance. They are not inimical to the Imperial Government. Recognising every debt of gratitude to the Imperial Government, they are fully prepared to retain the principle of joint responsibility for Imperial defence;

but in reference to their internal management they claim the principle of Home Rule.

‘I have little more to add. Here are the politics of South Africa in a nutshell. Let us leave the Free State and the Transvaal to their own destiny. We must adopt the whole responsibility of the interior. Let us consider that as an inheritance of the Cape Colony, and let us be prepared to take that responsibility at all hazards. As for the neighbouring States, we must take responsibility as to the railway communication, if they so desire it. We must propose a Customs Union on every suitable occasion; but we must always remember that the gist of the South African question lies in the extension of the Cape Colony to the Zambesi. If you, gentlemen, are prepared to take that, there is no difficulty in the future. We must endeavour to make those who live with us feel that there is no race distinction between us: whether Dutch or English, we are combined in one object; and that is, the union of the States of South Africa, without abandoning the Imperial tie. And what we mean by the Imperial tie is this, that we have the most perfect self-government internally, whilst retaining to ourselves the obligation of mutual defence against the outside world.’

## CHAPTER IX

## THE CHARTERED COMPANY AND ITS WORK

MR. RHODES'S next move was a journey in the spring of 1889 to London. There he had to amalgamate the Exploring Company's interest (the fruit of Mr. Maund's expedition), and there he had to form his own Company and obtain, if possible, a charter. Mr. Rhodes, who had at his back a most powerful financial group, the De Beers Company, the Gold-fields of South Africa, and Mr. Beit, among others, held from the first the reins, and practically directed the whole enterprise. It must have been amusing to those who were then behind the scenes to read the criticisms that have since, with the wisdom that comes after the event, been showered on the allotment of the shares; for at that time the venture was regarded by all, except its moving spirit, Mr. Rhodes, and the few who knew his record and had an almost blind faith in the success of anything he undertook, as extremely hazardous. Mr. Rhodes's optimism, however, is infectious, and he had no difficulty in securing the necessary financial support, and indeed De Beers (which found £200,000), the Gold-fields of South Africa, the great Rhodes-Rudd Gold-mining Corporation, with Mr. Beit and Mr. Rhodes himself, could have easily subscribed the capital of a million among themselves. But no one at the time had any idea that the British public would at once

perceive the big possibilities that lay behind the nebulous present and very distant and doubtful future value of the shares, and ignore, as they did, the enormous difficulties of occupation, and the necessarily slow progress and great uncertainty of development.

The business of obtaining a charter from the British Government was not so easy or so expeditious as that of providing the capital. The preliminary negotiations took time, and it was not till July 1889 that the formal application was made, and it was October before it was formally granted.

One of the difficulties which Mr. Rhodes had to overcome was the wish of the Government to limit the charter to the territories south of the Zambesi. Mr. Rhodes was resolved not to be satisfied with such an arrangement, which would have been a terrible blow to his vast scheme of expansion; and by the same untiring perseverance which carried through the De Beers amalgamation, he got what he wanted—freedom to take the unclaimed territory north of the river. Mr. Rhodes's real ambition and aim at this time was nothing less than to secure through the Chartered Company the whole territory north of the Zambesi for the British Empire, and he had no intention of stopping even at Lake Tanganyika, if he could possibly succeed in painting the map red till he reached the Hinterland of Egypt upon the upper Nile. With this object in view, Mr. Rhodes succeeded in getting the northern boundaries of the Chartered Company's realms left undefined, and it was accordingly described in the charter as the region 'lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions, while the

power of further extension was added subject only to the approval of the Government. He had already an eye upon Barotseland, north of the river (which he acquired shortly before the occupation of Mashonaland was completed), on the unexplored territory up to Lakes Bangweolo and Tanganyika, and also on the dominion of Msidi, Katanga, widely celebrated among the natives for its copper, and also supposed to be rich in gold. This last was afterwards successfully claimed by the Congo Free State, though certainly there had never been the most shadowy existence of effective Belgian occupation. He also aimed at making some friendly arrangement with Portugal, and sent a representative to negotiate at Lisbon with a view to acquiring an interest in her East African territories; but this he did not push through, depending here, as in Katanga, a little too much on the policy of action and of accomplished facts.

Further details of his vast schemes might be added, but enough has been told to make plain the immense range of Mr. Rhodes's ambition for the extension of the Empire, and the unhesitating sacrifice of any immediate financial advantage which he was eager to make in order to paint the map red over all unclaimed or unoccupied portions of the last continent that remained open for British expansion. Of course, Mr. Rhodes's associates, who were men of business first and imperialists after, were somewhat alarmed at the huge schemes of their empire-making chief. Lobengula's dominions would have amply satisfied their acquisitiveness, for they saw very clearly that the occupation of such enormous additional territories would cost money, while a development sufficient to get some return for their money must for a great number of years be practically impossible.



But Mr. Rhodes was not to be denied; he did not rest till he had successfully imposed his policy on his colleagues, and the Chartered Company thus became the great instrument in our time in Imperial expansion. In the spring and early summer of 1889, long before the future of the charter was certain, he was doing practical work to obtain a controlling interest far north of the Zambesi in Nyasaland. This he effected by an agreement with the African Lakes Company, by which the promoters of the yet inchoate Chartered Company, at that time not yet ready even to apply for the charter, subscribed a large sum to the exhausted treasury of the African Lakes Company, undertook to give Chartered shares for the Company's shares, and undertook to find a large sum yearly for the expenses of administration. Mr. Rhodes, on the other hand, obtained the right of taking over the African Lakes Company, a right that was, as regards land and administration, in due time exercised.

When all that could be done in London was accomplished, the restless energy of the empire-builder would not let him await the formal grant of the charter in October; and long before that time he was back in South Africa making preparations to push on at the earliest possible date that effective occupation of territory, which he considered the chief reason for the Company's existence, and, to judge from his tireless devotion to the work of expansion, a main reason for his own. In London Mr. Rhodes had had ample opportunity for consulting a pioneer of the northern territories, Mr. Selous. Mr. Selous, the world-famed hunter, is one of those adventurous English sportsmen, whose hunting expeditions have served so often as the forerunners of the advance of

British civilisation into savage lands. His thorough knowledge of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, acquired in the wanderings of many years in the pursuit of big game, his trained habits of observation, his personal, though not very pleasant, experience of Lobengula and the Matabele, made him the best of all possible advisers on the question of occupation. The weight of Mr. Selous's opinion was given in favour of Mashonaland, partly because it was far distant from the home of the Matabele, partly because its high veldt offered a healthy and attractive region for English colonisation, and partly, though in a minor degree, I think, because Mr. Selous, whose humane feelings had been repeatedly outraged by what he had seen of the cruel Matabele massacres of the helpless Mashonas, was anxious to interpose a barrier of Europeans to Lobengula's exterminating *impis*.

The charter was granted at the end of October 1889, and a little after the middle of March 1890 the expedition set out, not without a certain appearance of destiny, from the very place where the dream of empire to the north had first had birth in the young English digger's brain, from Kimberley.

The expedition was as strange and intensely modern in its mode of organisation as it was swift and thorough in its equipment and action. The question of the numbers of men and of the amount of money required for the occupation of Mashonaland was decided by the acceptance of the offer of Mr. Frank Johnson, a man of ample experience and great resource, to contract to raise a small body of Cape colonists and Englishmen, and occupy Mashonaland for the sum of £90,000. Less than two hundred men composed the famous Mashonaland

Pioneers, and these, with two troops of mounted police, made up the expedition.

A great difficulty had been to deal with Lobengula, and obtain his countenance and approval to the proposed use of the concession. Mr. Rhodes chose for this extremely delicate work of diplomacy a man whose worth he knew from years of intimate friendship, Dr. Jameson, the successful Kimberley medical man. Dr. Jameson went up to Lobengula in 1889, and stayed three months, cured the beef-eating, beer-drinking monarch's gout, and gained such power over him and his chief Indunas that he succeeded in obtaining his full approval to the objects in view, and particularly to the occupation of Mashonaland. After this was accomplished, Dr. Jameson returned to Kimberley, only to be despatched again to Bulawayo to contend with fresh complications there, and at Bulawayo he remained, keeping Lobengula in a friendly humour to the venture, until the pioneers were on their way to Mashonaland.

Dr. Jameson got away from Bulawayo, however, in time to join the expedition on its way up, and supplied in the work of occupation the place which Mr. Rhodes would have filled himself, had he not been forced by urgent political considerations to remain at the Cape and use the influence he had gained there. It is pretty certain that had not Dr. Jameson gone up the second time to Lobengula and kept that savage despot in good-humour, he would have definitely revoked his permission, and it is probable that the Matabele would, after his departure, have attacked the column, but that it had got through the dangerous bush beyond the Maccloutsie River long before the natives expected. Dr. Jameson joined and accompanied the advance guard, and Mr.

Selous, at the head of the pioneers, cut the road for the wagons through the thick bush. Once the high veldt, the plateau of Mashonaland, was entered, by a pass discovered by Mr. Selous, the danger was over; for a few hundred mounted men, good riders and good shots, like the pioneers and the police, could have made head in the open against a very large force of natives. The Imperial Government had given some useful aid to the advance, by sending up a force of Bechuanaland police to the south-west borders of Matabeleland, thus drawing off the attention of Lobengula from the expedition.

When one contrasts the unbroken success and the small expense of this occupation with the expense of somewhat similar operations of the Imperial forces, one realises the accurate judgment of Mr. Rhodes in determining to undertake the work of expansion through the Cape Colony and its people, with his own energy and practical abilities to direct the operations, and his own chosen men to see his plans carried through. On the 12th of September 1890 the expedition had reached its destination at Mount Hampden, and there the flourishing town of Salisbury rapidly sprang into existence. The rainy season of 1890-1 brought a great deal of hardship and suffering on the pioneers and on the crowd of gold-seekers who flocked in without any adequate supply of provisions or other necessities; but the work of expansion, the main object of Mr. Rhodes, went on unchecked. Dr. Jameson, accompanied by Mr. Frank Johnson, explored and mapped out a short route to the east coast by which the Beira railroad now runs. Manica was next explored, and treaties with the chiefs were followed by occupation. After great hardships and privations, Dr. Jameson made his way to Gazaland, to the kraal of the great

chief Gungunhana, and, in the face of Portuguese opposition, apparently succeeded in securing the country for the Chartered Company. These advances eastward had, however, brought Mr. Rhodes into conflict with the Portuguese, who had been making desperate efforts to establish some semblance of an effective occupation of Manicaland and the neighbouring territory they claimed. Umtasa, a Manica chief, had accepted British protection, and when afterwards Portuguese emissaries were found at his kraal, they were arrested by the Chartered Company's officials and sent to Fort Salisbury. This caused a violent agitation in Portugal. The king, believing his crown to be in danger owing to the handle this discontent gave to the Republican party, appealed to the British Crown, and Mr. Rhodes's young men were authoritatively checked, though the difficulty was not finally removed till the *modus vivendi* of November 11, 1890, followed by the Convention of June 1891, by which the greater part of Gazaland (in spite of Gungunhana's efforts to come under the British flag, with which object he sent envoys to England in 1891) remained outside the British Empire, but a preferential right of purchase over Portuguese territory south of the Zambesi was secured.

The same difficulty of shadowy Portuguese claims and active Portuguese aggression was found in what is now North Rhodesia, where Consul-General Sir H. Johnston managed to anticipate Serpa Pinto and his army, and made treaties with the chiefs right up to Lake Tanganyika. It was in 1891 that Mr. Johnston became Consul-General for Nyasaland and Administrator of Northern Rhodesia, where, aided by liberal support from Mr. Rhodes and the Chartered Company, he put down the slave-trade by some brilliant opera-

tions against the Arab slave-traders and their native allies. This work, of course, belongs to a later period. A far more serious difficulty was the attempt of the Transvaal Boers, backed by General Joubert, but of course ostensibly without the authorisation of President Kruger, to trek into the Company's territories and establish an occupation by force of arms. Some account of this will be given in the next chapter. Mr. Rhodes, not contented with the work of expansion Dr. Jameson and his men were carrying out so expeditiously south of the Zambesi, was not long in sending up an expedition north of the Zambesi under the well-known explorer, Joseph Thomson, and another under Mr. Sharpe, to make treaties, and if possible get possession of Katanga, which, however, it was ultimately decided, belonged to the Congo Free State.

Meanwhile, the empire-builder, who was thus stretching out his arm over Central Africa, had been engaged at the Cape in work which would have been sufficient to occupy all the energies and time of any man of affairs of ordinary ability and ambition. The Chartered Company was bound under the terms of its agreement with the Imperial Government to bear part of the expense of carrying the telegraph line through the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and to build the northern railway from Kimberley to Mafeking. The telegraph and the railway were and are Mr. Rhodes's favourite instruments for rapid development, and he was resolved that they should quickly follow in the wake of his pioneers. The telegraph, being much swifter of construction, as well as cheaper than the railway, was his first care (though he lost no time about the railway), and its beginnings were soon to develop into the great

Trans-continental line, which now joins Cape Town to Lake Tanganyika, and is on its way to Egypt, almost entirely at the expense of the private purse of the public-spirited maker of Rhodesia.

While these events were passing in Mashonaland and the neighbouring territory, Mr. Rhodes had accepted the position of Prime Minister at the Cape. Sir Gordon Sprigg's Government had not been a success, and an extravagant railway scheme hastened its downfall. There was really no one but Mr. Rhodes who could command the confidence and support alike of the English colonists and of the Dutch, and a reconciliation and coalition of the two races for the development of South Africa had been all along the great aim of his political life. It was specially important to obtain at this time the support of Mr. Hofmeyr and the Afrikaner Bond, as through them some influence might be exerted on President Kruger to stop the inroad of thousands of Transvaal raiders into Mashonaland, which must have resulted in a conflict, the event of which, considering the small number of the pioneers, would have been at least very doubtful. Mr. Rhodes accordingly decided to combine the duties of managing director and virtual head of the Chartered Company with the duties entailed by forming a Ministry at Cape Town. This was early in the latter half of 1890.

Before taking responsibility and forming a Ministry he asked the Bond party to meet him, and obtained an assurance of their support. Here I may point out that Mr. Rhodes, though he was anxious for the support of the Bond, and anxious to work with them, needing their help, and also deeply convinced that the true solvent for racial feeling is co-operation in a common work, and the mutual knowledge such inter-

course affords, has never joined the Bond, has never been one of the Bondmen. A short time before this, while Sir Gordon Sprigg was still Premier, Mr. Hofmeyr offered to put him in Sir Gordon Sprigg's place as a nominee of the Bond. Mr. Rhodes refused the offer. He was willing to work with the Bond; he refused to be their instrument. He kept his own independence of action, though willing to do all he could for conciliation. No doubt, Mr. Hofmeyr may have hoped to use Mr. Rhodes for his own scheme of Dutch Supremacy at the time when he and the Bond agreed to support the future Premier; but if he did, he has since learned his mistake. Mr. Rhodes highly esteems the Dutch individually, but naturally, being a Progressive and an Imperialist, is opposed to the idea of the Dutch as a governing body.

The ultimate object of Mr. Rhodes's policy was the union of South Africa, towards which he hoped to work through a Customs Union, a Railway Union, and if possible, in the future, a united native policy. He knew the complete union of South Africa would involve a change in the Transvaal and its policy of isolation and racial distinction, but that he proposed to leave to the workings of inevitable law, by which a large, an enterprising, and increasing industrial population, chiefly of English race, must in one way or other gradually free themselves from the domination of an oligarchy of uneducated Dutch farmers, managed for their personal profit by a clique of Hollander officials and foreign concessionnaires, and strong only in their passionate antipathy to English rule, their skill with the rifle, and their possession of a very powerful and shrewd leader in the dictator who ruled at Pretoria.

The speeches of this period are not numerous, as



Mr. Rhodes's energy was finding more congenial expression in action. The first in order is a speech made some time before Mr. Rhodes became Premier, at a banquet given (May 11, 1890) at Bloemfontein to Sir H. Loch (now Lord Loch), then Governor and High Commissioner at the Cape.

In replying for 'The Cape Parliament,' Mr. Rhodes said:—'Mr. Chairman, your Excellency, and Gentlemen,—I could only wish that this night one of the members of the Cape Parliament, who is also a Minister of the Crown, could reply to the kindly words addressed by the gentleman who has proposed the toast of the Cape Parliament. I must say, Mr. Chairman, that I have been for the last ten years a member of the Cape Parliament, and if there is one thing I have seen to be a success in the government of the country, it is the fact that Her Majesty was good enough to grant us the benefits of responsible government. At the time it was granted there were many who thought we were not fitted for it, and could not undertake our own government. I think you will admit in this neighbouring State, that though in many respects we have failed, yet it was a credit to the people of the colony that they had the boldness to take into their hands the government of the country. The feeling of the colony was that the time was come, and that they were fitted to undertake the management of government for themselves, and if I may put it to you, to-night, when we look back upon the period during which we have had that government, I think we need not be ashamed of ourselves.

We have taken upon ourselves the construction of two thousand miles of railway; we have educated ourselves, and have had to rule the races in our charge, and I think you will say that credit is due to us. We had to leave our agricultural pursuits and our mines; we had to educate ourselves to parliamentary life and government; and so we have deserved the confidence of the country. It has fallen to our lot to be put in possession of ports on the sea-coast, and thus we were brought into connection with the neighbouring Republics, and I think that the policy of the Cape Colony has been to cultivate the friendship of these States, and in that policy I think we have not failed generally. I may here refer to very recent transactions which have been entered into with the neighbouring Free State, and I may say that I have to compliment the gentlemen of the Volksraad, seeing that they carried out a political transaction of quite supreme advantage to themselves. When we come to consider a neighbouring State, which is said to be governed by a body of simple farmers, we find that they have made arrangements by which they have obliged the members of another Government to contribute a share of customs, and to spend its money on railways in their State: and when there is any profit on those railways they share it on a half-and-half basis, with the perpetually retained right of adopting full control whenever they see fit, to do so. I may say that the neighbouring State does not consist wholly of simple farmers but also of very capable diplomatists.

'But beyond that there is a doctrine, dated at least thirty years back, regarding customs as the just right of contribution of the coast ports; and I think a speaker to-night placed that as a cardinal fact in the settlement of the question. I think our politicians in the Cape Colony desired not to evade the discussion of these questions. I think that kind of reciprocity will continue. In the railway arrangements you hold, I may say, as a citizen of Kimberley, that I hope your State will claim the rights of further expenditure on the basis of a line between Kimberley and Bloemfontein. Any one who has travelled into the Conquered Territory cannot but perceive what will be the future of the granary of South Africa if only railway extension is afforded to it. The people there must have a market for their industry.'

Mr. Rhodes then alluded to the necessity for running the railways through the coal-mining districts of the Free State, in order that their coal might be used in the Kimberley mines, so that the directors might save the expense of sending 7000 miles for their fuel when it was lying so near their doors. In conclusion, he expressed admiration for a sentiment regarding the possession of a national flag, but said there was still a possibility of a South African Federal Union if they could pursue a course which would give them an arrangement in an equal Customs Union in all the countries from Durban to Walfisch Bay. This and other such equitable understandings would, while not sacrificing sentiment, bring about a practical union in Africa.

The next speech of 1890 is one made, as Premier, at the cradle of his political ambition, Kimberley, on September 6. This speech is in unimportant passages a summary.

‘ Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen,—I thank you for the very cordial and hearty manner in which you have received the toast just proposed. I cannot say that “A prophet is not without honour save in his own country,” for I am not a prophet, and I think the honour done me to-night as one of your citizens, on my being raised to the position of Premier of this colony, is very great indeed; and I appreciate it extremely. Only about two months ago, being much occupied with the North, I had made up my mind not to attend Parliament, but I found there was a huge Railway Bill proposed, and I thought it was my duty to oppose it, as it would place too great a burden upon the revenue of this country. I felt that this community had a very large stake in the prosperity of the country, and a Railway Bill which would cost twelve millions for railways which it was admitted almost on all sides would not pay, would be a heavy burden. I hurried down, and we fought the question, and the result you all know. But events hurried on faster than I expected, and before I knew where I was I saw it would be forced upon me to take the responsibility of the government of this country. I thought of the positions I occupied in De Beers and the Chartered Company, and I concluded that one position could be worked with the

other, and each to the benefit of all. At any rate I had the courage to undertake it, and I may say that up to the present I have not regretted it. If there is anything that would give me encouragement, it is the kindly and cordial greeting my fellow-citizens have extended to me to-night.

‘I may tell you that before coming to a decision in regard to occupying the position of Premier, I met the various sections of the House. I hope you will not be alarmed when I say that I asked the members of the Bond party to meet me. I trust you will agree with me that when I was undertaking the responsibility of government, the best thing to be done was to ask them to meet me and ask them plainly to give me their support. I put my views before them, and received from them a promise that they would give me a fair chance in carrying on the administration. I think that if more pains were taken to explain matters to the members of the Bond party, many of the cobwebs would be swept away and a much better understanding would exist between the different parties.

‘The Government’s policy will be a South African policy. What we mean is that we will do all in our power, whilst looking after the interests of the Cape Colony, to draw closer and closer the ties between us and the neighbouring States. In pursuance of this we have arranged to meet in December next in Bloemfontein, and hope to extend the railway from Bloemfontein to the Vaal River. We feel it is a matter of time to arrive at a settlement of the various

questions which divide the States of South Africa. It may not come in our time, but I believe that ultimately the different States will be united. The Government hope that the result of the Swaziland Convention will prove satisfactory to the Transvaal. We feel that if fair privileges were granted to every citizen of the Transvaal, the Transvaal would not be dissatisfied at the terms England will deal out to it. I feel sure that if the Transvaal joins with us and the other States in a Customs Union, the sister colony of Natal will also join, and that would be one great step towards a union of South Africa. The projected extension of the railway will likewise prove that we are getting nearer to a United South Africa.

‘It is customary to speak of a United South Africa as possible within the near future. If we mean a complete Union with the same flag, I see very serious difficulties. I know myself that I am not prepared at any time to forfeit my flag. I repeat, I am not prepared at any time to forfeit my flag. I remember a good story about the editor of a leading journal in this country. He was asked to allow a supervision of his articles in reference to native policy, and he was offered a free hand with everything else. “Well,” he asked, “if you take away the direction of my native policy, what have I left?” And so it is with me. If I have to forfeit my flag, what have I left? If you take away my flag, you take away everything. Holding these views, I can feel some respect for the neighbouring States, where men have been born under Republican institutions and with

Republican feelings. When I speak of South African Union, I mean that we may attain to perfect free trade as to our own commodities, perfect and complete internal railway communication, and a general Customs Union, stretching from Delagoa Bay to Walfisch Bay; and if our statesmen should attain to that, I say they will have done a good work. It has been my good fortune to meet people belonging to both sides of the House, and to hear their approval with regard to the development of the Northern territory. I am glad the Cape Colony will also share in the development of the country to the north. I feel assured that within my lifetime the limits of the Cape Colony will stretch as far as the Zambesi. Many of you are interested in the operations of the Chartered Company northwards; and it is a pleasure to me to announce that all risks of a collision are over, and that I believe there will be a peaceable occupation of Mashonaland. I have had the pleasure to-day to receive a telegram announcing the cession of the Barotse country, which I may tell you is over 200,000 square miles in extent. I think we are carrying out a practical object; we have at least sent five hundred of our citizens to occupy a new country.

‘To show how great is the wish to go north, I may mention that a Dutch Reformed minister at Colesberg has been called to Mossamedes, a place further even than the country we have annexed. I have often thought that if the people who originally took the Cape Colony had been told that the Colony would to-day extend to the Orange River, and a thousand

miles beyond the Orange River, they would have laughed at the idea. I believe that people who live a hundred years hence will think that the present annexation is far too short.'

Not long after this Mr. Rhodes accompanied the High Commissioner in a journey to the north of Bechuanaland to visit the colonists and the native chiefs, and in the course of this journey the High Commissioner and the Premier were entertained at a banquet at Vryburg, to which the northern railroad had just been completed. Here Mr. Rhodes, amid loud laughter, alluded to the days when he saved Bechuanaland for the Empire, and yet was informed by a high Imperial officer (General Warren) that he was dangerous to the peace of the country. This was early in October 1890.

Mr. Rhodes, who was received with loud and prolonged cheering, said: 'Mr. Chairman, your Excellency and Gentlemen,—I have to thank you for the very cordial manner in which you have received my toast to-night. I cannot say I quite agree with the sanguine statements about my capacities which have been made by the gentleman who proposed my health, but I certainly feel the cordial way in which he has proposed it and you have received it. It is true that to-day memories of the past come back to me. I could not help thinking of five or six years ago, when I first came here, and when we had the Stellaland Bestuur, the party of loyals, and various sections, all working with one object—the good of



the country—but each in their different way ; so that, at certain periods, and on certain occasions, we had some unpleasant interviews. It seems almost impossible to think that five years ago this was a country that you might almost call barbarian. There was hardly a house in the place. It was a sort of “Tom Tiddler’s ground,” and every one was fighting for his own hand. When I think of the unpleasant terms which were used as to many individuals, I can only pardon the terms used as to myself, because I feel that it was a new ground we were each endeavouring to bring under civilisation here, and we rather differed as to the mode of doing it. When I think, Mr. Chairman, that the last time I left this country, I was informed by a high Imperial officer that I was dangerous to the peace of the country, and when I think I am here to-day and have brought you a gift, as the High Commissioner has kindly put it, a gift from the Cape Colony of a railway, a gift from the Cape Colony to Stellaland, I think I am entitled to say that I have wiped out that remark—that I was dangerous to the peace of the country ; and I think, when I remind you that, owing to the cordial manner in which the High Commissioner has worked with the Government of Cape Colony and with the Government of the Free State, he has been enabled to arrange a Customs Union with those States, you need not have any distrust or fear that the Cape Colony is anxious to be too grasping with reference to your little State. Whenever the time may occur that you are anxious to join us, I think

I may say we shall be only too willing to let you join. Do not think for one moment that with an octopus grasp we are trying to seize you against your will. We are simply trying in every way, by the railway, by the Customs Union,—we are simply trying to make you a part of the system of South Africa.

‘I could not help hearing to-day the intense feeling that has been expressed as to what I think is a most ridiculous idea with regard to our neighbours in the Transvaal—with whom I may say the Cape Colony has been most cordially working—the idea that our neighbours are devising a scheme of a port of entry so remote that they would damage and would destroy the vested interests of this country. I cannot conceive that the Government of the country would, in a brutal manner, create a port of entry at Warrington, and deny any port of entry other than that along the border. I feel sure that such a suggestion is ridiculous, because I cannot help thinking that the late Convention entered into with the Transvaal is another indication of their intense desire to work in harmony, not only with the people of Cape Colony, but with Her Majesty’s Government; and there could be no more cruel blow to the people of the Cape Colony and to Her Majesty’s Government combined, than the suggestion said to be devised, that there should be only one port of entry for your goods, and that port so remote as to render the extension of the railway practically useless. Therefore I feel, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that it is a bugbear, and I

Have spoken strongly on it to-night, because I believe that there is not such a feeling on the part of the Transvaal Government, and I would like to give publicity to my belief that the Transvaal Government could not devise an unfriendly or unneighbourly act. Mr. Chairman and your Excellency, it was only the other day that I was informed on "the best authority" that as regards the territory we have lately occupied, and which has been guaranteed to us, the Government of the Transvaal was already devising the seizure and occupation of a part of it. I just mention this to show the fallacious rumours that go about. Could you believe it possible that a friendly and neighbourly State, when the ink was hardly dry, could enter on a scheme to seize a territory which was already guaranteed to a neighbouring and friendly power. But I mention this to show how fast these rumours come, and how groundless is their origin. Mr. Chairman, I do feel to-night it is a pleasing thing to see that these three great systems in this country are united systems, namely, a system governed by a Charter ; a system of a Crown Colony ; and, last but not least, a system of self-government as represented by the Cape of Good Hope. We have amongst us to-night two gentlemen who are members of Parliament for Cape Colony, and I wish to say to you it was due to the efforts of those two gentlemen, and the sections of the House with which they are connected, that this railway to Vryburg became an accomplished fact. They were thorough Afrikaners, but, whilst they had every regard to neighbouring

States, they felt that Cape Colony should look after its own interests and its own trade, and it is due to their action that you at the present moment have the railway to Vryburg.

‘I would point out to you, Mr. Chairman, that these three classes of Government happen most fortunately at the present moment to be working in entire unity. You have the Chartered system on the North, dealing with pure barbarism ; a Crown Colony lying between the Cape and the North, under the direction of his Excellency the High Commissioner ; and you have at the base self-government. There has been a great deal said about the desire of the Cape Colony to annex and absorb you. I can assure you to-night, we shall never take that step until you are anxious to join with us, but you must all feel it is a matter of time—that the whole matter rests on the word “time.” I know, in looking to the future, that the Charter must change first, perhaps to a system of Imperial Government, but finally to self-government ; and I remind you that that period must also come to you in the course of time ; and when your territory is developed, and when you possess the men who have a desire to deal with the government of the country, you must proceed from direct Imperial government to self-government. And I feel this too, that this is a desire and wish of Her Majesty’s Government, based on the word “time,” when the time arrives for it ; and, when it does, I feel you will join with me in remembering and recognising the debt we owe Her Majesty’s Government, who in the period of your

infancy has spent its wealth for you, has conducted you through your boyhood, and who, when you are ready for self-government, will grant it you without one word, 'as freely as, year by year, it has given you its wealth to develop the resources of this country.

## CHAPTER X

## THE MAKING OF MASHONALAND—THE BOER TREK

THE occupation of Mashonaland was, as has been seen, a brilliant success; the prompt and daring action of Dr. Jameson and other pioneers of Empire had carried out Mr. Rhodes's principle that it was the duty of Englishmen to annex to the Empire as much habitable territory as they possibly could. But the building up of a new country is not done in a day or a year, and the hardships of the first rainy season were followed by a far more serious depression. The British public had amazed Mr. Rhodes himself by the swiftness with which they appreciated the future value of the territories he had acquired for the Empire. Their faith in his achievement has since been proved to be fully justified, but the public had the defects of their qualities, they expected the impossible—immediate results from the gold reefs.

The settlers in Mashonaland naturally enough made the same mistake. They expected as swift results from the effort of development as from the effort of occupation. Well-equipped expeditions from England and the Cape Colony went up and found, of course, that gold was not to be picked up like gooseberries. The press in London fell into the same mistake. If results could not be had at once, as they expected, the country, as far as gold went, was evidently (they considered) a failure.

The more resolute of the settlers, however, stuck

to their work, in spite of the prohibitive cost of carriage, which by the Cape route came to about £70 a ton. The expenses of the Company were enormous, £250,000 a year, with practically no returns. The continued threatenings of a trek from the Transvaal necessitated an increased force of police, and the immediate outlook was decidedly gloomy.

In this critical situation, Mr. Colquhoun, the first Administrator, was succeeded by Dr. Jameson. Dr. Jameson, ill as he was with fever, the result of his expedition to Gazaland, agreed, at Mr. Rhodes's request, to go up and see what he could do to cope with the difficulties of the situation. His proposal was certainly heroic. 'Give me £3000 a month,' he said to Mr. Rhodes, 'and I can pull through.' The following year he reduced the police from seven hundred to forty, and at the same time enlisted a force of five hundred settlers at £4 each per annum; and by this and other large economies actually reduced the expenditure from £250,000 to £30,000. These difficulties from within were dealt with by Dr. Jameson with great good sense and ability, the cutting-down of expenditure being actually accompanied by the universal popularity of the new Administrator among the settlers.

The difficulty from without was at this time the attitude of President Kruger's burghers, who threatened to trek into the Chartered Company's territories and establish themselves, according to President Kruger's patent for expansion, already tried in Bechuanaland and Zululand, as an independent republic, to be, of course, in due time, incorporated with the Transvaal. President Kruger himself took no active part in this movement; he left that to General Joubert and Colonel Ferreira.

It is not to be wondered at that a man of President Kruger's stubborn tenacity of purpose and great daring should not have submitted without an effort to the defeat of his scheme for a Transvaal occupation of the northern territories. He has always been shrewd enough to perceive that if open defiance be avoided, conventions may be broken and boundaries overstepped with practical impunity, and often with ultimate success, and his experience in North Zululand favoured an attempt on Lobengula's dominions. If, at the worst, he was unsuccessful, he could use his failure as an argument for obtaining concessions from the British Government in other directions.

The occupation, by the English, of Mashonaland, a country of excellent pastoral and agricultural capabilities, with abundant rainfall and a healthy climate, a region that was emphatically 'a white man's country,' where a white race could settle permanently and increase, was as serious a blow to his aims as it was a manifest gain to the prospects of British supremacy in South Africa. Had President Kruger secured the country, he could have not only shut off the Cape expansion from the whole interior, but could have joined hands with the German Emperor in South-West Africa, with results the importance of which it is difficult to exaggerate. No doubt he had no intention of inviting German annexation, but German help was exactly what he required, shut out as he was from the sea by intervening British and Portuguese territory. The Germans themselves had cast covetous eyes on the northern territory, as Count Pfeil's mission to Bulawayo had proved shortly before Mr. Rhodes made his first arrangement with Lobengula. Some time before, early in 1890, it had been necessary for Mr. Rhodes to put pressure on or



placate President Kruger, whose Boers, excited at the news of an approaching British occupation of Mashonaland, set to work to organise a trek in earnest, in order, if possible, to anticipate it. It was on this and other questions caused by the Transvaal's attempts to extend its territories that the High Commissioner (Sir H. Loch), in company with Mr. Rhodes, met President Kruger at Blignant's Pont early in the year. Seeing that the British Government was in earnest, President Kruger proposed an exchange. The Transvaal would 'withdraw its claims to the northern territories on condition that Her Majesty's Government withdrew itself to the east of the Republic in Swaziland, from the territory of Zambaan and Umbegeza, and Amatongaland, including Kosi Bay.' As the Transvaal was barred by the Convention of 1884 from such an extension of its boundaries, this amounted to asking as a right to be allowed to break the Convention to the east, if the Republic gave up attempting to seize British territory to the north. This modest request was supported by a treaty with Lobengula, which that monarch denied that he had signed. The British High Commissioner, however, was firm. He demanded that President Kruger should stop the trek, not as a bargain for which he was to get payment elsewhere, but because the trek would be a breach of the Convention. After President Kruger had promised to stop the trek, a very generous offer of access to the sea, under certain safeguards and conditions, was made to the President, though not accepted either by him or by the Volksraad. President Kruger accordingly ceased openly to encourage the trek, the preparations for which went on much as before, General Joubert, Colonel Ferreira, and other Boer leaders being left to do what was needful. The result

was that a formidable expedition to invade Mashonaland was organised in the Zoutspanberg district of the Transvaal. The New Republic in Mashonaland was completely organised, the officials were named for its administration, and Mr. Rhodes had to exert all his influence with the Afrikaner Bond; and the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, had to put very strong pressure on behalf of the British Government on President Kruger directly, before the President was forced to issue a proclamation to stop the expedition. President Kruger's action 'damped' the trek, that is, reduced the numbers of Transvaalers who took part in it; but the trek took place, nevertheless, and a large and well-armed body of Boers arrived at the Limpopo, where they were stopped by Mr. Rhodes's armed settlers and a force of Bechuanaland police. The armed men and Maxims might not have prevented a collision; but fortunately Dr. Jameson had arrived on the spot, and succeeded by skilful diplomacy in persuading the invaders to retire. It is interesting to observe that a part of this diplomacy exactly repeated Mr. Rhodes's old policy in Bechuanaland. Those of the trekkers who were willing to come under the British flag were afterwards admitted. They got the land on terms of accepting the British Government, and their experience of the Chartered Company's administration made them most loyal citizens of the British Empire, and led gradually to that depletion of the stoutest burghers of the Transvaal by their emigration into Rhodesia, to which Mr. Rhodes used to look hopefully as one of the means, by diminishing the pastoral Boers, the fighting backbone of President Kruger's Government, to forward the gradual settlement of the Transvaal difficulty.

This emigration, of course, developed more fully at a later date—after Matabeleland came under the Chartered Company; but as General Joubert was behind this projected invasion of Rhodesia, it may be permitted here to give his address to his fellow-burghers (translated from *Land en Volk*) when this emigration from the Transvaal into Rhodesia threatened to assume serious dimensions at the time of the Matabele revolt. The address gives, from General Joubert's standpoint, a very accurate picture of the results of the Transvaal emigration into Rhodesia, and quite explains his attitude in supporting the trek in 1891.

‘Worthy Fellow-burghers of the South African Republic,—Hitherto I have preserved silence. I had firmly resolved to remain altogether silent, and leave the affairs of Mashonaland and the Matabele to go their own course, and see what the end would be. But now that it has become known to me that so many of our people and young men are being enticed to go to Matabeleland, now that I see that there are already on the death-roll so many names of young men who went from the districts of Ermelo, Middleburg—yes, from the South African Republic, to the scene of injustice and violence, and will never return again, now my heart breaks, the bonds of silence are removed, and I must address a word to the faithful burghers of the Republic. I know beforehand that my words will not be very agreeable to some, that they will give offence to many, and that I shall bring upon my head the adverse judgments of many; but

if I can only convince one of my fellow-burghers, or any one who loves the land wherein we dwell, and our independence, by this, my writing, and keep him back from the harm that he will do to himself, and from the evil and danger that he will bring upon the freedom and independence of the South African Republic, then I shall deem myself sufficiently rewarded. Let the rest of the world, and the enemies of truth and justice and the freedom of our Republic, then say and do what they like.

‘First of all, my fellow-burghers who are preparing to go to Matabeleland, I must ask you—Why leave the Transvaal? What impels you to do so? What are you going to do there? What do you expect to find there that does not exist in your own country, so blessed by God and Nature? That British troops are going to Matabeleland and further, to extend Imperial rule to the far north in South Africa, or even round the whole world; that they go everywhere, so that the fame and honour of their victories and bloody deeds of war may be made known to the world; that they go in order to bring one territory after the other under the Imperial power of England—this is so natural and such an old habit that nobody need be surprised at it. Therefore let them go. That many poor wretches and disappointed speculators from all nations of the world, misled by fortune-hunting, are attracted to the scene of injustice and violence need not surprise you either. They have no other prospect or better notion. Let them go. That so many healthy and promising young men

from Cape Colony and Natal hearken to the voice of Mr. Cecil Rhodes calling them to the scene is not unnatural. In the first place, they are already British subjects, sons of British soil, and only follow their Imperial leader, Mr. Rhodes, on his path to extend the British Empire over the whole world, over the whole of South Africa, yes, even over the Transvaal, the Free State, as he himself declared at Kimberley, as the Premier of the Cape Colony.

‘And now, my worthy fellow-burghers, what are you going to do? Did not the “voortrekkers,” did not your fathers and mothers, forsake their country, their goods—yes, their all—to escape the British rule? Did they not sacrifice their blood and chattels to throw off the British yoke and dominance, and become a free and independent people? Did they not struggle through the wilderness in order to found a free country, the Transvaal, and by doing so procure for you that dear, inestimable treasure of freedom, of independence? And now, my fellow-burghers, will you help to render that work vain, will you despise all these sacrifices, will you tread them under foot, will you go and aid the greatest enemy and underminer of the Afrikaner people? Will you commit such treason against our beloved Republic, against our independence? No, worthy countrymen, worthy sons and daughters of the Transvaal, that I cannot, may not believe, and therefore it is an intolerable, unendurable grief for me to learn that burghers are going from Piet Retief and other districts of the Transvaal to Matabeleland, to Mashonaland, the

country robbed in the English fashion. People of the Transvaal are weary of their independence; they depart, they forsake the inheritance of their fathers, disregard the sighs and tears of their mothers, they look back at the fleshpots of Egypt, forget the slavery of the British yoke, turn to the golden calf of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and wish to go to Mashonaland to help to unjustly kill unoffending Matabele, extend British rule, and hem in and stamp out the Transvaal.

‘You may say, “That is not our object.” Yes, I know, my dear friends, fellow-burghers, that is not your object; you do not foresee it, but I assure you, by all that is holy, that will be the end of the work of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, which you are unwittingly aiding. I say that all of you who do not desire to become traitors to, and underminers of, the independence of the South African Republic, all who do not wish to be false to the true interests of the African people, will not listen to the voice of the charmer, will not go to help to hem in the Transvaal, and the Afrikaners with the bond of Imperial dominance which Mr. Rhodes is now drawing around us in the north. And now, worthy burghers, I have already said I know that my letter will not be agreeable. I shall be criticised and condemned, and, who knows, perhaps abused. Perhaps I stand alone in holding this view, but that I cannot help. I am a child of the “voortrekkers,” one of the few survivors of the families murdered at Bloedkrans. I know what the freedom and independence of our country have cost us. The northern country, Matabeleland, was the natural and

only means for the extension of the Transvaal by our people. It was for years our hunting-ground. We lived in perfect peace with the Matabeles and Mashonas. And now we are not only cut off from that prospect, and robbed of our hunting-fields and friendly neighbours, but our burghers are enticed to go from our country to help to more rapidly bring the evils upon us, to completely encompass our country with British territory, and make our independent existence impossible. See, worthy fellow-burghers, the objections and fears that have compelled, and compel me, as a lover of our independence, to address these words to you, in the hope that you will take heed to them, and that no more of our burghers will forsake their inheritance and independence to go and worship the golden calf of Matabeleland.—Your humble, but also loving, fellow-burgher,

P. J. JOUBERT.'

During this year (1891) Mr. Rhodes himself went up to Mashonaland, and travelled through the country, looked into the mining development and the farming, took an interest in everything, and increased by personal intercourse that faith in him as their head for which the Mashonaland settlers were already favourably distinguished. Mr. Rhodes, who loves the simpler conditions of a settler's life, lived close to nature, had reason to congratulate himself on the excellence of the new country, and would have liked nothing better than to stay with his young men, and join in the work of development, but that his political aims, especially that of South African unification,

demanding his presence as Premier at the Cape. Here may be given one of the few long letters Mr. Rhodes has written during his political life, a letter to the Secretary of the Cape Town Branch of the Afrikaner Bond, April 17, 1891, which is particularly interesting from what Mr. Rhodes had to say about the proposed trek, and because he plainly states that if the interests of the Chartered Company and the Colony clashed, he would resign his position as Prime Minister, and devote himself to the development of the interior.

‘To the Secretary of the Cape Town Branch of the Afrikaner Bond.

‘SIR,—I have been asked, in consequence of the meeting of the Afrikaner Bond—which, I am informed, is to be held this afternoon—to place in writing, for the information of its members, my own ideas about the settlement, subject to the approval of his Excellency the High Commissioner, of that portion of the territory proclaimed as within the sphere of British influence, which is at present in the possession of the Chartered Company, and I take this opportunity of doing so. The regulations regarding mining which, as you are aware, have already been published, provide, *inter alia*, for the security of tenure by the individual miner of his claims, and render “jumping”—which was so fruitful a source of trouble in other countries—impossible. Deep levels are likewise unknown, the claim-holder following the reef through all its dips and variations. These mining regulations have been accepted generally as liberal and satisfactory. As regards the land, I think that, so soon as a settlement becomes possible, farmers



accustomed to practical farming should be invited into the country in order to personally occupy and work farms whose size will naturally vary according to their suitability for pastoral or agricultural purposes. The manner in which the farms would be given out is a subject for future consideration, depending in a great measure upon the number of applicants. Should the applications exceed in number the farms available, I would then suggest that a committee of representative men (from amongst the applicants), should be appointed for the purpose of selecting and sending in the names of those whom they consider to be the most suitable farmers for the occupation and working of a new country.

‘Although an arrangement has been already made for the admission of over one hundred farmers from the Transvaal, and although there will be no objection when opportunity offers for the admission of others from the Transvaal, Free State, and other South African communities, still I can give the assurance that in the final settlement of the country—with the consent of the High Commissioner—no undue preference will be shown to them over Her Majesty’s subjects who may desire to proceed from this Colony or from elsewhere. In order to pave the way for this, I would suggest that a deputation should proceed from the Cape Colony for the purpose of inspecting and reporting upon the country. My idea is that farms should be given out subject to a reasonable annual quit-rent, and that none of the farmers should be handicapped at the outset by being called upon to pay a capital amount upon their land, so that whatever funds they may possess should be available for the stocking and development of their properties. Every intending farmer will be required

to sign a declaration that on entering the territory he will be under the flag and conform to the Chartered Company's laws, which will be based in principle on those of the Cape Colony, with the right of appeal from the local courts to the Supreme Court in Cape Town. I should greatly value any practical suggestions which your members might have to make on this question of a land settlement in a new country, but I must tell you now that the Chartered Company cannot permit any other than those who are willing to place themselves under its jurisdiction to enter the territory. It is stated that a trek is being organised in the Transvaal by certain persons, who, in defiance of the concession granted by Lobengula, the paramount chief of the country, intend attempting to enter the territory for the purpose of setting up a new republic there within the proclaimed sphere of British influence, independent of, and antagonistic to, the Chartered Company. Bearing in mind the fact that the Pioneer force and the Company's police, composed exclusively of South African, English, and Dutch Colonists, marched in last year under circumstances which it was generally believed in the Transvaal laid them open to certain attack from the Matabele, and bearing in mind the fact, that the country has been occupied at the sole expense of the Company—after an expenditure of half a million of money,—I refrain from criticising the action and motives of those who are the instigators of such a step. All I can assure you is, that I consider it my bounden duty to assert the rights obtained by the Company by resisting such a trek—although at the same time quite prepared, as I have already stated, to give consideration to persons desirous of going from the Transvaal or from the

other South African communities. And, before closing, it may be just as well for me to repeat what I have all along maintained since the day I consented to become Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, that should from any cause—such, for instance, as this—the interests of the Cape Colony and those of the Chartered Company be considered to clash, I shall at once place my resignation as Prime Minister in the hands of his Excellency the Governor, rather than have it imputed to me that I am sacrificing the interests of the Colony; and very deeply though I should regret my severance from you, I will proceed, so far as is in my power, with the development of those interior regions on which my heart has so long been set, and where it has steadily been up to the present one of my aims to secure a fair share for your people, and for those who may come after them.—I am, sir, your obedient servant.

C. J. RHODES.

The first speech which I give of this period is the speech made at the Annual Congress of the Afrikaner Bond (March 30, 1891), a speech which emphasises the admirable work of racial conciliation under the Imperial flag which Mr. Rhodes had been accomplishing throughout his political life. Mr. Rhodes was then, as now, a strong Home Ruler as well as an ardent Imperialist, and this differentiates his broad Imperialism from much that bears that name.

It will be noticed that Mr. Rhodes boldly stated with regard to the Transvaal and the Free State to this audience of Cape Dutchmen, 'If I had my wish I would abolish that system of independent States antagonistic to ourselves south of the Zambesi,' and immediately went on to say to the Afrikaner Bond, 'Your ideas are the same as mine.' The excellent

proposal of a Central Teaching University at Cape Town as a means of promoting intercourse between the young men of the various States is also noteworthy.

‘Mr. President and Gentlemen,—I feel a deep pleasure in the fact that you have intrusted me with the toast of the Afrikaner Bond, and I feel a deeper pleasure in the fact that an opportunity has occurred to me to propose this toast when I have just returned from England, after having received the highest consideration from the politicians of England, after Her Majesty herself has expressed a desire that I should meet her, and should have the honour of dining with her. I think it would in the past have been considered an extraordinary anomaly that one who possessed the complete confidence of Her Majesty herself should have been able to show that at the same time he felt most completely and entirely that the object and aspirations of the Afrikaner Bond were in complete touch and concert with a fervent loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen. When I arrived at Cape Town and heard that you were meeting for your Annual Congress at Kimberley, it weighed with me more than anything that I had experienced such an unanimous and such a kindly reception in England from every portion of the House of Commons; and that, moreover, I could upon my arrival accept your invitation, and come to your meeting here.

‘I come here because I wish to show that there is nothing antagonistic between the aspirations of the

people of this country and of their kindred in the mother-country, provided always, Mr. President and gentlemen, that the old country recognises that the whole idea of the Colonies and of the Colonial people is that the principle of self-government must be observed and acted upon to the full, and that the capacity of the Colony must be admitted to deal with every internal matter that may arise in the country. The principle must be recognised in the old country that the people born and bred in this Colony, and descended from those who existed in this country many generations ago, are much better capable of dealing with the various matters that arise than people who have to dictate 7000 miles away. Now that is the principle of the Afrikaner Bond. There may be some of you who think that the relations of the Empire must be altered, and that separation must take place in time. That I will not discuss just now; but I have a hope that under the principle of self-government we may long remain a portion of the British Empire, enjoying special advantages under a differential rate. The gentleman on my right, Mr. Neethling, may laugh; but I can tell him the differential rate will work to his advantage—it will do so in reference to his wine and brandy, which will get a good market in preference to and against those who are outside the circle of the British Empire and its Colonies.

‘Let me repeat, my feeling is that a great step has been achieved in this respect, that I should have had the good fortune to meet with the reception given to

me in England, and that immediately upon my arrival in the Colony I should be able to be present at a meeting of an organisation which has been looked upon in the past with some doubt and discredit. I look upon your organisation as an expression of the desire of the people in the country to claim their share in the politics of the country, and to express their views upon public questions. Even although you might charge me with repetition, I say again that as Prime Minister of the Colony, I know when I am dealing with your representatives that I am dealing with the representatives of the people. I have to consider what they say to me in Parliament, and I believe the Government of the present day is just this—that the ministers whom you happen to select for the moment have to carry out the wishes of the majority of the people. That is what I believe to be the Government of the day. Now, Mr. President, for nearly nine years I have voted and worked with your party, for the simple reason that I looked upon that party as representing the people of the country. I did so with no ultimate hope that one day you would hoist me into power, but simply feeling that that was the proper policy and the proper politics to pursue in the Cape Parliament. It seemed to me a great idea and a great thing to know that there was a large country party taking a share in politics, and that they could show the town section and every other section of people a good example in the active interest taken in the public affairs of the country by them—the country party. Since Kimberley has enjoyed parlia-

mentary representation—I will not say it was due to my efforts, but it is a fact—Kimberley has almost invariably voted with you in the Cape Parliament.

‘Now another feature which struck me, another consideration which weighed with me enormously, was that when I read the programme of your institution it seemed to me that there could be no difference between your programme and the programme of any man who had an active ambition to bring about a union of the country. The principles of the Bond, instead of creating a diversity of states or parties, instead of inducing antagonism, have the opposite effect; they aim at working quietly, year after year, to bring South Africa into one system as to its railways, as to its customs, and as to its trade in the various products of the country. You see very clearly that though a surveyor might run a line, latitude so-and-so, thus bringing Mr. Wessels’ farm Benaudheidfontein, for example, partly into one state and partly into another, that the mistakes of disunion and division must not be continued or repeated in the future. We won’t go into the mistakes of the past, when instead of your young and adventurous men going from Cape Town northwards, and engaging in the work of harmonious development, independent states were created which have led to very great friction, which your organisation has been founded to remove. Still we know these states have been created; they have caused enormous and terrible difficulties in connection with our mutual relations; and I recognise that the Afrikaner Bond’s policy is to

remove these difficulties and obstructions from the way of union. I felt nine years ago, as a young politician, that there was no difference between my ideas and the ideas which your organisation promulgated. I might say there is no difference between the policy of Sir Bartle Frere and the policy of the Afrikaner Bond. If that had been stated at the time Sir Bartle Frere was Governor of the Cape Colony, it would almost have been met with laughter; but now you receive the statement in all seriousness, recognising its truth. People are beginning to see that this is the grand central idea.

‘Although there may be two different ways of working it out, the object is the same; and I would say to-night that the only time I ever differed with the Afrikaner Bond was when I saw that you were relying too much upon a sentimental arrangement (I am speaking now with regard to the northern states) rather than upon a practical basis. At one time you were prepared to let the whole of the northern territories go from you, in the hope that they would at some future time be united with you. Well, I have been through the fire in the work of amalgamating the diamond mines; and one powerful rule to follow is that you must never abandon a position. It is perfectly true that the northern states may accept your sentiment as to a union with South Africa; but you must come to a bargain with every card you have in your hand. That is the secret of the Bechuanaland development and the development of Zambesia, now going on. I have not one single



atom of antagonistic feeling in so far as the Transvaal or any of the neighbouring states are concerned ; but if your ambition or policy is a union of South Africa, then the Cape Colony must keep as many cards as it may possess. That idea led to the settlement of Bechuanaland, and that idea has led to the possession of districts in the Zambesia regions.

‘I can speak with confidence to-night, because my reports are such that I feel there is no doubt about the future of the territories on the Zambesi. That they contain within themselves a wealth that will support a government, I have no hesitation in stating to you to-night. I have every confidence in the future of these new northern territories, and I can also state to you that I shall never abandon my object. These territories possess a sufficient amount of wealth to demand in time the principle of self-government. A change must then occur from the Chartered system of government on the Imperial system to self-government ; and from self-government to a system of union with the Cape Colony. I may be charged to - night perhaps with making an after-dinner speech to you in order to gain your support and approval ; but you must always remember that whatever differences exist as to the policy of the diamond industry, whatever opponents may say as to the process that has been pursued with reference to the creation of that industry, the creation of which I own is due to myself, that industry is part of the Cape Colony ; and the money invested and the people who represent it, whether they like it or no—I like it,—are

a portion of your Cape Colony. If you succeed, they succeed ; if you have times of depression, times when your revenue does not meet your expenditure, they have to share in that. If you look on 'me as the representative of the diamond industry, you must look upon me as having the largest and most important interest in the Cape Colony ; and therefore in providing for these northern developments you have the most certain guarantee through me that that development is Cape Colony development. I feel sure as to the future. I think that we shall gradually go from the Cape to the Zambesi. I think I am not abusing confidence in stating that the recommendations of the High Commissioner to Her Majesty's Government in reference to the expansion of the Cape Colony, during his visit to England, would meet with your most cordial and entire approval. I am glad to see that you have admitted Bechuanaland as a portion of your organisation. Feeling that the railway to Bechuanaland belongs to the Cape Colony, and that a large portion of Bechuanaland at the present moment belongs to the Cape Colony, I can say that that recommendation which the High Commissioner has submitted to Her Majesty's Government would be in accordance with your views.

'I can only add that I think it is a good thing I can deal with the development of the north without committing you to all the various details which one has to deal with at the present time in order to mark out that territory in connection with the Cape system.

There might be a time at which you might not at the moment commit yourself to some action of my own as head of the Government; but I wish you to be impressed with the feeling that I have undertaken that northern development as a Cape colonist. If there was anything that induced me to take the position of Prime Minister, it was the fact that I was resolved in my mind that we should extend to the Zambesi. I felt that having completed the amalgamation of the diamond mines, and having perhaps an active imagination, unless I shared in the policy of the Cape Government and joined my interests with those of the Cape people, I should have to leave and go to the North. Now you know when any one is separated from you, he gets more and more separated from your ideas, feelings, and objects; and I felt that supposing I left all Cape ideas, abandoned all Cape policy, and relinquished all touch with yourselves, perhaps that development might create another system south of the Zambesi, which in future years might be a mistake. If it were possible—and I asked you to support me in it—I thought it was a grand idea to work the development of the Zambesi regions, and at the same time to remain in touch and in concert with the people of the Cape Colony. I mention this whilst proposing the toast of the Afrikander Bond, because the sentiment and object of the Afrikander Bond is “union” (although you have not stated it in so many words) “south of the Zambesi.” I say south of the Zambesi, because I have discovered that up to there a white human being can live, and

wherever in the world a white human being can live, that country must be changed inevitably to a self-governing country.

‘The great actuating feeling of a white man is that he must govern himself, and therefore I know that up to the Zambesi—for the climate will allow it—these northern territories must eventually be inhabited by a self-governing community. There, Mr. President, is an extraordinary flight of the imagination—that there must be a self-governing white community up to the Zambesi in connection with a United South Africa. What has been the case in other parts of the world? Look at the enormous development of the United States. After their unfortunate difference with England, Washington conceived the idea of a union of the States to the east and west of America. That union did away with the different tariffs of all sorts and gave to America a united people. Well, we have made mistakes in the past in reference to the neighbouring states, and if I had my wish I would abolish that system of independent states antagonistic to ourselves south of Zambesi; but I may say to you that no effort will be spared on my part to mark the map so that we need have no differences of that description in the future. That future rests with you. I say it rests with you because I look upon the Afrikaner Bond as a party I can work cordially with. Your ideas are the same as mine.

‘It is not for us to interfere with the independence of the states that are neighbouring to us; it is for us to obtain Customs relations, railway communication,

and free trade in products with them, but never to interfere with their independence. But it is for us, when we have the power and the means, to take the balance of the map and say, "That shall become part of our system." I may fortunately be able to deal with any difficulties that may arise in trying to carry out the policy which has initiated the formation of your Bond. I may be able to help you in the future because of the fact that I think I may say I have gained the confidence of the people of the mother-country. I can perhaps at times do things that your organisations cannot do; I can make the English people feel that the expansion and progress that I am pledged to is an expansion and progress which they may sanction—an expansion and progress which, undertaken by yourselves, might have failed. You have thus a guarantee that this system of development must be worked in connection with your people, and you can be assured and assure others that there is no difference between my policy and yours, because when you founded your society you founded it, not on a basis of a local idea, but on a basis of a broad United South Africa. The mistake that has been made in the past is to think that a union can be made in half an hour, whether rightly or wrongly for the good of the country. It took me twenty years to amalgamate the Diamond Mines. That amalgamation was done by detail, step by step, attending to every little matter in connection with the people interested; and so your union must be done by detail, never opposing any single measure that can bring

that union closer, giving up even some practical advantage for a proper union, educating your children to the fact that that is your policy, and that you must and will have it, telling it them and teaching it them in your district Bestuurs and households, and demanding that they shall never abandon the idea. In connection with this question I may meet with opposition; but if I do, I shall not abandon it.

‘I have obtained enormous subscriptions in order to found a Teaching University in the Cape Colony. I will own to you why I feel so strongly in favour of that project. I saw at Bloemfontein the other day the immense feeling of friendship that all the members had for the Grey Institute where they had been educated, and from which they had gone out to the world. It was the pleasantest dinner I had there. I said to myself, if we could get a Teaching University founded in the Cape Colony, taking the people from Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Natal, having the young men going in there from the ages of eighteen to twenty-one, they will go back to the Free State, to the Transvaal, and to Natal, let me even say they will go back to Mashonaland, tied to one another by the strongest feelings that can be created, because the period in your life when you indulge in friendships which are seldom broken is from the age of eighteen to twenty-one. Therefore if we had a Teaching Residential University these young men would go forth into all parts of South Africa prepared to make the future of the country, and in their hands this great question of

union could safely be left. Meanwhile, gentlemen, I shall submit this proposition to Parliament, and I hope it will meet with support. It may be that the Institution which exists at Stellenbosch, the Diocesan College at Rondebosch, or the South African College, may feel that one is interfering with their objects and their collegiate work; but I feel that should a Teaching University such as I have indicated be established—and, as I have said, the scheme has been most liberally supported at home—the young men who will attend it will make the union of South Africa in the future. Nothing will overcome the associations and the aspirations they will form under the shadow of Table Mountain.

‘I have visited every portion of this country; I have been in Natal, at Witwatersrand, and Bloemfontein; my wealth, my life, my ideas were formed here in Kimberley, but there is no place that can form, train, and cultivate the ideas of the young men of this country, no place better suited to such objects, than the suburbs of Cape Town. As a Cape Colonist I hope to make Cape Town the centre of South Africa. I ask you again, as representatives of the Afrikander Bond, to assist me in carrying out that idea. I have stated to you to-night my policy; and I have learned one habit in life, which is, whenever you make a public statement, never to depart from it. You can accept from me to-night what I think now, what I thought nine years ago, and what shall be my thought in the future. Some of you might criticise me for making so personal a statement, but

it has been my good fortune to have been put in the position of directing one of the greatest industries in the world, and I think I might humbly say I have a right to make a personal statement. I hope your organisation will be with me in the future, for the future depends upon that organisation in reference to the question of union. If some of you think that it is only possible that a settlement can be arrived at through the mother-country, I would say this in reply to you—Day by day the principle of self-government is growing and developing; and I would say again to you—Self-government is everything that you want.

‘Do not let us dispute on that point; let us accept jointly the idea that the most complete internal self-government is what we are both aiming at; that self-government means that in every question in connection with this country we shall decide, and we alone. I think that proposition will meet your views. If you desire the cordial and intense co-operation of the English section of this country, let us unite and be of one mind on this question of self-government. Remember that we have been trained at home; we have our history and our nation to look back upon, and we believe that with your help it is possible to obtain that union, fulfilling in every respect your ideas of self-government, and yet you will not be asking us to forfeit our full loyalty and feeling of devotion for the mother-country.’

The next speech, the speech at Paarl (April 23,



1891), begins with the account of the cross-fire of adverse criticism to which Mr. Rhodes's speech to the Afrikaner Bond had exposed him. It was Bechuanaland over again. Extreme Imperialists in London blamed him for being too Afrikaner, while the *Free State Express* 'slated' him in the most fearful language for being too much an Englishman. The liberal and enlightened Imperialism of Mr. Rhodes naturally did not please either extreme. He was too English for extreme Dutchmen, too Afrikaner for English Jingoism, too fair to both sides to please either, and of course, by quoting one portion of the speech without the rest, each party apparently made out its case. Mr. Rhodes's speeches must be read as a whole in order to be understood. No one can be more easily or more grossly misrepresented by a detached quotation. Another point worth noting is the blackmailing exposed in this speech in connection with the threatened trek from the Transvaal into Mashonaland.

'It has been borne in upon my mind of late that the best thing for a Prime Minister to do is to make as few public speeches as possible, and especially is this the case in South Africa, for in South Africa we have to deal with the feelings of the English people who have lent us all the money we have borrowed; we have to deal with the sentiment of the neighbouring Republics; we have to deal with the development of the northern territory, and then with the little sister colony of Natal. I defy any one to make a speech as Prime Minister of this colony without hurting the feelings of some one. I was reflecting only to-day that

the *Cape Times* has thought it worth while to spend a couple of hundred pounds on a cable from England, giving a criticism from the London *Times* of my speech at Kimberley ; and when I read that criticism I discovered that the English people were not satisfied with me. They think that I am too 'Afrikander. Then I have just received the *Free State Express*, in which Mr. Borckenhagen slates me in the most fearful language because I am too much an Englishman. I mention this to show you the difficulty in which one is placed. But I do feel that I am steering the right course between Jingoism on the one side and sensitive feelings on the other, if I confine myself to stating what is the policy of the people of Cape Colony.

'I have to thank the gentleman who has proposed my health for the statement of the fact that I am not devoting my mind solely to imaginative schemes in the North, but am carefully considering the interests of this colony, and amongst other things the industry in which you are all so deeply interested—I mean the wine industry. I will take you into my confidence to-night, and say that when I was at home and was talking to the Prime Minister of England, I said, "If you wish to retain the sentiment of the colonies, you must consider day by day how you can give the people some commercial advantage, and thus show them that the tie with England is one that is of practical advantage to themselves." I told him that in 1858 or 1860—I am not quite clear which—we had an arrangement so far as our wine was concerned which induced the English people to purchase our

wines, and to work them up into wines for the people of that country, basing my statements upon the fact that Mr. Gilbey, the great wine importer, had told me that until the change in the duty he imported very largely from the Cape, and had intended putting a great deal of capital into the trade with the Cape. As it was, however, he had bought vineyards in France, and imported wine from France and Spain, and even from Greece. When I discussed this with Lord Salisbury, I adopted the suggestions I had had from Mr. Hofmeyr about a differential rate, and said the greatest tie England could make with the Cape Colony was to return to the system of 1858. I therefore agree with the gentleman who has proposed my health that we must in these matters look more deeply than sentiment, and that the right course for the English people is to offer this colony some preferential tariff in regard to their wines over the wines of France and Spain, and so give them a practical commercial advantage.

‘I have also considered the other question with which the Ministry has to deal—*phylloxera*,—and it is the most practical and important question the Ministry has to deal with at the present time. I know perfectly well *phylloxera* has not invaded the Paarl; but it is close to the Paarl. It has, if I may say so, devastated Stellenbosch. I think, and I say so very humbly, that no process of bi-sulphates can permanently answer; and, as far as I can see, we shall have to make up our minds to adopt the American vines. I think that with the strong south-east winds—I am almost

afraid to say it—you cannot hope to be permanently free from phylloxera ; and I think it our duty frankly to deal with the subject on that supposition. I repeat that, as far as my experience goes, the importation of the American vines appears to be the only remedy.

‘ In dealing with this point I think it would be a good thing if we were to send men to Europe who would report to us as to the best sorts of American vines to plant, and distinguish between the soils and the sorts which suit them. I know that these deputations have often proved failures ; but I think it is simply a matter of the choice of men, and those men only should be sent whom the people can fully trust. At the present time a great many people are saying that they hear this and that about the American vines ; and they want information from men they can trust. I repeat—though I don’t want to annoy you—that the phylloxera is bound to come, and I want you to be prepared beforehand. I may say that I think this is a most important local question. Our diamonds are all right ; our gold is developing in the north ; with regard to the Scab Act, the districts are taking it up one by one, and I believe in time even my friend Mr. Le Roex in Victoria West will adopt the Act. But this question of phylloxera I am very seriously troubled about, and we have to deal with this terrible pest that has fallen upon us, and is destroying what, next to the wool, is the principal industry of the colony. And I hope when I propose in Parliament to send certain men to Europe to report upon this question I shall receive the support of your repre-

sentatives ; and when I have received that support, that they will be careful to select men who have the confidence of the people, because that is the question, and not the money that is spent upon sending them.

‘You will have heard, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that lately we have had a certain amount of trouble with some native races adjoining the Colony of Natal—I mean in Pondoland. Now, if you will allow me to take you into my confidence, I must say that I hesitate to annex still more native races. I am frightened, if I may so put it, at the returns the census show, for we have the bald record that whilst we have about 1,400,000 human beings in this colony, one million of them are black and only 400,000 white. It is a very pleasing amusement to keep on adding to the numbers of human beings, but it is a question for you to consider whether we should increase them with those of a black skin. If it was a question of adding another hundred thousand white human beings I would not say a word, but when it is a question of increasing that million blacks to twelve hundred thousand, leaving the 400,000 whites at the same figure, that is another matter. You must remember that we have before us the case of Natal, which, though it possesses three-quarters of a million natives and only 400,000 whites, has imported 40,000 coolies to do its labour. These are the questions of the future. It is not the question of the English and Dutch, believe me. That is over. I hope it is over, and I believe it is over. Mind you, it has been one of the greatest tussles in existence, because you have

only got to read history. If ever there was a proud, rude man, it was an Englishman; the only man to cope with him was a Dutchman. You have only got to read Motley's *History of the Dutch Republic* to see how the Dutch fought the Spaniards and were beaten; how they returned again and again, and were beaten again and again; and now they are the most dominant race in the world—except perhaps the Englishmen. And really I hardly know which to choose. Again, you have only to read the accounts of the administration of Java now, and the treatment of the natives there. I do not argue about it, but simply mention the fact. It has been a great problem in this country the fusion of these two races, both of them exceptionally dogged in character, but I think we are getting tied together, and I will say to-night that that question does not appear to me to be a great question.

‘What does appear to me to be a great question is the increase in the native races, when we know that we have half a million in the Transkei, where we thought we had only 250,000. Therefore with regard to Pondoland, I—or should I say Mr. Faure?—am proceeding with extreme caution. He has come down day by day to say we must be very careful before we get into any annexation scheme. We do not see very much practical advantage in taking over 200,000 more blacks; and therefore in dealing with the late disturbances in Pondoland, we have proceeded with the most extreme caution; and I think we shall have your sentiment with us when I say that if we find it

necessary for the peace of the Transkei to take it over we shall do so; but we are proceeding with the greatest caution and reluctance with the question of adding 200,000 more blacks to the already large number of a million against our 400,000 whites.

'You know also, Mr. Chairman, that we have sanctioned the extension of the colonial system of railways to Johannesburg with the sanction and approval of the Free State Volksraad. I know that in sanctioning railways beyond the colony some of you think we are considering our neighbours rather than ourselves; but I think you all must feel that having extended our system so far as Bloemfontein it was but a wise thing to go on to Johannesburg, in order that we might take a portion of the Johannesburg trade, in addition to which, however antagonistic at the present moment the sentiment of the Transvaal may be towards us, yet in so far as our trade and the employment of our young men are concerned, the railway is most important. Moreover, we feel that this sentiment is but a passing cloud. We know full well these ideas will change, and the great factor in making them change will be railway communication. And therefore I think you will not blame us in undertaking this expenditure in connection with the extension of our railway system from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg. It is true that in reference to the local requirements of this colony—I mean so far as railway extension is concerned—we do not intend to submit to you in the ensuing Parliament any measure of great importance; but I know this is

dictated by caution, and unless we see that more railway extension will bring some profit to you, we think that this country at present has sufficient obligations. I remember an article—I think it was in the *Cape Argus*, or else one of the managers of that journal said it to me, I am not quite sure which—when the fifteen millions railway scheme was launched on the country, and we said it would practically ruin the country, which already owed twenty-six millions. He said, “All this is very well ; but it will make the colony hum.” “Yes,” I said, “it will make the colony hum like a top ; but after you have wound up a top and let it hum, there is a period when it stops humming ; and those people who live in this country, and whose sons have to live here, look at the period when the top ceases to hum.” We have to consider that ; and we have to consider the obligations of this country ; and whatever your feelings may be, I think it my duty as Prime Minister to weigh most carefully every penny you borrow, or, to put it another way, every penny you add to your obligations ; because the diamond mines, in connection with which I hold a responsible position, export four out of the six millions of the local exports of the country. I watch, I say, most closely every extra penny that you become responsible for, because I feel in the future I shall have to account for it.

‘You have also been told that I have led you into some expense in connection with railways in Bechuanaland, but let me say, with regard to that extension to Vryburg, I had the money for it before I became



Prime Minister, and was prepared to build it ; but the late Government was desirous to mix you up with Bechuanaland in order to promote annexation in that country, and, when appealed to by the High Commissioner regarding that question, they said they desired to build to Vryburg if the Chartered Company would build a line beyond, and the result of that was that the Government agreed to build to Vryburg, the Chartered Company to take the line a hundred miles further on the present gauge of the colony, or two hundred miles on a lighter gauge. So you must dismiss from your minds the idea that I led this colony into the Vryburg extension. It was done before I was Prime Minister, and at the desire of the late Government, and now the position is that, instead of having only a hundred miles to Vryburg, the colony will receive two hundred miles of railway into the interior, made by the Chartered Company, and maintained at their cost.

‘ I have further the pleasure to say that I have received a communication from Tati, a remote place far in the interior, stating that the gold that they have crushed has given most satisfactory results, which means, to my mind, that the interior is worth taking. You all know what the development of the Witwatersrand has done for the Transvaal. Now I may tell you that I look at this interior development from a practical point of view. Perhaps twenty years ago one of you had a farm, and, while you were alone, it was big enough for you ; but since then there have come four or five sons, and some of them have

to seek new homes, and many have to move north. Now I don't think any of you will blame me when I say that holding that idea I thought it would be wise to take the balance of the north for the Cape Colony—and I make no distinction between the Cape Colony and the Chartered Company. If I had come to Mr. Marais and asked him to assist me in taking control of South Africa up to the Zambesi, he would have called me mad. I did not do that, but I took over this new country in trust for the Cape Colony, and I said that I would take your young men, I would allow whatever produce you send to go in free, and I would not ask you for any money; and the greatest guarantee that I would act fairly and honestly by you is that I am responsible for the diamond mines, which produce four millions per annum of your six millions local exports. Now, that is the position. And what am I threatened with? I will tell you in very simple language. Your young men—because they are your young men—have gone up sixteen hundred miles, have slept in their boots every night, and have felt they would be murdered at four o'clock in the morning—oh, yes! every one said so, from the President of the Transvaal downwards. They went right through, however, and took the country; but I now own to you that, of all my troubles, that was the most pressing, for I felt I ought to be with them; and when at last I found that they were through to Fort Salisbury, I do not think there was a happier man in the country than myself. But let me continue the story. What has happened since? They have

taken the country ; and I have continued the position I took up. I kept on taking any one of your people who cared to come to me, and I am preparing a land settlement on that basis. I have asked you to send men to report on the country so that we shall not idly take them away with no prospect. I have done all these things, and now what has happened?

‘A gentleman named Mr. Adendorff, and Mr. Barend Vorster and Mr. Du Preez, say they are going to take the result of the labours of your sons. When I came down from Tuli I visited Pietersburg, and I met Mr. Vorster and Mr. Adendorff. I saw them on several occasions, and Mr. Vorster finally came to me and said he had got a local grant from a native chief and wanted me to buy it. I said I did not recognise local chiefs as against the chief of the country, but if he would send the grant to me I would look it over and give it careful consideration, though I said to him frankly that I had not much opinion of his grant. He said, “If you don’t buy it I shall give you trouble.” I want to put it as clearly as I possibly can. I then saw the Rev. Mr. Helm, who was astounded at what I told him. It is a new country, and your young people have gone and taken it. It is no question of the kind that arose in the Transvaal. It is a question of a new country, which your people have tried to rescue from barbarism and add to civilisation. But these people came to me, and said unless I gave them so many thousand pounds they would induce some ignorant farmers to go in and murder our people in the country. That

is the case as it stands ; you cannot get out of it. I hope you won't be annoyed at this. Because I would not give Mr. Barend Vorster and Mr. Adendorff a certain sum of money, they have threatened me in the Zoutpansberg that they would give me trouble, that they would fight my people unless I would give them so many globular thousand pounds. And that is the case ; and those ignorant farmers in the Transvaal are being rushed in this way.

‘ That is the case with regard to this trek. You know that all who desire to come into this new country, whether they come from the Transvaal, from the Cape Colony, from Natal, or from the Free State, are only too welcome. I have no feeling as to where a man was born ; all I desire to know is whether he is a good man—and then I want him. Now, when these gentlemen say they are going to take from my young men their rights, and dispossess them of the results of their labours, then I confess I do lose my temper ; and I tell you to-night that if they continue with it, and if these people will not accept our rule and law, then there will be a difference between us, and I may have to leave the position which I at present hold. But I know that, if I had not taken up the position I had, they would have got into great trouble with Her Majesty's Government, and we might have troubles again like that which occurred at Majuba.

‘ Now, if these troubles were to occur with people whose independence was taken away, you might have some sympathy with them ; but I ask you what sympathy you can have with people who, when pioneers

have made an effort to lift a country from barbarism, and when it is proved that the Matabele need not be feared, rush in and commit an action of this sort! It is not fair 'or right. South Africa will say it is not fair, and I feel confident I have the feeling of South Africa when I say it is a wrong thing. You know that your children will be taken into that country as its clerks, as the civil commissioners and magistrates of the country. I suppose I shall receive a very severe hit from Pretoria for saying it, but I cannot help saying, as an Englishman, that that is a system I intend to adopt in my new country. I shall not put a tax of £40 a leaguer on your wine, or £5 each on your wagons. And I must also say that while I am perfectly willing to take any one Stellenbosch likes to send me, you have the position in the Transvaal that they send to Holland for their officials. Perhaps that is annoying, and I ought not to have said it; but the time has arrived when I must speak out and tell you what I intend to do in regard to this country. I make you a pledge to-night that if you will send me your sons and your produce they shall have the preference, and the best proof of that is the fact that the present occupiers of that country are nearly all Cape Colonists. I have now told you what my policy is, and that is that the new land shall be at one with the laws and system of Cape Colony.

'I know there are many difficulties before me. There is this trek from the Transvaal; there is the sensitive feeling in the Free State—little Natal seems out in the cold altogether; but I feel I am

justified in asking for the support of the people of the Cape Colony. I am not asking them for any expenditure; I am not asking them to enter into additional monetary obligations; and from your experience of me during the last nine years, you know that what I say I will try and act up to. If you will not give me that moral support, if you say the dual position is impossible, there will be no happier man than myself, because I can then go and live with those young people who are developing our new territories. I know them well, and, believe me, the life is better than that of receiving deputations, whilst it has all the romance which attaches to the development of a new country. You know my desire with regard to the map of Africa from Cape Town to the Zambesi, and the welcome you have given me to-night leads me to hope for the attainment of that object. It rests with you whether you consider it is possible to continue that dual position, which is held by me with the sole object of making South Africa one. But if you feel that it is impossible, remember that when I leave you I go again to your own people, and I shall develop these new territories in accordance with the laws, and, as I hope, with the cordial approval of the people of the Cape Colony.'

The next speech is a speech made in the Cape House on the proposal for an alteration of the franchise made in the form of a short resolution introduced by Mr. Hofmeyr. The proposal was to increase the votes of those who had a certain property or educational qualification; a double vote to be given

(1) to a man with a house worth £100, (2) a member of one of the learned professions. The educational qualification reminds one of J. S. Mill's view, though the object was to lessen the power of the coloured vote.

Mr. Rhodes, who rose to an almost empty House, which, however, speedily filled, said :—

'I should have liked to hear the opinion of the honourable members for East London, but I suppose they have both been reserving their remarks for a fuller House. I may say at once that I am glad that the honourable member for Stellenbosch has introduced the question in the form of a short abstract resolution, because it will give a year for the most complete and entire discussion in the country. Those members who are in favour of an alteration in the franchise will agree with me that it could only be done after the country has been thoroughly taken into the confidence of the House—and it would be most unwise and improper if the House rushed through legislation of this nature without having given the country an opportunity of declaring its opinion. I may point out that if there is anything I regret in the Bill which was introduced by the honourable member for East London, it is that when he practically changed the franchise, the measure was sprung on the country before it had been consulted. It is, of course, perfectly correct to say that it was a Registration Bill, but I think "the man on the bus," as I may, perhaps, be permitted to call the public, generally recognises the Bill as an alteration

of the franchise ; and I will say again that I regret that an intimation was not given in the session prior to its introduction. It was passed, however, and has met with more or less general approval.

‘I have listened with great attention to the remarks of the honourable member for Stellenbosch, who, in his resolution, has asked the Government to take into consideration the question of the franchise with a view to legislation in the ensuing session. I am aware that the honourable member for Stellenbosch represents a considerable part of the opinion of this House, and I would like to state that whatever may be the ultimate decision on the question, so far as I am personally concerned, I can refer to a previous debate to show that my sentiment has been entirely in touch with the proposition now submitted.

‘It was about five years ago, in my more youthful days, at a dinner at the Paarl, when I admitted that the Parliament would have to take into consideration the development of the boundaries of the Colony towards the north ; and here I may say that, although not perhaps at the direct instigation of the Colony, we have been brought into comparatively close touch with the Zambesi. The second proposition I submitted was that we should try to take in hand those things which the country can produce, and I went so far as to say we should encourage the corn by mild protection, and by irrigation work. My third proposition was that the policy of the Government should be for closer relations with neighbouring States by means of railways and a Customs Union. I think



the late Government has done its best to carry out that policy.

‘I notice that the President of the Transvaal is approaching the European markets for a loan, and I have considered whether we could not approach him, and by giving the Colony’s guarantee, enable him to borrow at a lower rate, and so save the Transvaal and their children in the future the higher rate; because I feel that, whatever may occur, the country will eventually become united. At the same time we might come to some arrangement as to railway tariffs as between Delagoa Bay and the Cape routes, with a view to avoiding cutthroat competition on both lines. My fourth proposition at the Paarl was in connection with the franchise, and I will point out that the honourable member for East London adopted a very serious change in the franchise, which I supported, and we saw it carried against great opposition. We have now to consider whether our franchise, is satisfactory and complete, and whether it should be altered or not. Well, I do not think there is anything under the sun that is not liable to change; and as for changing views, it was recently my privilege to hear Mr. Gladstone speak on the question of Welsh Disestablishment, and he promptly repudiated all his opinions of ten years ago. He had the frankness and confidence to say that he had altered his opinions, and the House cheered him for it. Now I am in the fortunate position that I have no such confession to make. I have always maintained the position that the franchise of the country is worthy of considera-

tion, and the question now before us is, Are there sufficient considerations to justify its being altered? I have listened with interest to the remarks of the honourable member for George (Mr. Vintcent), who holds that the fact of the Transkei being well represented is an argument against our dealing with the question. Well, we might say that the British Isles were never so well represented as now, a representation which includes the intelligence of the country. (Mr. O'Reilly: Hear, hear; the Irish party is intelligent.) Well, that is a somewhat noisy party. It is energetic, but troublesome at times, and would sometimes, I think, be better in the smoking-room. It is not a strong argument when the honourable member for George states that because the Transkei possesses half a million of the barbarians of the country, and because they have only two representatives, that therefore we should not change the franchise of the country. What we have to consider is, whether the present system of franchise is the best we can have; and if it be not, whether there are clear reasons for a change. As far as I can follow the honourable member for Stellenbosch, he does not condemn the present House, which is fairly representative, but says that what we have to consider is the future, and I think the tenor of the resolution submitted looks to the future. The honourable member might have thought of the large sum spent on educating the barbarians of this country, and might have been afraid the half-educated barbarians might interfere very seriously with our representation;

but the honourable member for East London has altered the franchise considerably, and I see nothing against it as it stands.

‘Of course, it must not be forgotten that there are opinions on both sides of the House. The Colony of Natal, which is under Her Majesty’s Government, has a franchise of extreme severity, and here I may say that the English nation, when dealing with barbarism, is most reluctant to grant the franchise. In India there are 150,000,000 of people with a civilisation far in advance of that of our natives, and not one of them has a vote. I merely mention this in passing to help us to arrive at a conclusion, and I am just sketching to the House the practice of the British Empire to show that it has been most cautious in granting the franchise to semi-civilised races. I feel that our great object should be to assimilate our franchise to that of the neighbouring States. I have before said that I could never accept the position that we should disqualify a human being on account of his colour, but I think we shall be right in considering the question of a higher franchise.

‘The simple question for us to consider is, whether we shall in any way change the franchise by giving a higher qualification with a double vote, or by raising the franchise. The sole objection to raising the franchise would be, that we would be taking away the vote of a number of people to whom we have already granted it. There may be other methods suggested, but as far as I can see at present, the present proposition seems more feasible than the

alternative one of raising the franchise. We have never yet quite seen to whom we have given the vote; but, in fact, it is not a question of colour at all, but of registration. I think we have been extremely liberal in granting to barbarism of forty or fifty years' training what we have ourselves obtained only after many hundreds of years of civilisation. The Government does not propose to pledge itself on the question in any form or shape during the ensuing session; but they will carefully consider the whole question in the recess, investigate the returns of the census, and wait to ascertain the judgment and feeling of the country. The Government expects that in every part of the country meetings will be held, and the question thoroughly canvassed. Personally, I think the proposition a most feasible one, and I hope we may arrive before the ensuing session at a solution of this most important problem. The Government will listen most attentively to expressions of opinion in every part of the country, and in the ensuing session they hope to submit a measure which will meet with the approval of the majority of the people.'

The last speech of this period is the speech made at the Second Annual Meeting of the British South Africa Company (November 29, 1892), and is important as containing Mr. Rhodes's patent, by which the Charter shareholders were to get their return by the pegging out for the Company by each prospector of the same number of claims\* which he pegs out for himself—in other words, the Company, as owners of the whole mineral wealth, were to take half the claims

pegged out by each prospector, that is, finally fifty per cent. of the vendor scrip was to go to the Company. This is very clearly explained by Mr. Rhodes, and shown to be, taken in connection with the other conditions, no hardship whatever.

‘When I look back at the past and see what has been accomplished, I feel that we must congratulate ourselves on our present condition in so far as the success of the charter is concerned. It is nearly three years ago that my friend Mr. Maguire went into the unknown regions of Lobengula, sat down with that naked savage, and obtained from him the concession for us and others. That concession was, I think, really obtained not from the purely speculative point of view. It was a conception that the North would have to be taken with the hinterland of the country, and would have to be developed, and the basis for obtaining that was to get a concession. I will not weary you with the various negotiations that subsequently occurred, but we had the satisfaction afterwards of obtaining a charter from Her Majesty’s Government. The work, however, had only then begun, because, although we had a charter, we had not got the country, which was occupied by savages; and although the chief of the country had given us a concession, he was not at all pleased that we should derive any benefit therefrom—that was, that we should occupy the country. After a careful study of the map, it was seen that the proper course to pursue was to try and occupy the territory to the east, at that time occupied by Mashonas, who were

yearly raided by him. We formed a force which marched through that territory, and I agree with the Chairman that the highest tribute is to be paid to those young men who marched for a thousand miles, four hundred of which were through a dense forest, and who had to cut their way day by day through it until they finally reached 'the promised land.' One thing which that expedition taught me is the audacity of our race, and in connection with our race I would mention the colonists of South Africa, both Dutch and English, because that force was composed of Englishmen from home, Englishmen in South Africa, and Dutch colonists resident there also. This combination brought about the occupation of "the promised land," and then the usual thing occurred—they found that "the promised land" was beautiful, but it was an open waste. Everything had to be done; there was nothing before them and nothing to take. In fact, I came to the conclusion that it was easier to conquer an old country than to occupy a new one—because, in the one case, however terrific the contest might be, there was the wealth of the land and of the citizens, the wealth of the country, as perhaps the reward. In their case, however, after unheard-of difficulties, they simply had an open country, which had been lately devoted only to barbarism. They made an occupation, they founded a Government, and so far as the first occupants went, there was the natural reaction. They found that they could not pick up gold like gooseberries, and that to acquire it necessitated work, toil, and patience, and the result

was that depression ensued after the first sanguine hopes as to the nature of "the promised land." Then the rains fell, and they found themselves shut up in the country, and there were all sorts of miserable reports; but I am glad to say that the majority of the people bore without complaint the hardships they had to endure.

'That lasted for about six months. Then the rivers fell, and a further number of emigrants was able to enter the country, as well as certain expeditions from home. Meantime we had formed an organised Government, and had begun the first groundwork of making a country. It is needless for me to refer to the various expeditions from home. They also thought that a fortune was to be made in about a week or a month; but they too found a bare country, whose future must depend upon the energy of its first occupants, and that a race out from home and a race back would not in any part of the world give one a quarter of a million of money. Then, undoubtedly, came a true period of depression. The condemnation of the home papers could only be compared to their previous undue sanguineness. They condemned the country as everything that was bad. Subsequently, we were removed from the criticism of the English papers, as they thought the country too bad to say anything about it. Those on the spot, however—about fifteen hundred strong—remained doggedly and determinedly in the country. They went to work to find their reefs, but they were removed seventeen hundred miles from the coast, and their food cost

them £70 a ton. Shortly after that, my friend Dr. Jameson agreed to assume the charge of the country. Dr. Jameson had been up in the country before, having just got back from a seven hundred mile walking tour—across the country of Gungunhana, a chief from whom he had obtained the whole of the coast region as a concession. Dr. Jameson was suffering from a very bad malarial fever, but when I asked him to go back he agreed to do so without a word. He was fortunate enough to fall upon a trek of dissatisfied Transvaal agitators, who were determined to take the northern country from this Company. By the measures he took and his good management, Dr. Jameson dispersed the trekkers, and many of them have since taken land under the Company's flag.

'Dr. Jameson afterwards proceeded to the country and took charge of the government; and shortly afterwards, as soon as my parliament was over, I went round and met Dr. Jameson in the country. I found the position at the time as follows:—A discontented population of about fifteen hundred people, and an expenditure of about £250,000 a year upon police. Things looked rather bad, because it was not only the large number of police, but also the feeding of them, which had to be done by carting the food for seventeen hundred miles from the coast. Dr. Jameson and myself talked matters over, and he said, "If you will give me £3000 a month I can pull through." The following year Dr. Jameson reduced the seven hundred police to forty, and brought down the expenditure from £250,000 to £30,000 a year.



That was the position last year, but the present position is even better, for Dr. Jameson has made the revenue and expenditure of the country balance. He has not, however, left the country without defence, for he has got the people of the country themselves to become volunteers, and for a small payment of about £4 per head per annum we have as good a force as we ever had in the days of the police. We have a force of five hundred men, three hundred of whom we could mount, and a force which I consider amply sufficient to defend the country from attack. I use the word "attack," but really I do not know where the attack is to come from. We had our difficulties in the past, and had been threatened with attacks from the Portuguese, from trek Boers, and from Lobengula. As you are aware, after a slight dispute with the Portuguese we came to a settlement. I might say that our people behaved exceedingly well in this dispute, because there were only forty of them as against four or five hundred on the other side. Since that little occurrence we have been on the best of terms. Our relations are peaceful all round, so that "bears" cannot say that the Charter territory will suffer from any hostile attack. I am on the best of terms with President Kruger. I pointed out at the time of the crisis that if President Kruger crossed the Limpopo we should have a very severe difference, and that it would not be limited to the people out there, but that it would react on Her Majesty's Government at home; and I must say that President Kruger has behaved loyally and well. Our

differences with the Portuguese are over, and we are on the most friendly terms with Lobengula. The latter receives a globular sum of £100 a month in sovereigns, and he looks forward with great satisfaction to the day of the month when he will receive them. I have not the least fear of any trouble in the future from Lobengula.

‘I have pointed out to you that revenue and expenditure have balanced so far as Mashonaland is concerned, and we must now look shortly at some of the indications of what prosperity we may hope to come from the internal resources of that country. The pleasantest sign that I have had was when we sold the stands in Mashonaland. When we remember that all foreign capital has been driven from the country by well-meant criticisms as to its unhealthiness, and by the bad reports which were circulated regarding the country, one writer stating that it was only fit for bucks, I consider it a wonderful thing that the people of the country should bid and pay £10,000 for the stands when they were sold. I am speaking of the township stands. Each plot of ground sold for building is called a “stand,” and the fact that they have been purchased for £10,000, not by foreign capitalists, but by the people in the country, is a most satisfactory sign, as showing their faith—the faith, perhaps I may say, of the fifteen hundred in the wilderness.

‘The next sign was the telegraph. In our worst times I determined to continue and complete the telegraph to Salisbury, because it put one in complete

touch with the country. I was amazed when I called for the telegraph returns to find that on an expenditure of £90,000, we had not only sent the Company's messages free of charge, and the Imperial Government messages through the Protectorate practically free of charge, but had earned 4 per cent. on our capital. I thought that that was a very practical indication that the country had something more in it than bucks. Having given the people the telegraph communication, it was clear that we could not expect from the country any great development unless we could give them a nearer means of communication; and a reference to the map will show that it was essential to make a communication from the east coast—in fact, to get a railway built. We have had great difficulty over this railway. We ought to have built it much sooner, but the Home Government, or rather the Foreign Office, has glided into that steady, pleasant duty of the exchange of letters, and they appear to think that this might last until the end of the century. Unfortunately, some of our younger spirits went up and forced the route from Beira, and then we had the unfortunate dispute with the Portuguese, which, however, did bring about a happy result. We got some final settlement of the question as to whether we could or could not build a railway—not only the general terms, but that the line should be completed within some date. The result was that we found we had to build the railway by arrangement with a company which the Portuguese had created.

'When I returned home about five months ago, when the charter was at its worst and our shares stood at 10s. or 12s., it seemed almost impossible to obtain any further capital, but through the good feeling of friends I obtained sufficient to build the railway from the coast. I think it fair to mention, as an instance, that Lord Rothschild—who, I think, did not believe in the least degree in the charter, but thought he was "chucking" his money into the sea—gave me £25,000. I regard it as a nice thing when our capitalists do acts of this nature, as it shows that they are a little above the ordinary,—a little above considerations of filthy lucre. There were many others who came forward and gave me money with which to build the railway, and the result of their subscriptions is that the line is now being constructed, and we hope it will be completed in a few months. This line will give us an easy communication, for it will place transport on the basis of transport to the Witwatersrand. Goods will cost delivered in Mashonaland about £10 a ton, which is the present rate to the Witwatersrand. The people have telegraph communication, and they will have easy communication with the coast. I think that we have done as a charter all that we can do for the people of the country, and it will now be left to their energy and determination to prove what the country is worth.

'I have spoken about Southern Zambesia, and there is also a territory termed Northern Zambesia. I may say that when the charter was obtained some of my friends were willing to stop at the Zambesi, but I did

not think it right to take two bites at a cherry, and felt that it was just as well to go north and complete the map in so far as the map of Africa was then open. We received the grant of a charter covering the north of the Zambesi as well as the south, and by arrangement with Her Majesty's Government, Mr. Johnston was sent to be Commissioner in that portion of the territory lying along the shores of Lake Nyasa. I may say that as far as regards Her Majesty's Government and the people of Great Britain we have no cause to complain. It is not a case of Her Majesty's Government paying for the charter, for the charter is assisting Her Majesty's Government to govern her territory, and the Company are paying £10,000 a year, which is spent on the Protectorate on the shores of Lake Nyasa. I do not complain of this, but I suppose that if there was a little more public spirit this sort of thing would be done by the Government of this country.

'As far as I can gather about Northern Zambesia it is a good country; from what Mr. Johnston has said it seems to be very similar to Mashonaland south of the Zambesi. I desire to remove one misconception that has arisen. I may say that Mashonaland is as healthy a country as can be found, and I only hope that Northern Zambesia is equally healthy. It seems, at any rate, a country suitable for white occupation, and therefore I may say that, by following the plateau of Central Africa, so far as the charter is concerned, we have a country that white people can live in. From what we can gather from the reports of Northern

Zambesia, coffee grows most excellently ; planters are settling down every month ; and, as far as regards the balance of the territory, it promises indications equally good with Mashonaland. Therefore we have a great reserve to develop north of the Zambesi. The other portion of our sphere of influence is the Bechuanaland Protectorate. You may not be aware that the charter extends from Mafeking to Tanganyika. As far as the Bechuanaland country is concerned, we have had some differences respecting boundaries, but these have been settled, and we are gradually acquiring the land and mineral rights of the Protectorate. You may be pleased to learn, as it is an unusual thing to expect from a Liberal Government—I am a Liberal myself—that Her Majesty's Government have lately agreed to co-operate with the charter pecuniarily in the development of the railway north from Mafeking. The understanding is that with the development of the territory, and as we increase the security of our own position, we should gradually relieve Her Majesty's Government from their pecuniary responsibilities in the Protectorate. I notice in a newspaper this morning that it is said that we have coloured the map incorrectly, but I can only say that it has been coloured in the terms of the charter and in accordance with the understanding with Her Majesty's Government.

‘I may refer to one of the greatest difficulties we have had. You may think it has been with the Boers, or with the Portuguese, or with Lobengula, but that is not the case ; it has been with the conces-

sion-hunters. They came just like locusts; they followed everywhere, but did nothing whatever; and when they found that a country had been occupied they came with a piece of paper from some wretched native chief and claimed the whole of the results. Then, if those who had done all the work dared to oppose them, they wrote letters to the morning newspapers. Whenever you meet one of these people you should ask him one question—what he had done except get a piece of paper from some native chief, by means of which he used every effort to get a full reward for his “labours” from those who had actually done all the work. These people have been the greatest difficulty which the charter has had from Mafeking to Tanganyika, and I fear that they will be our difficulty in the future.

‘I have dealt now with most of the questions in connection with our position, but you may ask what prospects you have, as shareholders, of a return. Well, I will say frankly that it depends on the result of the minerals in our territory. My experience of the past is that just as *qua* Government, so *qua* a company—we cannot expect to do more than balance revenue and expenditure from land, Customs, and assisting in other matters connected with developing the general natural resources of the country. Therefore, when we created the charter, we had to consider by what means a return could be given to the shareholders, and I remember thinking out the various ways of making a return to those who had risked their capital in the undertaking. It has always struck

me that if it were possible for the Government of the country to share in the discovery of the minerals, a very fair return would accrue. For instance, I have been a miner at Kimberley, on the discovery of the diamond-fields, and I was allowed to mark out one claim. It has always struck me afterwards, when I had become engaged in the politics of the country, that if I had been allowed to mark out five claims, no one would have been hurt if I had pegged out two and a half for myself and two and a half for the Government. The same thought occurred to me when I went up to Witwatersrand and saw that marvellous gold-field, where the terms were that they could each mark out one claim. It occurred to me that, supposing the law had been that each of them could mark out ten claims—five for himself and five for the Government—it would not hurt the prospectors, and it would have meant wealth to the Government of the country.

‘The only objection to the idea was that it was a perfectly new one. At any rate, we thought we would try it in Mashonaland, and it is the law of the country that fifty per cent. of the vendor scrip goes to the charter. I may say in a parenthesis that the charter had an extra reason beyond what an ordinary Government could give for asking for this, because, besides being the Government of the country, it is also the possessor of the mineral wealth. I will take this case of the charter having the right to fifty per cent. of the vendor scrip—that is, half of the claims marked out, apart from the working capital put in to



work them ;—who is damaged? I will take the case of the man who found the claim—the prospector. Under the ordinary law of our part of the world, and, I think, of Australia, the prospector can only mark out one claim. He has to “pick” in it every week, which means an enormous amount of useless labour, because one cannot touch a quartz reef without stamps and a battery. He has none of the dips, angles, and variations, and if he does not work it, if he is absent from it, or if he is unable to pay his licence, it is forfeited. In our country the prospector can mark out two blocks of ten claims—half for himself and half for the charter. He pays no mineral licence until capital comes in. He is not liable to be “jumped,” and he gets his claims in all their dips, variations, and angles, and he is, therefore, not subject to the terror of the deep levels. That is the case of the prospector, so he is not damaged. The second case is that of the capitalist. My usual experience is that the capitalist comes in, buys the result of the prospector’s efforts, and then goes to the public to form a company. There are fifteen thousand claims registered in Mashonaland. The capitalist buys in each block on the basis of five claims, and he has to distribute the cash which he has to spend between four or five blocks instead of only one. I therefore do not see how the capitalist is hurt. I then come to that very interesting individual whom the papers look after—the subscribing capitalist, whose proper name is the English public. That is my experience, and I know that the whole of the Witwatersrand capital

was found by the British public. Well, how is the British public hurt? It has in one case to subscribe its cash against vendor scrip given to Jones. In the case of the charter it subscribes its working capital on the report of its own experts against vendor scrip divided between Jones and the charter. I think it is more favourable for the British public that the vendor scrip should be thus divided between the charter and Jones than that it should be given wholly to Jones. It is less likely to be forced on the market, and, at any rate, there is some guarantee that it is not a bogus undertaking.

‘I have been assured that no one would subscribe on these conditions, and it has been pointed out to me that during last year we had no flotations. My reply was that, considering that the whole country had been tabooed, that it was some seventeen hundred miles from the coast, and could not get batteries, I did not see how they could expect flotations; but since my return, and since the belief which the public had has been confirmed, that there would be speedy communication from the east coast, I know of three companies that have been floated, and our Company has received its share of the vendor scrip—£115,000. The people who have subscribed have subscribed at par as against the vendor scrip, and the gentlemen who have subscribed were not the outside public—the majority of them, at any rate—but people who had received reports from the country which had given them great faith in the undertaking. I hope with these facts before us to continue this interest in

vendor scrip. Looking to the past, I can see that if President Kruger had carried out that idea, he would now have had £20,000,000 or £30,000,000 in his coffers; and I know that if the Cape Government had followed out this idea, they would not have had any fears about balancing their revenue and expenditure. At any rate, up to the present, the idea promises very successful results, as far as the charter is concerned.

‘With reference to the extent of the gold-reefs in Mashonaland, all that I can tell you is that there are four hundred miles of reef marked out. This means that the prospectors in the country, about a thousand of them, have pegged out quartz-reefs, which, added together, would make four hundred miles. Another good point is that they have thought it worth while, in respect to sixty miles, to sink shafts and cross-cut the reefs. You can quite understand that men would not do this unless they had great faith in the reefs they had pegged out. I will further add that I do not believe that Nature is going to belie herself. The country is mineralised throughout. Without asking you to be too sanguine, with the facts I have mentioned before us, we may look for good returns on the capital which has been invested by us, and we must look for that return to our interest in the minerals of the country.

‘I have now fairly sketched out our position, and I think that such a record for two years is a very fair record for any company. I would now resume my seat, only I have been allowed to put something personal to the shareholders. The question I am about to

submit to you has no connection whatever with the charter ; it is no liability of the charter. I may say that when the charter was commenced I always had the idea of an overland telegraph to Egypt, and the other day, when I was returning home, I hastened my journey when I saw that there was a certain section of the English people desirous of abandoning Uganda. I proposed to Her Majesty's Government to build a telegraph to Uganda. I found that this would cost about £140,000 to £150,000—that was to reach Uganda, and subsequently it would go on to Egypt. This was no wild scheme. We are earning upon the telegraph up to the Zambesi four per cent. on the capital expended. From the Zambesi to Uganda there were no difficult tribes to deal with. The distance is fourteen hundred miles, and the line would cost about £150,000. If I extend the telegraph to Uganda we shall certainly not hear any more about the abandonment of that place. You might ask me what commercial results I expect from such a telegraph. From a commercial point of view I feel perfectly clear that when I get to Uganda I shall get through to Wady Halfa. I do not propose to fight the Mahdi, but to "deal" with him. I have never met any one in my life whom it was not as easy to deal with as to fight. I am perfectly clear that if I get the money to make the line to Uganda I shall get the money with which to extend the line to Egypt. I agree that it will take from five to ten years, but in such matters we have to go slowly. The line to Egypt, provided the Mahdi is "squared,"

will cost £300,000 to £400,000, and we have lying to the east and west of the coast cables which have cost £3,000,000. We are now charged 9s. 6d. a word for our communications, but when we can get to Egypt by the telegraph I am referring to we shall be able to do it for 1s. 7d. from Egypt to England, or in all about 2s. 6d. against 9s. 6d. a word as at present. There is the commercial aspect as well as the imaginative, and I feel no doubt about the success of the undertaking.

‘There are fourteen thousand shareholders in the various companies I represent, and if they like to send me, not a charitable contribution, but about £10 each, there would be my line to Uganda, and I maintain that it will give an excellent return. With the capital of £3,000,000 at their back, the cable companies, when I get to Uganda, would have to consider their position. I may say, for instance, to the De Beers shareholders that they have known me some time, and that they have lately been brought through certain troubles by the purchase of a mine that had threatened their position and by the creation of a reserve that has given their company the command of the market. I have seen some remarks in the *Economist* about a sale that had been made of a De Beers interest. I may state that the chairman of that company was never consulted on that position, but that in future I shall expect to be consulted by my board in connection with such matters. The shareholders of that company have voted me sums of money which I have not taken, and I will ask

them, if they take an interest in their chairman, to assist me with the construction of the telegraph referred to. If I held Egyptian Unified I should subscribe as an insurance fund to this line, with the construction of which I do not think that any Government would talk about getting out of Egypt, or out of Uganda either.

'The contributions I have spoken of—not charitable contributions—can be sent to the secretary of the company at St. Swithin's Lane. There may be in various towns in England people who take an interest in Africa, and in the suppression of the slave-trade. If this telegraph is made, there will be an end to the slave-trade, and it will also give us the keys to the continent. I repeat that I have no doubt about the success of the project, which is a much easier undertaking than amalgamating the Kimberley diamond-mines, or governing the Cape Colony. It will also be a little relaxation from my work out there. There is one more matter I wish to speak to you about. It is of no use for us to be taking countries in one part of the world and having our statesmen "scuttling out" of other countries. There is a party of "scuttle" in England, whose idea is to retire from every portion of the globe. I suppose that the best representative of that party is the member for Northampton. I ask every one of you, each in his own way, at all times and on all occasions, to oppose the party of "scuttle." I do not mean this on the basis of "Jingoism," or on the basis of the Empire on which the sun never sets, but on the basis of pure practical

business. The constituents of the member for Northampton make boots, and if I asked where they were going to send them to, they would tell me to every part of the globe. The idea that the taking up of the uncivilised portions of the world is to the advantage of the classes is erroneous; the proceeding is entirely to the advantage of the masses. The classes can spend their money under any flag, but the poor masses have no money to spend on these speculations—these gold and silver mines; they can only look to other countries in connection with what they produce with their factories and their work.

‘The point I desire to impress upon the masses is that, instead of the world going all right, it is going all wrong for them. Cobden had his idea of free trade for all the world, but that idea has not been realised. The whole world can see that we can make the best goods in this country, and the countries of the world therefore establish against us, not protective tariffs, but prohibitive tariffs. Let us take the case of “the bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh,” the Yankees. What is the meaning of the M’Kinley tariff? It does not mean that they want a revenue, but that they desire to prohibit any trade with this country. Perhaps one of the most humorous things that ever happened was the Chicago Exhibition. I said to my colleagues at the Cape, “Are you aware that we are showing in a country that has declared that it does not want to trade with any other country? Are you aware that we are spending £10,000 to exhibit in Chicago? ‘Brother Jonathan’

is going to be very pleased to see us, but as soon as his exhibition is over he is going to lock his doors against us, and he does not wish to see us again until there is another Chicago Exhibition—for the glory of 'Brother Jonathan.' "

'Our statesmen talk a great deal about Home Rule. When this matter is arranged, it will probably be found that it all settles down to a mere delegation of local affairs, hitherto managed at St. Stephen's, to district assemblies, and we shall all wonder afterwards why we talked so much about it. Another section of the people is agitating very considerably about a reduction in the hours of labour to eight, without realising that this is impossible unless they can establish a ring fence round that portion of the habitable globe which agrees to work for eight hours only, with a tariff against the rest which work for more than eight hours. The question of the day, however, is the tariff question, and no one tells the people anything about it. I wonder if the member for Northampton, for instance, has ever told his constituents that the world is trying to shut their boots out. That is the tendency of the whole habitable globe. It seemed to be forgotten in talking about these islands that there are thirty-six millions of people, and that the islands only produce sufficient to support six millions, the other thirty millions being entirely dependent on the trade of the world. I maintain that the first duty of statesmen is to keep this question open, even to the extent of retaliatory tariffs. I read the newspapers frequently, but I never



see anything about this question. I know full well, as many of those present do, that if President Harrison's policy is continued by the Yankees, they will absorb Canada, make reciprocal arrangements with South America, and declare the New World to be self-supporting. I want to show the masses that the question of the day for them is the tariff question, and this country is the last country that should abstain from dealing with it. It is very different with France with its enormous agricultural wealth and the nature of the people, and it is very different with the United States also; but with this country it is the question, and the whole question.

'How does this apply? Let us take the case of this much-abused Africa. Our friend of Northampton calls it nothing but jungle. I would call it Cinderella. It has made marvellous development. If we take two parts of Africa only, Egypt and South Africa, we shall find that these two places alone are sending to this country exports amounting to £20,000,000. Egypt has been turned into a self-supporting country, and if England retires from it chaos will ensue. The interest on its debt will not be paid, its exports will not be made to this country, and this country will not send its goods in return. Perhaps I am rather tiring the meeting, but I desire to point out to you that it is your duty, wherever and whenever you can, to impress upon the masses that this question of keeping control of the outer world is a matter of pleasure to the classes, but is a question of life to the masses. I am going to return to South Africa, to do

my duty by the people who have made me their Prime Minister. I have to deal with the development of Mashonaland, and to assimilate it as far as possible with a colony that possesses self-government; for when our territory becomes filled with white people, and especially our countrymen, there is one thing that we shall insist on—nameiy, self-government.

‘My plan, therefore, is gradually to assimilate the territory south of the Zambesi, so that when the day arrives there will be no difficulty in the change from government by a charter to government by the people of the country. In addition to this work, I hope that I shall be able to continue steadily with the telegraph overland. Of course, if the English public and people will help in the undertaking, all the better, because there is not only the money question, but the feeling of having the people at one’s back; but even if they do not support it, I shall do it myself. A good many terms are often levelled at one’s acts and one’s nature. For instance, one is called an adventurer, but I noticed when I was at the Bank of England the other day that the charter for that institution was granted to adventurers. Again, sometimes one is called a speculator. I do not deny the charge. I remember meeting General Gordon and discussing with him why he had not taken the roomful of gold from the Emperor of China. Some of those present may remember the incident. General Gordon asked me if I would have taken it, and my reply was, “Certainly, and three more roomful if I could have got them,” because if one has ideas, one cannot carry

them out without having wealth at one's back. I have therefore tried to combine the commercial with the imaginative, and up to the present I have not failed. With respect to yourselves, I have asked you to do two things—one is, if you will, to send me something towards the undertaking of the telegraph I have mentioned; and the second is, never to lose an opportunity of pointing out to the people that, in view of the fact that these islands can only support six millions out of their thirty-six millions, and in view of the action of the world, which, finding that it cannot compete with us on a fair basis, is therefore trying to exclude our manufactures—in view of these facts, to point out to the people that we cannot afford to part with one inch of the world's surface which affords a free and open market to the manufactures of our countrymen.'

Attention may be drawn to the large and practical statesmanship of the views of the best way of consulting the interests of British commerce and the British labourer, set forth in this speech,—views which remind us that the welfare of England, and of the masses of his countrymen who earn their bread by manual labour, are very near to the heart of this maker of our South African Empire, whose devotion to his mother-country is in a sense his religion.

## CHAPTER XI

## THE CONQUEST OF MATABELELAND

THE situation in Mashonaland in the first half of 1893 was all that could be desired, and justified the optimism of Mr. Rhodes in his first speech to the Chartered Company's shareholders at the Second Annual Meeting (November 29, 1892), given in full at the end of the last chapter. The reefs were promising well, although the enormous cost of carriage from Cape Town prevented the bringing up of stamps. Sound development work was going on upon several of the reefs, and the prospecting work was such as to satisfy the most sanguine expectations of the mineral wealth of the new country, for already four hundred miles of reefs had been pegged out in the preceding autumn, and for sixty miles of them shafts had been sunk and the reefs cross-cut.

The later arrivals, who included a good many Transvaal Dutchmen, were delighted with the pastoral capabilities of large districts in which they had settled. The copious rainfall gave pasturage of an excellence not to be found elsewhere in South Africa, and their experience of the sweet veldt of Mashonaland after the sour veldt of the Transvaal, together with the perfect justice and sympathetic kindness of the Administration, had quite reconciled these Transvaal 'voortrekkers' to the British rule, which in their ignorance, fortified by the influence of President

Kruger and General Joubert, they had formerly supposed to be an anti-Dutch despotism. They had indeed reason to congratulate themselves on having cast in their lot with the British Empire and made their homes in a land which is *par excellence* 'the white man's country' of South Africa.

Mr. Rhodes had done his utmost to aid the progress of civilisation and prosperity in Mashonaland by finding the money out of his own purse for the extension of the Beira railway, which was coming up rapidly to the 75th milestone, which it reached in the autumn of 1893. He had pushed on the telegraph still more swiftly. It had reached Fort Victoria in December 1891, and Fort Salisbury, the capital, in February 1892. This telegraph was Mr. Rhodes's pet project for the rapid extension of civilisation into the realms of savagery, and he looked forward to it when completed, as has been seen in his speech in London (November 1892), as giving to the British Empire the keys of the continent and putting an end to the slave-trade, which it has since largely effected. The telegraph was built almost entirely out of his own private fortune, as he failed to convince the public of its feasibility or of the reasonableness of putting money into it as a commercial enterprise. Furthermore, the northern railway to connect Cape Town was progressing; the first section to Vryburg had been opened in December 1890, and the next section from Vryburg to Mafeking was being laid, though it was not to reach that town till 1894.

Mr. Rhodes, who believes in commerce and industrialism as opposed to militarism, was thoroughly satisfied with the pacific and prosperous position of development in Mashonaland, and feared no trouble from Lobengula. He had pointed this out in his

speech in London in the preceding November, and considered the regular monthly payment of one hundred sovereigns quite sufficient to ensure the good-will of Bulawayo. Yet it was in that quarter that a little cloud was rising which was soon to grow till it threatened the very existence of the Mashonaland settlement.

The Matabele, accustomed for years to raid the herds of the peaceful Mashonas, to kill the owners and enslave the children, could not at all accept the situation by which they were barred out from their favourite employment. Raids had taken place in 1891-92, but Lobengula had expressed his regret, and it was hoped that the difficulty would be got over. The Mashonas, however, became more and more restive, as the Matabele raids continued; and at last, in July 1893, Lobengula, who evidently took the peaceful remonstrances of Dr. Jameson for a proof of the conscious weakness of the white men, sent in a much more formidable body of raiders to the country round Fort Victoria. He also put off the mask of regret and asserted his right to raid the Mashonas when and where he chose. His instructions to his impis were to carefully avoid killing any of the white men, but to make their position untenable by slaying their Mashona labourers. These Matabele raiders warned the white men not to oppose them, on their peril, and killed the native workmen, often in the very presence of their masters, right up to the environs of Victoria.

Dr. Jameson, hearing of this serious raid, came from Fort Salisbury to Victoria, and held an Indaba with Lobengula's Indunas. He warned them in plain language that if they did not at once retire from Mashonaland, he would drive them out by force.

The majority retired; but a few hundreds of the more daring warriors continued their raiding, and Captain Lendy and a few mounted men were sent out, encountered them and put them to flight. This was, of course, absolutely necessary, as the settlers, the farmers equally with the miners, were in consternation at the situation, and threatened at once to leave the country.

Even then Dr. Jameson hoped to arrange matters peaceably with Lobengula, a course which the fewness and unpreparedness of the settlers and the great military power of the Matabele made a matter of common prudence. Lobengula, however, took the occurrence very seriously, as a defiance of his power; and, unsatisfied with the killing of some hundreds of Mashonas by his impi, demanded the surrender to him of the natives—the men, women, and children who had taken refuge in Fort Victoria—as a preliminary to any further negotiations.

This defiant reply sent to the High Commissioner, together with the firing on patrols of the Imperial police on the border, precipitated the war, already practically inevitable from the attitude Lobengula had taken up towards Dr. Jameson when he endeavoured to obtain a peaceful arrangement after he had driven out the raiders. It is probable that Lobengula himself did not desire war, but the national spirit of the Matabele, a proud and conquering people, forced him to act as he did.

War being inevitable, it was considered the best policy to strike home at once before the rainy season. There was no military force in Mashonaland, there being at the time only about forty police, but the settlers rose to the occasion. To horse the force was a first necessity, and there were very few horses

in the country. Mr. Rhodes, who was in direct telegraphic communication with Dr. Jameson, came to the rescue (the Chartered Company's funds being almost exhausted at that time) and supplied the money for the expedition, towards which he had to sell 50,000 of his shares in the Company at the low price then obtainable, for owing to his lavish expenditure of his own money on telegraph and railway he was himself in low water. Mr. Rhodes bought eight hundred horses and sent them up. Dr. Jameson enlisted men, and the little force which was to march on Bulawayo was organised and equipped with astounding rapidity. Less than nine hundred white men constituted the expedition; but Sir Henry Loch sent up two hundred Bechuanaland Police to threaten the Matabele from the west. These were supported by Commandant Raaf's recruits and by a considerable body of Khama's men.

The first battle with the Matabele took place on the Shangani River. The Matabele, confident in their numbers and their prowess, fortunately elected to attack the laager in the usual Zulu fashion, and were met by a heavy fire from rifles and machine-guns, and after repeated attempts to get to close quarters were finally repulsed. The decisive battle took place soon after on the Imbembesi River, where the pick of the Matabele army, employing the same Zulu tactics, were again utterly routed, and the victorious colonists pushed on to Bulawayo, which they occupied without resistance. Lobengula, who had fled, was hotly pursued by a detachment under Major Forbes. The daring attempt of Major Wilson and less than forty men to capture the Matabele king led to the most memorable action of this memorable war. Wilson and his men, cut off by the sudden rising



of the Shangani River, refusing to abandon their wounded, died fighting heroically against overwhelming numbers. Forbes himself, so hard pressed that he was unable to help Wilson, was rescued by a body of one hundred men who came up by a forced march, with Mr. Rhodes himself among them, from Bulawayo.

The war was now over, though Lobengula, who had escaped northward, did not die till some time afterwards, and then from fever. Matabeleland had passed from the rule of bloodshed and savagery to the rule of peace and civilisation at an expense of very few lives and very little money. Besides Wilson and the men who died with him there were very trifling losses, and the expenses amounted to not much more than £100,000—an incredibly small price to pay when one remembers what the very similar Zulu war of 1879 had cost the British Empire both in blood and treasure. This successful result was due to the coolness and courage of the colonists, most of whom had never before been under fire, to the careful and cautious tactics, and to the uniform excellent shooting of the men employed. Mr. Selous on the news of the war had hastened back from his marriage, which had just taken place in England, and arrived in time to take his part in the breaking up of the Matabele power.

Dr. Jameson's volunteers were at once disbanded, and settled down in Matabeleland as the first colonists of this new and valuable addition to the empire. Thus Matabeleland was conquered and settled within a few months' time. In England the news was naturally received with pleasure; though the Little Englanders again distinguished themselves by the grossest misrepresentation of the facts, as regards both the

cause and the conduct of the war, practically constituting themselves the champions of the blood-stained and cruel despotism of the Matabele, and, while thus posing as friends of the natives, quietly ignoring the enormous benefit to the far more numerous peaceful Mashonas and other tribes which came, with their deliverance from the cruel and continual attacks to which they had been for years exposed. The loss of the Matabele in the war was trivial compared with the losses they inflicted on weaker tribes in any single year. Lobengula's slaughtering impis had been a terror to the whole native population from Lake Ngami on the west to the middle of Mashonaland on the east, while even the native tribes north of the Zambesi had not been safe from their murderous raids. The Matabele, of course, were for the future obliged to abandon their favourite occupation of rapine and murder; but, except for the downfall of their power and prestige, they were practically unharmed in any way, and were themselves delivered from the reign of arbitrary executions and confiscation maintained by their savage king at Bulawayo. Of Lobengula it must in justice be said that, while he had regarded the Mashonas as his cattle to slaughter or enslave, and had ruled his Matabele with ruthless severity—no doubt, in his opinion, the only way of ruling them at all,—he had behaved with perfect good faith towards all white men who were in his power (if we except the suspicious death of Captain Patterson at an earlier date), and certainly his steadfast protection of the missionaries and white traders during the war is very highly to his credit.

An excellent commentary on the facts of the war will be found in the two speeches which I now give—the first made by Mr. Rhodes at Bulawayo to the volunteers on the practical conclusion of the war, but

before Wilson's fate was known or Lobengula's death had taken place; and the second at the banquet to him at Cape Town (January 6, 1894). At Bulawayo on December 19, 1893, Mr. Rhodes addressed a rare audience—the assembled conquerors of Matabeleland, with the half-consumed ruins of Lobengula's capital, as it were, for background.

'Dr. Jameson, Officers, and Men of the various columns,—I have to thank you for all the excellent work you have done, and I assure you I fully appreciate the great task you have accomplished. I know how difficult the task has been, for, as you probably are aware, one great military authority, at all events, gave it as his opinion that ten thousand men would be required to do the work which you, people of Mashonaland, have done with somewhere about nine hundred. We also know what prophecies—very gloomy prophecies—were indulged in as to what your fate would be, and what the many pessimists said would be the result. Well, now, we know the result. You have been able, with the co-operation of the Bechuanaland Border Police, to conquer Matabeleland. As you well know, we had no desire to interfere, but interference was forced upon us. You remember at Victoria how the Mashonas in your employ were murdered on our ground, when we were quietly carrying on our mining operations. It is true, of course, that the Matabele said they would kill none of the white masters, but human beings could not stand their servants being slaughtered under their eyes, while appealing to them

for protection, even if the savages did say they would not actually kill the white masters. Therefore we took measures to ensure the safety of our people, though of course no offensive operations could be undertaken without the direct sanction of the Home Government. When at length this sanction was given, we proceeded to punish the savage onslaught on the inhabitants of Victoria, and the fact remains that what was put down as work for ten thousand men has been done by far less than a thousand. This must be the greatest satisfaction to you as well as to myself. At the beginning it was thought that the Company was doing nothing, and afterwards that we were only getting up horses; but, indeed, I assure you that all I wanted was to be left alone by people in the Colony, in South Africa, and also in England, to carry out the work which in Mashonaland was considered necessary. In England, a certain section thought the usual consequence was sure to ensue, and require like action, as in other colonial wars. An appeal would be made to Her Majesty's Government for assistance, they said; but no—we relied on the brave efforts of our own men, and they have done the work.

‘You would have thought the English would have been satisfied. On the contrary, you have been called freebooting marauders, bloodthirsty murderers, and so on; but I know this has not been by the people of England as a whole, but only by a section of them. I am as loyal an Englishman as any one can be, but I cannot help saying that it is such conduct

that alienates colonists from the mother-country. We ask for nothing, for neither men nor money, and still a certain portion vilify us. In the same spirit it was that the mother-country lost America. There are no people more loyal than your colonists in Africa, but continued misrepresentation will alienate the most loyal. And then what is to be the future settlement of the country? Whatever that may be, it must be remembered you were the first to conquer this country, and the settlement must be made in a fair way, and not be left entirely to negrophilists at Exeter Hall. Thanks are due to the Bechuanaland Police and their co-operation; for though you know that they did not share in our chief engagements, it was well for us that we had them; and we can imagine how they assisted us by coming in over the neck, thereby turning away many from us at both the Shangani and Imbembesi fights. Thanks also are due to the Cape Mounted Rifles, who to a man volunteered to come. Events may cause them to be recalled, but you will be glad to know that the Bechuanaland Police will otherwise remain here with you. There is one pleasurable thing to remember, and that is, that a combination of colonists and Imperial police has effected the destruction of ruthless barbarism south of the Zambesi, and established a further extension of the British Empire, and done this practically by their own unaided efforts.

'It is unfortunate, however, that our pleasure in a successful undertaking has been marred by—I will not call it disaster—a sad uncertainty; but there is still much ground for hope for those whom we

miss to-day. Those men, the want of whose presence we deplore, were in reality the leaders of the advance party. All of you have volunteered to go and ascertain reliably their actual fate, but your offer to go has been declined, because I may tell you that its acceptance would be of no benefit. We have sent out native scouts to scour the whole country and obtain information, so no advantage could be gained by our missing friends or yourselves. They were either, as we hope, able to get out, or else they remained there; and to risk your lives by exposure to the very heavy rains of the present season, and to the fire of scattered groups of natives in the bush, is unnecessary. You could not find them if alive. They will be by this time far away, either out on the Hartley Hill road, or else on the Gwai River; and if either is the case, we will find it out when the final collapse of the king comes, as come it must. That is the reason why I have declined your offer. I feel the sadness of the thing myself, if it should turn out to be a disaster, but, as I have said, there is ground for hope. They are colonists, well used to both bush and natives, and so, until we know the worst, let us keep hopeful. We have this consolation, that you of Major Forbes's party are back here with us. You have returned with the loss of one man only, and you have shown us how the Matabele nation has been destroyed. Although they were there in thousands, one hundred and thirty of you marched through them, and on your return no attempt was made by them to follow you. They did not follow you, and

the king has gone, and with him his young men have gone also, and now the time has come for you to disperse and select your ground.

‘I must tell you, furthermore, that it is agreed that the High Commissioner and myself shall discuss the whole of the future mode of settlement to be hereafter decided upon. There will be probably reserves for natives, and the remainder will be what I might call public land, so that you will be the first entitled to select land, and you will deal with it after provision has been made for the natives. We will certainly have to deal with your grants of land without loss of time. It is your right; for you have conquered the country. I must also tell you that it is agreed, as far as we are concerned, that with regard to the balance of the ground in the country, the minimum price at which it will be sold will be 3s. per morgen. There will thus be native reserves, free grants to yourselves, and the balance of Crown land, which is not to be sold under 3s. per morgen, so as, to begin with, to give a certain value to the first occupiers, numbering somewhere about nine hundred, in favourable portions of the country. Remember, gentlemen, that all these arrangements with regard to the settlement are subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, and that is one of the principal reasons why I am hurrying down to Cape Town to confer with him. This is only due to you. We have opponents who talk about the land, and who talk a great deal of nonsense too. Do they think you have left everything, and run the risk that every one said

you were running—which was that you were all going to be slaughtered—for what? Let us say a farm. What is its present value? Say £40. Then am I to be told that you left your occupation and your employment and took the risk of being shot for the value of a farm worth £40? The thing is ridiculous.

‘No, the reason you came was that you knew your property in Mashonaland was worthless unless the Matabele were crushed. You found you had no choice other than to fight or to leave the country of your adoption. You could do nothing at your mines. When Dr. Jameson and I were faced with that alternative, we did what you know. It happened that the Matabele fired on the patrols at the border, and this at once caused the High Commissioner to sanction the commencement of offensive operations; and it is a satisfaction to us all to feel that the major portion of the English public are fully in accord with his decision, though there is a section against us. I, indeed, have been accused of every crime in the Decalogue, but that I do not mind. What I do know is, that it was impossible to deal with Mashonaland while barbarism had the upper hand. We had hoped that the Matabele would, like the Swazis, come and settle down to work with the white man, and so become civilised, or that at least they would leave us alone; but they would not, and therefore we could do nothing else than what has been done. We got sympathy from our friends in the Colony, but they were somewhat unhappy as to our fate. Now, what I want you to see is that really the mode of



final settlement of the country will not be with Her Majesty's Government, Dr. Jameson, or myself, but with you, the first settlers, and your representatives, the representatives of the people of Mashonaland, who have made that country the home of your adoption, and in self-defence have been compelled to extend its borders to the spot where you now stand, since for this you came here and risked your lives. Many of you are going to leave, and we wish you all joy and success ; but I must confess that my feelings and sympathy are most with those who are going to stay and make this their home, and to them I do heartily wish success.

‘ I would say to these last, that when afterwards they are alone, and have possibly to deal with hardship, let them deal with it whilst considering always what I call their comparative state. When the hard times are present, try to think, “ Were I not here, where should I be and what should I be doing ? ” When you think of what you might have been doing elsewhere, many of you will find it is a great source of comfort that you have here a great country, with many miles of it mineralised : it is impossible to say how much ; but we know that you have here many gold-reefs, and that there is a fair prospect before you of a fair number of them being of value. Then you have, if you are inclined that way, a certain sentiment about knowing that nine hundred of you have created another state in South Africa, large in extent, with every possibility of being proportionately valuable, and that you have put an end to savage rule south

of the Zambesi. I read in the newspapers of what Mr. Rhodes has done and what he has not done, and I must tell you I regret standing in what I may call stolen clothes. Everything done in regard to your campaign has been done by Dr. Jameson and yourselves, with the co-operation of the Bechuanaland Border Police. The future will have many obligations, but there is one thing that presses me most, and that is that I must use my brains in getting fresh capital here for railways and public works to found a state south of the Zambesi, which I hope will be one of the largest, and at the same time one of the richest, in South Africa.'

After the speech Mr. Rhodes hurried down from Bulawayo to Cape Town, and upon his arrival was entertained at a banquet attended by representatives of all political parties, at the Good Hope Hall on January 6, 1894, where he made the following striking speech. He sketched, with some interesting reminiscences, his work of expansion, and concluded with one of those revelations of the real man behind the politician, which are only too rare in his public utterances.

'Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen,—There are times when it is very difficult to express one's views. It is easy in conflicts on political grounds to feel that one has a position to fight, that there is a political effort to undertake, and one feels that one is in fighting trim. But I can assure you, gentlemen, that when you have to reply to your own fellow-citizens—when they have intimated to you that, as far as the

external politics of the country are concerned, they feel you have deserved well of the State,—I can assure you that it is exceedingly difficult to speak. When I look round this assemblage, and see that there are gentlemen here who, as regards the politics of the Cape Colony, feel it their duty to be in opposition to myself, and yet have been so broad-minded and so fair that they have come to this dinner, and express by their presence at it that, as regards a portion of my political ideas, they consider that I have deserved well of the community—well, Mr. Mayor, it makes it very difficult for me to express myself; and it is most creditable to them when I consider the animosity of politics in my own country and in other parts of the world. These gentlemen, knowing full well that it will be their duty—and I admit their right duty in the interests of responsible government—to oppose me and find fault with me, and do their best to bring about a change of government, yet have the broad-mindedness to say, “In so far as a portion of your political ideas is concerned we consider you have deserved well of the country.” Well, Mr. Mayor, those who are present to-night are thanking me for the result of ideas which were mine when I became one of the representatives of the people. I had led an active life in the amalgamation of the diamond-mines; and I thought it would be a good thing to have an idea in connection with one’s politics, and try steadily to carry it out. I am referring to my position as a representative of the people some twelve years ago, and I thought it would be a good and wise

idea to work in season and out of season to obtain the unknown interior as a reversion to the colony of which I was one of the citizens. I will not tire you to-night with a statement of the various steps that I took. I am looking back over a period of nearly twelve years of my life. I had that idea, I advocated it in Parliament, and gradually I had the satisfaction of seeing your hinterland grow from the Orange River far into the vast interior.

'I remember, and it is an amusing recollection, when I used almost daily to see your late Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson. I had to deal with the acquisition of Bechuanaland, which was our frontier district. I had to deal with the expansion of the Protectorate, which if I remember right was up to latitude 22.00, and I remember so well that in my discussions with your late Governor he was good enough to say, "Well, I think that is enough," and, Mr. Mayor, the only reply I made to him was, "Do come with me and look at the block-house on Table Mountain." I used that expression to him, and then I said, "Those good old people two hundred years ago thought that block-house on Table Mountain was the limit of their ideas, but now let us face it to-day. Where are we? We are considerably beyond the Vaal River, and supposing that those good people were to come to life again to-day, what would they think of it and their block-house?" Then I said, "Sir, will you consider, during the period you have been the representative of Her Majesty in this colony, what you have done? We are now on latitude 22.00." It was amusing when he said

to me, "And what a trouble it has been!" He said to me, "But where will you stop?" and I replied, "I will stop where the country has not been claimed." Your old Governor said, "Let us look at the map," and I showed him that it was the southern border of Tanganyika. He was a little upset. I said that the great Powers at home marked the map, and did nothing: adding, "Let us try to mark the map, and we know that we shall do something." "Well," said Sir Hercules Robinson, "I think you should be satisfied with the Zambesi as a boundary." I replied, "Let us take a piece of notepaper, and let us measure from the block-house to the Vaal River; that is the individual effort of the people. Now," I said, "let us measure what you have done in your temporary existence, and then we will finish up with measuring my imaginations." We took a piece of notepaper and measured the efforts of the country since the Dutch occupied and founded it. We measured what he had done in his life, and then we measured my imaginations; and His Excellency, who is no longer with us, said, "I will leave you alone."

'Well, Mr. Mayor, the idea progressed, and His Excellency gave me a free hand, but he claimed from me a certain action when he considered that he had strained the responsibilities of Her Majesty's Government to the fullest extent. He claimed that I should take an obligation when we got to the 22nd degree of latitude, which was then the boundary of Khama's territory. It is unnecessary for me to tire you with a statement of the end-

less negotiations which ensued. I found myself with the responsibility as far as the Zambesi—that is, so far as concerned the High Commissioner of the Colony, and far beyond, so far as the Foreign Office was concerned. I took upon myself these responsibilities because I thought it would come out all right. You must remember, Mr. Mayor, that in those days every one was against me; you must remember that when I pointed out to the House, as an individual member, that the hinterland must be preserved, I could not get a vote, I could not get a single vote; and one had to continue at this question in spite of every difficulty.

‘I am now referring to twelve years of my life—twelve years as an individual member, and twice as a Minister of the Crown. But, Mr. Mayor, it came out all right. I have found out one thing, and that is, if you have an idea, and it is a good idea, if you will only stick to it, you will come out all right. I made the seizure of the interior a paramount thing in my politics, and made everything else subordinate; and if there are some of you who at times considered that any action of mine, as a member of the House, was such as you could not agree with, I can only say in reply that probably in any case I should have to differ with you, but frequently my paramount object weighed with me as supreme. I knew that Africa was the last uncivilised portion of the empire of the world, and that it must be civilised, and that those who lived at the healthy base, with the energy that they possess,

would be the right and proper individuals to undertake the civilisation of the back-country. I will not tire you, Mr. Mayor, or the gentlemen present, with what occurred. I was fortunate in being in that position which falls to few : to have an idea, and to be able to call upon funds in support of that idea.

'I remember full well my various discussions with General Gordon, and I remember saying to him, "It is of no use our having hazy ideas ; it is of no use our giving vent to our imaginations ; if we have imaginative ideas we must have pounds, shillings, and pence to carry them out." Before I undertook this idea of the occupation of the interior, I weighed full well what it would cost, and I received the most loyal support from the little circle who had been connected with me in other industries. I suppose they said, "Rhodes has his hobby ; he is useful to us in other questions ; he has fulfilled to us all our conceptions of what a man should be in connection with the commercial undertakings with which we and he are connected, and so we will let him run his hobbies so long as they are not too expensive." And so, Mr. Mayor, I was able to start into the interior, and you can follow very shortly the result. We went far to the north ; we occupied all short of the Zambesi ; we did it by the feeling of the people. For, after all, even if you have the wealth, it is impossible to carry out a conception unless you have the feeling of the people with you.

'And so we occupied an almost unknown country close to the Zambesi, and I may say, Mr. Mayor,

we were satisfied. All I wanted was the painting of the map, because I knew full well that the other Powers who were painting the map would do nothing for a century. Still, the great conception was to have the map painted, and so we painted the map, and further than that, we made an occupation, owing to the energy of people from this country who had an adventurous spirit, and were willing to fall in with one's ideas. I thought that that position would last for five or ten years. We had a country as big as France. We knew by the reports that it was highly mineralised, and, with reference to the ruthless power that existed on our border, the last representative of barbarism south of the Zambesi, my judgment was that we should leave it alone. But you may form an opinion and some one else may upset it, and so I had to face during the last session of Parliament the impossibility of remaining quiet. I often think what my colleagues must sometimes have thought of me as I was sitting in the House, because I would often have a telegram to say that the natives had been murdered inside their masters' territory at Victoria, that the people would not stand it, and that there was but one solution, or rather two solutions—one, that they should trek out of the country; the other, to face the position. On that point, as you have been good enough to meet me to-night, you will give me some kindly consideration, because I have had to conduct the administration of the country. I have had to be daily and hourly in Parliament, and even those who are on the other side of the House would admit that I



did my duty as the representative of the country by my daily and continuous presence in the House. But you will share with me the feeling, the strain in dealing with some local questions of the country, and yet having at the same time, perhaps, in my hands the statement that these people in the north would no longer stand the position, and that their boys were being murdered in their sight.

‘Well, Mr. Mayor, I made up my mind that we had to deal with the question. We made all our preparations. We had to buy the horses, and I will admit that one of the difficulties of the situation was the following. I had been a little too progressive. I had sanctioned and raised the money to build the Mafeking railway, which was an obligation to this country, and I could not face the people unless I fulfilled that obligation. I had provided, and I will say it, out of my own means, the extension of the Beira railway, to give communication to the eastern portion of that territory. I have been open to all sorts of abuse; but I will say frankly to you to-night, you cannot provide everything from the south, and there was an eastern portion which must have its communication with the coast on the east. And, Mr. Mayor, in addition to that, I had indulged in a hobby, and found four-fifths of the money to go on with six hundred miles of telegraph through Africa.

‘Now, sir, I must be very guarded. I must not claim from you your support on that account; but I mention it to you for a reason. Do you think for one moment that a human individual who had

been landed with the Mafeking railway, with a telegraph to Nyasaland, with the extension through the fly from Beira, was recklessly going to chuck himself into a struggle with the last ruthless power of barbarism that existed in South Africa? I knew, Mr. Mayor, that that power must pass away; but I also felt that it was a question of subsequent years; and can you fancy the appalling position to be faced when I found myself involved in a struggle with that power with all those obligations on my hands? By telegraphic communication I tried to postpone it in every way. To sum up, the situation I had to face was this: that people who had gone two thousand miles from here, and adopted this new country as their home, would have to trek; they said it was impossible to remain in that territory which they had accepted as their own, if the Matabele impis were to lie on their border, and from time to time destroy their servants, with the proviso that I have mentioned before, that the gentleman who was the master of a white skin would for the present be spared. Such a situation you can hardly discuss; but such a situation in practical experience no man who has a claim to humanity can endure.

‘Well, Mr. Mayor, in those long hours that we spend in the House I made up my mind, and said good-bye, at the conclusion of the session, to my colleagues, without expressing my purpose, and went up to Mashonaland knowing full well what was before me. Fortunately the High Commissioner also fully apprehended the situation, and whilst I was travelling up

into that country, and was approaching the forces at the end, the permission was granted, and the men went in. Now, I think, though I may be tiring you, it will be a pleasant thing for you to hear from me who were those men that went in. Well, I can tell you, because I arrived just after they had departed. I see here a representative of Her Majesty's forces; but then I know full well his feeling and knowledge about the people of this country; and I will tell you, Mr. Mayor, that the men who went in to destroy the Matabele power were your citizens. We none of us can get out of the facts. I have done over ten years of the duality question, the separation of the north from the Cape Colony, and the admission of myself as your representative, provided I kept the north perfectly separate. I say I have kept it separate. But you may talk as you like, and you may have your meetings as you like, but you cannot stop civilisation going into the interior; and the civilisation that has gone into the interior has been that of your own people.

'With whom did we fight the Matabele? Well, really, it is the most amusing thing you ever heard of. The gentlemen who volunteered to destroy the Matabele power were butchers; yes, and bakers too, and men in stores, and men connected with business in this country. Fortunately a number of them had had Volunteer training. Our best man with the artillery, I think you will find—I will not mention his name—was a Cape Town man connected with the Volunteers. They left their different pursuits, and said, "We must

settle the question, or clear out of the country." And the extraordinary thing is that these men went in with the column of nine hundred men and did the business. My views are changed, Mr. Mayor. When I go and buy something in Adderley Street now—I hope you will not be angry with me—I know the man that is across the counter and is selling the article to me will, if the occasion require it, with his knowledge and his training, do his duty. The whole thing is most extraordinary. When I arrived in Salisbury, out of about 1500 people at the outside—and I think that is exaggerated—650 had gone to the front, and when I asked those who were left why they had not gone, they told me that it simply meant the closure of their business, and they were in positions they could not lose. But what they had done was to allow every member they could of their industry to go. And, of those people who had gone, fortunately many had had a Volunteer training in the Cape Colony, and the others, Mr. Mayor, had the courage to feel that they could do anything. But there is the story, and you cannot get out of it: these few men went from these two spots, Victoria and Salisbury, to face a power that was supposed to be nearly equal to the Zulu, and with the general idea that we should never see them again.

'Well, I will not tire you. They went through, and they won the position, and they occupied Bulawayo. But do remember in consideration of that effort, that you must not take only the two fights when they succeeded, but you must take the

daily and nightly terror that the Matabele would be down on them at any moment. As against the two fights that occurred you have in your minds to consider the fifty occasions when the wagons stopped, when the laager was formed and the Maxims were got into readiness. These occasions may not appear clear to you, but they occurred daily; and when I got to Bulawayo, and saw a gentleman who had been in the confidence of the king, he told me that the king had given instructions that his men should attack on the march, but the reply of the Indunas was that the column was in such a state of preparation that they never could hit them disorganised on the march. So, when you think of the two engagements, you must remember that every night and day these people, who were, Mr. Mayor—and I hope none will object to my saying it,—simply shopkeepers and traders without the knowledge of military organisation, never knew from night to day when the Matabele would attack them, but they went through and did it, as nobody denies.

‘And so a few hundreds of the people who have come up from you—and there is also a portion of our own countrymen from home amongst them—conquered a savage power which Her Majesty would have had to deal with, to conquer which would have cost the people at home many millions of money. And you might think the people at home would be satisfied. They all expected the usual thing—the appeal to the mother for help and the expenditure by the mother of enormous sums of money; but,

though they all expected it, it did not come, Mr. Mayor, and not one single sixpence did we ask for. And you would think surely that would have satisfied them. But it did not. I have always felt, Mr. Mayor, that it is a most unfair thing to the English people, with their difficulties and their poverty, that in the expansion of their empire those who are conducting the expansion should at the least difficulty run off and say, "You must pay the piper"; and when I left here I told the High Commissioner I wanted nothing. I do not know what would have occurred had there been a reverse; but the right principle, in my mind, was that one should not go and ask Her Majesty to find millions of money—with the difficulties they have had at home with the social condition of the people—to do something for the expansion of the empire, to do what would appear to the people to be simply sucking their vitals for a reckless expenditure thousands of miles away. Now, having entered on this undertaking with the people of the country, having found the money to carry it through successfully, and having—which has never occurred before—the unanimous support of the religious denominations in Mashonaland—religious denominations representing the Church of England, the Roman Catholics, the Wesleyans, and, if I might say it, the Salvation Army,—surely you would have thought that the people at home would have been satisfied. No, no. We conducted the campaign with the greatest humanity. I am prepared to submit our conduct to any Board, even a Board of the

Aborigines' Protection Society. I cast a cloak over what occurred in Egypt; but I know. I cast a cloak over many other wars when the individual efforts of Tommy Atkins were too much for his officers. These things are secret from us, but I am prepared to submit the conduct of the men who went from Victoria and Salisbury and occupied Bulawayo, to a committee of the Aborigines' Protection Society.

'Now I do not think any one can accuse me of preparing a speech, though no doubt it is the right thing to do, but I did copy out for the information of the gentlemen who have met here to-night, and who wish to express to me the feeling that I have deserved well of the community, a little extract to illustrate the conduct of the Aborigines' Protection Society. You must remember, gentlemen, that we went into Matabeleland with the support of every religious denomination in Mashonaland. We conquered the Matabele, we destroyed their power, and we looked for the approbation of our countrymen at home. Now, this is one of those little things about a very interesting body who went and communicated with Lord Ripon when they found we were in Bulawayo. They did not say anything before, and this is the matter that they submitted. They stated that, in their opinion, the future control both of Matabeleland and of Mashonaland should be assigned to the Crown, and not to the Chartered Company. I am, of course, paraphrasing what they said. I have no objection to the Crown if the Crown would recognise its duties, but the Crown, in this affair of mine twelve

years ago, would never "do anything." And then they (the Aborigines' Protection Society) added, in reference to the Chartered Company, "which has avowed its intention of civilising the country and its inhabitants in the interests"—and here comes a very good word—"of unscrupulous trade"—what is unscrupulous trade?—"and of the adventurers attracted to employment under it." Now, after the conquest of the country—every religious denomination being in our favour, because of their being perfectly aware that year by year at a certain period the Matabele impis went and killed the Mashonas—I do not want to go into claptrap stories, but I can tell you one fathered by Mr. Selous, that on one occasion when the Matabele returned with their captives, who were bothersome, they tied wisps of straw upon them and burned them in a kraal. Well, this was perfectly well known, yet that is how these gentlemen described our conduct in the operations.

'I might tell you an amusing story, that when I was chatting over the question with a gentleman in Bulawayo, he said, "I do not call them the Aborigines' Protection Society, I call them the Aborigines' Destruction Society," and though some of you have sentiments in accord with them, I will tell you the reason. When the charter was granted, Her Majesty sent a letter to the king telling him to recognise the charter, but at the same time there was a breakfast given by the Aborigines' Protection Society, and they gave a letter also, that the king should work his gold himself, that he should not give it to any adventurers. The



two letters arrived together. The king made careful examination, and found unfortunately that at the breakfast they were all gentlemen with white hair, and he said, "It is clear to me, that Her Majesty is giving a nominal letter in favour of Rhodes, but her old councillors have sent another." This was in terms of native ideas, and the king did his duty. Do you know what that duty was? He promptly went and murdered the man who had witnessed the concession, and seventy of his people—women and children; and when remonstrated with afterwards, he said, "Oh! but the old greybeards told me to do it"—the old greybeards being the Aborigines' Protection Society. I do not know, when they appeal to those interesting old ladies in England, that they will ever read my speech; but still, if I was one of those interesting old ladies, I would think twice before sending a contribution, because I would not know whether this would not be repeated. These are facts, Mr. Mayor, and you cannot get rid of them.

'I see here Mr. Frank Thompson, who obtained the concession, and went through unparalleled difficulty with it; and Mr. Rudd is here, who was also up with him. They know the circumstances, and I think, therefore, I am fairly entitled to speak of that Society as the Aborigines' Destruction Society. Now, we have an amusing combination—we have this assembly of old gentlemen who have killed about a hundred people—because they cannot deny it, I can bring facts—and with whom have they combined? Well, they have combined with the member for North-

ampton. Now, Mr. Mayor, I have to be careful. If I were to indulge the instinct that is in me I would say things, perhaps, that some of you who are kindly disposed towards me would in after criticism say put me on the level of the honourable member for Northampton. No, it is better to take a higher platform, and I will simply say that the combination of the Aborigines' Protection Society and the member for Northampton is unique. I would be trespassing upon doubtful ground if I referred to the record of the member for Northampton. If you will wander with me into the classics, into the history of the Roman empire two thousand years ago, you will find that the conduct of a certain section was to make money by vilifying any one who got above the crowd; but then please remember that if I were to lower myself to that platform, I do not think that you, though you would agree with my facts, would say that I commended myself to you by my conduct. Of course it is an anomaly—I leave the private character—it is an anomaly that a cynical editor in London, whose paper exists for the criticism of any one who rises above the average—it is an anomaly that that man should appeal to a working community—I refer to the electors of Northampton. But they require to be educated; they require to be told that the Little England that he advocates is destruction to their industry; that England is a very small country with a very large population, which has lived during the last hundred years by working up raw products and then giving them to the world; that

the world has very cleverly discovered that, through giving to the world the raw product when manufactured, England has got control of the world, and, to sum it up shortly, the world by protective and prohibitive tariff says, "We will have nothing to do with England." If I could put before you a simile—and it appeals to every one of you, because we are all a sporting community—it is just as if a cricket eleven, say the county of Yorkshire, beat every one else, and the neighbouring counties were to get nervous and frightened, and say, "We will handicap you with fourteen or sixteen men when we play"; and then afterwards went on to say, "We will not play you at all." That is just the situation in the world. This has nothing to do with us here, but the politicians of England do not conceive the situation. That is why the Little England is hopeless. If England were a country like the United States, with a large expansion of territory, it might enter on such a career, but with an entirely small island, almost at present a workshop, its future depends upon its relations with the external world. And these relations, Mr. Mayor, depend on the relations with the colonies of South Africa, with Australia, Canada, and the rest of the world. No politician has yet hit that idea, but if the world as a whole hits on a prohibitive tariff against the mother-country, what would occur? I will give you one more simile. The land cannot provide for the support of forty millions, and they would be exactly in the position of a ship out of which the provender had been taken and yet the rats were left. The food having

been exhausted, there would be only one solution, and that is, to eat themselves.

‘I leave to the community the comprehension of the idea, but I have mentioned it because this advocate of the Little England has not explained to his constituents the position that really exists. The United States, France, and Russia, and almost every civilised part of the world, are shutting us off by prohibitive tariffs. They say they will not play cricket with us, and the only solution is to make arrangements to play cricket with our colonies, and if we do not see what is going on, perhaps the colonists will play cricket with people other than ourselves. I could say a great deal more, but I think in justice to yourselves, of whom I am the representative, I should hold silence. But of course one of the most amusing pictures that ever was seen is the member for Northampton and the Aborigines’ Protection Society in the same boat. I wish them a happy voyage and a safe haven, but I do submit this to you, gentlemen, that beyond such a picture imagination cannot go. When I consider these kindly old gentlemen, who are utterly wrong, in close and holy alliance with the member for Northampton—I wish them joy of the situation.

‘But, Mr. Mayor, what should be a practical consideration for yourselves is the following:—You may say, “We admit that our people have gone out and taken the north, and we are rather proud of it. We are proud that some of our colonists should have done this work. It makes us feel stronger and better that they undertook and successfully carried that work to a

conclusion." But perhaps if we were at Port Elizabeth they would say, "Where do we come in?" I would simply answer this: It was my duty the other day to speak to the people of Salisbury in connection with the Beira railway, and they showed me, so far as the eastern portion of our country went, what an enormous saving they would make by communication with the coast. I find, before we get to the end of the railway at Chimoio, we pay out in connection with railway and river transit nearly £6 a ton, and I find from the end of the railway to Bulawayo is five hundred miles, and I think you will begin to see what I am at. I find that after fulfilling my obligations to the Cape Colony as to the construction of the railway to Mafeking (five hundred miles from Bulawayo), this much-despised Mafeking railway will give for many years to come the sole trade of Matabeleland to the people of the Cape Colony. Now, that is the proposition I submit to you, and I ask further—and there are many commercial men here to-night—where, in relation to this much-despised telegraph, where am I at the present moment, in spite of the difficulties of the Matabele question? Within six months I shall be at Blantyre. We can see from the press that Her Majesty is to take the responsibility of Uganda. Before we know where we are I shall be at Uganda. Now, I feel the coming criticism pleasantly. You will say, "What is the good of that?" Do any of you pay 7s. 6d. a word to the Eastern Telegraphs? I think many of you do. But, gentlemen, you see what is going to occur. Her Majesty is going to get Uganda.

If I cannot get through the Mahdi, I am going to get to the coast, and there is then going to be a competitive telegraph system before we are very much older. I am speaking, say, of five years hence, when you are going to use your telegraph at about 4s. a word instead of 7s. 6d., and then I shall have done something in the interests of the commercial community.

Now, we will take another advantage. I have dealt with the Mafeking railway and the telegraph to the north, to both of which I have not in any way pledged the people of this country; and there is one more question. You must remember that you are responsible for 1,200,000 natives. I happen to be the Native Minister. Well, there are difficulties on certain portions of your border, but, Mr. Mayor, don't you see that the destruction of Lobengula by a force of nine hundred men of your colonists is going to render it a perfectly easy thing for us to deal with the Pondos, and other native tribes? The one story of the Matabele who submitted, and the one story when I came down from the Protectorate, was that this little thing that went "toot-too, toot-too, toot-too," was an unfair thing, and no one could stand against it; and so, when in your position as individual citizens you weigh the situation, please remember that in so far as yourselves are concerned, not one single sixpence has been contributed, and in so far as the direct advantages are concerned, there are many that have come to you. That is the proposition that I submit to you, and what more can I do?

'I see lying here a document which I had forgotten, carried away by the current of my thoughts, when I submitted to you that it was impossible for us to go on in our position in Mashonaland with those threatening impis. Here is the statement of the son of the father of missionaries, who is also the representative of Her Majesty, and I think I may read it to you for your information. On that very question he makes the following statement. Referring to the Matabele, he says: "Probably what they will do will be to make life a burden to the unhappy Mashonas in the vicinity of the pioneer column, who may be bringing supplies for sale, or otherwise showing a disposition to welcome the new chums. There are no two ways about it—this is where the shoe will pinch eventually." Is not this interesting to you, written by the son of the father of missionaries, and you might say by one intimately in association with the Aborigines' Protection Society? He continues: "Your men go as liberators to do the work of the Aborigines' Protection Society, whatever may be their actual motives; another time will come when, however peacefully you have succeeded in working, you will have to draw the line at Matabele raids into Mashonaland, bullying and plundering the people who will be doing your work." This is the contribution which I had forgotten from Mr. Moffat, the Imperial Commissioner at Palapye, and these are facts which I would like to convey to you.

'And now, having dealt with the question of our occupation and the difficulties thereof, the abuse that

we have received, and what our men have done, I will make a few remarks as to our future. The future, Mr. Mayor, is full of difficulties. As I once said to a representative organisation, "If one only knew what was in front of one, one would never attempt a thing"; but it is very fortunate we never know, and the future to me is a simple, daily, steady attempt to apply whatever we have in this old portion of South Africa to those new estates that we have obtained, or—if you will let me use the personal—that I have obtained, and wait for the future, for no one will remove from myself the idea that the day will come when there will be one system south of the Zambesi. With full affection for the flag I have been born under, and the flag I represent, I can perfectly understand the sentiment and feeling of a Republican who has created his independence and values that before all; but I can say fairly that I believe in the future, I can assimilate this system which I have been connected with, with the Cape Colony, and it is not an impossible idea that the neighbouring Republics, retaining their independence, should share with us as to certain general principles.

'If I might put it to you, I would say they should share with us as to the principle of tariffs, the principle of railway connection, the principle of appeal in law, the principle of coinage, and in fact all those principles which exist at the present moment in the United States, irrespective of the local assemblies which exist in each separate State in that country. I fully recognise—excuse me



wandering into this—that even if, so far as the flag is concerned, we were one united people, it would be better, in so far as the gold of Johannesburg and the coffee, tea, and sugar of Natal are concerned, that there was a local assembly dealing with those matters; and whether that local assembly happens to be under our flag or whether it is not, surely it is not a very high conception to think that as to general questions—these broad questions of railways, tariffs, coinage, and dealing with the natives—we should have a unanimous policy. And in the future—in so far as the special questions that I have been dealing with are concerned—they will have to be assimilated with the Government of the Cape Colony by degrees in so far as regards its laws, railways, and tariffs.

‘When some of you talk in private about my dual position, please remember this—I have said it before—that if you were to sleep for five-and-twenty years, you might find a gentleman called your Prime Minister sitting in Cape Town and controlling the whole, not only to the Zambesi, but to Lake Tanganyika. Then do not indulge in this frightful objection to the dual capacity so long as you see under the light of public criticism that a human being does not sacrifice the interests of one, and does not do something that is unfair and incorrect. For the future is clear—we shall be one. Surely you should be thankful for the happy accident of a human atom who makes us one, for I feel assured that if you went to sleep you would not wake up to object to a

Prime Minister who regulated the whole: that is a thought for you to carry home with you.

‘When you ask for immediate movement in these matters, I think of the warning of Sir Bartle Frere: You must never hurry anything. You must take step by step, in accordance with the feeling and sentiment of the people as a whole. You may be more progressive in one of the cities of the country, but if you are wise you will consider the relations of that city with the whole. Never hurry and hasten in anything. I remember in the impetuosity of my youth I was talking to a man advanced in years, who was planting—what do you think? He was planting oak-trees, and I said to him, very gently, that the planting of oak-trees by a man advanced in years seemed to me rather imaginative. He seized the point at once and said to me, “You feel that I shall never enjoy the shade?” I said “Yes,” and he replied, “I had the imagination, and I know what that shade will be, and at any rate no one will ever alter those lines. I have laid my trees on certain lines; I know that I cannot expect more than to see them beyond a shrub, but with me rests the conception and the shade and the glory.” And so, Mr. Mayor, I would submit to you the idea that many of us have conceptions, and we may also have the frank recognition that in our temporary existence the results cannot be known. But we can work slowly and gradually for those results which may come beyond our temporary existence, and it is satisfactory to feel that one may find the right lines in the same way that I saw the

pleasure of this individual who was laying the lines of the oak-trees.

‘Now, Mr. Mayor, I will add little more before resuming my seat. Do not think for one moment that I do not recognise all the fences that I have to take. It may be in the future that a fence will meet me that I cannot get over, but it is satisfactory to think that in the past, in connection with this conception of mine, I have been as yet able to surmount the fences in front of me. And I may say to you frankly that I know full well that the great success of the future rests on your support and your approval. No man can form ideas, or can carry out an undertaking on this gigantic scale, unless he has the support of the people, and that is my own feeling. It is for you to decide, and for you to consider carefully, irrespective of your local politics, whether in the future you can give me that cordial and hearty support. My motives have been assailed. I have many enemies, and they have insinuated many reasons for my action; but, Mr. Mayor, they do not understand yet the full selfishness of my ideas. I will take you into my confidence, and will say that I have a big idea that I wish to carry out, and I know full well the reward, a reward which is the highest reward a human being can attain; and that reward, Mr. Mayor, is the trust, the confidence, and the appreciation of my fellow-citizens.’

## CHAPTER XII

## THE NATIVE QUESTION

THE ultimate reconciliation and amalgamation into one South African people of the two white races, the English and the Dutch, always under the British flag or the British hegemony, with British civilisation and British institutions, had been, as we have seen, Mr. Rhodes's aim throughout his political life. He had laboured to remove racial feeling by promoting closer intercourse between the two races, and was himself on excellent terms with the Dutch, even with the Cape Dutch leaders, though he did not conceal that his ideal of a United South Africa differed from theirs, because his United South Africa was to remain a part of the British Empire, while theirs required for its realisation an ultimate separation. In his own words, in a speech at Kimberley, 1888: 'We must endeavour to make those who live with us feel that there is no race distinction between us; whether Dutch or English, we are combined in one object, and that is the union of the states of South Africa without abandoning the Imperial tie.'

There was, however, another question which he well knew would be one day of altogether supreme importance, and which had been in the past, and was to some extent still in the present, a cause of separation between the English and Dutch races in South Africa. I mean the native question. The

native question was to be in the future the question of questions in South Africa, and in the past it had been the chief operating cause of the separation of the Dutch, when the Great Trek of the discontented Cape Dutchmen led to the formation of the Republics, whose existence and influence have been the means of fostering and maintaining racial feeling at the Cape. It was the British Government's insistence on the rights of the black man which, far more than anything else, produced the exodus of the Dutch from the Cape Colony. Missionaries from England had constituted themselves from the first the protectors of the natives; and while they seem to have acted often very unwisely and with distinct prejudice, no doubt the natural abuses by individual colonists of the system of slavery which existed till 1834, supplied them with a good deal of actual reason for their interference. This interference with the cherished rights of the slaveowners over beings whom they regarded as their property, produced a state of irritation which was sharply accentuated by the giving of equal civil rights to the free natives in 1828; and the long pent-up indignation burst forth when the emancipation of 1834 was carried out by Downing Street with such stupid maladministration as to deprive the slaveowners of the bulk of the compensation for their property.

The South African Dutchmen at that time regarded the natives as animals, differing essentially from white men, and absolutely without claim to the civil rights which the British Government asserted and conferred. He did so then; and in the Transvaal, where he has full freedom to make his own laws, he does so now. The Transvaal Grondwet, the basis of law in the Republic, is explicit on this subject: 'The people will suffer no equality of whites and blacks either in

state or in church.' Among other civil disabilities, landowning is forbidden to natives, and the right of serving on a jury is denied, while the treatment of the natives in the Transvaal has always been characterised by a harshness and habitual refusal of justice to the black man as against the white man which is notorious. The full report given by Mr. Fitzpatrick of the case of the chieftainess Toeremetsjani, head wife of Sekukuni, and since his death head of the tribe, gives a fair notion of the state of things that obtains, especially the cross-examination of a person so high placed in the state as Commandant Cronjé, lately the Boer leader at Magersfontein, then the Superintendent-General of Natives.

Now, this same feeling on the native question has always obtained, though in a modified form, among the Cape Dutchmen. In the Cape Colony black man and white are equal before the law, have practically equal civil rights, though there are certain special police regulations adapted to the present condition of the black man. The question of political rights had, of course, followed upon the establishment of responsible government, and the black man has had a vote ever since, so far as he has been qualified, under the franchise law. In 1892, with Mr. Rhodes, who had formed very definite views on the question, as Prime Minister, a fairly high property qualification, ownership of a house value £75, or receipt of a yearly wage of £50, was fixed by a new act, with the very moderate educational qualification that the voter should be able to sign his name and to write his address and his occupation. This law admits to the franchise those natives who have acquired property and some measure of education, and is a fair attempt to gradually confer political rights as an encourage-

ment to industry and education among the black people. The law applies equally to the white man and the black. The law, of course, denies the vote to natives living in a state of barbarism and communal tenure.

This gradual enfranchisement of the natives had been preceded and accompanied by their education, at first by the missionaries on the basis of a mere book education, which was found a failure; latterly more and more on the basis of good industrial education, of which Lovedale, the great industrial school of the Free Church of Scotland, was long the only and is still the most admirable example.

Obviously, the crux of the native question is their enormous and increasing preponderance of numbers. South of the Zambesi there are, roughly speaking, seven or eight million natives to three-quarters of a million of whites, and even in Cape Colony there are about a million to some four hundred thousand whites. The majority of these are Bantu, and the Bantu race tends to increase under the conditions of civilised rule, the old check of war and massacre being removed. Naturally enough, though unfortunately, the whole feeling at the Cape is largely tinged with the old exclusive view, still held strongly by the Dutch portion of the community, though the English ideal has had a leavening influence, and has, besides, steadily operated through the laws to improve and elevate the natives.

The English view, however, is carried to extremes by a certain section of the English population, who, without any regard to actual conditions, would give the natives at once electoral privileges for which they are quite unprepared. The Dutch view at the Cape is seen (I believe) in the exclusion of natives from

the Lord's Supper in the Dutch Reformed Church ; the English view, in the fact that they are admitted in all the English churches of all denominations.

In his views on the native question, Mr. Rhodes steers a middle course between the extremes. And just as the broadness of his Imperialism led, in his Bechuanaland settlement, to a cross-fire of attacks and misrepresentations from extreme men, from Jingoese and Dutch Bondsmen alike, so his views on the native question have been assailed by the extreme sections of both sides. He sees the native question, as he sees other questions, as it actually is, and he shapes his policy accordingly. He is not, as he has repeatedly stated in the House, in favour of depriving the black man of the vote, when his growth in civilisation, evidenced by the acquisition of some education and some property, justifies it ; but he utterly opposes the giving of the vote to the masses of ignorant and irresponsible natives living under communal tenure and in a state of barbarism.

His position, the thoroughly English one of gradual elevation to full citizenship as the black man gains in civilisation, is well put in a passage of the speech on the Glen Grey Bill, which I give in full at the end of this chapter. 'It will be wise not to deal with the whole native question at once. The natives are children, and we ought to do something for the minds and brains the Almighty has given them. I do not believe they are different from ourselves.' He holds that, as a body, they are ourselves in the state of savagery which we were in in Britain before the coming of the Romans, and while they are in this state of barbarism they are, he says, unfit for full privileges of citizenship. As far back as 1887 he stated in a speech in the Cape House his position as



against the extreme negrophilists. 'On account of an extreme philanthropic sympathy there are those who wish to endow the native with the privileges which it has taken the European 1800 years to acquire.' Again: 'I will lay down my policy on this native question: either you have to receive them on an equal footing as citizens, or you have to call them a subject race. Well, I have made up my mind that there must be class legislation, that there must be Pass Laws and Peace Preservation Acts, and that we have got to treat natives, where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way from ourselves.' He went on to say: 'The missionaries are wrong on the question. When they turn out men who are capable of administering the telegraph and postal system, and of doing carpentry and managing machinery, these are the men who will get the franchise without difficulty.' He had already expressed his admiration for the system of industrial education at Lovedale. What he objected to was the mere book education and Christian doctrine generally taught; and since 1887 the missionaries have generally come round to his view. The old mode of native education is admitted to be a failure; the industrial education, then carried out only at Lovedale, is taking its place everywhere.

On the other hand, on another and most important point, Mr. Rhodes was in 1887 and long before, and has continued to be ever since, against the Dutch view. He knew liquor to be the curse and ruin of the natives by his own observation and experience in Kimberley and elsewhere; he knew the enormous advantage of keeping liquor from the natives, and he has never ceased to insist in the Cape House on the wisdom and justice of doing so. This, of course, was not the Dutch view, not only because liquor kept

the natives down, and was the surest means of preventing them acquiring the property qualification for the franchise, but also because the wine industry and the brandy industry at the Cape were almost exclusively Dutch. Mr. Rhodes, when he has a firm conviction, is not afraid of running counter even to those he desires to conciliate, and on the question of keeping liquor from the natives he has fought the strong opposition to his view, in season and out of season, throughout his political life.

The essence of Mr. Rhodes's views on the native question is this: 'We have got to treat the natives, where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way from ourselves.' 'Where they are in a state of barbarism' is the condition that requires this treatment; but Mr. Rhodes has always been strongly in favour of gradually elevating them out of that state, not only by giving an industrial education, but also by giving them an interest and a part in local government among themselves, as he did in his Glen Grey Act (1894), while encouraging them in education and in habits of industry, which alone could lead to the possession of property, by making the conditions for the franchise an educational and property qualification required of black men and white alike.

Mr. Rhodes has an exceptionally good practical knowledge of the native question, because he knows the natives, from long and close intercourse, extraordinarily well. He has none of that dislike and contempt for the black man, as black, which is so prevalent in South Africa and has even infected the English, though, of course, to a far less degree than the Dutch. He likes to have black men round him; he treats them as his fellow-men, simply in a lower state of development. His servants are all natives

from different parts of Africa; Lobengula's sons, whom he has sent to school, make his house and gardens their own during their holidays, and he treats them just as if they were his own.

In his compound at Kimberley he was in the habit for years of talking with natives from all parts of Africa, knowing enough of their language to make himself understood; while he had seen the prosperity and happiness which his paternal government there had brought to the thousands of black men under him. The shopkeepers and liquor-sellers of Kimberley might grumble and agitate, but Mr. Rhodes looked after 'these poor children,' as he calls them, won their confidence by his friendliness and kindness, and won their affection through that almost animal instinct by which they can tell whether a man has genuine goodwill to them, or is merely professing it; kept the liquor from them, gave them plenty of healthy and harmless recreation, with good education for all who desired it, and thus made the great De Beers Company an instrument in the civilisation of the natives, the influence of which, seeing that the labourers come to the compound from all parts of Africa, and learn the advantages of total abstinence as well as the liking for and the dignity of labour in this practical way, cannot be overestimated.

Of course Mr. Rhodes had studied the native character and native way of thinking, which is very different from the European, in other places than Kimberley. He had begun as a boy in Natal with the Zulus on his brother Herbert's plantation; he had studied it in Basutoland at the beginning of his political life, when he was Commissioner there; he had studied it in Pondoland and the Transkei; he had studied it in Rhodesia; and thus, in 1894, he was

better equipped to undertake a bill to deal with the native question than any other politician living.

With this object in view he took, 'during his Premiership, the position of Secretary for Native Affairs. The speech in which he moved the second reading of the Glen Grey Bill (July 1894) is a practical attempt to deal with the native question in legislating for the more uncivilised and ignorant natives crowded together in a part of the Cape Colony. It was to be applied first to the Glen Grey district and to Fingoland, and then gradually extended, as it has been since, to new areas. The genuine philanthropy which is often too well concealed beneath the rather rough and downright language of one who loves always to call a spade a spade, and rather enjoys the indignation his plain speaking may produce, betrays itself, to any one who has the seeing eye, in several parts of this speech. That he should have undertaken it at a time when he was loaded with the many anxieties and multifarious business of developing Rhodesia, his time also filled with the ordinary business of his position as Premier, and his mind troubled by the increasing hostility of the Transvaal, says much for his interest in the natives; and the plan he proposed was to elevate the natives to a higher level of humanity by teaching them to govern and to help themselves. Our relation towards the natives in South and Central Africa is the relation of teachers towards pupils. Mr. Rhodes's comparison of the natives to British tribesmen of the time of the Druids conveys a deep truth in reminding us that the British Empire has to do for the native African exactly what the Roman Empire did for the native Briton, and that the duty of passing on the civilisation we have received and developed will pay us well, makes the

performance of the duty a business arrangement. Our profit is the price of their schooling.

The essentials of the measure were its provisions for local self-government and industrial education out of the natives' own resources, while its labour clauses enforced his own maxim, 'The secret of a happy life is work.' The check on the liquor traffic was a kind of local option which was to have an educative influence on the natives by teaching them to make some sacrifices to remove from themselves the pest of drink. The practical wisdom and philanthropy of this measure is a very strong additional claim to the approval of all who value these qualities as characteristics of true statesmanship. The operation of the Act has, as a matter of fact, made for the happiness of the natives, more than any increased facilities for the parliamentary franchise could possibly have done. Six months after the Act came in force the chief inspector of police found the prison at Glen Grey, which was generally crowded, absolutely empty. An inquiry elicited the information that there were no prisoners now, because crime had ceased with the cessation of drink and idleness.

This new development of the policy of stopping the liquor-drinking among the natives could not commend itself to the Dutch wine-growers and brandy-farmers of the West, and would have met with much more serious opposition but for the labour clauses, which redeemed it for them, as for all employers of labour, who were ill supplied owing to the dislike to regular work, which seems almost a primitive instinct among the industrial as well as among the military Bantu. This dislike, of course, may be ascribed to ancestral habit, the old division of duty being war for the men of the tribe, work for the women, which arrange-

ment the polygamous Kaffir finds too satisfactory to change, though his share of this division of duty has ceased to exist. The unskilled labour of the Cape Colony is all, one need scarcely add, native.

This policy of keeping liquor from the natives has, moreover, from the beginning, been placed in the forefront of native administration in Rhodesia, where Mr. Rhodes, as managing director and head of the enterprise, has had about a million of natives under his sway. The laws against selling liquor to natives are very severe, and were from the first stringently enforced, so that a stop was promptly put to the first beginnings of the evil both in Mashonaland and Matabeleland. To treat the natives like children, to let them have what is good for them, and forbid to them what is bad for them, is Mr. Rhodes's policy, to which is joined legislation, such as parts of the Glen Grey Act, the influence of which is carefully designed to be educative as well as protective.

On moving the second reading of the Glen Grey Act in the Cape House, on July 30th, 1894, Mr. Rhodes said :—

‘ There is, I think, a general feeling that the natives are a distinct source of trouble and loss to the country. Now, I take a different view. When I see the labour troubles that are occurring in the United States, and when I see the troubles that are going to occur with the English people in their own country on the social question and the labour question, I feel rather glad that the labour question here is connected with the native question, for I see that at any rate we do not have here what has lately occurred in Chicago, where, on account of some

question as to the management of the Pullman Car Company, the whole of these labour quarrels have broken out, and the city has been practically wrecked. This is what is going on in the older countries on account of the masses as against the classes getting what they term their rights, or, to put it into plain English, those who have not, trying to take from those who have. If they cannot get it by what might be termed Irish legislation, they mean to get it by physical force. That is another aspect of government by the people. The proposition that I would wish to put to the House is this, that I do not feel that the fact of our having to live with the natives in this country is a reason for serious anxiety. In fact, I think the natives should be a source of great assistance to most of us. At any rate, if the whites maintain their position as the supreme race, the day may come when we shall all be thankful that we have the natives with us in their proper position. We shall be thankful that we have escaped those difficulties which are going on amongst all the old nations of the world.

‘Now, it happens that in the rearrangement of the Cabinet I was given the charge of the natives, and, naturally, what faced me was the enormous extent of the native problem. In addition to the natives in the colony, I am responsible, on this side of the Zambesi, for half a million of natives, and on the other side of the Zambesi I am responsible for another half-million. By the instrumentality of responsible government, and also by that of another position

which I occupy, I feel that I am responsible for about two millions of human beings. The question which has submitted itself to my mind with regard to the natives is this—What is their present state? I find that they are increasing enormously. I find that there are certain locations for them where, without any right or title to the land, they are herded together. They are multiplying to an enormous extent, and these locations are becoming too small. The Transkei could support, perhaps, its present population of 600,000 people, but it is not able to support double that population. The natives there are increasing at an enormous rate. The old diminutions by war and pestilence do not occur. Our good government prevents them from fighting, and the result is an enormous increase in numbers. The natives devote their minds to a remarkable extent to the multiplication of children. The result is an increase in the population. The problem before us is this—What is to become of these people? I am sure that the Transkei cannot support 1,200,000 people, whilst I know that there will be certainly that number of them in about twenty years. What then do we intend to do? As I have stated once before in this House, the natives have had in the past an interesting employment for their minds in going to war and in consulting in their councils as to war. But by our wise government we have taken away all that employment from them. We have given them no share in the government—and I think rightly, too—and no interest in the local development of their country.



What one feels is that there are questions like bridges, roads, education, plantations of trees, and various local questions, to which the natives might devote themselves with good results. At present we give them nothing to do, because we have taken away their power of making war—an excellent pursuit in its way—which once employed their minds. Then there arises the question of their land, which cannot continue to provide enough for all of them. There is not room for them all. In the third place, in many parts of their country we have placed canteens. The man who has nothing to do turns to the canteen. We do not teach them the dignity of labour, and they simply loaf about in sloth and laziness. They never go out and work. This is what we have failed to consider with reference to our native population.

‘These are my premises. I wish to look at them, not from a philosophical point of view, but from a practical point of view. The natives know nothing about the politics of the country. They have told me time after time that they do not understand these politics. “Leave us alone, but let us try and deal with some of our little local questions.” That is the common statement they have made to me. I do not know whether the member for Fort Beaufort would agree with me, though I am not trenching upon the question of no vote at present. I feel, too, that if the people desire it the canteens should be removed from their midst. Further, it is our duty as a Government to remove these poor children from this life of sloth

and laziness, and to give them some gentle stimulus to come forth and find out the dignity of labour.

‘And then, if I may speak on a general question in the interest of the country, I would say that I have had to face the question of the extraordinary position of the labour problem of the colony. One day I am told that I ought to introduce an irrigation scheme; then the Malmesbury farmers say I must go into the question of the growth of corn; and I am told that my country contains in its natural soil the greatest possible capabilities. And yet I find that nothing is done. This, I am told, is owing to the sluggish conservatism of the people. I might say something about this question. So long as I talk about farming, so long as I talk about what we should do, it is all right. But as soon as any one of my own race commences to farm, I can almost prophesy that in three years he will collapse. Slow progress—extremely slow progress—is made, it is true; but when I begin to inquire into the reasons for it, I find that the country which grows the greatest quantity of corn is Egypt, at 2d. per diem as the basis of cost of labour. In Nyasaland, where good coffee is produced, wages are 4s a month, including food 1½d. per diem. It has been stated that it is the laziness of the Western farmer which prevents his producing corn and competing, when he has his labour on this basis—of at least 2s. 6d. to 3s. per diem as against 2d. per diem in these other parts of the world. I am speaking of those countries which are great grain-producing countries. I have seen what these people live on,

and their food is not worse than that of the Kaffir. But the wage of the English agricultural labourer averages only about 12s. per week, and he lives certainly at a higher standard of civilisation than our raw Kaffir; and yet the Kaffir is paid almost 50 per cent. more than the Englishman.

'So much for this aspect of the question. Now, as to the Bill itself, I wish to point out that the first clause deals with the question of area. The clause only states Glen Grey, but if the House approves of the Bill, I would propose to apply it to other native areas. If the House approves of the Bill, I will certainly apply that clause to Fingoland. Under the clause, individual title will not be given unless the Divisional Council recommends it. The other provisions I would apply to Fingoland, because I would consider that with the approval of the second reading I had received the approval of the House. Part ~~is~~ simply as to the creation of areas. Glen Grey is not suitable in many respects, and it is mixed up with white farmers, and so we have had to reserve in Glen Grey those parts of the country which are in the occupation of white farmers. Certain other reasons have had to be considered: the Indwe railway, for instance. What I would like in regard to a native area is that there should be no white men in its midst. I hold that the natives should be apart from white men, and not mixed up with them. There are about three hundred morgen of Glen Grey farms which have been already surveyed, which would give about seventy allotments. The Bill proposes that to each of these allotments

there should be a village management board of three men, which should be nominated by the Government. And the Government would select first the people whom they thought best to nominate. Perhaps the House is not aware that Glen Grey has been actually settled before. There are five of these farms, which are called mission farms; but they are not mission farms at all, but Crown lands on which there happen to be missionaries. Successive Governments have already settled this question of Glen Grey. They have been giving the titles while the House has been discussing the matter, and I find that they have created these titles and managed them by a village council or board of natives. The Government would give these boards all the powers of the Village Management Act. Under these powers, the boards would limit the amount of stock on each agricultural lot, and therefore overcrowding would be prevented. It rests with the natives to apply for an extra title for building lots which would be pointed out on the commonage.

'As to the cost of surveying, I find on investigation in the district that they have given a title to the Mount Arthur people on what was termed a mission station. It has been said that we should charge them £2, 10s. for each agricultural lot of three to four morgen. But I find that the cost for each has been £5. After discussing the matter with the magistrate, I think it would not be just to let the difference between the two amounts come out of the revenue, for we should have to issue eight thousand titles to Glen Grey,

which would be a loss to the country of nearly £20,000. And this I do not think would be right. I find that they are all anxious to get these titles, and, so as not to lose the other £20,000, the Government has spread the additional cost over four years, to be paid in four instalments. I think that seems fair, as I do not think that the Government should be called upon to pay half the cost. It should be understood that the Government are not asking the natives suddenly to pay the £5, and I do not think that they would feel the other portion of the payment when spread over four years. The natives could always get the four morgen by paying 15s. per annum, and they pay 10s. at present in hut tax. For an extra morgen they would have to pay 3s. With regard to alienation and transfer, it has been thought advisable not to submit these people to the very heavy charges which we have in connection with our farms. The Government looks upon them as living in a native reserve, and desires to make the transfer and alienation of land as simple as possible. These clauses have been drawn after very careful consultation with those gentlemen who are in charge of this matter. In reference to administration and distribution of their estates, the Government have simply taken the Native Succession Law of 1864 and adopted it, the object being to save expense. The next great question is that of primogeniture. These people are given a piece of land, and they are very domestic in their nature. Four morgen of land would not split up into much for each of the family, in case of the

death of the native who was the head of the family. The only way to meet this is by the native law of primogeniture. The only way to deal with it is by the law of entail—leave it to the eldest son. We fail utterly when we put natives on an equality with ourselves. If we deal with them differently and say, "Yes, these people have their own ideas," and so on, then we are all right; but when once we depart from that position and put them on an equality with ourselves, we may give the matter up. What we may expect after a hundred years of civilisation I do not know. If I may venture a comparison, I would compare the natives generally, with regard to European civilisation, to fellow-tribesmen of the Druids, and just suppose that they were come to life after the two thousand years which have elapsed since their existence. That is the position. The honourable member for Fort Beaufort simply wants to get rid of the two thousand years that lie between us and the natives.

'To return to the clause under consideration, I consider that the procedure to be adopted with regard to the second wife of the native is a matter for the House to decide. I was in the Transkei the other day, when a native told me that the Government taxed him for each wife. I believe he said he had six, but I am not sure. Now (went on the native), you say you can only recognise the first wife. The missionary tells me that it is very wicked to have more than one wife. But I find in the Old Testament people had from one to one hundred wives. And I do not find any instructions in the Old or

New Testaments as to whether I may have a hundred wives or only one. This was just a simple native. I told him, "I had not considered the question." To proceed : of course, the House will have to deal with the matter of entail. As to the question of voting, we say that the natives are in a sense citizens, but not altogether citizens—they are still children. And though we place them in individual positions with regard to certain pieces of agricultural land, we protect them by all sorts of laws. In so far as that land is concerned, the native has no right to claim a vote for it. And so it will be said you are going to take away the vote from the poor native. But if those gentlemen who say that they wish really to consider the welfare of these poor people, would think less about their votes, and more about their future, they would effect more. I know that these gentlemen talk much at missionary meetings about the poor natives, but I say to them, Try to do the natives some real good. Some honourable members may say that I have broken my pledges in interfering with the country by revising the voters' lists in the territories I have referred to. But this is not the case. It may, perhaps, be said that the list of voters clause will rob these poor people of their votes. Nothing of the kind. I have found that nine-tenths of them were not entitled to vote at all at present. I do not propose to interfere with the Franchise Law as it was passed last year, but I say that it has been carried out improperly, and therefore, in dealing with these native areas, if the House approves of it, I pro-

pose to extend the law as it at present exists, so that it shall be properly carried out. I think there would be an alteration effected in Aliwal if this were to be carried out. I think that a very large number of voters registered in the district would, on a careful examination, not continue on the roll under the present Franchise Law.

‘With reference to the labour tax, some newspapers in the colony take it that all of the natives will have to pay the labour tax whether they work or not. Now, that is not the case. What I have found is this, that we must give some gentle stimulus to these people to make them go on working. There are a large number of young men in these locations who are like younger sons at home, or if you will have it so, like young men about town. These young natives live in the native areas and locations with their fathers and mothers, and never do one stroke of work. But if a labour tax of 10s. were imposed, they would have to work. Their present life is very similar to that of the young man about town who lounges about the club during the day and dresses himself for a tea-party in the afternoon, and in the evening drinks too much, and probably finishes up with immorality. These native young men are not in a position to marry and settle down, because they have not got cows. They are a nuisance to every district in the Transkei, to every magistrate in the Transkei, and to every location. We want to get hold of these young men and make them go out to work, and the only way to do this is to compel them to pay a certain labour tax. But we



must prepare these people for the change. Every black man cannot have three acres and a cow, or four morgen and a commonage right. We have to face the question; and it must be brought home to them that in the future nine-tenths of them will have to spend their lives in daily labour, in physical work, in manual labour. This must be brought home to them sooner or later. There is nothing new in this.

'Now is the moment to deal with the question of taxation. I would do away with locations on private farms, the defect of which is that we do not know where the natives are. I propose to use the labour tax for industrial schools and training. I propose that the neglect of labour should provide a fund for instruction in labour. I have called them industrial schools, but I mean that they should be carried on under regulations to be framed by the Government. Why? I have travelled through the Transkei, and have found some excellent establishments where the natives are taught Latin and Greek. They are turning out Kaffir parsons, most excellent individuals, but the thing is overdone. I find that these people cannot find congregations for them. There are Kaffir parsons everywhere—these institutions are turning them out by the dozen. They are turning out a dangerous class. They are excellent so long as the supply is limited, but the country is overstocked with them. These people will not go back and work, and that is why I say that the regulations of these industrial schools should be framed by the Government; otherwise these Kaffir parsons would develop into agitators against the

Government. Let me go on and point out the way in which the minds of the natives should be occupied. I find that many of the friends of the natives would hear of their minds being employed in no other pursuit than that of electing members for Parliament. That was the question of the vote. "You must get them to vote for me," was the general position of the friend of the native.

'Now, I say the natives are children. They are just emerging from barbarism. They have human minds, and I would like them to devote themselves wholly to the local matters that surround them and appeal to them. I would let them tax themselves, and give them the funds to spend on these matters—the building of roads and bridges, the making of plantations, and other such works. I propose that the House shall allow these people to tax themselves, and that the proceeds of their taxation shall be spent by them on the development of themselves and of their districts. The honourable member for Cape Town (Mr. Wiener) smiled the other day when I spoke of the natives building bridges, and asked how they could build them with the proceeds of their taxation? If in Fingoland an extra tax of 10s. per agricultural lot, or per head, were put on, and a district council were formed, that would give them £9000 per annum to spend. The Local Loans Act could be applied, the repayments to extend over eight years. By that means I propose that the country shall gradually be relieved of local expenditure in the Transkei. These people have the best portion of South Africa. I think that any one in

charge of the Transkei is doing his duty to these people and to the country when he works with this object, that the Transkei should not be a charge upon our funds for local purposes. So far as roads, bridges, etc., and even so far as education and the appointment of scab inspectors, and indeed all those which I may call local questions, are concerned, I want to ask that these people shall have, through district councils, this kind of representation. Mr. Veldtman, whose name is a household word, has begged me to do something of the kind.

Now as to the liquor question, I have read carefully the proposals of the Labour Commission, and the proposition is that the majority in divisional councils shall have power to make any law for the disposal of liquor licences. I can say that I have been instrumental in removing the liquor from tens of thousands of these poor children. I refer to the compounds and locations in which they are shut up, and in which the liquor is kept from them. The liquor question is a difficult one, and I know the difficulties of it. When it is said that we should take the licences away from all the hotel and canteen-keepers, I think there is some unfairness in it. We have gone on year after year encouraging these people to improve their dwellings, and have then suddenly turned round and proposed that all these people should shut up shop and have their business taken away from them. This is manifestly unfair. If the majority of the voters decide that a canteen should be closed, we should give compensation. The advantages of the system

are plain. No one can then say that the closing of a canteen or hotel is the fad of a teetotal party. The people must put their hands in their own pockets and be willing to pay compensation. If in Fingoland we could raise a fund of £9000 per annum, as I have before pointed out, we shall be able in Glen Grey to have a fund for this compensation. These are the reasons why, in dealing with this liquor question, I have adopted the recommendation of the Labour Commission, but I have also laid down the principle that if the people wish the canteens to be closed they should also pay compensation. Half the people could forward a request through their council and say that they were willing to pay for the closing, and who could say anything against that? If no compensation were paid, we should be open to the charge that it was a temperance move, and that without compensation we were taking the trade away from the people. Then there might be another charge, that the council nominee members would stop this. One half of the council are elected, and the other half nominated. These natives are mixed up with white farmers. I have asked the farmers whether they would object to sitting on the council with people of another colour. They said No. I have made the number of nominees six, for the following reasons: that if it were left to election, there would not be a white on the council. This would not apply to purely native districts, but Glen Grey, unfortunately, is entirely mixed up, and that is the only way out of the difficulty. But for any one to say that the whole of the six white men would

vote for no compensation is perfectly ridiculous. I think better, of my own countrymen.

‘Before I finish dealing with the Bill, I will refer to the question of title. There is the payment of quit-rents, and there is that of alienation with consent of the Government. Some newspapers have said that the whole object of the Bill is to get land into the hands of the white men, and I simply refer to the title to refute this. Again, we hear the argument that after five years these people will sell out to the white men. My idea is that the natives should be kept in these native reserves and not be mixed with the white men at all. Are you going to sanction the idea, with all the difficulties of the poor whites before us, that these people should be mixed up with white men, and white children grow up in the middle of native locations? In the interest of the white people themselves we must never let this happen. White labour cannot compete with black labour in this country—physical labour, I mean. As to the argument that some men by assiduous detail could buy out seventy native holders with their three thousand morgen in one bargain, I have dealt with the Diamond Fields and with Charterland, but I would rather do either or both over again than undertake such a job as that. The title means that the holdings cannot be sold without the consent of the Government. There are clauses which lay down that in case of theft the land shall be forfeited; there is a clause that in case of non-cultivation the land shall be taken away and reallotted; there is a clause providing that it shall not be

sublet; and another clause that there shall not be subdivision.

‘I would now deal with a few of the literary criticisms of the Bill. The Bill has puzzled many because it has appealed to the different classes of this country. In one paper I read that the Bill is too sudden. Well, I am sorry. I have not been a year in the Native Affairs Office, but I see terrible crowding of locations going on, and that is my reason for hurrying on the Bill. Another paper remarks that no voting powers would be given. I have explained that before. I have not interfered with the native voting powers at all. If the honourable member for Fort Beaufort raises an objection on that score, then we must come to the conclusion that some persons have voted for him who had no right to do so. I have already dealt with the criticisms in reference to title. There is another criticism, that I am not taking any notice of the recommendations of the Labour Commission. But I would point out that there are no less than ten of these recommendations embodied in the Bill. There are the recommendations in reference to liquor, a labour bureau (for the natives would come and ask to be provided with masters, because otherwise they had to pay a tax of 10s.), forfeiture in case of conviction for theft, subletting, cheap transfer, additional taxation for educational purposes, the agricultural and industrial clause, and vagrancy—in all, ten of the Labour Commission's recommendations embodied in the Bill.

‘I submit to this House that there are four pro-

positions that come before us in regard to this question. We have to find land for these people; we have to find them some employment; we have to remove the liquor from them; and we have to stimulate them to work. I submit to this House these propositions, and I hope the House will accept them. Do you admit that the native question is most dangerous? Do you admit that you have done nothing for these people? Do you admit that in many parts of the colony these people have been ruining themselves? Do you admit that century after century these large numbers could not be provided with land? Do you admit that these people are increasing at a great rate? This Bill puts forward various proposals to meet this state of things. I submit to the House that the idea that we could drive them out must be dismissed as regards those parts of the colony which these people have occupied. They are our future labourers, and we cannot permit them in these areas to be ever increasing, and the places to be overstocked. I propose to apply these principles to Fingoland at once. It would be wise not to deal with the whole native question at once. The natives are children, and we ought to do something for the minds and the brains that the Almighty has given them. I do not believe that they are different from ourselves.

‘The Bill says to them that we will put them on the land; we will put them under their local magistrate; and we will let them conduct their own local affairs. As to liquor, you will, no doubt, hear that the wine-

farmers of the West will object. Still, when the winefarmers hear that these people are willing to pay compensation for the removal of this pest, I do not think they will continue to object. The last proposition is that we must give the people some stimulus to work. It is impossible to provide them all with land; at the present time their homes are crowded. The question has been met by many countries before, and it is admitted that there has always been a period when the country could not be supported by agriculture alone. Hence the provisions of the Bill to meet this difficulty. I will say one thing in this House—that there was never a greater mistake made than by people who think that the native editor of *Invo*, the native paper, has the confidence of the native people. And so the criticism and abuse which have been poured upon this Bill by this barbarian, who has just partly emerged from barbarism, are not to be taken any notice of. What does this Bill mean? It is an earnest effort to deal with the position of these people. We cannot stand by and do nothing: it is easy to do that. It is an effort to deal with these four propositions I have submitted. Mr. Speaker, this is a Bill with a wide scope. I may say the whole of the north will some time or another come under this Bill if passed by this House. If the Bill gets through, he will be a brave man who will attempt to alter it. I would not be surprised to see Natal—I should say the Transkei—come under this Bill. I will not prophesy that it will be applied to Natal,



because the Natal people have too much independence to accept Cape legislation. Indeed, you may say this is a native Bill for Africa. You are sitting in judgment on Africa at the present moment. I have merely submitted to the House my ideas on the question. It is a proposition submitted to provide them with district councils; it is a proposition submitted to employ their minds on simple questions in connection with local affairs; it is a proposition to remove the liquor pest; and last, but not least, by the gentle stimulant of the labour tax to remove them from a life of sloth and laziness; you will thus teach them the dignity of labour, and make them contribute to the prosperity of the state, and give some return for our wise and good government.'

The last speech in this chapter is one made in the Cape House, May 20, 1894, on the annexation of Pondoland. Mr. Rhodes objected to disarmament, as he had done in respect to Basutoland twelve years before, when he said, 'It is hard lines to take from them their guns which they bought with their own money'; for justice to the natives, and consideration for their feelings (the guns being regarded by them as a sign of manhood), were always a part of his native policy.

'I do not ask for congratulations,' for what has been done by the Government during the session

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Rhodes moved:—'That in the opinion of this House it is expedient that the country known as Pondoland, comprising the territories of East and West Pondoland which have been ceded by the Chiefs Sigcau and Nquliso, should be annexed to this colony, and that the Government take such steps as may be necessary to effect such annexation.'

has simply been a necessity, The House has recognised that once they crossed the Kei, it was merely a matter of time when the boundaries of the Cape would be conterminous with those of Natal. The maintenance of a barbarian power between two civilised powers has been proved by experience to be almost an impossibility; and the only point for the Cape to consider in connection with Pondoland has for some time been, When would be the right moment for annexation? In the Bluebook upon the matter there will not be found some correspondence which had taken place between the late Government and the Governor of the colony. This has been excluded at the request of the Imperial authorities, but I am allowed to allude to it, and it appears that during the existence of the late Government, when they were asked what course they proposed to pursue, they said that when the right moment came they were prepared to relieve the Imperial Government of all responsibility on condition that the colony had complete control. The whole crux of the question, therefore, was and is this, When is the right moment to annex?

‘During the last recess Sigcau and Umhlangaso broke out into hostilities, and the colony of Natal asked the Cape to co-operate with them in dealing with Pondoland. About the same time, too, a native power in the north had been dealt with, and Ministers came to the conclusion that the opportune moment had come to deal with the Pondo question. The next question arose, How was this to be done? The

Governor at first rather feared the weakness of the colony, but Ministers felt that in the Cape Mounted Rifles they had a force perfectly capable of successfully carrying through hostilities, should they break out. Major Elliott, the chief magistrate, then came down to the colony, and after consultation with him it was decided that the chiefs should be informed of the proposed annexation, and that it would be sufficient for the purposes of the Cape to move the Cape Mounted Rifles to the boundary and leave to Major Elliott the diplomatic details.'

Mr. Rhodes proceeded to narrate in detail the circumstances of the mission of Major Elliott to Sigcau and Umhlangaso, and said he was supported by physical force, because he (Mr. Rhodes) believed that in dealing with natives a display of physical force went a long way.

'It might be asked, Why did we not consult the neighbouring colony of Natal? But I would point out that there was no time to lose. Hostilities were constantly occurring between the chiefs, and prompt action was necessary, otherwise we should have had serious complications with neighbouring colonies and states, which was not desirable. The position taken up by Natal was an impossible one; it was actually suggested that we should divide the territory with Natal, which meant the handing over of Griqualand East to Natal. What I would suggest to Natal is the consideration of the question whether the river

Umzimkulu, from its source to its mouth, is not the natural boundary between the two colonies. After obtaining cession of the country, I visited Pondoland, and met the two chiefs, when a new difficulty arose, because it appeared that they desired the country to have been annexed on the basis of Basutoland, which meant that their magistrates should advise and not govern. Now, each chief had been found utterly unfit to rule, and though the chiefs tried hard to make me change my mind, I had to tell them that the only basis of annexation the Government could sanction was that the magistrates, and not the chiefs, should govern. This created some unpleasantness at the time, but the chiefs subsequently gave in; and at the present time the magistrates are enforcing the law. Now if the Pondos had intended showing fight, I think they would have done so during the first week, when there were one or two outrages, and magisterial interference was necessary. But the secret of the peace is that the common people are delighted at the change of government, for they know that now there will be law and order.

‘The next difficulty that arises is the question of concessions in Pondoland. The Government have decided that no concession shall be recognised. They have been blamed for that decision, but they thought it much better to speak out, otherwise they would have had people, who had *bonâ fide* put their money into concessions, asking them in the future to recognise these concessions, and saying that the Government had not spoken. The Government may be right or

wrong, but the position they have taken up is this, that no concession shall be recognised as legal unless sanctioned by the High Commissioner. When you go into a native country you should endeavour to obtain all the attributes of government; and I would remind the House that you would have a hard time of it, if you found the land, minerals, and forests in the hands of different concessionaries. Government then would have the husk and other people the kernel. The Government considers that a sum of £500 a year is enough for the proper maintenance of a native chief. That is the story of the cession. After the cession was made, Government thought it desirable to leave fifty Cape Mounted Rifles with each magistrate, and the result has been that the House will be asked to vote £15,000 to replace the 134 Cape Mounted Rifles taken out of police service in the colony. The actual cost of the occupation of the country is £7500, but we have stores valued at £1812, and although there are incidental expenses, I am confident that we shall come out under £7000. In addition we shall have to pay £8000 a year for magistrates, for we could not get the hut tax in until after next year. That will make in all a sum of £15,000, which, with the cost of the new police, will make £30,000 in all. We hope next year to obtain hut tax sufficient to pay for the maintenance of the police, but I submit that there must be a charge debited to the Transkei, though one hopes that the time will arrive when this portion of the colony will pay for itself. I think we might, indeed,

put the cost of the Cape Mounted Rifles against the Customs duties. The House may congratulate itself, if it admits that the annexation of Pondoland was essential, that a happy conjunction of circumstances has permitted it to be effected without great cost or danger. There was of course a considerable difficulty that had to be dealt with in the person of Umhlangaso, whom Sigcau had stipulated that we shall remove from the country. Accordingly Umhlangaso has been brought into the colony, and is now located with a few followers eight miles from Kokstad, and has given a solemn pledge that he will not return to Pondoland. Another difficult question was whether the Government should disarm the natives. But I would ask on what basis we could disarm them. They had submitted without a shot being fired, and I do not think the Government could justly claim to take their guns from them. Even if we had taken the wretched guns they had, the guns would have had to be paid for, and they might then use the money to buy better weapons. There is really no just or logical ground upon which the Government could disarm them, and it is for the House to say whether the decision of the Government was a wise one. With 700,000 natives to rule you may feel almost overweighted with responsibility; but, having taken the step of extending the borders of the colony, we are bound to carry it out. It has been often said that the Cape is unfair to the natives, but it would be as well if the critics knew and studied the conduct of the colony toward native tribes which have frequently rebelled, have been

subdued, and are now governed with money drawn from the treasury of the colony. I have pointed out the unselfish position of the colony. To us annexation was an obligation, whereas to the natives it will be a positive relief, for they will be freed from a seething caldron of barbarian atrocities; and I hope that if the House be pleased to adopt this motion, the people will experience the blessing of coming under the kind and beneficent sway of the Cape Colonial Government.'

## CHAPTER XIII

## PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

MR. RHODES, though known by every one from the beginning of his political career to be a strong Imperialist, had so far conciliated Dutch sentiment by his just and considerate treatment of disputed questions, like the land settlement in Stellaland, and his perfect freedom from race feeling, that he had obtained on his own terms the support of the Afrikaner Bond before he formed a Ministry in 1890. He was helped, too, by the fact that he had made during his political life a great many personal friends among the Dutch at the Cape, especially among the educated and enlightened section who were not averse to progress, by whose help he sought to educate the mass of the Dutch electorate so as gradually to win them from their reactionary conservatism to accept so much of the progress of the time as would bring them into line with the English electorate in supporting a progressive policy. The isolated conditions of life, that had for a long period obtained among the bulk of the Dutch or country party, naturally made them less inclined to favour progressive measures than the more adventurous English population, which was chiefly, though of course by no means exclusively, especially in the east of the Colony, confined to the towns. The Dutch character, solid, cautious, slow, and not easily stirred, was an additional force in the



same direction as the long-existing isolation of the conditions of the farmer's life.

Change of any kind was what the Cape Dutchman in the country parts most disliked; and just as he had kept his religion free from change, so he would have liked to keep all other questions, such as the native question, which concern his life. He was, in fact, satisfied to live as his fathers did before him. He would have liked to go on farming in the same way as he had been accustomed to all his life, and innovations of any kind were suspected as well as disliked. To this solid conservatism he added the conservative influence of the Old Testament, which was still taken literally as a guide in daily life. Thus the interference with their flocks by the Scab Act seemed to a great number of farmers not only an innovation, but an impiety, a flying in the face of the Heavenly Ruler, who would send scab or remove it as He saw fit, but would disapprove of human interference with His will by such means as sheep-dip.

Education and intercourse with more progressive minds were the means by which Mr. Rhodes hoped to bring the solid excellence of the Dutchman into combination with the more adventurous ability of the progress-loving Englishman in the work of South African development and unification. The experience and knowledge which would come from taking a part in the government of the country were an excellent solvent for the excessive conservatism of the Dutchman, in the opinion of the progressive Cape Premier, who had, however, to proceed very cautiously, as the mere fact that he was an Englishman, and looked what he was, awoke the ancestral antipathy. In a speech in 1887, Mr. Rhodes gave a Dutch elector's reasons, expressed to himself, for distrusting

him: 'In the first place, you are too young; in the second, you look so damnably like an Englishman.'

Furthermore, Mr. Rhodes sought to recommend progress to the bucolic mind by bringing home to its strong self-interest the material advantages.

The wine industry might be one of the most important industries in the country, and the wine industry was at this time threatened by the phylloxera. To meet this, Mr. Rhodes recommended trying American vines, and himself studied the question, where it could best be studied, in France, and brought the result of his inquiries to the aid of the Western wine-grower. The fruit of the Colony, though it had great advantages of climate, being very carelessly grown and packed could make no successful impression on the London market. To encourage and develop the export fruit trade Mr. Rhodes exerted himself actively, and brought to the producer the knowledge of the best modern methods of growing and of packing his produce. Also with a view to a greater extension of the industry, not only at the Cape, but in Rhodesia, he brought over experts from California and Florida to advise and superintend planting operations. With proper irrigation oranges might be grown largely, and Mr. Rhodes set the example on his own farm at Sauerdale and at his estate in Inyanga. The Angora goat introduced in 1856 is largely bred, and the Cape supplies one-third of the goats' hair bought in England. Mr. Rhodes himself visited Constantinople, and obtained an Imperial Firman through which he secured the purest Angora blood in the world for the improvement of the breed of goats which furnish so valuable a part of the produce on the stock-farms of the Karoo.

These practical efforts to bring the advantages of progress home to the unprogressive Dutch farmers were supplemented by the practical teaching of the advantages of material progress seen as expansion, in the open market for Cape produce offered by Rhodesia, in contradistinction to the prohibitive tariffs imposed on Cape products by the Dutch farmers' kinsfolk in the neighbouring South African Republic.

In considering Mr. Rhodes's speeches and legislation during the years he ruled as Premier at Cape Town, it must, therefore, always be remembered that he had to modify his progressive policy in order to carry the Dutch colonists with him, and this involved temporary sacrifices to their sentiments and their prejudices. He got, indeed, valuable help from an unexpected quarter; the policy of Pretoria, with its hostile duties on Cape imports, and its choice of strangers from Holland instead of Dutch Cape colonists to fill the posts in its administration, having a decided, if gradual, influence in alienating the sympathies of the colonists from their kin in the Transvaal. The alienation, which went on as self-interest thrust out race sentiment, made Mr. Rhodes's aim of reconciling the Dutch to the Imperial idea an easier task than it at first seemed. The self-interest of the Cape people, to which Mr. Rhodes had on the whole successfully appealed in his advocacy of expansion to the north through the colony, had by this time found that his appeal had been well grounded. Their sons found employment in the new territory, the official positions were filled by Cape colonists and Englishmen with perfect impartiality, their produce and wagons went in untaxed, and the contrast of this treatment with the treatment they were experiencing more and more in the Transvaal increased their satis-

faction with the politician, Imperialist and Englishman though he was, who had taken and developed Rhodesia for their advantage.

As a working politician Mr. Rhodes showed himself the same skilful and far-sighted man of affairs, who had carried through the great diamond mine amalgamation. Once in the saddle, and the reins of government gathered into his strong hand, he resolved to be unhorsed by no combination. Conciliation of opponents and amalgamation of interests had always been Mr. Rhodes's way of dealing with opposition, and he carried the same methods into politics with conspicuous success. The opposition ceased to be dangerous, nay, almost ceased to exist, when its leaders were won over by Mr. Rhodes and became members of his Government, Sir Thomas Upington, for example, as his Attorney-General, Sir Gordon Sprigg as his Treasurer-General. The strength of the Rhodes Government at last became so great that nothing, short of a miracle, seemed likely to oust him from his practical dictatorship. In all this political work Mr. Rhodes was helped by what had hindered him in the days before he rose to political power, by the breadth and liberality of his Imperialism. The middle course he had always steered between the extremes now brought him near enough to either extreme to recommend his policy to both, and English and Dutch vied with one another in their faith in the strong Imperialist who had drawn them together to make them one in feeling by working unitedly for a common object—the greatening of the British Empire by the addition to it, not only of territory, but of a united and loyal South African people.

It is to this period of political power, though a little

prior to the time of its highest development, that the following speech belongs. It was made in the Good Hope Hall at Cape Town, October 27, 1894.

‘Your Excellency, Mr. Mayor, and Gentlemen,—You know this is rather a difficult toast to reply to, because I have to reply for the Ministry and the Houses of Parliament, and I happen to be a member of both. Now, it is exceedingly difficult to speak in both these capacities, but if I had to reply for Parliament, I would point out to you that they represent the people of the country. It is exceedingly easy to say that we do not do our duty; it is exceedingly easy to say that we are defective in looking after the affairs of the country; but, gentlemen, if you will allow me to say it, we are the elected representatives of yourselves. If I were to indulge in remarks to the effect that we were the best people that you could possibly elect, I would be asking you to flatter us; but I will merely point out that we are the elected representatives of yourselves, and if you do not approve of us, you have the important power of dismissing us. Can I say more? I will shelter myself, in so far as the Parliament is concerned, behind the judgment of one of your past governors, who had acted in many lands, and who told me that he, after the various parliaments he had dealt with, was best satisfied with the Cape Parliament; and I will explain to you the reasons that he adduced for that. He said—and perhaps I may hurt some one’s feelings—he said, “You are a most conservative

people ; you never make a change without the most extraordinary discussion, and after repeated demonstrations of sufficient causes for that change." And he said further, " One of the most curious things about your Parliament is that nine-tenths of them never desire office ; and I have read your discussions, and notice that there exists a courtly consideration between you, and (if I may use the words) you never use ungentlemanly language." I am not quoting my own remarks, but the remarks of one of your governors. Nor can I add anything to them. I remember the occasion when the mother of parliaments was so moved by a party discussion that the members proceeded even to physical force, and I recollect that one of the oldest members of the Cape Parliament came to me in exceeding alarm and said, " Can these things be? I can't believe it." Unfortunately, it proved to be true, but this gentleman to whom I am referring really felt that the government of the world was getting into difficulties, because such conduct was so contrary to every idea and feeling that he had.

'I may say, as one who has been a member of this Parliament, I think, for over twelve or thirteen years, I have had many difficult questions to fight—especially this Northern question—and with the various changes of politics, I have frequently found that those who were intimately associated with me at one time have subsequently become my opponents ; and yet there has always been a kindly and courteous consideration shown, and if any

member lowered himself to personal abuse beyond ordinary parliamentary practice, he was condemned, not only by those who were opposed to him in politics, but also by his own supporters. I attribute that, Mr. Mayor, to the fact that with reference to the parliament whose health you are proposing, I may say that nearly nine-tenths of them do not desire office. They come down with all their prejudices, I will allow, and some of them perhaps with extreme views, they sit in that Parliament, and you may perhaps say that one section is under So-and-so, and one section under some one else, but this is not really the case. My experience of Parliament, in so far as a private member is concerned, is that I can gain the ear of the House on any question if it is a right proposition to put ; and in so far as a Ministry is concerned, if I take gentlemen present into my confidence. It has frequently been suggested that a Whip should be provided, but my view of the present Cape Parliament is this, extraordinary to state, that you can rely on the individual judgment of the House. It is an extraordinary position, I admit ; but at any rate, my experience of the Cape Parliament is, that if a fair proposition is submitted to the House, you need not deal with the sections of the House, but you can win the ear of the whole House, and ensure the success of your proposition, if you can produce facts to support it.

‘In so far as the special question is concerned which you have met to-night to approve, the development of your hinterland, it is pleasing, in connection

with this Parliament, to think that at the present moment the sole judge of that district is one of your people—the son of a respected member who has lately departed from us, who was, I might say, a member of the Opposition, yet dealt with me always with the kindest consideration on this Northern development, and who told me from time to time frankly that he did not agree with my local politics, but on every question gave me the kindest consideration. His son now holds, next to the guest whom you are greeting this evening, the highest position in the Northern development. He lost another son in our occupation of that territory, and so he gave two pledges to that development. It is only a few days ago that I received a telegram from another gentleman who has gone to the North. He is one of your late prime ministers. He also has thrown in his lot with us, and has taken the position of legal adviser for that territory. I talked with him frequently. I may very fairly speak about him, because when lately a change occurred, owing to the difference of party politics, he went into active opposition; but he has now given the balance of his life to the development of those northern territories, and he was once one of your prime ministers. I refer to Sir Thomas Scanlan.

‘It is hopeless to take up the position that you have secured country enough, and will go no further. As I have told you once before, those old people at the Blockhouse might have said that was the limit; and when members of Parliament get up and say you must



go no further, that this must be your limit, and that you are taking away the best blood and energy of the country, the only reply to them is, that it is an absurdity. The people will go on, and you must follow them, and when you follow them, follow them with your laws and administration, and make everything the same, waiting—waiting, Mr. Mayor, for the ultimate amalgamation.

‘But the toast that I have specially to refer to is the toast of the Ministry, and I have pointed out to you two of the leading members of the House—one who has gone from us, who has given his tribute to the northern territory in the persons of two of his sons, and the other who has been your prime minister, and has gone to throw in his lot with the people in that new country. Now, sir, I have to reply for the Ministry, and I am told that this is a very delicate question; but I do not feel it to be so. I am told that Cape Town returns three gentlemen who desire a change, and a fourth who is a little doubtful as to the issue. Well, what I think about the question is this, that the Cape community is a reasoning community, that the people know perfectly well within themselves that the base in Africa for a Federal Assembly or for the development of Africa, with its railway communication, must be Cape Town, and Cape Town recognises that very fairly, and says it will judge us all by results. It says: We know the position that we have; we know that there is no part of Africa, with its climate and surroundings and old associations, equal to ours, and all we want is fair play. As to

any special Ministry, don't suppose that we are going to say we swear by these people ; no, we shall not do that ; we shall judge a Ministry by its results. You meet here this evening, and you say that it is a proper thing to propose the health of the Ministry. You say : We do not bind ourselves thereby to support all their acts and conduct, but it is a constitutional thing to do, in the same way as you propose the health of the administrator, even though at the present moment it may happen that there is a Ministry which, in so far as its acts are concerned, we do not entirely agree with. You will drink the health of the Ministry from a constitutional point of view. I am not going to indulge in a party speech. I will simply say that personally I view Africa as a whole, and I may add that if that ultimate object is obtained whereby, with a due regard to the independence of our neighbouring states and the foreign powers, we join together in unity on a certain broad basis of certain big principles, that is all I desire. And if we are going to discuss those principles, I am perfectly clear on one thing—that the place for consultation is the place in which I am now addressing you, under Table Mountain ; for it is a very interesting thing I have noted in my travels, that in the different states that I visited, different people will propose that their state should be the base, but still I always find that the second place proposed is Cape Town, and so I see that it is the general tendency of the country to say that, if there are certain propositions to be discussed, without interfering with the independence of neighbouring states or foreign powers,

they would mutually agree that the place for the discussion should be Cape Town. Mr. Mayor, I can speak fairly of this because I was not born here, and I was not brought up here. I came here from the diamond-fields, and therefore I can have an intelligent judgment of the question. Perhaps, in consequence, as a member of the Ministry which is now in power, I can fairly claim a general support from the people here, as one who can give an impartial decision on the question, What is the best position in Africa south of the Zambesi ?

‘Now, I am not going to indulge in local politics, but I might go into foreign politics for a short period, and might say as a question of foreign politics, with reference to a Ministry that is trying to do its best, that one of the questions that troubles us now is the question of our railway communication with the interior. All we desire on that head is to recognise that the neighbouring colony of Natal has its claims. We know that the president of a neighbouring state, the Transvaal, has built what he calls his own line. It is almost complete, and he rightly demands his share of the trade. We also, who happen to have arrived at that neighbouring state, a state with enormous wealth, consider that we should have a certain share. All I can say on that question is this, that we recognise that the neighbouring colony of Natal should have its share ; we recognise that the president of the neighbouring state, the Transvaal, rightly can claim, after spending four millions, that he should have his due share of the trade of that important state ; and all we

hope is, that after careful discussion and consideration, we shall not enter into a ruinous competition, but that we shall allot to each state a fair portion of that trade. That is a question of external politics which we have to deal with, and you must watch our conduct very carefully in our negotiations, and you can judge of our action in that matter subsequently from the publication of correspondence. Those, Mr. Mayor, are external politics, not party politics. I feel sure I shall have the same support on this question from members of the Opposition as I may have from the gentlemen who have done us the kindness to be here this evening.

‘If we were to talk further of external politics, Mr. Mayor, there is really one subject that I might say represents the politics of the country, and that is the native question. Now, you know I have been away for two months. I have been travelling the whole of that time continuously. I have been travelling for two months in a country that you are going to govern, and that your people are going to occupy. For two solitary months I have been continuously travelling, and, do you know, the one point that has come home to me is the question of native labour? It is a very interesting question. I feel I am detaining you, but I must mention it, because I want you to think over it. I start from here, where native labour is £3 or £4 a month and food, I get up to Bulawayo, and I find it 10s. a month and food, and the telegraph is going to Blantyre, where it is 4s. a month without the food. Then I come to Parliament, and I find

that honourable members want irrigation schemes and fruit-cultivation schemes, and then I think it out. I find labour in England at 12s. a week, that is £2, 10s. a month, producing an export. I happened to go to Egypt the other day, and I found labour 2d. a day, that is 4s. a month, producing an export, and I find in India labour at 4s. a month, and food, producing an export. Then you talk to me about producing corn and sending it home, and you talk about fruit-cultivation, and you say the farmers are very lazy, and they won't do anything; but you don't really think over the question—the labour question—that is at the root of it all. You are paying these natives £3 or £4 a month, and here are the people of Blantyre, with whom we are just going to be connected by telegraph, paying 4s. a month, and you are going to ruin them. You are going to introduce £4 a month. Now, I am constantly meeting the gentleman who advises the Transvaal, and he made a proposition that those natives who don't work should pay a certain tax. Then, totally apart from that proposition, a gentleman who represented Her Majesty proposed that those who did not labour should pay a tax. Then I thought it out myself, and last session we passed a bill,—don't think I am going into party politics, for the whole House nearly approved of it; there were only three against it on the second reading.

On the subject of this bill I will tell you a story. I remember an excellent Dutch member came to me. He said, "I am going to vote for your bill, but I really

think I am wrong." I said, "Why?" Well, this member represented Victoria West, his name is Mr. Le Roex, and he replied, "Why! I hear that the member for Fort Beaufort is going to vote for it." He added, "I am sure something is wrong; I must vote against it." You know, if I might put you a simile—I hope I am not saying anything which will subject me to subsequent criticism, but I think you will understand the feeling with which, and the reason why, I put it—really, if you want a simile, it is just as if those ethereal beings above voted with the ethereal beings below on a substantive proposition. Now, you may ask me why I put this proposition. I put it as being aloof from and above party politics, for the proposition you have got to think over is this, that we have got a great country, and while we cannot expect the neighbouring states to part with their independence, just in the same way as we will not part with our flag, yet on general questions like railway tariffs there is no need to go into a cut-throat competition detrimental to all of us.

‘It is just the same with regard to the labour question. We have all got to think out the proposition why the English labourer works at the rate of 12s. a week, why the Indian works at 2d. a day, why the Egyptian works at 2d. a day, and why we pay, including food, £4 a month? I represent two millions of natives, and they are lying idle. I know the best thing for them would be to understand the dignity of labour; and if you ask me for a big foreign policy, it is the question whether we can

bring these natives to understand the dignity of labour, and whether we can make arrangements with the neighbouring states to co-operate in bringing that about. I have dealt with our railway question. I have dealt with our labour question, and others have dealt so ably with the development of the hinterland, that I will say very little on that point. It was a hobby. One went into Parliament fortunately with a hobby twelve years ago, and stuck steadily to it. One has had very unhappy times over it, but I find if you stick to a point which is a right point, a proper point, a point in the interests of the country, you gradually win the people to it. To-night, I will not speak to you in an apologetic way, for in so far as our hinterland is concerned, the risks are over. I have kept clearly in my mind the idea of assimilation—the assimilation of men, the assimilation of territory—and I feel that the position is that one does not now wish to ask in a humble way for support; one wishes to ask the question, “Do you agree now?” I could not do that before. I can do it to-night. I will only give the pledge that the proposal I made twelve years ago, on the basis that there should be an amalgamation of laws and of people, will be carried out by myself, and I will add no more.

‘As to the Ministry, we are doing our best. We know the inexorable fate of all ministries. They must change, but remember the change rests with the people. It does not rest with the Opposition. It does not rest with four or five gentlemen who run

round the town and say, "So-and-so is a dreadful person, and So-and-so is doing wrong." It rests with the calm judgment of the people, and when the people exercise that judgment against us, we must go. I can but express the hope, that when that time comes, in so far as the foreign policy of the country is concerned, and under the foreign policy I include the native question, the relations with the neighbouring states and our hinterland, I and my colleagues may indulge in the same fair criticism which has been the habit of those gentlemen who are now in Opposition. The period which may ensue before they take our position is a period open to question. I will not express an opinion on that, but I feel sure of this, that as to our foreign policy, as to the external questions of the country, we need have no fear; and all I hope is, that those who are with me will pursue the same course as to those external questions which they have pursued during the period when they have been in the cold shades of Opposition.'

Meanwhile, far away in the north, Mr. Rhodes's progressive ideas were finding freer and fuller expression, for the development of Matabeleland was making rapid and unbroken progress under Mr. Rhodes's most trusted lieutenant, its able and popular Administrator. Dr. Jameson succeeded as perfectly in Matabeleland as he had in Mashonaland, and displayed as great tact, and exercised as strong an influence over the conquered Matabele, as he continued to display and exercise in dealing with the white settlers.



That the charm of Dr Jameson's personality should have been, so generally felt among the settlers of Rhodesia was probably due to some extent to the very superior class of men who had settled in Rhodesia. There are, of course, some black sheep in every community, but the comparatively high character of the settlers is vouched for on all sides. Of many witnesses, perhaps the most obviously impartial is Mr. Bryce, who is certainly not an unlimited or blind admirer of the maker of Rhodesia. Mr. Bryce visited Rhodesia in 1895, and has written a very interesting record of what he saw. 'I was struck,' he says, 'by the large proportion of well-mannered well-educated men whom one came across in this tropical wilderness.' Again, 'Comparing it (a mining town or camp) with the many similar "new cities" I had seen in Western America, I was much struck with the absence of the most conspicuous features of those cities—the "saloons" and "bars." In California or Montana these establishments, in which the twin deities of gambling and drinking are worshipped with equal devotion, form half the houses of a recent settlement in a mining region.' Again, 'There is, of course, a free use of alcohol, but there is no shooting, such as goes on in American mining towns, crimes of violence of any kind are extremely rare, and the tracks are safe. No one dreams of taking the precautions against "road-agents" (*i.e.* highwaymen) which are still far from superfluous in the Western States, and were far from superfluous in Australia. Trains are not stopped and robbed; coaches are not "held up." Nothing surprised me more, next to the apparent submissiveness of the native Kaffirs, than the order which appeared to prevail among the whites.' Bulawayo itself was rapidly growing into a considerable

town at the time of Mr. Bryce's visit. 'An opera-house was talked of, and already the cricket-ground and racecourse, without which Englishmen cannot be happy, had been laid out. Town lots or "stands," as they are called in South Africa, had gone up to prices which nothing but a career of swift and brilliant prosperity could justify. However, that prosperity seemed to the inhabitants of Bulawayo to be assured. Settlers kept flocking in. Store-keepers and hotel-keepers were doing a roaring trade. Samples of ore were every day being brought in from newly exposed gold reefs, and all men's talk was of pennyweights, or even ounces, to the ton. Every one was cheerful because every one was hopeful. It was not surprising. There is something intoxicating in the atmosphere of a perfectly new country, with its undeveloped and undefined possibilities. And the easy acquisition of this spacious and healthful land, the sudden rise of this English town, where two years before there had been nothing but the huts of squalid savages, had filled every one with a delightful sense of the power of civilised man to subjugate the earth and draw from it boundless wealth.'

The gold industry, on which the immediate success of the country depended, was at this time in a very flourishing state, allowing for the fact that until the railway was up, little except some development work could be done on account of the excessive cost of carriage by wagon. Prospecting, however, went on apace, and at the end of 1894 there were 40,000 claims registered with the Government, which amounts, as Mr. Rhodes shortly after pointed out in his speech to the shareholders of the Company, to two thousand miles of mineralised quartz. These discoveries were made far more convincing as proofs of

the value of the country by the report of Mr. J. H. Hammond, the celebrated mining expert, who went through the country with Mr. Rhodes and examined the reefs. He testified that the veins were true fissure veins of the class universally noted for their permanency. 'There are,' he said, 'substantial grounds to predict the opening up of shoots of ore, from which an important mining industry will ultimately be developed.'

The chief difficulty was the insufficiency of native labour, for the Matabele had an inherited contempt, as well as dislike, for manual labour, considering war the only proper occupation of a man. The Matabele had not only no sense of the dignity of labour; they very generally did not care to earn the excellent wages offered, being quite satisfied to remain in their savage condition, with none of the wants of white men, and no need for money; and when they did come to work, they were in the habit of leaving the work whenever the inclination seized them. This, however, was bound to be a merely temporary drawback, as willing natives from other parts of Africa could be brought in, and the custom of earning money by labour would gradually grow by example, and the assistance of the chiefs be no longer required to induce the natives to come to the mines.

Farming was at the time being carried on very successfully, especially in the neighbourhood of the mining centres where there was an excellent market for produce, the profits of market-gardening being enormous. This was the case in Mashonaland as well as Matabeleland; and in Mashonaland, Fort Salisbury, which was then three years older than Bulawayo, had become quite a considerable place, with well-lighted streets and churches and villas, and

many of the characteristics of English civilisation. At Bulawayo, as at Fort Salisbury, there were numbers of hotels. There were twelve at Bulawayo in 1895. Newspapers (four) were regularly published. The telegraph and postal service was well managed and actively employed, and, in short, the development of a modern English civilisation and a thoroughly competent English government had reached a point of excellence absolutely unprecedented in the annals of the world, considering the few years that separated this new order from the savagery that it had succeeded.

At this point Mr. Rhodes's speech to the shareholders of the Chartered Company, on January 18th, 1895, may suitably be given, being a very full description of the condition of things in Rhodesia at that time.

‘Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, I have to thank you for the reception which you have accorded to me, but I think that you naturally desire that we should deal with the practical part of the Company's development in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, because you must remember that the English are a very practical people. They like expansion, but they like it in connection with practical business. I will not refer to the causes that led to our late war, but I may tell you very frankly that we either had to have that war or to leave the country. I do not blame the Matabele. Their system was a military system; once a year they raided the surrounding people, and such a system was impossible for our development. Conclusions were tried, and they came to a successful issue so far as we were concerned. I might make

one remark with respect to that war ; that to refer to the men who took part in it as political adventurers was a mistake. You can quite understand that, however bad times were, you would not risk your life unless there was something other than profit from the possible chance of obtaining a farm at the end of the war of the value now of about £50. Really, why the people volunteered so readily was that they had adopted this new country as their home, and they saw very clearly that unless they tried issues with the Matabele they would have to leave the country. I think that is the best reply to the charge that the men who took a part in that war did it for the sake of loot and profit.

‘Now, in looking at this question we have to consider what we possess, and I can tell you that we possess a very large piece of the world. If you will look at the map, let us consider what we have north of the Zambesi. We have now taken over the administration of the land north of the Zambesi save and except the Nyassaland Protectorate. We have also received sanction for all our Concessions there ; that is, the land and minerals north of the Zambesi belong to the Chartered Company—with one exception, the small piece termed the Nyassaland Protectorate. Even in that, however, we have considerable rights as to the minerals and land, in return for the property we took over from a Scotch company called The Lakes Company. We have, however, been relieved from the cost of administration of the Nyassaland Protectorate. Her Majesty’s Government

and the British people have at last felt it their duty to pay for the administration of one of their own provinces, and I think we have a very fair reply to the Little Englanders, who are always charging us with increasing the responsibilities of Her Majesty's Government, and stating that the "Charters," when in difficulty, always appeal to the mother-country. Our reply must be that the boot is on the other leg. For four years we have found the cost of administration of one of your own provinces, and we are proud to think that we have yearly paid into Her Majesty's Treasury a sum for the administration of one of our own provinces because Governments were unable to face the House of Commons to ask them to contribute to their obligations.

'Well, that is the position north of the Zambesi; and I may say, in reference to that part of our territory, that there are very promising reports from it. It is a high plateau, fully mineralised, and every report shows that the high plateau is a part where Europeans can live. If we pass from that to the south, we first come to Matabeleland and Mashonaland. There we have had great difficulties in the past. We had a Charter but not a country. We had first to go in and occupy Mashonaland with the consent of the Mashonas, and then we had to deal with the Matabele. At the present moment there is a civilised Government over the whole of that. We also possess the land and minerals; and from a sentimental point of view I will say this—that I visited the territory the other day and saw

nearly all the Chiefs of the Matabele, and I may say that they were all pleased, and naturally so. In the past they had always "walked delicately," because any one who got to any position in the country and became rich was generally "smelt out," and lost his life. You can understand that life was not very pleasant under such conditions. In so far as the bulk of the people were concerned, they were not allowed to hold any cattle or to possess anything of their own. Now they can hold cattle, and the leaders of the people know that they do not walk daily with the fear of death over them. We have now occupied the country, which I think we administer fairly, and in that territory also we possess the land and minerals.

'With regard to the South, in the country termed the Bechuanaland Protectorate, we possess all the mineral rights of Khamaland, and we have the negative right to the land and minerals as far south as Mafeking. What I mean by the negative right is that from Mafeking throughout the whole Protectorate, since the grant of the Charter, no one has any right to obtain any concession from the natives except through the Chartered Company. We therefore possess the land, minerals, and territory from Mafeking to Tanganyika—that is, twelve hundred miles long and five hundred broad. I might say, with respect to that country, that I see no future difficulties in so far as risings of the natives are concerned. We have satisfied the people throughout the whole of it, and we may say

that we have now come to that point when we can deal, without the risk of war, with the peaceful development of the country. That is what we possess.

‘Now, you might very fairly ask what has it cost us. Your position is somewhat as follows:—You have a share capital of £2,000,000, and you have a debenture debt to-day of about £650,000; and I might point out to you that as against that debenture debt you have paid for the hundred miles of railway in the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland, you have about fourteen hundred miles of telegraph, you have built magistrates’ courts in the whole of your territory, you have civilised towns in five or six different parts, and the Beira Railway. Although you do not hold their debentures, you have the voting power, and the railway is completed. We might now fairly say, if you put aside the Mafeking Railway and the land you hold in the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland, as apart from the chartered territories, that your debenture debt can be regarded as about £350,000, because I do not think it is an unfair price to put in your assets in Bechuanaland at £300,000, for since the railway was opened there it has paid its working expenses and four per cent. Therefore, in looking at the matter from a purely commercial point of view, you might say, we possess a country with all the rights to it, in length twelve hundred miles, and in breadth an average of five hundred, and we have a debt of about £300,000 or £350,000 because we have an asset apart from that country in the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland of about £300,000.



‘The next question you would naturally ask would be, what is the appreciation of the people as to that country? The only test you can take in a way is, apart from the very large sum put into mineral developments, what the people consider the value of the townships sold, because that is always the judgment of the individual. He buys a stand because he wishes to erect a store or building. You cannot term that the speculative action of syndicates. I may tell you that at the last stand sale in Bulawayo the purchases were made by people who have since erected stores and buildings with the intention of remaining and residing in the country. As you are aware, the sales there realised £53,000, and I received in connection with this matter an interesting telegram last night. A stand which fetched at our sale £160 was sold—I suppose yesterday or the day before, because we are now in complete communication by the telegraph—for £3050. The value of the building on it is estimated at £1000, so within six months, in the estimation of the purchaser, the stand has risen from about £160 to £2000 in so far as the ground value is concerned. That speaks more than words, and shows the confidence of the people in the country.

‘The next risk with a commercial company like ours would be the question of the cost of administration. You might very fairly say, “We know that the future is all right. We feel that so huge a country—mineralised like that—must come out successfully; but what is the cost of administration, what is the

difference between revenue and expenditure?" That is the next question which business men would ask. In connection with that you will, no doubt, have examined the reports, but it is always very difficult to gain a practical idea from a report respecting a question like that. I can, however, tell you from my knowledge about the position. The revenue now is about £50,000 per annum from the country, and the expenditure is about £70,000. You must, however, remember that I do not include in the revenue of £50,000 the sale of stands, because I call that capital account. I mean by revenue, what you receive monthly from stamps, licences, and the ordinary sources of revenue which every country possesses. I am therefore justified in thinking that we need feel no alarm as to the future about balancing our expenditure with our revenue, because I would point out to you that if with no claim licences—because we are deriving few or none now—with no customs, and practically with no hut tax at present, you almost balance now, I think we may fairly say that we shall balance in the future, and earn a sum with which to pay interest on our debentures. I do not think that is an excessive proposition to make, and you must remember that this expenditure covers a force of over two hundred police. Two years ago, when I told you we were balancing in Mashonaland, we had practically dismissed all our police, as we could not afford them, but the new position is that with an expenditure of £70,000 and a revenue of £50,000, we are paying for two hundred police, and

really we do not want more expenditure. We have magistrates, in every town, mining commissioners, and a complete system of government. We have a Council, an Administrator, a Judge, and a Legal Adviser. I cannot therefore see that we want any more heavy expenditure, and that is why I have not asked for any increase of capital.

‘From a commercial point of view the way I look at it is somewhat as follows: We have a capital of £2,000,000 in shares—let that be our capital; we have our debentures, as to half of which we have a liquid asset in the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland. What future extra expenditure can there be? There can be no more wars, for there are no more people to make the wars. As to public buildings, in each of our towns we have most excellent public buildings—quite equal to the ordinary buildings in Cape Colony; I speak of Bulawayo, Salisbury, Umtali, and Victoria. As to telegraphs, every town in the country is connected with the telegraph excepting Umtali. As to railway communication, we have given railway communication in the east from Beira to Chimoio, through the “fly,” and one of the richest portions of the country is only seventy-five miles from the terminus. We have extended the Vryburg Railway to Mafeking—that is five hundred miles from Bulawayo. If the country warrants further railway communications the money can be found apart from the Charter. If the country does not warrant any further railway extension, then we had better not build it. The people must be

satisfied as we were in the past at Kimberley. For years we had to go six hundred miles by wagon to Kimberley, and then we went five hundred miles, and later four hundred miles by the same means, although the yearly exports were between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000. When Kimberley justified a railway, a railway was made, and so it will be in this case. We have maintained our position. We have a complete administration, and we have railway facilities which will allow batteries to be sent in. I do not see therefore where more public expenditure is required. The extension of railways will be undertaken when the country warrants it apart from the Charter. When, therefore, I came home, and was spoken to about the question of an increase of capital, I, after careful consideration, thought it would be an unwise thing to submit to the shareholders. We are practically paying our way, and we shall keep our Chartered capital at £2,000,000, and I cannot see in the future any reason which would cause us to increase it. If the country is a failure we had better not increase it, and if the country is a success it will not be wanted.

‘Now, we have dealt with the questions of what we possess, what it has cost us, and our present financial position; and you might next very fairly say, what are the prospects? Well, looking at that question, I can only say that I have been through the country, and from an agricultural point of view, I know it is a place where white people are going to settle. It is good agricultural country. As to climate, it is asked

by some whether it is not a fever country. It is nothing of the kind. It is a high, healthy plateau, and I would as soon live there as in any part of South Africa. Towards the Portuguese territory, and in some parts of the low country the climate is unhealthy, and the same applies to the country just on the Zambesi. The high plateau, however, is perfectly healthy. You may, therefore, say that you have a country where white people can live and be born and brought up, and it is suitable for agriculture; but, of course, the main point we must look to, in so far as a return to our shareholders is concerned, is the question of the mineralisation of the country. I have said once before that out of licences and the usual sources of revenue for a Government you cannot expect to pay dividends. The people would get annoyed if you did; they do not like to see licences spent in dividends—those are assets which are to pay for any public works and for good government. We must, therefore, look to our minerals to give us a return on our capital, which you must remember is £2,000,000.

‘In dealing with that question, I will ask, What have you got? You possess a country about one thousand two hundred miles by five hundred, which is mineralised, and as regards the efforts which have at present been made, you have in connection with the search for minerals forty thousand claims registered with the government of the country. That means two thousand miles of mineralised quartz, and I would refer you to the report of Mr. Hammond, who went

through the country with me, and who is the consulting engineer of the Gold Fields of South Africa Company! He was highly pleased with what he saw. There was a suggestion made that the reefs were not true fissure veins; did not go down. He pooh-poohed that idea. I would refer you to page 35 of the directors' report, where he alludes to that, and says: "Veins of this class are universally noted for their permanency." Then if you follow his remarks on the mineral position, you will find that he says: "It would be an anomaly in the history of gold mining, if, upon the hundreds of miles of mineralised veins, valuable ore-shoots should not be developed as the result of future work." He adds: "There are, I think, substantial grounds to predict the opening up of shoots of ore from which an important mining industry will ultimately be developed." Then he warns people about the mode of investing money in the search for minerals, and says: "With these admonitions, I confidently commend the country to the attention of mining capitalists." That is the report of a cautious man who visited the country, and reported on what he saw.

'You must remember that in the past in dealing with our reefs, we have not had men acquainted with mining. They were chiefly young fellows who went up and occupied the country, and who knew as little about mining as many of you here do. They had no means of ascertaining, because the mineralisation of that country is quartz and not alluvial, and we could get in no batteries. Still, the past four years have

proved that the whole country is mineralised from end to end, and in reference to the discoveries made, I think I am justified in stating that such have been the reports of those who are connected with those discoveries, that nearly three-quarters of a million sterling has been subscribed lately for the development of them—not by puffing prospectuses, but privately by friends of those who have gone out and made reports on what they have discovered. If I might address a word of warning to you, I would say we, as directors, are responsible to you for the charter as to its capital. Do not go and discount possibilities as if they were proved results. I think, however, that with the facts which I have stated, you may be confident that in the future Matabeleland and Mashonaland will be gold-producing countries, because it would be contrary to nature to suppose that a country that is mineralised from end to end should not have payable shoots. With these words I will make no further remark as to the gold, save and except to tell you this: that if one of you asks how you will get a return in connection with that gold, I may state that what I term the “patent” in the country—namely, the company getting a share in the vendor scrip—has been practically accepted by the country. We have had not the slightest difficulty in settling with the various corporations who have obtained capital from the public.

‘The great objection to the idea was its newness. It had never been tried before. It has now been tried and accepted, and for a very simple reason.

The prospector has found that he is not eaten up by monthly licences while holding his claim; the capitalist, when he goes to purchase, knows that the charter has a certain interest, and pays accordingly; and as to the public, who always find the capital for quartz mining, it is a matter of no importance to them whether Jones gets all the vendor scrip or whether Jones and the Government share it together. The public do not take such a personal interest in Jones that they require that he should have the whole of the scrip. They also know that if the Government receive half of it, it is held until the value of the mine is proved, whereas if the whole of it was handed over to Jones, he might part with it to a confiding public. When, therefore, you are considering this question commercially, you will say: Well, we are dealing with a proposition of a capital of £2,000,000; we are dealing with a country nearly as big as Europe, and we know it is mineralised. The present tests must be fairly satisfactory, or else the friends of those who have gone out and found reefs would not have subscribed three-quarters of a million sterling for their development. We must always remember in connection with mining that it is very speculative, as I told a friend of mine the other day—they are always bothering me about mines; and I said to one of my friends—a French financier—I will give you advice at last. He was delighted, and asked what I would advise. I said, either buy French Rentes or Consols. Then he went away annoyed. What, however, I desire to put to you is,



that when you go into a mining venture you go into a speculative venture ; but as a proposition with a capital of £2,000,000, dealing with a country almost as big as Europe, which is mineralised, and with that subscribed capital for its development—and as regards its administration, the revenue paying for the expenditure—it is a fair businesslike proposition. When you consider this comparatively—and that is the great secret in life—it represents in capital perhaps one Rand mine. As to the question whether the scrip proposal has been accepted, we have settled with all the chief corporations, and as minerals are found in that territory, you therefore know perfectly well that in reference to the share capital you have an interest in everything that is discovered. I will not say anything more than that with regard to the mineral question, but I would repeat again : Do not discount possibilities as if they were proved results.

‘ Now, gentlemen, I think that on this occasion you cannot accuse me of not dealing with the commercial aspects of the country. I think you will admit that I have shown you the size of it, the cost of it, and the possibilities of it, and if there is any point I have missed, please tell me. We have to consider, because we are a charter and are connected with politics, the political position of the country, and I may say that that is most satisfactory. We had a good many enemies before, and difficulties with the Portuguese, with the Transvaal, and with the Matabele. As you know, the Matabele difficulty has disappeared ; they have incorporated themselves with us. The diffi-

culties with the Portuguese are also over. We had different views as to where our boundaries were situated, but now I may say that our relations with them are on the most friendly footing; and we must always remember with reference to the Portuguese, that they were the original civilisers of Africa. They had the bad luck, if I may say so, to get only the coast, to be on the fringe, and never to have penetrated to the high healthy plateau at the back. Their power is not what it was, but we must respect them, and we must remember that the man who founded the Portuguese Colonial Empire—that is, Henry the Navigator—was of our own blood. The other day, when we were at Delagoa Bay, they had trouble with the natives, and we offered—Dr. Jameson and I—to assist them, because the natives in rebellion were a portion of the tribe of Gungunhana, to whom we pay tribute, but the Portuguese declined our assistance, and one cannot help respecting their national pride. They would not take help from any one, and we should do the same. They were very courteous, and thanked us, but they declined our proffered assistance, although they knew that we could help them, because these natives who were troubling them were receiving tribute from us. In the same way they refused assistance from the Transvaal Government, and I believe from two foreign powers. With national pride, they are settling their difficulties themselves. It will be our object to work in perfect co-operation with the Portuguese Government and officials.

‘With regard to the Transvaal, our neighbour the President finds that he has quite enough to do in dealing with his own people. I have always felt that if I had been in President Kruger’s position, I should have looked upon the Chartered Territory as my reversion. He must have been exceedingly disappointed when we went in and occupied it, but since then we have co-operated most heartily with him, and I look to no political difficulty from the Transvaal. We have received throughout the complete support of the Cape people, who, recognising that it was too great an undertaking for themselves to enter upon, were glad that we undertook it, and they look upon it as their Hinterland, as, remember, we shall pass from the position of chartered administration to self-government when the country is occupied by white people, especially by Englishmen, because if Englishmen object to anything, it is to being governed by a small oligarchy. They will govern themselves. We must therefore look to the future of Charterland, I speak of ten or twenty years hence, as self-government, and that self-government very possibly federal with the Cape Government.

‘Then, when we think of the political position, we have also to consider the English people, and I must say we have received the very heartiest support from the English public, with few exceptions—possibly from ignorance, possibly from disappointment, and I think often from utter misconception. I remember while coming home I was sitting on board ship, and some one handed me the *Daily Chronicle*,

in which I read the following: "Not a single unemployed workman in England is likely to secure a week's steady labour as a result of the forward policy in South Africa." What is the reply to that? I do not reply with a platform address about "three acres and a cow" or the "social programme," but I make a practical reply, and say what we have done. We have built two hundred miles of railway—the rails all made in England, and the locomotives also. We have constructed thirteen hundred miles of telegraphs—the telegraph-poles and wires all made in England; everything we wear, and almost everything we consume, is imported from England. Can you tell me, then, that not a single unemployed workman in England is likely to secure a week's steady labour as the result of this enterprise? I can assure you, it does them much more good than telling them about "three acres and a cow," because nothing has ever come out of that. With regard to the social programme of division, you know the old story. I think it was one of the Rothschilds who, having listened to this doctrine in a train, handed the gentleman who had addressed him about it a sovereign as his share of the plunder.

'We have to deal with this question, however, because we have to consider the feeling of the English people, who are most practical. You must show that it is to their benefit that these expansions are made, because the man in the street who is not a shareholder naturally asks, "And where do I come in?"' You must therefore show them that there is a distinct

advantage to them in these developments abroad. That is the reason why, when we made a constitution for this country, I submitted a provision that the duty on British goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff, and I should like you to listen to me on that matter, if I do not tire you. You must remember, as I have said, that your Little Englander very fairly says: "What is the advantage of all these expansions, what is the advantage of our colonies? As soon as we give them self-government, they do two things. If we in the slightest degree remonstrate with them as to a law they pass, they tell us they will haul down the flag, and they immediately proceed to devise how they may keep our goods out." The Little Englander says quite rightly that these people will not listen to any advice regarding administration, and as to manufactures, they make every effort to bolster up bastard factories and to keep out our goods. It is very true that many of the colonies have found out the folly of protection, but they have created a bogey they cannot allay. These factories have been created, and workmen have gone out to them, and they are only kept going by high duties, and a poor minister who tries to pass a low tariff will have his windows broken by an infuriated mob. The only chance for a colony is to stop these ideas before they are created, and taking this new country of ours, I thought it would be a wise thing to put in the constitution that the tariff should not exceed the present Cape tariff, which is a revenue and not a protective tariff. The proof of that is that we have not a single factory in the Cape Colony.

‘I thought that if we made that a part of our constitution, we should do two things—make a distinct tie with England, and stop the creation of bastard manufactories. You would be surprised that that proposition was refused. But I will tell you why it was refused: because it was not understood. People thought it was a proposition for a preferential system; in fact, I may tell you that all my letters of thanks came from the protectionists, and nothing came from the free traders. It was, however, really a free trade and not a protective proposition. A proposal came from home that I should put in words to the effect that the duty on imported goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff. I declined to do that, because I thought that in the future—perhaps twenty-five or fifty years hence—you might deal with the United States as with a naughty child, not altering the policy of England, but saying, “If you will keep up this M’Kinley tariff, we for a period shall keep out your goods”; just the same as we go to war, although we are not pleased with war. That is why I objected to the introduction of the words “imported goods” and wished them to be “British goods,” because England in future might adopt this policy, and yet have a clause in the constitution of one of her colonies which prevented it. Who could object to this provision? Certainly not the French or German Ambassador, because, so long as England’s policy is to make no difference, they come in under this clause, for the policy of England being that there should be no preferential rate, any law passed by us giving a prefer-

ential rate would be disallowed. This clause would have assisted German and French manufacturers so long as England's policy remained what it is, because they would also have shared in the privilege of the duty on British goods not exceeding 12 per cent.

‘If you follow the idea, so long as England did not sanction a law making a difference, we had to make the tariff the same for all; but this great gain was obtained—that, supposing the charter passed into self-government, and a wave of protection came over the territory, and they passed, say, a duty of 50 per cent. on British goods, that law would be disallowed, because it was contrary to the constitution. The only objection that has ever been made to this proposition is, that it would have been law as long as it was no good, and that when it was any good it would have been done away with. That shows the want of knowledge. People think that the colonists are all for protection. Nothing of the kind. They know that with protection everything that you eat and wear costs you 50 per cent. more. But what does happen is, that at times a wave of protection comes over a country, and it is carried by a small majority, the law is passed, the factories are created, and the human beings come out, and must be fed, and you cannot get rid of them. In the case, however, of a wave coming over a country under a constitution such as suggested, the Secretary of State would be justified in disallowing any such proposal. He would say, “There is a large minority against it, and it is also against the constitution. I disallow it.” Look at the ramifications

of it. If the gold is in the quantities we think it is in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, that will become a valuable state of South Africa, and we know that there is going to be a Customs Union in Africa. This clause being in our charter would have governed the rest of Africa, and therefore you would have had Africa preserved to British goods as one of your markets.

‘Take the comparison of this question, and I will show you what it means. There are sixty millions of your people in the United States. You created that Government; that is your production, if I may call it so. They adopted this folly of protection, and they cannot get rid of it now. What is your trade with the United States? Your exports there are about £40,000,000 per annum. In South Africa and Egypt we have only 600,000 whites, but your exports there amount to £20,000,000. You have £15,000,000 with the Cape and Natal, almost entirely British goods, and £4,000,000 with Egypt, where you have a fair chance for your goods. You are doing £20,000,000 with these two small dependencies as against £40,000,000 with another creation of yours, which has shut your goods out, and where there are 60,000,000 of your own people. If they gave a fair chance to your trade, you would be doing £150,000,000 with the United States, to your advantage, and the advantage of the American people. I can see very clearly that the whole of your politics should be to allow your trade to grow, because you are not like France, producing “grand wine,” and not



like the United States, a world by itself, but a small province doing nothing but working up raw produce and distributing it all over the world. You have done a wise thing, therefore, in remaining in Egypt and in taking Uganda, and you have to thank your present Prime Minister for that. In one year that man has done this against the feeling of almost his entire party, which comprises the "Little Englanders"—he has taken Uganda and retained Egypt, and the retention of Egypt means the retention of an open market for your goods.

'The lesson is so easy. Come to England. The last time I came here I went on the Thames, with its endless factories. They were making goods—not for England, but for the world. The other day I went into a club, and saw four hundred people standing about, and, for the sake of amusement, I asked what they were doing. I was told they were not doing business with England—but with the world. There was not a single man who was not doing something with the world. The same thing applies to everything here. It must be brought home to you that your trade is the world, and your life is the world, and not England. That is why you must deal with these questions of expansion and retention in the world. Of course, Cobden's was a most beautiful theory, and right too, that each part produces something special, and all should exchange, but you must look at the world as a whole, and human beings will not agree to that. Every one wants to make his own things, and finding out that

England makes the best things, and distributes them in the best manner, they go and put on protective duties against you, and if they are allowed to go on in this way, they will ruin you. It is not an ethical discussion about the House of Lords that you want, or a discussion about "three acres and a cow"; but really, when I mention the House of Lords, we all know that you are not going to be guilty of the folly of making only one Chamber—so that a wave of popular opinion might sweep away the constitution. Brother Jonathan does not do that. It may end in strengthening or in mending the House of Lords a little, and we all agree in that. As you do not care to go to an election on an ethical question about the House of Lords, if you really believe in the point I am making—and I am doing this for a reason—when you get on the various committees at the next election, and Jones and Brown ask you for your votes, say that you will give them on one condition—that you have that clause put in the constitution of Matabeleland.

'That is the position. All these big questions, remember, come from little things. If you carry that clause in the constitution of Matabeleland, you do not know how it will spread, the basis being that your goods shall not be shut out from the markets of the world. That clause will extend from Matabeleland to Mashonaland, throughout Africa, and then, perhaps, Australia and Canada may consider the question. You will be retaining a market for your goods. You have been actually offered this, but have refused it, because you did not understand it.

I do not complain, but I shall blame you if you do not in the ensuing elections insist on that clause being inserted. If it is, it will do your trade in the future more good than anything else I can consider. Think that it is always the little things that change the world, not the big things. This taking of the charter came by an accidental thought. All the great conquests of the world came from accident. We have now great propositions about commercial union and federation, and these are beautiful essays; but if you carry the clause I have been speaking to you about, it will be better than any essay, because there is something practical in it. We have been accused of being a speculative set of company-mongers, but no one who started this idea could have seen any great hope of financial success from it. By your support we have carried it through. Whenever the man in the street sneers in that way, remind him that it was an undertaking which he had not the courage to take part in himself as one of the British people. The Imperial Government would not touch it. The Cape Government was too poor to do so. It has been done, however, and is a success. I do not think any one would say now that he would prefer to see that portion of the world under another flag. It has been done also—which the English people like—without expense to their exchequer.

‘We have had to combine this expansion with the commercial, or we should not have succeeded. Let us look at facts. There was that development of East Africa based, if I might so put it, on the

suppression of the slave trade and the cultivation of the cocoa-nut tree. I saw Sir William Mackinnon, whom it almost killed. He got no support from the British public, who are a very practical people. Take my own case ; take the African Trans-continental Telegraph. It has been of great assistance to the Charter Company in connection with its trade, and it has been no expense to us. In so far as an appeal to the public went, I found that they had no great grounds to subscribe ; but I will take two corporations with which I am connected. One of them gave nothing, and in the other an indignant shareholder wrote to the board to inquire who paid for the paper and envelope of the circular. I mention this to show you what an eminently practical people you are, and unless we had made this undertaking in connection with a commercial advance, we should have failed. That is the best reply to those who sneer at us and call us a set of company-mongers. We have been fortunate in forming an imaginative conception, and succeeding, and really, if you look at it, within a period that is hardly equal to the term allotted to an Oxford student. Commercially, if you think it out, I believe you will go away from this room not to sell your shares, but to regard it as a fair business-like proposition, for we have gone in for speculative mining and have not gone in for Consols. The country is paying for itself. There is no more claim for fresh money, and our £2,000,000 represents a very large interest in all the gold that will be found practically between Mafeking and Tanganyika. If

you are satisfied with the commercial, I really think you might give a help in the political, and I hope that in the ensuing elections you will do your best to see my clause carried, because by that you will be doing a really practical thing, and taking the very best practical step that has been taken towards the closer union of the Empire.'

## CHAPTER XIV

## THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AT JOHANNESBURG

THE two main means by which President Kruger pursued his policy of hostility to the British supremacy in South Africa were expansion beyond the borders of the Transvaal, and a deliberately anti-British Government within. The progress of the first means has been set forth already from time to time in preceding chapters, and it is obvious that this expansion had to be carried out at the expense of the British Empire in South Africa, as within its Protectorate or sphere of influence the expansion had necessarily to go on. In order to understand the audacity of these attempts to increase the area of the Republic, it must be remembered that each of them was a deliberate breach of the letter as well as the spirit of the London Convention which Lord Derby had with more generosity than wisdom substituted for the Pretoria Convention, in 1884. The ink was not long dry on the Convention of 1884 when President Kruger annexed by proclamation an important part of Bechuanaland, with a view to shutting off British expansion from the Empire of the North. Sir Hercules Robinson at once intervened and forced the President to withdraw his proclamation, as being a distinct breach of the Convention. The great point of the Convention of 1884 was the carefulness and foresight with which it guarded against any attempts

at expansion by the South African Republic. The first article defined the boundaries of the Republic very distinctly, and the second stated that 'The Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in the first article.' The policy of expansion, in defiance of the Convention, thus audaciously begun was followed up in succeeding years with a tenacity of purpose and a daring contempt for legality which have characterised throughout President Kruger's long dictatorship at Pretoria. His experience of dealings with the British Government had convinced him that it would be quite possible to take liberties with the Convention with perfect impunity, provided that he was always ready to recede when the Government woke up from time to time and showed itself to be in earnest.

Mr. Rhodes, it is true, aided by Sir Hercules Robinson, checkmated the Boer attempt to seize Bechuanaland, and anticipated the Boer advance, delayed by Lobengula's power and prestige, in Mashonaland; but in Zululand the Transvaal policy of expansion was to a great extent successful, and added a valuable portion of that territory to the Republic. President Kruger's method was simple; it was to intrigue with the native chiefs, and then to seize or claim all the territory he could, and if compelled to retire, to propose a bargain to the easy-going British Government on the ground that he was an injured party by their interference to keep him to the Convention. The notion of strictly observing the Convention never seems to have been thought of in his eminently practical diplomacy. Thus in Swaziland the President's advance guard of Boers coolly founded the Little Free State, and in 1888 the Republic demanded as a right permission

to annex this territory, from which they were expressly excluded by the Convention, a demand which the easy and generous British Government conceded in 1890, afterwards surrendering the rest of Swaziland to the thankless Republic, which merely complained of the delay in the transfer of a territory which was expressly barred against it by Article 12, Convention 1884. A still more serious attempt was the Boer intrigue to secure an exit to the sea through Tongaland, an attempt defeated, at the instance of Mr. Rhodes, by the High Commissioner's treaty with the Queen of that country. The correspondence and negotiations that went on are interesting as showing the coolness with which President Kruger ignored the restraints imposed by the Convention of 1884, advancing to the High Commissioner arguments to support his claim, which were disposed of beforehand by the letter as well as the spirit of that Convention. The exit to the sea was actually arranged and granted by Sir H. Loch, with the very reasonable conditions that the Republic should depart from its position of hostility to the neighbouring British Colonies, admit their produce free, and join their Customs Union. The only other condition was with regard to the harbour, which was not to be alienated or dealt with by treaty without the consent of the British Government. Behind Sir H. Loch's Convention it is easy, of course, to see the policy and the hand of Mr. Rhodes, anxious to be friendly to the Transvaal, but also resolved to checkmate the President's schemes against the British supremacy. President Kruger, unwilling to comply with the conditions, did not accept the offer, and after some years the Convention finally lapsed. The Boers, however, continued their secret advances with the chiefs in Tongaland, even after the policy of steady pressure



had got them Swaziland ; and the territory was at last annexed by Sir Henry Loch in the spring of 1895, not without indignant protests from the Transvaal.

The same deliberate hostility to the British Empire, and the same disregard of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the London Convention, had characterised throughout President Kruger's internal government of the Transvaal. One of his first steps in this hostile policy was made in 1882, when the period of residence required to obtain the franchise was increased from one year to five years ; and I have already pointed out in another chapter how, at a later date, the Volksraad, which is simply President Kruger writ large, showed its strong anti-British feeling by passing a resolution depriving the loyalists of the war of 1881 of political rights, a resolution which was withdrawn on the strong representations of the High Commissioner. The alteration of the terms for acquiring full citizenship was a change in the *status quo* as it was present to the minds of the British Government when they negotiated the Convention ; and the doubtfulness of the validity of this change was perceived and pointed out forcibly long ago by Mr. Chamberlain. The spirit of the Convention, not to speak of President Kruger's verbal assurance to the High Commissioner, was obviously transgressed by this alteration of the conditions of citizenship, which was only the first step towards more serious changes.

When increased numbers of Uitlanders came in, on the discovery of the gold-mines of the Rand, and settled in the Transvaal, the residential conditions of the franchise were still five years' residence. In 1890 a sham concession was made—the creation of a powerless Second Chamber, accompanied by changes which

raised the qualifying period of residence to fourteen years—and finally the law of 1893 permitted the applicant for the franchise, when he was over forty years of age, to acquire the full franchise, if he could obtain a petition in writing for it from a majority of the First Chamber, a majority which was bitterly hostile to any such claim. Thus in 1893 President Kruger completed his franchise legislation by finally shutting out the Uitlanders—the majority of the population, who also possessed the intelligence and education, in addition to the wealth of the country, developed by their enterprise and industry—from any representation in the Government. As by further legislation of 1894 the children born in the Transvaal were to follow the status of the father, two generations were disfranchised together.

President Kruger personally was responsible for this legislation, although up to about this time he had deluded a great many of the Uitlanders into the belief that he was privately in favour of real concessions. Now he disclosed his true attitude—that he would never give the franchise on any terms. With the passing of the franchise legislation of 1893-94 the constitutional agitation received its death-blow, the Reform party realising that they had been deliberately deceived by the President, and that they had nothing to hope for from peaceful agitation.

The constitutional agitation had begun with the formation of the Transvaal National Union in 1892, under the leading of its chairman, a Cape colonist, an able and successful solicitor, Mr. Charles Leonard. The backbone of the constitutional agitation thus set on foot, were the professional classes, such as the legal and medical men, and a considerable number of the working-classes. The capitalists, the great mine

owners, refused for more than two years to have anything to do with the movement. The objects of the Union were, while maintaining the independence of the Republic, to obtain, by all constitutional means, equal rights for all citizens and the redress of all grievances; and its franchise proposals were two years' residence, with the possession of a property qualification of £100, or the earning of a salary of £100 a year. In 1894 a petition to the Volksraad, signed by 13,000 Uitlanders, was received with contempt and dismissed with jeers and laughter. In 1895 a petition, signed by 38,000 Uitlanders, a number far in excess of the whole adult male Boer population, was rejected with open contumely and contempt, and with challenges from the Boer members of the Volksraad to the despised and abhorred Englishmen to come and fight for the franchise, if they wanted it, when Mr. Otto, the Boer spokesman, said he and the rest of the burghers were eager to meet them. The fruits of the surrender of the Transvaal in 1881, in the addition of profound contempt to intense dislike and distrust of the English, were merely expressing themselves a little more freely than usual in the Transvaal House of Parliament, but that expression marked the approach of the explosion which this consistent policy of scornful oppression of an English majority of the population rendered inevitable.

The Uitlanders' demand for the franchise was sufficiently justified by the principle that taxation requires to be accompanied by representation; but, quite apart from this principle, the grievances of the Uitlanders were of a very serious kind. The government under which they were placed was not only manifestly unjust; it was also incompetent and corrupt.

As to its injustice, the taxation was deliberately arranged so that nine-tenths of it fell on the Uitlander community, and such imposts as a tax of a shilling a pound on bacon and butter, and seven shillings and sixpence on one hundred pounds of flour, pressed heavily on the working classes. The additional hardship of making the language of the schools solely Dutch was intended to operate with the cost of living to keep English workmen from bringing their families out and settling permanently in the Transvaal. Dutch was also the language of the courts, and the jurors, owing to the conditions imposed, were Dutch, which, added to the interference with the judiciary, deprived the Uitlander of common civil rights. An Englishman had no sure redress for assault and ill-usage against a Boer. Freedom of speech and liberty of the press were gradually curtailed and destroyed; and the deliberate spirit of hostility in which all this injustice was carried on, rendered redress hopeless.

As to incompetency, the police force was grossly inefficient as well as venal; the needs of sanitation and pure water were ignored; there was no honest attempt to keep liquor from the natives, who were made the helpless victims of the vile spirit supplied by the liquor monopolists; and disorder and violence, as well as great loss to the mining industry, were the result.

As to corruption, President Kruger and his party had begun after the retrocession by granting concessions and monopolies of all kinds, of which the dynamite monopoly and the railway monopoly are most notorious; and the profits derived from this sort of work by members of the Executive and the Volksraad were matters of common knowledge; indeed, in respect to the Selati railway scheme, President

Kruger openly stated that he saw no harm in the members of the Volksraad receiving presents, a statement made in connection with the bribery of nearly the whole Raad, to support the Selati railway scheme, and valuable as showing the high official Boer point of view.

In 1895, then, the Uitlanders, denied all redress of their many grievances, and all hope of the franchise, were convinced of the futility of constitutional agitation, for had not the President-Dictator himself, in a moment of candour, declared to an important deputation of men of substance and character, 'Go back and tell your people I will never give them anything. I shall never change my policy, and now let the storm burst.'

No doubt it would have been perfectly possible for President Kruger to grant the franchise and for the Republic to remain independent; in fact, as some few of the more enlightened Boers perceived, his absolute refusal to redress the franchise grievance or any other, was the most dangerous blow at the permanence of the Republic. But President Kruger meant by independence a very different thing from the meaning usually conveyed by the word. He meant his own autocracy, the retention in his own hands of absolute power, and of the spending of the State resources as he pleased, and this would have been lost had he given the franchise to the English-speaking inhabitants, had they all been the staunchest Republicans. It is not that the President was influenced in this chiefly by the sordid desire of personal gain, though himself by no means immaculate, and conniving openly enough at the notorious jobbery and corruption of his relatives and supporters; but he was convinced, probably correctly, that no other hand but

his could steer the ship of state, with the other communities of South Africa in its wake, into the haven towards which he had been steadily directing its course ever since he first took the helm. In other words, he knew that without himself the idea of Transvaal hegemony in a United Dutch South Africa, free from British rule, could not possibly be realised. Therefore he felt, as he once said, that he might as well pull down the flag as grant the franchise, because the ambitious policy which the Transvaal flag represented to him, as the rallying point of all the Republicans and discontented colonists in South Africa, would, with the establishment of a really free Republic in the Transvaal, and the consequent downfall of his own power, be wrecked irremediably.

In the middle of 1895, some of the capitalists, finding it hopeless to obtain reform in what they cared about, the monopolies, the liquor pest, the cost of living, which necessitated high wages, and the other imposts which were pressing on their properties, were induced to join the Reform movement, which, failing in its constitutional agitation, bid fair to develop into something in the shape of a revolution. The deliberately hostile policy revealed by the Volksraad in 1895 really decided those capitalists who joined, coming in gradually one by one, and the Reformers thus gained the support of the representatives of the most powerful and highly esteemed firm in the Witwatersrand, Messrs. Wernher, Beit & Co., together with the backing of a personage not quite so important financially, but of course much more important politically, who came in for a very different reason from that of the other capitalists, the managing director of the Goldfield's company, Mr. Cecil Rhodes. With financial magnates like Mr. Beit and

Mr. Rhodes behind them, the financing of the movement was not difficult. It may be observed here that only four of the seventy members of the Reform Committee were capitalists, and it must be remembered that Messrs. J. B. Robinson and Barnato did not join at all, nor yet the representatives of German capital and other wealthy groups.

Mr. Rhodes himself refused at first to come into the movement or join the other capitalists at all, till he had learned the true situation from Dr. Jameson, who had examined carefully the real state of feeling among the mass of the Uitlanders, and it was only after this inquiry proved the depth of their discontent and their ripeness for revolution that Mr. Rhodes, in order to direct the change, agreed to give his support. Mr. Rhodes's original object in associating himself with the Reform movement was, by the establishment of a true republic instead of an oligarchy, to bring the Transvaal into line with his own policy of South African unification, so far as free trade in South African products, and a Customs and Railway Union, leaving the ultimate amalgamation in other matters to the work of time. He feared that without his direction the revolution might result in a Republic almost as dangerous to the British Empire in South Africa as President Kruger's Government had been, perhaps also supported by a foreign Government, the Government at Berlin.

The error which ultimately ruined all came through the desire of the Reform party to have some armed support within reach, to supply which it was agreed that Dr. Jameson was to place an armed force on the frontier of the Transvaal to co-operate with the Revolutionary party as might be arranged. The first object of the Uitlanders should have been to do without any

external aid ; for the one thing which might spoil their plans was any apparent English interference with the cherished independence of the Republic. Provided that the revolutionary movement had been wholly internal, the more liberal and progressive Boers would have refused to act against it, being by no means satisfied with President Kruger's autocracy, and especially with his use of the State funds, and his policy of employing Hollanders to the exclusion of born South Africans.

The revolution was very nearly made unnecessary in the autumn of 1895 by President Kruger's action in support of his system of hostile tariffs against the rest of South Africa, in order to force their traffic on to his Delagoa Bay line and bring the colonists to their knees. The joint Cape and Free State line ends at the Vaal River, and the Netherlands railway, by a short line of fifty miles, gives access to Johannesburg. The traffic at this time was enormous along the Cape line, and to stop this the Netherlands railway raised the rates by leaps and bounds on its own section, in spite of a verbal agreement made by President Kruger with the Cape Government as consideration for a loan to build the railway. As the traffic was not diverted to Delagoa Bay even by the huge rate, the line was next deliberately blocked to stop the traffic ; but the Cape met this policy by unloading at the frontier and carrying in the goods by the drifts of the Vaal River in wagons to Johannesburg. Then President Kruger, who was resolutely backing his own railway, after trying the effect of a warning that he would close the drifts, actually closed them against the wagons to stop the last means left of avoiding the Delagoa Bay route. This was a deliberate breach of the Conven-



tion of 1884. Sir Hercules Robinson appealed to Mr. Chamberlain, and after obtaining the consent of the Cape Colony to bear half the expense in the event of war, Mr. Chamberlain launched an ultimatum; upon which President Kruger, perceiving the seriousness of the situation, at once surrendered and opened the drifts. War at such a time the astute old ruler saw would be madness; for he would have had the whole feeling of South Africa against him, the Free State as well as the Cape, a fact evidenced by the consent of a Cape Ministry supported by the Dutch vote, and including Mr. Schreiner, then Attorney-General, to bear half the expenses of the war, if war had followed the ultimatum, as it must have done, had not President Kruger reopened the drifts.

This threat of war threw President Kruger into the arms of Germany, and Dr. Leyds was sent to Berlin and Lisbon on a secret mission—an arrangement to bring in German troops being the aim. The Uitlanders, highly incensed at the stoppage of their supplies by the closing of the drifts, were more than ever inclined to support the Reform Union in active measures. Dr. Jameson, in pursuance of his arrangement with the Reformers, went to Mafeking and collected with difficulty a small force of Chartered police, not a third of that originally intended, at Pitsani, a suitable place for a camp, on the frontier. Near the end of November, Dr. Jameson visited Johannesburg for the second time and obtained the letter of invitation undated, for use in certain eventualities. The question whether Dr. Jameson was to come in before the rising took place, or after, was ultimately decided by the Reformers in favour of the latter alternative, but it had been originally arranged that he should

start two days before the rising was to take place ; and his own impression was that they were to act simultaneously. Weapons and ammunition had been smuggled in, but in very inadequate quantities. A means of at once arming themselves and disarming the Boers was to be the surprise of the fort and magazines at Pretoria, which was the step chiefly relied on to make the rising a success. The ten thousand rifles and twelve million rounds of ammunition in the fort would have put Johannesburg in a fair way of defending itself, which, looking at the failure of the Boers in the present war at Mafeking and Kimberley, would not have been an impossible task, for there were twenty thousand men willing to bear arms, if they could have got them, and the gallant deeds of the Uitlanders in the Imperial Light Horse have proved that, though poor conspirators, they were certainly brave men.

At this juncture rumours began to come in that the establishment of a free Republic was not Mr. Rhodes's real aim, but the hoisting of the Union Jack and Imperial annexation. This was not the purpose for which the Reform party were working, and suspicion and alarm became so general that, after sending one gentleman who received a somewhat unsatisfactory explanation about the flag, Mr. Charles Leonard and Mr. Hamilton were despatched on Christmas Day to see Mr. Rhodes on this point at the Cape. Dr. Jameson's impatient messages, proposing to start at once, alarmed the Reformers, who, owing to the discussion about the flag, and to the fact that Dr. Jameson had with him fewer men than they had expected, now changed their plans and resolved to postpone the rising. A public meeting was to be called on January 6th, and under cover of this the

fort at Pretoria was to be seized on the night of January 4th. On Sunday morning there arrived a telegram from Charles Leonard bringing satisfactory assurances from Mr. Rhodes. There also arrived a telegram from Dr. Jameson containing his decision, 'I start without fail Sunday night.' The Reform Committee, alarmed by the tone and tenor of previous messages, had already sent Major Heany and Captain Holden to stop him, and were confident they would succeed. Meanwhile, in pursuance of the new policy, Uitlander deputations waited on the President, who, till he heard at a later date of Jameson's advance, refused any concession. On Monday two telegrams arrived, one from Dr. Jameson himself, making it quite plain that he had already started, and in the afternoon the news of his start arrived from Mafeking. The Reformers were now in a quandary, the arms and ammunition they had were ridiculously inadequate for a rising (there were not rifles for one man in seven, and very few cartridges), and the only chance of arming themselves was to seize the fort at Pretoria before the news of Jameson's advance reached the town. This was being planned when the news came in that Pretoria knew all, and the town was full of armed Boers. The Committee then determined to give out the few rifles they had, and to fortify and defend Johannesburg. They at once assumed the government of the town, and the precautions taken to prevent disorder and drunkenness were perfectly successful; while the firm attitude of Johannesburg so impressed the President and his advisers that two Boer Moderates were sent to arrange with the Reformers that they should meet a Government Commission to consider and redress grievances.

Long before there was any sign of Dr. Jameson's approach, the High Commissioner's proclamation had reached and paralysed the Reformers.

Jameson's rush to Johannesburg was, as ought now to be recognised by those who do not judge simply by results, a not unnatural proceeding on the part of the man who regarded himself as the acting leader of the movement. He felt that what the Uitlanders needed was a strong man of action who knew his own mind and was ready to take all risks. The ablest committee is incapable of leading. Energy melts in talk, and the moment for action is lost. Jameson, a Bayard of unselfishness as well as bravery, believed that he could do this work for his countrymen and the Empire, and his great popularity ensured him a first-rate opportunity. He never doubted his power to reach Johannesburg, for neither he nor any one else knew then the real fighting value of the Boer. Garibaldi's raid succeeded in Sicily, not because Sicilians were braver than Uitlanders, but because the Bourbon despot's power was as wavering and feeble as the Transvaal despot's was stubborn and strong.

Jameson pushed across the veldt with his column, having first sent troopers to Zeerust to cut the wires to Pretoria, a duty which they postponed till they had had some drink. The troopers awoke next morning to find themselves prisoners in the hands of the Boers, the wires open, and Pretoria alarmed. Jameson's long ride, broken by skirmishing, ended at Krugersdorp, where five hundred Boers were entrenched. The only hope was to avoid detention by making a swift detour; instead of which, owing to a misunderstanding about support from Johannesburg, the day was wasted in a fruitless frontal attack. The column laagered for

the night, and no one knowing the way to Johannesburg, a guide was procured at dawn, who led them to Doornkop, where, after some fighting, they surrendered on Wednesday morning, being in a hollow overlooked by high ground in the hands of large bodies of Boers who had ridden up during the night.

When the news of Jameson's surrender reached Cape Town and London, the Uitlanders were loaded with abuse as miserable cowards who had left their ally to his fate. Mr. Rhodes alone, while the storm of abuse was at its fiercest, spoke up and stated the truth, since proved beyond question. 'The Uitlanders were no cowards; they were rushed.'

After a week of solitary reflection, during which he shut himself up from every one at Groote Schuur (he had already resigned the position of Prime Minister), Mr. Rhodes went back to the place where he had first dreamed his dream of Empire to the North, to Kimberley. On the way he was recognised and the news telegraphed to Kimberley, and when his train arrived a great body of townspeople and workmen were waiting to welcome him at the station. He had already made up his mind in those days of solitude at Groote Schuur, and delivered on the spur of the moment the celebrated fighting speech in which he said that his friends told him that he should have to retire from political life, but he was of opinion that his political life had only just begun.

Mr. Rhodes's political position at the Cape was now hopeless for the moment; Jameson's impetuous action in riding in to force the Uitlanders to rise gave the strongest support to the Boer view that the annexation of the Transvaal by the Chartered Company was his aim; and at Pretoria, as Sir Hercules Robinson informed Mr. Chamberlain, it was asserted

that there was written evidence of a long-standing and widespread conspiracy to seize the government of the country, on plea of denial of political privileges, and to incorporate the country with that of the British South Africa Company. Of course, no such evidence was forthcoming, the story was obviously and ridiculously false, but it imposed on the Boers and for a considerable time on the Cape Dutch, and was actually maintained by the Little England critics in London. Thus Dutch racial feeling at the Cape was almost as much incensed as Boer feeling in the Transvaal, and reason and common sense were powerless against the most baseless rumours. Mr. Rhodes had become for the time being impossible in Cape politics, and at once prepared to start for Bulawayo, and devote all his efforts to the development of the new country.

Meanwhile Johannesburg, which had armed and was prepared to defend itself against the Boers, while demanding the intervention of the paramount power, was persuaded to disarm by Sir Hercules Robinson, acting with President Kruger through the British agent, Sir Jacobus de Wet. The danger to Jameson's life was the card very skilfully played by the President, though all the time the conditions of the surrender at Doornkop had given to Dr. Jameson and his men perfect security for their lives. Strange to say, the British representatives knew nothing of this, and never attempted to communicate with the prisoners, the President, in the interests of his astute diplomacy, begging them not to do so. Moreover, Sir Jacobus de Wet assured the Reformers in a long personal discussion that not a hair of their heads would be touched, not a man would lose his liberty for an hour, if only they would disarm, and this he did as the representative of the British Government, which he

said could not possibly permit such consequences to follow a disarmament obtained from loyal British subjects through the Government's intervention.

President Kruger, however, having got what he wanted by this intervention, immediately showed his good faith by arresting the Reformers and imprisoning them on a charge of high treason. Of course the Uitlanders' grievances, with a flagrant disregard of the President's promises, were neither considered nor redressed, and the savage sentences, afterwards commuted to heavy fines and imprisonment, were felt by them as a breach of the guarantees of the British agent, relying on which they had put themselves in the power of the Boer despotism at Pretoria.

As I have up to this given the account of what occurred from the Reformers' standpoint, Dr. Jameson's very complete statement, from his point of view, of the circumstances which led to his starting for Johannesburg, in fact the most concise account of the Raid by its leader, may here be given, with a few omissions of matter not directly connected with the main subject. It is taken from the Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee of 1897.

'At the end of 1893, shortly after the conclusion of the Matabele war, I had many conversations with Mr. Rhodes on the subject of the federation of South Africa, and the obstacles presented to this by the attitude of the South African Republic. About the middle of 1894, Mr. Rhodes and Mr. John Hays Hammond were with me in Matabeleland, and the position of the Transvaal, and the grievances of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg were freely discussed by us. Mr. Hammond asserted that it was impossible for the economic conditions of the Rand to continue,

and that unless a radical change was made, there would be a rising of the people in, Johannesburg, meaning thereby, the general inhabitants of all nationalities. I was much impressed by these representations, and early in October 1894, I passed through Pretoria and Johannesburg, coming from Matabeleland with Mr. Hammond. While there I occupied myself in verifying, by direct communication with the miners and working classes, the accuracy of the above views. I communicated the results of my investigations to Mr. Rhodes, and it was agreed that the police and volunteers of the Chartered Company should be made as efficient as possible, in order to be prepared for eventualities, so that if a revolt did occur in Johannesburg, and help were required, I should be in a position to use my discretion as to how, when, and where, if at all, the police and volunteers should be utilised. When in England, in the latter part of 1894, I urged the transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Chartered Company. I was again in Johannesburg in March 1895 on my return to Rhodesia from London. I found the feeling of resentment against the executive very high, and a rooted determination on the part of the general body of the people to insist upon, and, if necessary, enforce reforms. Rifle associations had been formed, and there were other indications that the inhabitants were preparing for emergencies. In Rhodesia I gave special attention to the formation of the Rhodesian Horse, a volunteer force, by the Chartered Company, and to the general efficiency of the Matabeleland Mounted Police. In July 1895, Khama and two other native chiefs were about to sail for England to stop, if possible, the administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate



being given to the Chartered Company. I therefore went to Cape Town to confer with Mr. Rhodes, and afterwards visited Khama at Palapye. . . . I returned to Bulawayo from Cape Town, taking Johannesburg on my way. I again made my own observations as to the discontent of the general population, and finding this discontent more pronounced, I for the first time discussed the position with influential and leading Johannesburg residents engaged in all kinds of businesses and professions, such as Mr. Charles Leonard, the leading solicitor in the place and chairman of the National Union; his brother, Mr. J. W. Leonard, Q.C., formerly Attorney-General in Cape Colony; Mr. Esselen, then Transvaal State Attorney; Mr. Phillips, Mr. Beit's partner; and Mr. George Farrar, an employer of a very large number of white workmen. I had already, as mentioned, had frequent talks with Mr. Hammond. No definite plan or engagement was settled at this visit. In October 1895, a large contingent of the Matabeleland Mounted Police was moved down from Rhodesia through the Bechuanaland Protectorate to Pitsani, and I went to Cape Town, where I had further conversations with Mr. Rhodes and explained to him the opinions I had formed as the result of my visits to Johannesburg respecting the position there, and the intention of the people to rise if they could not otherwise obtain the redress of their grievances. In October and November I was again in Johannesburg, and found matters much advanced. The people generally were convinced that they would never get their rights without force, and they were ready—indeed, determined—to bring matters to an issue. Preparations were being more or less matured by the capitalists, professional men, and others there, who assumed the

position of leaders, and strong speeches were made at Johannesburg by Mr. Phillips and Mr. Farrar. I was satisfied that, not only those who assumed the leadership, but the Uitlander population generally, had not hurriedly, but after grave and prolonged deliberation, come to the conclusion that their grievances would never be redressed by the Transvaal Government without more than a mere threat to resort to force, if necessary, and that there must inevitably be a rising. I had many protracted discussions with the leaders, and was informed of their wishes and plans. Their first proposal was to act alone, but my troops to be in readiness on the border, a common-sense view in which I fully concurred. On further consideration, however, the leaders came to the conclusion that they could not hope to succeed without the co-operation of an armed force. They felt that the only practical way by which the desired reforms could be obtained was by changing the administration of the South African Republic, and that the least violent and safest mode of effecting this was to have a sufficient force in Johannesburg to induce President Kruger to take a plebiscite of whole population, Uitlanders as well as burghers, which should decide if Mr. Kruger should be re-elected, or who should take his place. They, therefore, invited my help, stating that unless they were assured of assistance in Johannesburg the rising would not succeed. I agreed, and it was arranged that I should take my force to Johannesburg to maintain order, and to bring pressure to bear on the Transvaal Government while the redress of grievances was being enforced by the people. I thereupon obtained the letter signed by four representative leaders, with which the Committee is familiar. This letter was

advisedly left undated, it being agreed I should insert the date when, in my judgment, the time for acting upon it arrived. This course was adopted to obviate the necessity of procuring a repetition of the letter at a later date. The time selected for the rising in Johannesburg was the end of December. It was agreed that simultaneously with the rising I was to start. My final arrangements with Johannesburg were that this date should be adhered to as far as possible, though it was thought an earlier date might prove necessary if the Transvaal Government gave signs of massing troops on the border, which would have made it impossible for my force to get through—a rapid march without opposition being essential. Of this necessity I was, with my troops on the border, to be the judge. It was intended that the force should be 800 strong; but, in fact, it mustered only about 500. I returned from Johannesburg to Cape Town, and told Mr. Rhodes I was convinced from the representations made to me that there would be a rising, and that I had received the letter of invitation. I further told him that I had promised to help with my force, and generally the arrangements come to by me with the people in Johannesburg. He agreed, and we arranged that, when the rising took place, he should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal Government and the Uitlanders. From my own conversations with the High Commissioner, I knew that when the rising took place he would go to Johannesburg or Pretoria, but I never alluded to my co-operation with the people in Johannesburg. With these matters settled, I left Cape Town and joined my camp at Pitsani. I required no orders or authority from Mr. Rhodes, and desired neither to

receive nor to send any messages from or to Cape Town. My arrangements were made direct with the people in Johannesburg, and not through the medium of Cape Town. It was, of course, necessary that the utmost secrecy should be observed, and therefore many communications between Pitsani and Johannesburg were sent *viâ* Cape Town, lest a frequent interchange of telegrams between Pitsani and Johannesburg should attract the attention of the Transvaal authorities. The practical transfer of the Bechuanaland Border Police to the Chartered Company, and its consequent annexation to my force, was effected by the middle of December 1895, from which time I was ready to move. I was not waiting for instructions from Cape Town. The establishment of the force at Pitsani, and the concentration of the Bechuanaland Border Police at Mafeking did, in fact, arouse suspicion in the Transvaal as early as the first week of December. I knew that any massing of Boer troops on the Transvaal border would make it impossible for me to get through from Pitsani and fulfil my engagement with the people of Johannesburg, and these Boer suspicions caused me much anxiety, the rising having been determined upon by Johannesburg, the presence of my force being deemed essential to success, and I having agreed to go in. This is the explanation of the urgency of my messages pressing for no delay at Johannesburg. My first telegram to this effect was as early as 8th December. The replies I received from Johannesburg only pointed to delay and postponement, never to the abandonment of the determination, deliberately come to, that there should be an appeal to arms if President Kruger refused to redress the grievances. On 20th December I was asked by Cape Town to send a copy of the

Johannesburg letter of invitation. I therefore had the letter dated 20th December, and sent it to Cape Town. I thought it was possible that something had occurred in Cape Town which might lead to the Government interfering with my freedom of action, the only contingency which would have prevented me from fulfilling my engagement. It was this that led me at the end of December to advise Cape Town that I should "make my own flotation," and start unless I heard expressly to the contrary. . . . It appeared to me evident that the Transvaal authorities knew the position, and that matters in Johannesburg had come to a head. Under my arrangements with the Johannesburg people, I felt I had no alternative but to proceed. I started in the evening of the same day. Captain Holden on the Saturday night, and Major Heany on the following day at noon had arrived at Pitsani from Johannesburg, the former having come across country by road, the latter having come round by rail. They both brought messages to me from the committee at Johannesburg, postponing, not abandoning, the rising; but for the reasons given above I felt obliged to disregard these messages. In conclusion, I desire to state that no telegram, message, or other communication was at any time received by me, or any one at Pitsani or Mafeking, from Mr. Rhodes, or any one at Cape Town, directing or authorising my force to move to Johannesburg. I acted entirely on my own judgment. Major Heany brought me no message from Mr. Rhodes or any one at Cape Town.'

That the High Commissioner was not altogether ignorant of what was going on in Johannesburg is shown by his despatch to Mr. Chamberlain (Blue-

book, c. 8063, p. 37): 'On Sunday the 29th of December 1895, Sir Graham Bower called upon me and informed me that he had learned from Mr. Rhodes on the previous day that all prospect of a rising at Johannesburg was at an end. It had, as Mr. Rhodes remarked, "fizzled out as a damp squib." The capitalists financing the movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a *sine quâ non*. This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto declaring for a republic.'

The code word 'Chairman' in the telegrams was proved to be the High Commissioner, who had talked over the possible rising with Mr. Rhodes, and had agreed with the Premier that he (Robinson) should go up, if there were a rising, and mediate and do his best to obtain civil rights for the Revolutionists. This was fully admitted by Sir Hercules Robinson, telegraphing to Mr. Chamberlain, only he said that 'if a communication of any kind was made to the Reformers with reference to my visiting Johannesburg, on the event of a rising, it was made without my authority or knowledge.' All this projected action was perfectly proper in the High Commissioner, and remembering Sir H. Loch's plan to meet a similar contingency, it is evident that Jameson might very properly have gone to protect life and property after a rising had taken place and a provisional Government had been established at Johannesburg, whereas his rush for Johannesburg to stir up a rising among the Reformers constituted an invasion of the territory of a friendly power. It must be remembered, however, that neither Dr. Jameson, nor for that matter President Kruger, looked upon a movement like the raid with the seriousness and the regard for legality which is natural in Europe, but quite contrary to the uncon-

ventional and careless methods of South Africa. No one, for instance, in South Africa thought the worse of President Kruger for raiding Bechuanaland in 1883-4; and when the President's men raided North Zululand, the Imperial authorities themselves seem to have discarded the red-tape view for the South African view, and let them keep 3000 square miles which they had seized. Also, in the case of the establishment of the Little Free State in Swaziland in defiance of the London Convention, the tolerant attitude of the Imperial Government showed some traces of the Colonial point of view. The Bond leaders—Mr. Hofmeyr at their head—strenuously supported President Kruger's raiders in Bechuanaland in 1884, pointing out that if the Transvaalers were not allowed to keep the territory they had seized in the British Protectorate, after slaying numbers of natives under British protection and driving off their cattle, there would be rebellion among the Dutch in the Cape Colony. No doubt the cases are different. Jameson went in not to take territories, but to assist British residents to obtain the rights of freemen in the Transvaal. President Kruger's men, in Bechuanaland in 1884, attacked and slew the natives under British protection, and seized their lands, and President Kruger himself annexed, by proclamation, the territory thus obtained.

## CHAPTER XV

## THE REVOLT AND PACIFICATION OF MATABELELAND

MR. RHODES was already on his way up to Bulawayo when he was summoned to London by the Board of the Chartered Company. He arrived February 4, 1896. After interviews with Mr. Chamberlain and the directors of the Company, he determined to carry out his original scheme of work, and started for Rhodesia by way of Beira. In Egypt, where he broke his journey, he made arrangements for a monthly shipment of donkeys to Beira, donkeys being proof against tsetse-fly, so fatal to horses in some parts of Rhodesia.

The pending trials in Pretoria and London had made it impossible to speak out, without harming his friends, and though he was openly accused of having sent Jameson in, and of deserting his friend, he kept silence, waiting for the proper time and place to fully declare the truth as to his connection with the revolution and the raid. He placed his resignation in the hands of his solicitor to be delivered to the directors of the Chartered Company, though they, for a considerable time after he had left, declined to part with one of their chief assets, the invaluable man of affairs who had created the Company and made occupation and development so successful. Earl Grey succeeded Dr. Jameson as Administrator, and his able administration was destined to be carried on at a time when most critical occurrences endangered



the Company's prospects, and the very existence of civilisation in Matabeleland was in the balance.

When Mr. Rhodes left England for Beira, however, everything was peaceful in Matabeleland. Dr. Jameson had taken the Company's white police (except forty-eight who remained in the country) to assist the projected movement to establish freedom in the Transvaal, and they had been made prisoners at Doornkop. There were, however, plenty of well-armed native police, and no sign of any disturbance among the Matabele. The settlers were, in fact, perfectly confident that all danger from the natives was over. The growing prosperity of the country left little to be desired. Bulawayo was rapidly developing into an important town, with churches, hotels, banks, newspapers, and a stock exchange. Waterworks were approaching completion, and electric lighting was planned. White settlers, like Mr. Selous, whose admirable book, *Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia*, is the authority for the events of this period, were living with their wives and families on their farms and on the best of terms with the natives. That occasional roughness to the black man, in his capacity of labourer, may have occurred is what was to be expected in any new mining community, in which there are sure to be a few outcasts of civilisation; but not only does Mr. Selous, whose accuracy can be relied on, deny any general ill-usage, but Mr. Bryce had in the previous year been struck by the remarkable superiority of the class of men who had settled in the country to any settlers he had seen in the English-speaking mining communities elsewhere. That there was nothing to call for any general dissatisfaction with the Company's administration seems, after exhaustive inquiry, to be certain.

Mr. Rhodes had taken a great deal of trouble personally in previous years to fit the new civilisation to the capacities of the natives. Knowing the native mind well, he knew they could not at once understand the white man's laws and administration, and he therefore allowed the natives to remain as much as possible under their own native laws, administered by their Indunas. The chief changes in the law were the more serious punishments assigned for rape, murder, and witchcraft. Mr. Rhodes travelled through the country on several occasions, met the chiefs, and carefully explained to them in detail the requirements of the white man's law; though, except for the serious crimes above enumerated, he left them under their own tribal law. The law was equally administered and equal justice dealt out by the magistrates to black man and white, as the magistrates' reports preserved in the Crown Prosecutor's Office still show. The testimony of the missionaries of the Church of England and various other denominations is to the same effect. The Rev. C. D. Helm, for instance, the senior missionary of the London Missionary Society, who had lived for many years in Matabeleland, found that whenever any unfair treatment of a black man was brought before the officials, justice was done between black man and white with perfect impartiality. The most common wrong-doing occurred with the rougher prospectors, who would sometimes try to trick their natives out of their wages. Any uninvited interference of white men with black women was unknown. The lash could not be inflicted by magistrates, but only by order of the judge of the High Court, and in very serious cases, as in the mother-country.

There had been, indeed, a temporary difficulty

about the cattle of Lobengula which had become the property of the Company, but that had been got over by a division in which the natives were given three-fifths of 70,000 head and the Company took the rest, an arrangement which naturally satisfied the recipients of the Company's bounty. The real causes of the rebellion are plain enough now after the event. The rebel Indunas who survived the war have since explained that the natives had for some considerable time before resolved to try conclusions with the white settlers. They did not think they were fairly or fully beaten, and the peace and quiet of the new order of things were very irksome to men bred up to rapine and war. Moreover, they had found a way of obtaining plenty of rifles and ammunition. The Boers of the Northern Transvaal are expert cattle lifters, and used to cross the Limpopo for the purpose. They were also quite willing to trade, and used to exchange their rifles and cartridges for cattle, knowing that the President would always supply arms to any Boer farmer, or borderer, who reported his loss, these men being the solid fighting foundation of his Government. The discovery of these rifles, bearing the Government mark, in the possession of the Matabele rebels, produced at first the natural but erroneous impression that Pretoria was behind the rebellion. The severe regulation against witchcraft and the crimes it produced made the witch doctors use all the influence they possessed to foster an outbreak.

The first rumours of an approaching overthrow of the whites began in February and the opening of March, and were traced to that mysterious semi-divine personage the M'Limo, who lived in a cave in the Matoppos. Then to precipitate the rising came the rinderpest, the terrible cattle plague, moving south-

wards and exterminating the cattle, the whole wealth of the natives. The rinderpest reached Bulawayo March 5, and on March 9 the High Commissioner's proclamation gave powers to segregate and kill the herds affected. Naturally enough, the Matabele owner could not understand the real reason for destroying his cattle, and looked upon the white man's action as a wanton injustice. There were other but minor contributory causes—the absence of the white police force, and the co-operation with the rebels of the bulk of the native police, who deserted with their weapons when the war began. The native police had already made the white man's rule disliked by their swaggering violence in the kraals they entered, where, puffed up with their position, they oppressed their own relatives, taking possession by force both of cattle and women. This was a chief complaint at the great Indaba in the Matoppos at which Mr. Rhodes presided later in the year.

On March 20 the rebellion actually broke out, and opened with a general massacre of white men, women, and children throughout the country. This merciless slaughter of women and children raised the white settlers' blood to boiling point, and they at once concentrated on Bulawayo, where there were a good supply of rifles and ammunition. Thence columns started to relieve the settlers in distant parts of the country. There were not three hundred whites left for this service after garrisoning Bulawayo and sending a force to keep open communications by the Mangwe road. It must be remembered that at this time the nearest railway station from the Cape was six hundred miles off; but Mr. Rhodes's telegraph was fortunately in good working order, and the High Commissioner permitted rifles and ammunition to be taken and sent

up from the Government stores at Mafeking, while Colonel Plymmer went to that town and raised a force of about seven hundred to march to Bulawayo. This force included some of Dr. Jameson's men released from prison in Pretoria, and it reached Bulawayo in the middle of May.

Meanwhile Mr. Rhodes, who had some time before arrived in Mashonaland from Beira, took his place and shared the fighting in the relief force that went up from Salisbury under Colonel Beal. Colonel Napier's column had come out from Bulawayo to meet them, and the combined forces soon had sharp skirmishing. The discovery of the mutilated remains of white women and children gave additional vigour to the punishment dealt out to the murderers. Soon after his arrival at Bulawayo, Mr. Rhodes went out again with Captain M'Farlane's patrol and joined in the fighting on the Umguza; and at Shiloh and Thabas-i-Mamba was in the thick of very severe encounters, where his perfect coolness under the hottest fire won him golden opinions among the young Rhodesians.

In the beginning of June, General Carrington came up and took the command of the forces, but was delayed for a time in his campaign against the Matabele by a rising in Mashonaland. On July 4 the Bulawayo field force, which was disbanded, was succeeded by a force largely composed of Imperial troops, and the centre of the operations was shifted to the Matoppos, where the rebels stood at bay. Colonel Plumer and Colonel Baden-Powell entered the range of hills and lost heavily in a number of small but very severe engagements. In the fortnight ending 5th August the loss was twenty per cent. in killed and wounded in a column 1000 strong. It was clear that

it would require five or six times the number of men to cope with the rebel Indunas in their hill fastnesses, for a great part of the fighting was cave-fighting, and the natives knowing every inch of the ground were able to make a stubborn defence. General Carrington, a soldier with great experience of South African warfare, considered that there was no alternative, and that a force of 5000 men at least must be sent up the following year.

Mr. Rhodes was in consternation. This fresh campaign would cost probably five millions, with the enormous cost of carriage for supplies over six hundred miles, a cost greatly increased by the ravages of the rinderpest. If this campaign took place, the Company would be ruined. The rebels held their own in the hills and disregarded the proclamation which offered pardon on terms too severe to be even considered. Mr. Rhodes thought he saw a way out of the difficulty, and put it before General Carrington and obtained his consent and approval. The plan was this—that he, as the known head-man of all the whites, should go unguarded and unarmed into the fastnesses of the Matabele and try by his persuasive powers to induce them to come to terms. That Mr. Rhodes can win educated and reasoning men, as he can do a deal with any fair man of business, was known to all who remembered his success with Mr. Schnadhorst and Mr. Barnato, the first of whom he converted to Imperialism, the second to consent to let a portion of the profits of his company be used for Imperial expansion. But he now undertook a very different enterprise, in which he had to take his life in his hand and depend on the power of his personality, man to man, to win over these savage and formidable rebels.

In order to inspire confidence in the natives, Mr.

Rhodes left the troops and moved his camp away into the skirts of the hills. There he lay for six weeks within easy reach of the enemy. The camp could have been rushed any night, and there was not a bayonet to protect him. Gradually this attitude of the great white chief inspired confidence in the natives. Mr. Rhodes had with him the assistance of that most admirable negotiator with black men, Mr. Colenbrander; and just what they were both hoping for came to pass, when a messenger arrived to say they were invited to a great council or Indaba in the depth of the hills some miles off.

The chiefs sent to say they hoped their old friend, 'Johann' (Mr. Colenbrander, who had taken one at least of these rebel Indunas to London some seven years before) would come and talk with them, and they would wish, but they hardly hoped, the great white man (Mr. Rhodes) would come. There was of course the danger that this was a plan to get Mr. Rhodes into their power. He saw the risk, but he did not hesitate. He mounted at once and set off, refusing to take any weapon, but accompanied by three white men, who carried revolvers. The little party rode to the place appointed, where they were in the midst of ambushed swarms of armed Matabele. The white men dismounted, and after a delay, which seemed endless and suggested bad faith, the chiefs filed down from their ambush in the crags of the kopje and formed in the half-moon Zulu crescent round the white men. Mr. Rhodes greeted them in Zulu, and then a long and animated discussion followed. The chiefs declared their grievances, and the white envoy told them how he would have those grievances removed. Then Mr. Rhodes came to the point briefly—'All that is of the past. Now for the future—is it peace or

is it war?' The chiefs each lifted a stick and threw it down at the white man's feet, saying, 'See, this is my gun; I throw it down at your feet,' and 'this is my assegai,' followed by the same gesture. 'We are all here to-day. We give you one word: it is peace. The war is over,' was the chiefs' final assurance, and thus after four hours' consultation the work of an army was accomplished, peace which proved to be permanent was secured, and the war was really ended.

The fearlessness and dignity of the white chief—the strong man talking freely and fairly with strong if savage men—secured their admiration and confidence. Mr. Rhodes years before had said in the Cape Parliament, speaking of the natives, 'I believe that they are not different from ourselves'; and as he expected, his trust and goodwill towards them provoked the same feelings in them towards him. After his return from this momentous council, Mr. Rhodes remained in his camp, unguarded as before, and was open all day to the visits of any of the chiefs. They used to send no notice that they were coming, but simply walk in and sit down and talk to their 'Father and King,' as they called him, and discuss the way in which they were to be ruled in the future. At these informal meetings the big unconventional Englishman was in his element, and used to chaff the chiefs, and point out genially how easy it would be to send their young men down at night and kill him. The chiefs, quite hurt at first, till they perceived that he spoke in fun, would entreat him not to suspect them of treachery. And so at last he completely won the full trust and affection of the chiefs, and they used to come and sleep at his camp, and even brought their wives out of the hills, suspicion and doubt having finally passed away.



The knowledge that Mr. Rhodes would live among them and see that they were fairly treated, and that the terms of peace were scrupulously kept, helped to make the arrangement effective. Mr. Rhodes had afterwards to use all his influence to conquer the Imperial officer's reluctance to accept an arrangement that was not marked by a hanging assizes. In fact, he had to threaten to go back to the Matabele, and throw in his lot with them to carry through the policy of forgiveness which he had devised and guaranteed when he said 'all that is of the past.' The advocates of a stern policy of justice, of trials and hangings, predicted utter failure for this policy of mercy; but Mr. Rhodes proved to be right—the Matabele chiefs kept their word. The war was really over, as they said, and the pacification of Matabeleland, thus dramatically effected at that impressive council, has never been seriously disturbed since then.

Mr. Rhodes has been often assailed for a want of ethical development, but it is doubtful if General Gordon could have done any better in this business than his sometime comrade in Basutoland, one of whose earliest political utterances was his rough protest against disarming the Basutos, because he saw the injustice and hardship it would be to them. Mr. Rhodes had already let the Matabele feel the hand of iron, taking an active part himself in giving them a lasting lesson in the earlier engagements of the revolt; but when they were driven into the hills and half-starving, he considered that the time had come for forgiveness, and he carried his policy through.

Mr. Rhodes's plan for the future was to make the chiefs salaried officers of the Company, and to trust to them to manage their unruly young men, and induce them to come and work for wages on the

farms and in the mines. Idleness is the curse of life in Mr. Rhodes's view, the secret of happiness is work, and by the dissemination through their chiefs of this practical philosophy in Rhodesia, he looked to win them to habits of regular industry, which would more than anything else expel the old military spirit, and ensure the speedy advance of civilisation among them. Mr. Rhodes holds with the foremost living exponent of evolution that 'there are certain stages through which society must pass in its onward march from barbarism to civilisation. Now one of these stages has always been some form or other of despotism, such as feudalism or servitude or a despotic paternal government; and we have every reason to believe that it is not possible for humanity to leap over this transition epoch, and pass at once from pure savagery to free civilisation.'

If Mr. Rhodes's presence during the Matabele revolt was a godsend to the natives, whom he befriended and saved from the stern reprisals that would otherwise have followed surrender, it was little less to the white community, whom his cheerful faith in the future, and good-humoured acceptance of the hardships and difficulties of the present, infected with something of his own genial optimism. When the great man of South Africa said, 'So far as I am personally concerned, I have been a happy man since I have been amongst you,' it was not for ordinary mortals to complain. He enjoyed sharing with his young men, his fellow-colonists, the dangers and discomforts of this crisis in the affairs of their common country. 'You must not think,' he said, in a speech at Bulawayo, 'that I incurred unnecessary risk in proceeding with the columns you have sent into the field. I thought that by going with them I

should get a knowledge of the people and a knowledge of the country, and I should share with the people their risks and their responsibilities.' The free, unconventional life with the columns out on the veldt suited a primitive nature that loves reality and hates show and sham, and the close intercourse of facing danger and death together carried men past the defensive veneer of cynicism and coldness, which really conceals a good deal of natural shyness and a benevolence which is anxious above all things to avoid recognition. His bluff English sincerity, which rather likes to call a spade a spade, was here appreciated, being a sure pass-key to the sympathies of the adventurous advance guard of civilisation with whom he had cast in his lot. After the pacification of Matabeleland, his popularity and influence were based on the firm foundation of their personal knowledge of the man. The gentler and tenderer side of his nature was brought out by such an event as the death of poor Hubert Hervey, who was mortally wounded at the storming of Sikombo's stronghold, and asked for and found pleasure in a serious talk with Mr. Rhodes, in which he entrusted to him his last wishes before his death. How deeply the unselfish Imperialism of Hervey impressed Mr. Rhodes is to be found well described in Earl Grey's interesting memorial volume.

The speeches of this period are not numerous, but are specially interesting as being addressed to a community of English and Dutch colonists, fighting a savage enemy, with their backs to the wall against overwhelming odds. The speech I give first was made early in June 1896 soon after Mr. Rhodes arrived at Bulawayo with the Salisbury relief column, and immediately before he went out with Captain Macfarlane's column to attack the rebels on the

Umguz River. Fortunately, Bulawayo possesses excellent newspapers, and to one of these, the *Bulawayo Chronicle*, I am largely indebted for my version of this and other speeches.

‘Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott, and Gentlemen,—I have to thank you for the manner in which my health has been proposed and received by you. I thank Mr. Scott for proposing my health, but while expatiating on my performances and on the ideas, years ago entertained by me, of proving and pioneering the northern country, he forgot to add that my aspirations could never have been realised had it not been for the people who carried out those ideas. It was easy to take the initiative, and easy to keep the path open, but it would have been impossible to accomplish my ideas had not the people grasped them and carried them out. Moreover, we must not forget the men who took in hand an undertaking which seemed almost bound to be a failure. I refer to the march into Mashonaland, where, having arrived, the expedition found that gold could not be gathered like fruit from gooseberry bushes, but that hard blows and discomfort had to be encountered. That too has been the history of Matabeleland, but now you have overridden the difficulties of the situation, and are within measurable distance of a successful issue. I was only thinking to-day, when I sat on the hill where Government House is now situate, and where Lobengula used to reside, if he could but come back, and sitting there, look towards Thabas Indunas and towards the town you have built, what would he

think of the town and of the people. I am told that the M'Limpo, who is supposed by the Matabele to live in some mountain cave, has told them that they must not touch that Government House until they have dealt with the people here, and when Bulawayans are exterminated, and when they then go to the house, they will find Lobengula there; but I am afraid their anticipations in this respect will not be gratified.

'Now, Mr. Chairman, Lobengula's country has progressed marvellously when you think of its remoteness from civilisation. That we are doing our best towards its progress I think you will admit. The arrangements have been completed for the eastern railway, so that as far as transport is concerned there will be no question of fly or fever. We have also been able to obtain the money to give you the connection with the south. That railway is being pushed on with all possible speed. With regard to the material for its construction, the Cape authorities are giving the carriage of such material the preference before even the goods for the Transvaal. The rails are being forwarded at the rate of one mile, or two train-loads, per diem, and we will lay the rails as fast as the Cape authorities give us them. Some of you have suggested that the rails should be laid simply on the veldt, but at Mangwe you could not do so. In so far as the balance is concerned, as fast as the Cape authorities will give us the rails we will lengthen our substantial line. I do not propose to prophesy, but still I think that in two years you should have the

railway to Bulawayo. In deference alike to mutes and grousers, I do not think it possible to finish the line within the year, but if, within twelve or fifteen months, it reaches Palapye, it is then within a reasonable distance. The Chartered Company have done their utmost to bring you within reach of speedy railway communication.

‘With regard to the mines, they will pay the cost of development, but we also know that such cost will be reduced by one-half if railway communication is established. As to the future, when discussing it I think our conversation would begin and end with railways, but we can say no more than that we will give you the railway within the shortest time possible.

‘You have, of course, been cursed with the Matabele war, but I think you will feel a certain satisfaction that you have dealt with it by yourselves. We all most heartily greet General Carrington. I can personally, and I am sure Earl Grey can also. He is one of us. He is not new from home, but has passed the best years of his life amongst the Colonials, and if I were to choose a leader in any colonial war, I should say, “Give me Sir Frederick Carrington.” He has carried through successfully whatever warfare he has been connected with, and it has given me confidence to know that he is among us. Within twenty-four hours he arranged his plan of campaign, and within three days as many columns will go out. I myself feel personally satisfied, for behind the place where I reside there is bush, and from that

bush the Matabele have occasionally come out and threatened, the town. This gives an uncomfortable sense of insecurity. I feel a personal satisfaction in the knowledge that General Carrington is putting three commandoes behind the place where I am residing. A gentleman has been good enough to refer to the danger incurred by me in going out with the troops, but the column with which I have been has been most fortunate, and the dangers encountered by us have been few. I do not, however, shut my eyes to the fact that you people here have had a terrible time. Your list of killed and wounded is severe in the extreme. It shows how bravely you have met the situation. Remembering the history of the Cape Colony, one remembers that the usual case has been that the Kaffirs have been met and defeated in some big battles, and then the war has been at an end; but here they come up after defeats like a Jack-in-the-box. You meet them, and they suffer defeat one day, but the next day they reappear as if nothing had happened. Now we shall have to hunt them in the bush, and in the stones, and in the kopjes, in a country nearly half the size of Europe. But there must come a moment when they will find the hopelessness of the situation. Their food supplies will fail, and their courage will disappear. After General Carrington has dealt with them, it will be our duty to keep a large police force. Such a force, with posts distributed through the country, will give miners and farmers a sense of security, and they will be enabled to carry on their work without fear of

molestation. We shall have to accept the suggestions of General Carrington and Sir Richard Martin as to where such forts must be placed.

‘It is a wonder to me how we have got through our difficulties as we have. Nearly everything has had to be carried five or six hundred miles. Providence has sent us rinderpest, and its outcome will be a railroad, and as to horses, ever since we came to the country we have been continually getting them up, and they have as continually died. We cannot deal with the question thus, but you know they do without horses in Egypt. They have most admirable donkeys in Egypt, and when there I arranged for a monthly shipment to Beira. I had hardly arranged for these donkeys to arrive here when I received a peremptory telegram, asking if it was correct that I was arranging for the importation of Soudanese. I replied promptly, gentlemen, that it was totally incorrect, and that the only animals I was receiving or arranging for were donkeys. The Egyptian donkeys are far in advance of the donkeys of this country. You go in for horses. They die. Then get donkeys. One thing that the pioneer farmers have done is that they have come into Matabeleland and collected cattle, and it is surprising to me that so many were recently holding each of them two or three hundred head, and were accordingly far in advance of many of their brethren at the Cape. Unfortunately when the rinderpest came they died, and then there were the misfortunes caused by the war. All this is without precedent. In the Cape



House we have always refused compensation for war losses, and notwithstanding the present unprecedented position of Matabeleland, it is to the Chartered Company's credit that they intend giving compensation.

‘ Now, gentlemen, I have noticed that every elective body in the neighbouring states has been discussing and settling your future ; but they have forgotten one item ; they have not considered that you have a voice in it. I have always stated very clearly what I thought of the future of the country. I recognised it was not a tropical country. The population could not always remain purely native. Taking the Niger and East African settlements as examples, they suffered on that account. But this country will be the abode of a white race. If I am allowed to remain and work with you, I look in the future for the Charter to lapse, and for you to become a self-governing body, and that as speedily as possible. If we get railways into the country, we shall find the population increase very rapidly, and if you ask me how to get rid of the Charter and become a self-governing body, I think that matter can be dealt with satisfactorily without hurt to the shareholders. I only mention this, seeing that the future of the country has been dealt with by your neighbours, whether by amalgamation to the Transvaal or by absorption by the Cape Colony, and because I have never heard any one ask what you thought yourselves. I can clearly see that you will become another state in South Africa, and it will be my

duty to think out the plan by which that self-governing state may be created with the greatest advantage to yourselves ; but as to Transvaal or Cape absorption, that is impossible. You have only got to look at the map to see the extent of your possessions. They are not bounded by the Zambesi. Five years hence you will say the best of our province is north of the Zambesi River, and the country north of that river you must look on as your own. This rests with yourselves, and your cordial co-operation will carry it through.

‘ I think you will agree with me, however, that the war must be settled first, and that the population at present is rather too small. There might be an intermediate stage of representation in the Council leading to the ultimate object of self-government ; but I wish again to repeat to you that the idea that the Charter can remain for ever over a white community is untenable, but when the settlement of this country was first mooted, the Crown and the Cape Colony both rejected it, and my own solution of the Charter was adopted. I do not think the shareholders have been fattening on your substance. I think the best thing the Chartered Company has done has been its steady determination to develop the southern railway, and that will make the link between us. I do not think you will ever be governed from Cape Town. Always looking to your future as an independent state, you will keep in your hearts the idea, ‘ Free trade and speedy communication with the Cape.’ Their laws have been made forty years, and are the best, with

certain amendments, that we can possibly make. We will not carry out a policy of isolation. We will give them free trade to the utmost, and speedy communication ; similar laws as far as possible ; and, in the near future, mutual defence ; and I think the word to express that is federation. I am glad of this opportunity to say so. Because of certain unfortunate circumstances I do not change one statement or one idea I have put forward in the Cape House ; my policy has always been self-government in the north. Why I mention this to-night is that I wish to clear away the idea that because one's situation changes, one's policy changes. If I have a say in the country, my policy will never change. I would be a very small human being if I altered, through the recent troubles, the ideas of a lifetime. I hope you will prepare your minds for the ideas I conceive and intend to confer about with the shareholders, namely, some mode of self-government as a means of making you one of the states of South Africa, and above all, that the end of our efforts shall be South African federation.'

Another speech of this period which may be given here is an after-dinner speech made at a later date, when the war was over, at a banquet given to Colonel Napier at Bulawayo. An interesting point is the prophecy that those who come out to make money and go home, will go home, but will not be able to resist the fascinations of the new country, and will return to it.

'Looking back over the war in Matabeleland, however sceptical any one of us may be, you will

admit that for three hundred men who went out to fight the natives numbering about six thousand, the record of a butcher's bill of about seventy-five is a very fair one. After you had broken the natives up, we were fortunate enough to get Imperial troops and to have them under the guidance of General Carrington, and I think we should be thankful that when Her Majesty's Government thought it advisable to assist us, they sent us a man like General Carrington, the best part of whose life has been connected with the Colonial service.

'Some of you have expressed considerable sympathy with myself. I may say that it is not needed. If you were to look to find what is the pleasantest work in life, I think you would find it in the development of a country as big as France, Germany, and Spain combined. You have been good enough to give my name to the country which you occupy. In considering the various courses in life, which a man might pursue, I cannot think of any pleasanter course than the making of a country in which the inhabitants have so firm a belief. When I viewed the country in the various commandoes, that I have been out with, I found how good the country is. I find it is admirable for agriculture; it is without a rival for stock, and I feel quite clear about the future even if the mineral development be not what you expect it to be. I repeat to you what I have repeatedly said to shareholders, the world has never met with a country which, being four hundred miles in length and two hundred miles in width, and mineralised in every direction, does not contain paying properties.

‘One satisfaction I feel over our present difficulties is that they are undoubtedly hastening your railway. I have told you plainly about the offer of Mr. Pauling to bring you the railway to Bulawayo by 1897, and they are pushing on the railway from Beira as hard as they can. The war, therefore, has not been an unmixed evil. You have the offer, which is almost closed with, of a railway by 1897, and we have given our pledge to Salisbury to unite you by speedy railway communication. Those who are here as representatives of companies and syndicates will then be able to deal with the properties on a fair basis; whereas with meal at £7 or £8 a muid, and timber at such high prices, you would find it very difficult to work any mine and make it pay. And so I would put it to you that the war has not been an unmixed evil, for it will bring speedy railway communication, on which all your success must be based.

‘As for myself you have been kind enough to ask me to speak, which I did not expect, but I may tell you in very plain language that in the circumstances which I now find myself with you, so far as the judgment I have been able to form goes, one can have no more attractive occupation than the development of a country from barbarism to civilisation.

‘I am here amongst you, and you have done me the favour of giving this country my name. My return for that will be to make this country as great as I can. Please remember that I respect individually, and feel for any one who has had the feeling of adventure strong enough to come out

of civilisation and to take his risks with us in this country.

‘Do not let us think for one moment that we are in a country of no prospects; we are in a country with every prospect. When you speak of the Government—it is natural to go for some one—remember the Government has had great difficulties which it has passed through, and so far as the thoughts of an unofficial individual are of use, I repeat what I said the other day, that the first question is to get the railway to you and of course to get the war over, and I feel confident that if General Carrington remains with us we shall get it over soon. With the enormous mass of minerals that exist—I believe that 60,000 claims have already been pegged—I am perfectly certain that you will find any quantity of payable gold. And then you must get the rights of civilised citizens, and I see the way to glide from the present position to representation for the people, and from that to a state of self-government by the people. You may say that a charter is ridiculous, but it is the first step. With the first step under the Imperial supervision, you would not have had the railway or the development, on account of the timidity of the English people; but I would be the first to say that it is only temporary, and that our government must be primarily by an elective system, and finally by a full and complete system. If you claim to be politicians you must think these things out, and what I said the other day, when you were good enough to give me a dinner, I repeat—amalgamation with the Cape

would not be justice with this community, on account of the distance; but you can grow into a self-governing body.

‘There are many of you here who think that you will make your pile and disappear. Now I am going to make a forecast. I have seen the same thing in Kimberley and in many parts of South Africa, and you find that when the pile is made you cannot throw yourself back into English life, and you will soon find yourself back here again.

‘The future is big; it is fast bringing up the railway, and then out of those endless minerals certain reefs will pay, and we shall grow into a big community, and while we accept the present system we shall look at the future, which will bring us a share in the government of the country. We shall develop the State, not on lines of antagonism to the rest of South Africa, but of harmony with it. We must be careful; we cannot take responsibility at present; the temporary position suits us. With railway communication will come proper development and proper working of the reefs that we possess. As soon as that occurs and our population increases we shall have the confidence to take the responsibility of our position, and we shall take that position not in antagonism to the rest of the states in South Africa, but in perfect harmony with them.’

## CHAPTER XVI

## THE POLITICAL SITUATION AT THE CAPE, 1896-99

MATABELELAND was now perfectly peaceful, and Mr. Rhodes prepared to leave his accomplished work for the ordeal of an examination before the Select Committee of the House at Westminster. He left Rhodesia by way of Salisbury, Umtali, and Beira in order to arrange for the completion of the east coast railway to Mashonaland. From Beira he might most easily have returned, as he had come out earlier in the year, by way of Egypt. He decided to face the music at the Cape, where Mr. Hofmeyr and the Afrikaner Bond could find no words bad enough for their former ally. Mr. Hofmeyr's old dream of a united and independent Dutch South Africa, free or practically free from the Imperial supremacy, closely resembles President Kruger's; but though far superior in education and culture, Mr. Hofmeyr has not the old peasant's daring nor yet his stubborn tenacity of purpose and dogged perseverance of action. It was felt by Mr. Rhodes's South African advisers that Mr. Hofmeyr and the Cape Dutch Republicans would, if Mr. Rhodes returned to the Cape, receive him with open hostility. Mr. Rhodes, however, is afraid of nothing, and, indeed, rather enjoys a tussle; so, in spite of all warnings, he left Beira for the Cape.

The news of his departure was received with enthusiasm by the loyal Colonists of Cape Town,



who at once organised a reception. The steamer did not stay long at Durban, and there was no formal demonstration; but when Port Elizabeth was reached, a great assemblage of Colonists was awaiting his arrival. Forty old Rhodesians took the place of the horses and drew the empire-maker through the streets to the Town Hall. After the luncheon Mr. Rhodes got up and made, absolutely without preparation, one of those rather rambling but deeply interesting speeches for which he is famous. 'Nobody can accuse me of preparing a speech,' he once remarked in the Cape House; and though careful preparation would give a better choice of language, yet the grasp of facts and the great ideas, and above all the intense sincerity of the speaker, generally enable him to do very well without it. This speech at Port Elizabeth is important as the first laying down his intentions in politics after the catastrophe of the Raid, the first I mean after the fighting speech at Kimberley, which, being quite unexpected by the public, was never verbally reported. A very significant point in this speech was the idea put forward by Mr. Rhodes of a practical solution of the Transvaal problem, namely, that the major portion of President Kruger's burghers, his backbone of fighting men, would gradually leave the Transvaal for Rhodesia, attracted by the excellent pasturage and vast unoccupied areas, and that in Rhodesia they would become loyal citizens of the British Empire, learning by experience of good government and intercourse with their British fellow-settlers the falseness of the notions of British tyranny and injustice with which they had been for years indoctrinated by President Kruger and his anti-British supporters. The problem of South African union was being worked out thus in Rhodesia. Of course the 'high individual in the Transvaal'

here referred to is the Transvaal Commandant-General, whose appeal I have given in full in an earlier chapter.

‘Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen, I must take you into my confidence. I was not aware I should have the honour of sitting down with so many of you to-day, and so I am without a speech. But if I am without a speech, the best thing is to tell you, and those around me, the thoughts of my mind. I am frank enough to own that I have had a troublesome year—a pretty troublesome year. But during that period, whilst I was in the remote North, I often used to get some expression of sympathy from friends, which used to give me help. I remember one who suffered in Johannesburg. He sent me word to say, “There is one pleasure about all this; we know now who are men and who are not.” And if I can put to you a thought, it is that the man who is continually prosperous does not know himself exactly, his own mind and character. It is a good thing if one has a period of adversity. And further, there is another thought connected with that; you find out who are your real friends. I will admit, Mr. Mayor—for I am ready to confess all my faults—that my experience has been this: from those from whom I expected most I got least, and from the most remote quarters and remote districts I got a kindly feeling, a kindly thought, and a kindly consideration I never expected. It is needless for me to refer to the reception your citizens have given me to-day. I understand that reception. It means that they have calmly

considered my actions in the past, and feel that I have done my best in the interests of the country.

‘Gentlemen, your Mayor has referred to the amalgamation of the Kimberley mines, but perhaps he does not know a story about it. Well, we sat down one night and arranged the terms of the amalgamation. Of those who held the principal interest in the mines there were three. We each sat down and made a condition. I will not refer to the conditions made by my other two friends present, but I said, “I want the power to go to the Zambesi to spend your money made out of the diamonds to take a country and form an empire.” It was very unusual. Can you fancy a more ridiculous thing than that the diamond mines should be made to create a territory? But I was obstinate, and sat there until four o’clock in the morning. Seeing that I was determined, I remember one of my friends saying, “Some people have a fancy for this thing and some for that thing, but you have a fancy for making an empire. Well, I suppose we must give it to you.” And if you read the trust-deed of De Beers, you will see how it was changed.

‘Well, gentlemen, you have congratulated me to-day on the work in the North. That work was, in the first place, largely dependent on the great interest taken in it by De Beers. As a result of that interest De Beers have given, from first to last, £500,000 to the work in the North. They gave the money reluctantly, but they now have the satisfaction of knowing that they will get their money back again. So you see how a thought may change your life. But

you must remember a man may have many thoughts. Every man has his thoughts, but the difficulty is to get the pounds, shillings, and pence to carry out those thoughts. For ten years my life was spent in looking after the mines, and doing the best I could for them on behalf of the shareholders, and I thought it a very fair return to make to me that the trust-deeds should be altered to give me my hobby ; and without going into details, you know, if you have watched the history of this country for the past ten years, how this has worked out. You have the plain practical fact that a country two thousand miles by one thousand miles has been added to the empire, and the relations of the African States have been changed. It is needless for me to say what would have occurred if a huge, a tremendous power in the North had grown up out of sympathy with the South. It is also needless for me to say that those who met under the shadow of Table Mountain failed to recognise that fact, and so whatever faults there may have been in this individual, he can reply with a clear and clean mind on that point on which you have greeted him to-day.

‘ It is fortunate that in the troubles of this year, I think I was able to see the right place to go to, and a right public course to take. I was told that my public life was at an end, but the first thing I told them was that it was only beginning. You will excuse the personal nature of my remark, but it is a true one. No man objects more than I do to the “ I ” or to too frequent personal reference, but sometimes one cannot help it. Well, we have been fortunate in the North

owing to one of those unusual things which has occurred; the different powers that be were all in concord. We have often had experience of difficulties and differences with the Imperial representatives, but fortunately in this instance General Carrington came out to the North. He is practically an old colonist, much more so than I am. In every difficulty that occurred—I was occupying an unofficial position—there was the Administrator, who took my advice in almost everything in the kindest and nicest way possible, and General Carrington, who was in cordial agreement. General Carrington has done what few Imperial officers would have done. He could have ordered up needless troops. There was no transport, and they could not get transport. General Carrington seized the situation, and instead of ordering up five or ten thousand troops, directed his efforts to the better purpose of bringing the war to an end. The ordinary Imperial officer, without regard to the difficulties of transport, would have said, "I must have ten thousand men, and I will have them." The transport would have then broken down, and incidents which would have been called the horrors of the North would have occurred. General Carrington seized the situation, not only as regards military occupation, but also as regards transport. Rinderpest had broken out and decimated the cattle, and only a certain number of mules could be purchased for love or money. It was by all working in cordiality that the war was brought to a conclusion. And I would venture to say, after deep thought on the question,

that there is no chance of its breaking out again. You may have the usual scares sent down, but the people have really submitted.

‘I will tell you something as an amusing instance of the sort of report that gets abroad and creates a scare. It is rather a good story. The other day some of these poor creatures—they were almost starving—went out to hunt hares, and it was immediately telegraphed that the impis were out. I am not sure that the Deputy-Commissioner was not fully of that opinion. They found out afterwards that the men were hunting hares because they were starving. So all I tell you is, that when you get telegrams of that nature, accept them *cum grano salis*. Well, what is the result? We have got the country, and one result of the war is that railway communication is assured. It is not a case of proposing to make railways. The contracts are sanctioned, and so, at the end of next year, this port will be in communication with Bulawayo.

‘Now, sir, in all my thoughts about this question in the North, there has been but one object. It is a clear and distinct idea drawn from past history, that no savage country can long remain vacant; and further, from its situation, that the Cape Colony should be the dominant power from the South to Central Africa. I have often said that in the House of Assembly, and it has been supposed to have been a political remark. Now, I repeat it here without any one thinking it a political remark. It is an idea of mine, and I think it is a correct idea. I have

done everything for it in my power—by railway communication, by assimilating the laws, by taking up young people from the South, and putting them into our administration of affairs, because our country is not one in which “no Afrikaner need apply.” I have done all in my power to assimilate the North with the South. I have said in the past, if you could get into a balloon and look down on Africa, and find it possible for a man to have his head under one law and his body under another, how ridiculous it would seem. If you think that, and you are in a position to help to bring about a change, it is your duty to bring about such a change—and so it is with the North. It is at the present moment administered almost entirely by your people, there are no hostile tariffs, you will shortly have railway communication, I can assure you positively ; and so, if you are aware of my faults, I shall always ask you to credit me with this point. Whilst I am on the question of railways, I may say this, and I told them so at Salisbury, that after railway communication has been established to Bulawayo, and Salisbury has communication with the East, we can well leave railways alone for the present. I don’t want competition between the East and the South. I don’t say this as a matter of politics, but if you have undertaken heavy expenditure with railways, you are fools if you make them compete to cut each other’s throats.

‘One of the most interesting things in the North is the position in connection with the various states. You will be surprised to know, that in addition to the

large numbers there from the Cape Colony, we have a large number from the Free State., President Kruger's country has sent a thousand human beings there. I have been fighting in company with them lately, and I know no more loyal citizens in the North than those who have come from the Transvaal. It is, Mr. Mayor, a pure question of business. They have discovered that there is sweet veld in the North and sour veld in the Transvaal. I will venture to make a forecast, that before half a century has passed away, we in the North shall have the major portion of the burghers of the Transvaal. I know of none of the thousands of men, women, and children there more loyal to the country, more willing to take a share in the responsibilities of government, than the burghers from the Transvaal. I do not think the high individual in the Transvaal who a year ago addressed lamentations to the burghers, warning them that they must not trek into this country—I do not think he was aware that there was sweet veld there. All I can tell you is that burghers from the Transvaal are there, and I believe that a very large number of Transvaal burghers will yet throw in their lot with us in the Chartered territory.

‘There are also a very large number in our administration of young men from the Cape Colony. One of the grievances of Queenstown, I believe, is that we have taken all their young men. And, gentlemen, our native administration there is largely composed of men from Natal. Natal sent a contingent to fight the natives, and a large number



are desirous of remaining. So a very curious thing is happening. There is a union of states occurring in the North. And, Mr. Mayor, I have done my best in my unofficial position to promote it, because there are ramifications. Every one who comes there feels the impulse to write to his friends and relations, and the relatives find the politicians, and so it all works out. In the North, there is no consideration shown for the men from one state as against the men from another, and that means really the union of Africa. I am told that I have promoted great disunion. That may be temporarily for the moment. We will leave that question for the future. As I have said before, the question of race never occurred to my mind. Practical proof of that is that, in my social life, the majority of my friends—people on the diamond fields and in Cape Town—were men of a race other than English. It is not a question of race. It is a question whether we are to be united or not. And, sir, I see daylight now. I will not trench on politics, but I may say that I think, by continuous and persistent effort towards union, and by the creation of a great state in the north, working in harmony with the Cape, Natal, and neighbouring states, we may make a great step towards union, especially if Providence kindly gives us a fair go. It is certainly a case where a fair go should be given, for it will revolutionise the conditions of South Africa.

‘You, sir, and the citizens of Port Elizabeth, have received me with a kindness which has exceeded my utmost expectation. I am confident enough to say,

and perhaps impudent enough to say it again, that I do not feel that my public career has closed. I am going home to meet a committee of my own countrymen. As soon as they release me from their assiduous attentions, I mean to return to this country; and when I say this country, I mean South Africa. I shall go to the North and do my best to develop that part, in co-operation with the Cape Colony and any other states which may desire to co-operate. I shall keep my seat in the Cape House, because it is part of my programme to show to the people of South Africa that I don't undertake a career of isolation. You may tell me my faults, you may condemn me, but until you turn me out, I mean to remain with you. When I see so large a number of your citizens, who have gone out of their way to welcome me, I would like to say to them that I have told them freely what I propose to do, because in my small way of considering politics, I have come to the conclusion that the best thing in politics is to take the people into your confidence, so that every one when sitting at home, if he takes an interest in politics, may take up his newspaper and learn exactly what the leaders, or those who have been leaders, are doing. By that plan you know you are doing the right thing, because the people are really your partners in the country. Who ever heard of a trust company where the directors never told the shareholders of anything that they were doing? The idea of modern politics is to tell the people nothing, but I have an exactly opposite idea. The right thing is to tell them everything, and leave

them to judge. In that way you are taught to do the right thing, because every man has his daily work. He may be an engine-driver, a mechanic, or a clerk in a store ; but when relieved of his toil in the evening, he takes up a newspaper. Those are the people we have to deal with. Who were the men to the fore during the late trouble ? I would say the workmen. They are the men who have thought it all out, and have come to a practical conclusion. Their life is a practical one. So my idea about politics is that you should take the people of the country into your confidence, and leave it to them to say whether you are right or whether you are wrong.

‘To those of you here to-day, and to those living in more remote parts, to whom the press may possibly communicate my ideas, if they think it worth while, I would give this message : “I don’t propose to close my public career, and I am still determined to strive for the closer union of South Africa.” To all here present I would say : “Base your votes on the higher platform, attempt to attain closer union, cultivate friendly relationships with those you meet, entirely irrespective of race, but state boldly that you will have no foreign interference in this country.” In another twenty-five years, I think, if people take that thought home with them, all will be well. I won’t go into figures, but we are a very small community in the North, only about six thousand. On the basis of managing our local affairs, and on such questions as native laws, questions of tariffs, and questions of railways,

we are one. I feel sure that there are forty-eight thousand in the neighbouring colony of Natal with the same feeling, though they may desire more consideration from the Cape Colony. We have three hundred and seventy-five thousand or four hundred thousand people in the Cape, and if you were to appeal to them to-morrow, you would have a unanimous vote on this question. In the Transvaal, the whole of the new population feel that, and a good many of the old. If the countries south of the Zambesi work on that basis, not in the spirit of the politician's speech, which is forgotten next day, but in the same way as they work in their Freemasonry or other interests they have outside of their businesses, the thing must come right. Because you will have a population entirely with you. They may have many interests, but they are all agreed on the bigger questions of one native policy, mutual defence, and so on.

‘To-day you have taken me rather by surprise, but I have told you the thoughts that have come uppermost in my mind during my life, and more especially during the last nine months. I thank you for the reception you have given me. I have conveyed some thoughts to you. If we in South Africa will, as individuals, work on that basis, and when we come to political elections make that the predominant idea, the end is certain. We must carefully cultivate, as in my little way I have always done, the determination to dismiss race feeling. The true idea is not a race idea at all. It is a desire for union—

the true barrier against localism, and also against the trouble caused by the intrusion of the foreign element. Now, I have not wandered far into politics. I have given you thoughts to consider and exchange, and, sir, I will resume my seat, thanking you for the warm and good reception you have given to me—one who has not always been one of your friends. You have given me a warm reception, a reception I shall never forget. I only hope in my future public conduct you will recognise that I have never abandoned the programme I have laid before you, and especially I hope I will always preserve a grateful feeling for those who have welcomed me so warmly and so kindly in my time of trouble.'

From Port Elizabeth Mr. Rhodes went to Kimberley, his own city, where he was of course received with enthusiasm, but where he used his influence to escape any regular reception, and thus avoided speech-making. As the train ran from Kimberley to Cape Town through the great Karoo, the scattered farming population collected at the stations to welcome him back. This was of course natural, but when he entered the Dutch centre, the home of the Afrikaner Bond, a surprise was in store for him. Contrary to his own expectation and to that of every one else, large bodies of Dutchmen were assembled at every station to greet their old friend, and show that his misfortunes and errors had not altogether destroyed their confidence and esteem.

The spontaneity of this demonstration in his favour, which was as unexpected by the Afrikaner Bond as by himself, was, no doubt, the reason that it was

allowed to take place. Mr. Hofmeyr and his myrmidons of the Bond had done nothing, because they thought nothing was needed, to prevent the Dutchmen rallying to the Englishman who had been for so long their political leader, and had done so much to dissolve racial feeling and promote an enlightened and liberal Imperialism in which Dutchmen could combine with Englishmen for the benefit of their common country. Mr. Hofmeyr and his caucus, with its army of wirepullers and its skill in manipulating Dutch racial sentiment for its own purpose, might well be alarmed; for at the various places where the train stopped the addresses presented bore signatures that were chiefly Dutch. At the Paarl, for example, the address presented was signed by four hundred farmers, mostly Dutchmen.

Mr. Rhodes had to make a speech at each of the stations, and the gist of his speeches was this. He was not going out of political life. He would stick to his seat in the Cape House, and work not only for the development of the empire he had won in the North, but also for the union of South Africa. As for the accusation that his action in Johannesburg was instigated by race feeling, he gave it an unqualified denial; pointing out that his staunchest friends belonged 'to the race which most of you represent here; and therefore, when at times some of my conduct, when criticised, has been referred to the question of race, I hope you know how perfectly false that is.' These hearty receptions by the Dutchmen showed that he had not altogether lost his hold, but, as he knew, it remained to be proved how far the subterranean methods of 'the Mole' (as Mr. Merriman long ago nicknamed Mr. Hofmeyr) would be successful in appealing to the old suspiciousness and distrust

of any Englishman, which lies deep down in the South African Dutch character, and especially in appealing to the sentiment for the Transvaal, the dominant Dutch State, the centre and chief source of anti-British Republican feeling in Africa.

At Cape Town, of course, where the population is chiefly English, a great reception awaited the man who had added to the British Empire the vast regions of Rhodesia, and made the supremacy of England in the distant, if not the immediate future, a practical certainty. It must be admitted, too, that the catastrophe of the raid, so disastrous to himself, made Mr. Rhodes doubly popular with the loyal English colonists, raising their enthusiasm to fever pitch for the Prime Minister who had risked his dictatorship at the Cape and his whole political future for the overthrow of the tyranny in the Transvaal and the supremacy of the British Empire in South Africa.

Immediately after this, in the beginning of 1897, Mr. Rhodes returned to England to face the South African Select Committee at Westminster. At Westminster he followed his own instinct and inclination and spoke out the truth frankly and fully, so far as his own connection with the revolutionary movement at Johannesburg and the Jameson Raid was concerned. He refused, of course, to betray the confidence of those who had been associated with him; but as far as his own share in the affair went, he made a clean breast of everything. He took on himself the whole blame of the admittedly improper and unconstitutional actions that had taken place. That a high and unselfish devotion to the Empire was the sole motive of Mr. Rhodes's decidedly irregular and incautious actions was amply proved by the labours of the Select Committee. This view was generally accepted by

public opinion in England, and was manifestly the view of a very just and wise mind, the highest personage in the nation ; for Her Majesty retained Mr. Rhodes as a member of Her Privy Council.

Not a few went as far as Sir Arthur Arnold, who has recently stated, in a letter to the *Times*, that 'I am quite prepared to assert that historically the raid was as justifiable as was the Dutch raid upon England in 1688.' It was felt that the long-standing and shocking misgovernment of the Transvaal (apart from the menace to British supremacy and the general peace of Africa, of President Kruger's open hostility to British interests, and secret intrigues with foreign states) fully justified the Uitlanders in attempting a revolution, and largely excused, though they did not wholly justify, British subjects in their attempt to assist the revolution with money and men.

Here it may be permitted to give Mr. Rhodes's own general statement before the Select Committee, which, though brief, covers the whole ground, and gives the facts of the case.

'From the date of the establishment of the gold industry on a large scale at Johannesburg, much discontent has been caused by the restrictions and impositions placed upon it by the Transvaal Government ; by the corrupt administration of that Government : and by the denial of civil rights to the rapidly growing Uitlander population. This discontent has gradually but steadily increased, and a considerable time ago I learnt, from my intercourse with many of the leading persons in Johannesburg, that the position of affairs there had become intolerable. After long efforts they despaired of obtaining redress by constitutional means, and were resolved to seek, by extra-



constitutional means, such a change in the Government of the South African Republic as should give to the majority of the population, possessing more than half the land, nine-tenths of the wealth, and paying nineteen-twentieths of the taxes in the country, a due share in its administration. I sympathised with and, as one largely interested in the Transvaal, shared in these grievances; and further, as a citizen of the Cape Colony, I felt that the persistently unfriendly attitude of the Government of the South African Republic towards the Colony was the great obstacle to common action for practical purposes among the the various states of South Africa. Under these circumstances I assisted the movement in Johannesburg with my purse and influence. Further, acting within my rights, in the autumn of 1895 I placed on territory under the administration of the British South Africa Company upon the borders of the Transvaal, a body of troops under Dr. Jameson, prepared to act in the Transvaal in certain eventualities. I did not communicate these views to the Board of Directors of the British South Africa Company. With reference to the Jameson Raid I may state that Dr. Jameson went in without my authority. Having said this, I desire to add that I am willing generally to accept the finding as to facts contained in the Report of the Committee of the Cape Parliament. I must admit that in all my actions I was greatly influenced by my belief that the policy of the present Government of the South African Republic was to introduce the influence of another foreign power into the already complicated system of South Africa, and thereby render more difficult in the future the closer union of the different states.'

The real object of Mr. Rhodes, as was amply proved before the Select Committee, was to secure the establishment of a Government in the Transvaal, friendly to the union of South Africa in a federation of states, of which the hegemony and the flag would be British. It was the danger that the revolution, rendered inevitable by the long delay of the Imperial Government to recognise its responsibilities in South Africa, should take a direction hostile to this object, that decided Mr. Rhodes to risk everything in order to assist and direct it.

The methods adopted to assist the Revolutionists involved much that was blameworthy, involved this inevitably owing to Mr. Rhodes's position as Premier. He has fully admitted this. While he insisted on the high object of what he did, 'the methods,' he said, in a speech at Cape Town (March 12, 1898), 'have been worthy of condemnation'; yet Mr. Rhodes's generous willingness to take the responsibility for proceedings of which he was entirely ignorant, does not justify such statements as Mr. Fitzpatrick's note in *The Transvaal from Within* (page 125), in which he asserts that 'Dr. Harris, acting on Mr. Rhodes's instructions, telegraphed the letter to the *Times*, having altered the date to 28th, and prefaced it with the statement that the letter had been "sent on Saturday (28th) to Dr. Jameson, Mafeking."' Not only did Mr. Rhodes state in his evidence at the Inquiry that he was asked simply if the letter should be cabled, answered Yes, and knew nothing of the date; but also Dr. Harris's evidence contradicts Mr. Fitzpatrick on the same essential point. The date, as well as the statement which prefaced the letter, were, Dr. Harris admitted, his own independent contribution, and the date was absurd, as the latter could not have reached Dr.

Jameson the day it was written in Johannesburg. The letter had been given undated to Dr. Jameson to fill in the date in certain circumstances, and Dr. Harris, believing he would have Jameson's approval, put in the 28th. Dr. Harris's evidence is perfectly plain. 'He (Mr. Rhodes) said nothing about the date.' And 'I believed that Dr. Jameson would carry out the original intention of the letter, of filling in the date of his crossing as the date of the letter, and therefore I did the same.' Mr. Fitzpatrick's note is calculated, no doubt unintentionally, to produce a false impression, which the truth, as seen in Dr. Harris's evidence, will remove.

After the Inquiry in 1897, Mr. Rhodes returned to South Africa to find the Afrikaner Bond had been hard at work during his absence, stirring up racial feeling, and allying itself closely with President Kruger, with a view to making a bid for power at the next election. Mr. Hofmeyr was, at first, not very successful. His counter-demonstrations, got up to neutralise the effect of Mr. Rhodes's reception in the Dutch districts, were poorly attended.

But Mr. Rhodes's evidence at the Parliamentary Inquiry disclosed such thorough and uncompromising Imperialism of motive, that it was an easy task to represent him as an enemy of the Dutch, a staunch Imperialist being to the bucolic mind a synonym for a confirmed Boer-hater.

Moreover, Mr. Rhodes was persistently described as 'the traitor,' because the Republicans had always hoped to win him over at last, in spite of his strong Imperialism, to head their scheme of establishing a United States of South Africa, freed from the Imperial tie, under its own flag. As he refused their advances, even in his darkest hour of depression after the raid,

refused, that is to say, to be a traitor to the British Empire, he was naturally enough denounced by them as a traitor to South Africa, that is, to the Republican idea, which he had never accepted, and as all who read the speeches collected in this book can see for themselves, had steadily and successfully worked to render impossible, by establishing the actual supremacy of the Empire, and by winning the wavering majority of the Dutch colonists to understand and accept it.

Mr. Hofmeyr, who has plenty of shrewdness and sagacity, went on quietly with his mole-like operations to undermine Mr. Rhodes's popularity, and he found a suitable instrument in Mr. Rhodes's former friend and Attorney-General, Mr. Schreiner. The Rhodes ministry had been reconstructed when its leader retired after the raid, and remained in office till 1898, when the elections gave Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Schreiner their opportunity. They had for two years worked very effectively to stir up racial feeling and sympathy with aims of Dutch supremacy, held, it is to be hoped, somewhat theoretically by Mr. Hofmeyr, but very practically by President Kruger. They had secured a far more powerful instrument than any before wielded by the Bond—I mean the power of gold. By their alliance with President Kruger the huge secret service fund of the Transvaal was at their disposal, and the candidates were the approved representatives of what, for want of a better word, may be called Krugerism.

This, however, was in 1898. In 1897, after the Parliamentary Inquiry, Mr. Rhodes had gone back to South Africa and had taken up his residence in Rhodesia, where he threw himself energetically into the development of the country. This period of

development saw an important achievement in railway extension; the Cape railway from the south arrived at last at Bulawayo, and the Beira railway from the east at Umtali. Mr. Rhodes found himself much happier in such favourite occupations as farming, horse-breeding, and fruit-growing on his Inyanga estate, or in superintending his own great irrigation system, at Sauerdale, in Matabeleland, than he could expect to be in the turbid current of politics and political intrigue at the Cape. But the Progressive party, the English Cape colonists, and a certain number of more enlightened Dutch, could not spare the one great statesman in South Africa to Rhodesia; Krugerism had to be fought, and there was only one man big enough to captain the party who remained loyal to the Empire, and so Mr. Rhodes, very reluctantly, consented to return and take a part in Cape politics once more. The parties consisted, broadly speaking, of Mr. Rhodes and the English colonists, assisted by recruits from the progressive and loyal Dutch, against Mr. Hofmeyr and the Afrikaner Bond, controlling the solid country Dutch vote, with President Kruger and every Republican in South Africa behind them. The first encounter was the election for the Upper Chamber; and the success in this election, rather to the astonishment of the Afrikaner Bond and its allies, was entirely with Mr. Rhodes, whose party rose from five to fourteen in a chamber of twenty-three. The difference of electoral areas in the two chambers, however, deprived this election of some of its significance; but every effort was made by both parties to carry the all-important election for the Legislative Assembly, which is, of course, the real governing body.

Mr. Rhodes had already, long before the raid, attempted as progressive a policy as he could per-

suade his Dutch supporters and the Afrikaner Bond to accept ; but, of course, to keep their support for his larger policy of expansion and federation, he had had to make some concessions in matters of minor importance. His platform at the elections of 1898 showed that he had thrown overboard these concessions, though his sympathy was still openly with the farmer rather than the townsman. The chief new planks of his platform consisted of removal of the duty on meat and reduction of the duty on wheat, the imposition of an excise tax on brandy, and of fresh restraints to stop the sale of liquor to the natives, though the last, indeed, had been always an aim and endeavour of his throughout his public life, hindered from fuller development by the dislike to it of his Dutch supporters. This was bound to be unpopular with the farmers : agricultural interests disliked any reduction of the wheat duty ; pastoral, though the rinderpest had left them no stock, the removal of the meat duty ; brandy-farmers would be hit heavily by the excise-tax and the restraints to keep the liquor from the natives, which would enormously decrease the demand for the commonest and most easily produced spirits. Nor was his education policy likely to be more popular ; for he proposed to make it permissive and compulsory, in order to secure the proper education of the next generation, to which he believed progress would thus be made acceptable, and this compulsion was sufficient to condemn it utterly in the opinion of so staunch an individualist and hater of State interference as the Dutch farmer.

As of old, the large policy of working for the Union of South Africa under the British supremacy was in the forefront of his programme, and he looked to the success of Rhodesia to bring it within

the range of practical politics, from which it had obviously been withdrawn for the time being by the catastrophe of the raid. But all these questions really were at the moment secondary questions; the election had to be fought on one supreme question, which dominated everything else—the question whether or not the Cape would support the Transvaal, or in other words, whether the Cape Ministry was to be in alliance with President Kruger and uphold his autocracy with its hostility to the British supremacy in South Africa.

In 1895 President Kruger had already so far tried the pockets of the Cape Dutch as well as the English colonists by his policy of hostile tariffs, that instead of falling on their knees to him, as his faith in coercion and disdain of conciliation led him to expect, they were ready to pay half the expenses of the Paramount Power in a war to force him to stop finally that particular breach of the Convention. But the Dutch sentiment was so deeply stirred by the Jameson Raid, or rather by the long and vigorous Republican propaganda that followed it, that the Transvaal tyranny had regained most of the ground it had lost by selfish disregard of Cape interests in the tariff coercion of previous years. Well-informed German papers frankly stated that the object of the Afrikaner Bond at the Cape was gradually to sever the connection with British tutelage and erect an independent Republic in alliance with the supreme Republican State, the Transvaal. This project Mr. Rhodes ridiculed openly in his election speeches, saying that only a fool could indulge in thoughts of an independent South Africa. At the same time, he boldly attacked President Kruger's Government, and pointed out the undeniable fact that it was going from bad to worse every year.

President Kruger certainly had supplied Mr. Rhodes with ample materials for an indictment. The abortive revolution and the raid had placed the Kruger Government on the vantage-ground of victory; and had its head been really a statesman, not merely a stubborn though extremely crafty autocrat, he might have done much even then to make the Republic stable and contented. Concessions would have been gracious and easy to make from the position of security and credit to which the raid had raised him.

But the dogged strength of the Great Trek Boer has always had its defects. He has always wanted to take as much as possible and give as little, and certainly the price at which he obtained a temporary reputation for magnanimity was not excessive. By concealing the written terms of surrender, and by actually stating that Jameson's life was in danger, he had got the High Commissioner to disarm Johannesburg. By the usual bait of promises which he had no intention of performing he had got the Uitlanders into his power, and wreaked his vengeance upon them, stopping only at the point where it paid better in hard cash to assume an attitude of magnanimity.

Not satisfied with thus punishing the representative Uitlanders, moreover, President Kruger had next proceeded to deal with the whole Uitlander population in the old hostile spirit; and elated by the completeness of his triumph, proceeded to add, among other laws of the same nature, the new Press Law, the Aliens' Expulsion Law, the Aliens' Admission Law, to the old achievements in oppressive race legislation. It was not exactly statesmanlike, though no doubt it was gratifying to the love of absolute power, to go on, as he did early in 1898, to make the High Court of Justice the tool of his dictatorial will,



and to dismiss the Chief Justice because he would not stoop to be the slave of every whim of an irresponsible despot.

This iron misrule, being exercised on British subjects, and accompanied by every privilege and encouragement for the Boer minority, together with arrangements for offensive and defensive purposes with the Free State, huge armaments, and an understanding with the Republicans at the Cape, with a view to the propagandism of the scheme of an independent and republican South Africa, was thoroughly appreciated by all ill-wishers of British supremacy. The first step in the Republican programme at the Cape was to be the capture of the Cape Parliament, which was to be brought under the absolute domination of the Afrikaner Bond, whose chief had always favoured the big idea of a United States of South Africa under their own flag, and had given much valuable help to President Kruger's efforts,—for example, in the war of 1881, when threats of a Cape Dutch rising accelerated Mr. Gladstone's surrender; in the opposition to the northern expansion, and the northern railway, where, however, Mr. Rhodes safeguarded the interests of the Empire; in the raiding of North Zululand, where Mr. Hofmeyr's party successfully put pressure on the British Government to allow the Transvaal raiders to keep the territory they had seized in defiance of the Paramount Power.

This was the position, then, in 1898. Mr. Schreiner, as the instrument of Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond, headed a powerful Republican combination, consisting of advanced Republicans and of those who were as yet merely in sympathy with Transvaal independence. This was backed in everything by the Republican chief at Pretoria, who with his enormous secret

service fund, and his unlimited power of increasing it by fresh exactions from the helpless Uitlander population, was practically the commander-in-chief of the campaign. Mr. Rhodes, on the other hand, headed a solid phalanx of British colonists, whose fervent loyalty to the Empire, stirred by the Dutch Republican challenge, would have been better satisfied with a more violent and less broad and liberal Imperialism than their leader's; for even in this struggle with Dutch Republicanism, Mr. Rhodes insisted on maintaining his old advocacy of racial equality, deprecated and discouraged racial animosities, and openly declared the great importance he placed on the support of the Dutch, at the risk of discouraging and discontenting the English stalwarts, who were nothing loath to accept the Bond challenge and fight the battle out on racial lines.

The Schreiner party, from whom the racial challenge came, did their utmost to make the battle a battle of races, appealing to racial animosity and racial ambition almost to the exclusion of other arguments. Nevertheless, Mr. Rhodes showed how much he had done to reconcile the Cape Dutch to the Empire by retaining a very considerable amount of Dutch support, in spite of the terrorism exercised by the Bond, and the golden arguments of the Transvaal secret service fund.

Party feeling, of course, rose to fever point, and the personal attacks on Mr. Rhodes were as scurrilous and violent as most of the allegations made against him were demonstrably false. The result was that the unusual element of a good deal of personal criticism of his opponents found its way into Mr. Rhodes's chief election speeches of 1898, which I shall give in chronological order. The great importance of this

election (there were actually two—the first being speedily followed by a second fought on an insufficient Redistribution Bill) justifies the inclusion of a number of these rough-and-ready, but very interesting election speeches; for had Mr. Rhodes returned to power at the Cape, it is more than probable that the absence of a friendly Bond ministry, who would admit war supplies and take up a position of disloyal neutrality, would have made President Kruger less confident of the wisdom of appealing to the arbitrament of war. Mr. Rhodes and the Loyalists had finally a majority of voters, but a minority of seats in the House, their ultimate defeat being probably due to his absence in London on the urgent business of securing capital for railway extension in Rhodesia.

The first of these election speeches is one in which Mr. Rhodes set forth very fully the Progressive programme and the far-reaching issues of the election then approaching, and was made at Good Hope Hall, March 12, 1898.

Mr. Rhodes, who was received with loud and prolonged cheering, the audience rising, said:—

‘Mr. Chairman,—Your greeting is most gratifying, but we must make one agreement—that is, if you wish to hear what I am going to say on the topics of the country—that you will allow me to be the only one who shall speak or make an utterance. Now, gentlemen, as you are perfectly well aware, I have not been with you for nearly two years; but I hope I have been doing good work. And now I am back at a crisis of your country—I mean, that you are now going to elect for one of your representative Assemblies

the men who will guide your future for the next five or seven years. Few of you know what that means. If you were in ordinary countries—whether in one of the States of Australia, for instance, or in the mother-country—to a great extent, the politics would be “Ins” and “Outs.” You, on the contrary, have to decide on gentlemen who may be connected with a total change of South Africa, and that is why I would warn you to be most careful as to the manner in which you register your votes. Why, sir, take an ordinary election. Jones thinks so-and-so, Brown thinks so-and-so, and there is very little difference between them; but on your votes at this election rests very probably the future of South Africa. That is what I wish to bring home to you to-night, and I can only do so if you will be perfectly silent.

‘You have greeted me and your candidates with this enormous meeting, and I am sure there are many who would like to hear the views of one of yourselves on the future of South Africa. I observe some opponents saying to themselves, “Oh, he will drag us into the North; he will spread the whole of South Africa before us; he will avoid the parish pump; he will not tell us about any of those things that burden our families. We shall be very pleased for the moment, and go away and find that we have had nothing to instruct us.” No, gentlemen, I will take your points step by step. Why will I do that? Because, whatever my faults, I have been intimately connected with you for many years, for six years as Prime Minister; and I have been dealing with the expansion of your

Hinterland both before and since; and surely the things connected with such a work must have given one some experience and some thought. I say this very humbly indeed.

‘Now, let me see what you are troubled about. “I know. You are troubled about the meat and bread duties. We will take meat. Some of you say: “Well, you can’t have much to say about that. We are told you were for increasing the meat duty to please the farmers, and now you are taking a sharp turn and wish to do away with it.” Now, gentlemen, let us get at home together. I won’t say what is the reason of my change, because I don’t think it is a change. Of course, I shall read those pleasant letters which are always in the papers—which, sir, I am told on the best authority, are written by the editors themselves. I can tell you a good story about that. We are all together at home to-night. There was, I remember, when I was in Kimberley, a gentleman whose comings and departures were always announced in the newspapers. I went into the office one day, and asked, “How is it that every movement of that gentleman is announced in the papers?” I was told, “He always put the letters in himself.” There are, however, gentlemen, statements that it is understood that I am in favour of the abolition of the meat duties, and there are also statements that I was totally in the opposite direction in the past; there is the usual sort of family chat that the Bond and the gentleman in question have quarrelled, and that I am Progressive now though I was not so in the past.

‘Now, let us look at it practically. I will tell you a story; it is one of the many thoughts that come to me. I wonder how you will take the story? I was looking at the lions I own for my own amusement and for the amusement of the people. I asked my man what they cost. He said, “Well, owing to the terrible price of meat, they are costing £180 a year. And, if you take those two you have been offered from Bulawayo, they will cost £360”; and I said, “Well, we won’t take those two.” Now from the humorous let us go to the serious. I rode a little further on and I saw a great town beneath me, and I said to myself, “If I in my selfishness have only had this brought home to me by the expense of my lions, how does the matter affect every family in that huge town?” I begin to think that we shall have it said that it was all owing to the lions—but still that is a way of bringing it practically home to one. Then other thoughts came to me—that owing to rinderpest, as I have seen, they have taken 370,000 carcasses out of East London. We know that the rinderpest has devastated the whole of Africa, and, whatever people may say, the broad fact is that food, which is our main staple, has risen from 5d. to 10d. per lb., and we must try to reduce the price of that food. So I am in favour of the abolition of these duties, with this proviso—that the Government should at the same time erect a cold storage—because it is no use taking money out of the Government’s pocket and giving it to a private firm, though I admire and respect the energy of that firm. But we must not

have the transference of the obligation—or of the profit. Well, I think we should have abolition of the duties and cold storage, and if there is a tremendous ring among the butchers (which is not likely), we must have some co-operative system to cheapen the price of meat. I think that with the cold storage and the cheapening of the rates on live-stock coming down, we shall have the farmers of the country with us. It is only a suggestion.

‘As to the wheat, which is the next point before us, I can see that that is not such a burning question as the meat. But you must remember that the whole point of protection is, that the land should not be abandoned. If the vested interest can get a fair profit on the land, we must consider the food of the people. In this Colony we have to consider our relations with our neighbours, and the development of the North has been a tremendous help lately to the farmers in the western province. You will scarcely believe it, but whether they like it or not, whatever our friends may say about the development of the North, there are 10,000 people taking the whole of their wheat from Malmesbury, Piquetburg, and Caledon, because we have given them this protection on the railways—namely, a half-penny a ton per mile for 600 miles, instead of the ordinary rate paid on the flour purchased in Australia. Thus you have been given that exclusive market. We have to consider the food of the people, and we should give it consideration; and if we can see that the farmer cannot still hold his own, we should consider that question

also. I have nothing to recant upon that. I have always said, and shall still say it, and I have my own idea, that if you can bring the excise home to the consumer, and not embarrass and irritate the farmer, I am with you. Then you say there is an "if" in the question. Yes; it is a mistake to collect the excise from the small stills, where you expend what you get in the collection, and you irritate the owner; and my theory is to collect it from the consumer. Years ago, when I was a young Minister, I proposed that in the Cabinet. It is a perfectly easy proposition, and no doubt will come about, when the Government require revenue. You see what happens in other countries. In other countries there are great distilleries, and you can deal with it at once. I am for the excise on that basis.

'Now, we are taking the fences one by one. I suppose you say you are hearing a recantation, but you are not. It is only right I should speak to you on the local questions, and I am told I must deal with the parish pump before proceeding to the general questions of South Africa. But after all, the general questions of South Africa and the parish pump are wonderfully intermingled. Take a question like that which will soon be before us—the redistribution of seats. I can speak to you clearly on that. We don't live in the age of the government of one, though many of us would like to live in that age—and therefore we must take population on the basis of numbers, and we must give the representation of this country on the basis of the number of the people who live in



it—if they have intelligence, whether they were born here or whether they came here. If you only knew it, that is a tremendous statement to make. It is the key of the whole of our politics—whether they are born here or whether they have come here, provided they have proper intelligence and a certain position, and that position by inheritance of means or by the work of their hands.

‘Now, gentlemen, there is another point, and it is a sentimental one connected with our local politics, and this is the question—and a very broad one—the question whether the Colonies should contribute to the defence of Her Majesty’s Empire. Well, if you look at it fairly, seeing she protects our trade absolutely, seeing she never asks anything from us, and the proposition in order to be favourably received by her must be unanimous, and seeing she does not ask it from us, I think there ought to be no question about it. When the proposition was put in the House I listened to the speeches. The speeches were unanimous, and the vote was unanimous. I am sorry to think now that the unanimous vote with some was due to the idea that nothing practical would ever be asked upon it. There have been several red herrings since. A cable appeared from the deep—but as a humble member of Parliament it seemed to me the proposition was whether we would contribute in some shape or form to Her Majesty’s fleet. The question as to whether we would contribute to a cable or some other thing to assist our commercial institutions was not before us. The

crucial point of the question was, as the old Empire protects our trade, ought we not to give a contribution to the Navy? We voted unanimously for it. There was not a dissentient vote, and there was the usual expression of the most intense loyalty. But as soon as it was sought to be carried into practical shape I noticed all sorts of divergencies. I would for myself say I am in favour of a yearly contribution for this simple reason, that, as has been stated before, a ship might go down, and the factor that brought the sentiment home to us would be removed. But a yearly vote, representing the contribution, would yearly allow us to show our interest and feeling in our mother-country. Therefore I am in favour of a yearly contribution to the fleet, and it could be used by the gentlemen in control of the fleet in any way they liked. It may be an extra vote for the increase of the service, it may be something towards quick-firing guns, but the Admiralty should have £30,000 or £40,000 a year from a remote colony to use as they will. I think the yearly vote is better than the idea of a ship. We may hope that in the course of time with closer union of the country other States may come in, and add to that vote—which could not be before them, if the question had been settled once for all by giving a ship. I remember that a great friend of mine, in dealing with Lobengula, was in favour of giving him a monthly stipend as against a lump sum, because he said, “Don’t you see, the savage king if he receives a monthly sum will be reminded of our existence, whereas a lump sum may

disappear in the ramifications of his harem." So I do myself thoroughly believe in the proposition of an annual contribution to the Navy, because I believe it will be better for this portion of the world, but I object to the red herring, that it should be a cable, being drawn across the path after we have voted. The idea and vote were distinctly a contribution to Her Majesty's naval defence, not to a cable. If the latter were assented to, why not have a swift service of balloons to carry despatches or some such subtle idea different from the real vote, which was a contribution to the Navy?

'Now, sir, I have dealt, I think, with most of the local questions that have been agitating your thoughts during the present election, and I ask you to pass from those to what I may term our external questions, those which also affect every one of this community, but which are larger questions because they embrace a thought connected with the whole of Africa as against the thought which may be connected with the towns and villages in any one State in Africa. Now, let us see what is occurring. Since I was a member of your House, we have gone from the Orange River to Tanganyika. I have also seen a neighbouring pastoral State expand—from having nothing in its Treasury, and having the greatest difficulty in borrowing £20,000 to keep it going—into one of the greatest producers of gold in the world. You must agree that such changes suggest great thoughts, and one thing I am quite clear about is, that we human atoms may divide this country, but Nature does not, and the

Almighty does not ; and whether you are resident here, or in Durban, Johannesburg, or the newly formed State of Rhodesia, the interests are the same, the language is the same, those who form the States are the same, connected in family and thought and domestic relations, and any one who tries to separate them in thought, dealing, and connection, is attempting an impossibility. And so we drift from the internal to the external, and you will find that they are so intimately connected that you cannot separate them. Take the head of a family, who whilst working here considers the price of food and also considers how labour depends upon expansion, and then thinks of another member of his family living in the interior. How can he separate the two? He cannot ; they are one with him. They cannot help being one, and what Nature has made one the whole question of your politics is, can a few human beings make separate? Why do I say a few human beings? I would like you to think—and I will not indulge in a diatribe upon the present condition of the Transvaal—of your friends there, of the huge new population, ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 people (the old one is not half that amount). Yet we see the Transvaal Government attempting the impossible, trying to deprive the new population of their rights of citizenship, to place the whole of the taxation on them, and not allow them a meeting or speech in their own language, and finishing by interfering with the independence of the Court. On that point I can speak strongly, because Chief Justice Kotzé is no friend of mine ; for, sir, in

the crisis of my life he despatched the message "Punish Rhodes and revoke the Charter." But even he could not stand the depravity of the administration of the Transvaal, and has had to go out as a good Afrikaner. You cannot get out of it; there it is plain and distinct before you, the Chief Justice has had to be dismissed because he desired to uphold the integrity of the Court. I am expressing to you my thoughts during a considerable period. Shall I wander a little into the Free State? Oh no, I merely ask you to read that speech of President Steyn's the other day. After a most fearful attack on myself—I am quite used to it—and a general diatribe against capitalists, he stood up to defend labour and attack capitalists. The humorous side of his whole position is that he refused to take the duty off meat, and so help labour. It is, as you know, the Free State, as represented by the President, that stands between you and the reduction of the meat duties, and the humorous thing on this occasion is his trying to stir up labour against capitalists and especially against myself, when he has refused the one thing that does appeal to labour—that is, the labourer who has a large family, and sees the enormous difference the duty makes to him in the price of meat daily.

'We wander on, sir, and come down to the Colony, and come to the tussle we are now having. We have on our side the desire for the education of the people, if necessary by compulsion—and who will benefit most by that? Not the townspeople, but the country; because in the towns there is every application and

extension of the voluntary or non-voluntary system for the education of those who really desire education. My own thought on this question is to have permissive compulsion. We could take the Colony in circles on the basis of the present election, and leave it to the people to say whether they will have compulsory education, but we should contribute to the expenses from a consolidated fund. If there are some districts which refuse to have compulsory education, they will have to contribute to the expenses of the districts which accept it—and that won't last long. We shall have compulsory education of the people at any cost—a most necessary thing, for you have only 100,000 male voters amongst you, and you have a continent behind you. Surely you must have those 100,000 educated, and with education will disappear that race hatred which is inspired by ignorance, and with education will come better thoughts and grander conceptions.

‘Let us think what is the position as to external politics. Though we may be flattering them, we will take *Ons Land* and consider their conceptions. We will take *Ons Land* as representative of opposite politics. My own idea is that they are not the politics of the Dutch people, but that they are the politics of a very small coterie. Let us think what the politics are—non-education, drunken coloured labour, anti-Fleet vote, anti-the-North, favourable to the present policy in the Transvaal, whatever that happens to be—even to the dismissal of the Chief Justice. Now, do you tell me, sir, these are the politics of the Dutch

people? No, sir, they are not. We have got to look at signs. I noticed at the Bond meeting at Worcester they were not a happy family. There was a grand minority. I noticed that they were not greeted by the Municipal Council, and only by a majority of one in the Divisional Council. In the Paarl a great fight is going on, and the Bond candidate has been defeated in the municipal elections. And another thing—you must read the papers—an extraordinary resolution was passed at Worcester. Let me tell you what that is. When any district *bestuur* selects a member as candidate to Congress, the matter is to be referred to a Board sitting here in Camp Street—a committee nominally consisting of three, really of one. And so, sir, I find that just as there is a one-man policy in the Transvaal, so we are exposed to a one-man policy in this Colony as far as Dutch people are concerned. Look at the matter fairly. You belong to a district *bestuur*, or to a branch of the South African League. You elect your candidate, and he ought to be accepted. Then why this change? The Dutch are only allowed to choose possible members of their *bestuurs*, and the whole is to be regulated from Camp Street. Let us look at it practically. Mr. Faure was elected a candidate, but the representative of the Bond disappeared up the mountain until this new regulation was passed. Thus the decision of the formally constituted power of the Bond (representing some 10,000 votes), was superseded by the nominal committee. Now, there is a tremendous flutter in the camp, because I hear

that ten or twelve of the members of the House are marked, and even if elected by their *bestuurs*, they will be rejected in Camp Street. What we have got to fight is that policy in the politics of this country—lest the one-man system should come in. And the fight that is before us is not one of the Progressives only of the towns, but of the country also. There has been an enormous terrorism established over the Dutch farmers in the country. Many of them are resenting it. I say it is wrong; that is all I say about it. And so you see this one-man system, whether it be here, whether it be at Bloemfontein or at Pretoria, is the system proposed for this country.

‘I will tell you a very good story. I tell it with the greatest care to be accurate. I remember we had a great meeting at Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many there, and especially—and I speak of him with the greatest respect—a gentleman who is dead, Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, “I never wrote a speech, and I don’t know what I said; but I will tell you what I know about it.” He wrote it down, and afterwards came to Cape Town with me. I have every respect for his memory, and I was pleased with the letter some one wrote the other day—evidently a relation or connection of his—showing what a kindly man he was in his domestic home, and what a great idea he had. And my story will tell you what that idea was. He spoke to me very nicely



about my speech, and he said, "Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa." And I said, "So do I." "Yes," I said, "I am with you entirely; we must have a united South Africa!" He said, "There is nothing in the way," and I said, "No, there is nothing in the way. Well," I said, "we are one." "Yes," he said, "and I will tell you we will take you as our leader." He said, "There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of course, be independent of the rest of the world." I said, "No; you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to forfeit all my history and all my traditions, and I would be a fool because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by yours?" From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his *Express* toward myself, and I was made full sorry at times by the tone; but that was the overpowering thought in his mind, an independent South Africa. And when I think of his friends here and in the North, I have to realise that that is the thought of very many. But it is an impossible thought, an impracticable thought; it is only a fool, who would indulge in it now, with our diverse nationalities, our immense native question, with the fact that our territory is one, but our human beings are disunited. The only chance of union is the overshadowing protection of a supreme power. Any German, Frenchman, or Russian would tell you that the best and most liberal Power in the world is that over which Her Majesty reigns. Now let us summarise the two distinct lines upon which the country

—that is, the Colony—is now crystallised. On the one side you have the idea of teaching your children to contribute towards Her Majesty's Navy, to fight against drunken labour—meaning by that to keep liquor from the barbarian who cannot be responsible for the amount he takes. You have many other broad ideas of what you term progress. In addition to that, as to your external questions, you say, "We wish to draw nearer to Natal and the North. We would like to give the Uitlander in Johannesburg the idea that, though we cannot interfere, we are in sympathy with his desire and claim to obtain citizen rights." That is the thought on the one side, with many other minor details. What is the thought on the other? To revert to scabby sheep, to oppose compulsory education, and various other details—such as billiards and Sunday trains—to oppose any contributions to the Navy; and, as to external things, to place, not the Transvaal, but the present Government of the Transvaal, paramount whatever it does, and to agree and concur in it. That is why, though their Commission reports that dynamite is a gross monopoly, not a word is said; and it is why, when suggestions are made to help by a lower railway tariff, not a word is said. That is why when the Chief Justice, who is an Afrikander, and demanded my head on a charger, is dismissed, not a word is said. Now, I would say that might be good politics if there were any reward in the future for it. At present the only reply it has got is a desire to annihilate our railways and to refuse our products. I noticed at the Paarl

the other day a clever speech on the question of the Transvaal tax on colonial brandy, evading it by a comparison with English brandy, which pays £15 per leaguer—not mentioning the real effect, which is the exclusion of the colonial products—and then suggesting, too, that although the North taxes none of your products now, still it might be going to tax them some day. But I can give you the assurance that the North will never tax the products of this country if we carry out the policy of Union. So that on the present lines there is nothing to gain from supporting what I may call *Ons Land* policy. There is everything to gain by the adoption of the programme of the Progressives.

‘Let us look at it. Did you ever hear in the history of the world of a Hinterland to a country being obtained, and yet a section of the country saying everything they possibly could likely to damage it? First of all Rhodesia was a swamp, then there was no gold, and the people were dying of fever; but since the opening of the railway we have carried 3000 tons of produce per month to Rhodesia, and the total profit to the Colony has been £100,000. I do not wish to indulge in an antagonistic policy which would bring bloodshed. Let the past bury itself; but what good can you have in supporting all these barbaric actions of the Transvaal Government? I call them barbaric, because you won’t find them even in the twelfth century. What is the good of a policy of continually damning the North? It cannot do you good in the Cape Colony, because if *Ons*

*Land's* policy is continued by a majority you gain nothing, but you know as surely as the sun shines that the new population of the Transvaal will rise from one hundred thousand to half a million of people, and then they will get rid of their taskmasters. They will get rid of their taskmasters and obtain a share in the government of the country. Do you think that they are going to have anything to do with you if a majority in your House has been doing nothing but abuse them for ten years past? Take the North, that new State which has got its railway built, which has borrowed nothing from you and asked for nothing.

‘We are glad at present to be in touch and to keep in with you, but do you think that State is going to have any kindly feelings towards you, if you have tried to damage its credit, tried to embarrass its railway, called it a swamp, a fever-stricken swamp, and a country without gold? When they rise to be a self-governing State, do you think they will not avail themselves of the chance of coalescing with those in the Transvaal who have obtained their constitutional liberties and fair share of government? Where will you be with your *Ons Land* programme? I am not speaking to you only. I am speaking to the whole country. In that programme, which supports whatever may be done in the Transvaal, however extreme, even to the dismissal of one of the most distinguished Afrikaners, you gain nothing, and get nothing, except exclusion of your goods, and embarrassment of your railways. You are keeping

up bad feeling in the new community of the Transvaal and in the young State in the North. Is that a proper line to take up from the lowest motive, from the commercial motive, with regard to your future at the southern end of the continent? It is not, and you all know it. Some of you say, "Let us rub along somehow; better be on friendly terms with the Transvaal Government," but what if these friendly terms obtain nothing that is right and fair and just for you to have, and at the same time gain for you for the future the bitter hatred and dislike of those two new States in due time to be created? Judged from the lowest standpoint of motive, is that statesmanship? No, sir, I think it is not. What is statesmanship? To deal with these local and internal questions, and to do our best with them; and at the same time to watch the broad South African politics, and determine that you will do everything to promote the union of the country, without interfering with your neighbouring States, by sympathy with the new population in the Transvaal and by close association with the Northern State. Every one of these canons is violated by the programme—and I remark again that I hope I am not making it too prominent—of *Ons Land*. I don't think about the editor. It is like thinking about a servant instead of his master. It is humiliating and undesirable to go into personal feelings in the matter, but the whole policy is absolutely wrong. And I am sorry that the gentleman who directs and inspires it should be able to do that which promotes race feeling and bitterness, and

which does not promote the union of Africa or the prosperity of this Colony. In everything it is the same, because I notice that these gentlemen that are being elected have every consideration for every vote, whatever colour it may be. I notice a meeting at a place called Stellenbosch, and I see the suggestion of Mr. Neethling was that the coloured vote should vote for him. But what was the expression Mr. Upington used to use—every chicken comes home to roost? These people knew perfectly well that their people are treated as slaves in the Transvaal, and they say they will have nothing to do with Mr. Neethling because he spoke up for the Transvaal. It showed the impossibility of the policy, however you pursue it, even in an appeal to the coloured vote. It is only reasonable when they say, "What is the good of voting for you? You will support the Government that subjects our people to every kind of indignity. So we can't vote for you, Mr. Neethling." I was very much struck. It showed what these people are thinking of. And so you go into other ramifications. We tried to give the Transvaal railways, and as soon as we built them railways, all they thought of was of excluding us. This State tries to isolate itself and exclude all South Africa, and you are asked in this election—because this is the paramount thing—to support them in all their wrongdoings. That is the policy of what is called the non-Progressive party. I should call it the *Ons Land* party, because I will not admit that it is the policy of the Dutch. How can it be the policy of

the Dutch when we find men like Mr. Faure and Mr. Bellingan driven out of their ranks; when we find this mutiny growing at Worcester, even in the Bond itself; when we find that a resolution has just now been passed to drive out of the Cape Assembly most of those Dutchmen whom I respect and admire for their progressive thoughts; and when we see that the policy which *Ons Land* represents would support your Van Wyks and Van Eedens? I mention Van Wyk because of the amusing rabidness of the man. He howled at me, I remember, and he considered he could take 40,000 Englishmen for breakfast. Well, he is amusing. You don't tell me that that is the Dutch people, and the people that I know. They live in every homestead, they are in the educational establishments at Stellenbosch, they are spread over this country. If I thought that *Ons Land* represented the feeling of those people it would be a bad time for this country, but I am perfectly sure it does not, and I am sure that this little gang in Camp Street are terrorising the country. And so I say it is the duty of the Progressive party to fight them perhaps even more than to support the broad principles that we have enunciated. Now I think I have put to you the thoughts I have about this country, and why I am so earnest about them.

'I must say to you that one has had great trouble during the last two years—most probably as every one might say, owing to my own faults; but with a high object. The methods have been worthy of condemnation; but, gentlemen, remember this, you

all have your trials, you all have your troubles, and then you become better men. I don't falter. I have not faltered in my greater thoughts—the closer union of this country. I could have had a happy, a pleasant, and a great time, given to few, in the development of a new State representing 800,000 square miles of Her Majesty's Empire; but the picture would not be complete unless that State kept in complete harmony, in complete unison with the South—the South from which everything has gone up, and which Nature meant to be in close contact, in close sympathy, and in close union with the rest of South Africa and Central Africa. A disappearance into the North might mean another State arising with hostile aims and hostile thoughts against your State, and I feel that as that State bears my name the best service I can render to the country is to return here and to assist you in your big aims of closer union. The picture would be half complete if we have a great State in the North, and yet we are not in touch and keeping and practical union with you in the South; and I believe that can be better maintained by my being a representative in your House of Assembly—by keeping up a connection with the Southern State with a hope that you may obtain a Progressive majority (a voice: "Premier"). Far better than Premier if one can assist the union of South Africa; if you will assist in our drawing closer to Natal and the North, not in antagonism with the other two States that remain—though I hope in time they, too, will be federalised—so that



the future may be speedy. For, as we draw together, and that new population in the Transvaal rises, as we are assured and know it will, to half a million of people—most probably after Mr. Kruger's death and after mine—the union of the three States will mean the ultimate union of the whole.

‘That union is perfectly possible in the next five years. On what does it depend? It simply depends on the North proving itself a gold-producing country. I would not ask you—because I can foresee the criticisms I shall hear—to take that State until it has proved itself wealthy and powerful, but I say when it has proved that, take it before it becomes too powerful and uplifted. Then Natal will go with you. I am talking high and future politics, because your prosperity depends upon it. Natal will go with you in that arrangement, and then we can only wait for the time when we know the central States will be with us too. That is a policy for you to consider. The closer union of the three States might come in five years if the North is gold-producing. Of course it will be said that the North is an awful failure, and I am trying to transfer it to the Cape, so I will say, as soon as the North is a gold-producing factor. I have discovered in my life that you must take mining claims as they are becoming valuable; don't wait until they are too valuable. If you do, you never see them at all. So I sketch you big politics, which are based on the state of parties in this election. If you have a Progressive majority in the Council followed by a Progressive majority

in the House, during the next five years those questions will probably be put. If you return a non-Progressive party, or an *Ons Land* party, or a Hofmeyr party, they will never consent to union because they are afraid to lose the oligarchical domination which exists here and in the Transvaal, which is out of sympathy entirely with republican ideas and Imperial ideas, which preaches that the government of the few shall run a State. That has to be fought, and I am anxious that the system of government by the few, established through the excitement of race feeling, shall not exist here. That is why I speak boldly and clearly. You know it is so, and that is why I point out the serious issue before you. Return the Progressive majority, and you will deal with these questions of closer union, because you want a great United South Africa. Return the non-Progressive majority, and all these questions will be opposed. I will put it neatly; Kruger will be supported and the Northern development damned. Why, one of the most hideous faults of the members, who are to be driven out of the Cape Parliament, is that they supported the taking over of the Bulawayo railway, because that might have something to do for the North. And so it exemplifies itself in everything, whether it is a Chief Justice or the demands of the Uitlanders, whether it is the bogey of the capitalists as exemplified by the opening of a poor whites' school, or the appeal to labour on the basis of retaining the duties on meat. In whatever direction you look you are faced with the same questions,

and they are coupled with the desire to excite great race feeling. I was amused the other day when Mr. De Waal went to see his constituents. As he remarked quite frankly, he is a friend of mine personally, apart from any political action. His humour was splendid. He said, "You must remember this man has taken a continent as big as the continent of Europe, and we shall get that and retain it, and all of it that he can get out of us is—six feet by four!" He was absolutely right. Whatever may be my faults and the condemnation of them, the practical results remain—the Cape has got the Hinterland of Africa, and as it is entirely mineralised I cannot believe that it is a hopeless State. You must be careful lest by continuing a non-Progressive majority in the Cape Parliament you drive the North away and utterly isolate the new population in the Transvaal. Because when the one gets its wealth and the other its rights, it is probable that the two will go together, and leave you at the shank end of the continent.

'I suppose it will be said that I am saying this to frighten you. No, I am giving you these thoughts to think over, so that you may reflect on our position and on what it rests. It rests upon Progressive majorities in the two Houses. We cannot indulge in throwing away a vote or splitting a vote when there are such big questions before us. I speak with humility. There has been no more trying wrench for me than with a man who stood by me very loyally in my dark times. I refer to Mr. O'Reilly. He

insisted upon standing. I begged him not to, for this reason. I said in effect, "We cannot afford to lose a vote; the whole future of Africa is before us. Within the next five years enormous changes will be made. Everything depends upon a Progressive majority. If you stand now we will be splitting our Progressive vote; and a non-Progressive will be put in. That may make an enormous difference in the big issues before us." I put the case practically, and said I would not split the vote for my own father. I speak with strong feeling because I cannot help remembering how loyally Mr. O'Reilly stood by me, and further that he did so although he had never been a supporter of mine in the House. But I do think it would have been a grander thing if he had stood aside for the present—for the bigger object, and the bigger purpose. No one feels the thing more than I do, because I risk the charge of being disloyal to one who has been loyal to me. You will never have the risk again. During the next five years the States of South Africa will crystallise one way or the other. My idea was to have a Progressive majority here to watch the expansion in the North, so that welding with them we might have a great South Africa. I have sketched my ideas. With whom rests the decision? The longer I live the more I find that it is the right thing to share with the people every political conception you have. Your friend often betrays you or misunderstands you; the political coterie in the room does not always express your thoughts and ideas; but the people, if you tell

them everything, will go and think over it. And if you are absolutely right in your facts the people will go with you. With you now rests the decision. There are not many of you. You represent for the fate of a big continent, 100,000 votes; and it is an enormous continent. If you are right here, with the changes that are developing in the North, these States will be welded with you. If you are wrong here, these States will separate in the final settlement. With you it is a great obligation—you the inhabitants of the spot which on right lines must be the capital of South Africa. The railways are like my hands, the people are the same with you—it would be a miserable thing for your future happiness if the various States should obstruct the union meant by Nature. I feel I was right to come and give my help to the State to which I owe so much. I have never altered my ideas, and shall never alter them so long as I have life. I think even the sage of Camp Street was wrong when he suggested to that interviewer—and after all interviews are generally right as far as the substance of a conversation, though they may be wrong in the details—when he suggested that the true solution was my disappearance from this life. You will see it in the interview. I think it was a mistake. I have no doubt that it was meant in the kindest way, but I do think that if I have ever so many faults to atone for—and I have many—the best atonement I can make is to work for this big object, and that can be done only by your unanimous support and your unanimous work, dismissing on an occasion

like this your respect and thoughts for any individual, and sacrificing everything for a cause.'

The second of these speeches is one made to his own constituents at Barkly West, August 3, 1898, and is, like the other election speeches, considerably abbreviated in the unimportant passages.

In this speech Mr. Rhodes referred to the early days of his representation of Barkly West in Parliament, and said that the desire of certain towns for increased representation in Parliament arose from increased population as a result of the development of the mining industry. He said he would not deal with the side issue that had been raised as to his own personality in connection with that present election, as he did not think that that would affect the broad issue. Referring to a contribution to the Navy, Mr. Rhodes favoured the idea of an annual contribution by the colony, to be used by her Majesty's Government as they deemed fit. 'I think,' he went on, 'the thought of this country is going in that direction. I will not refer at length to the opponents of the proposition that we should contribute to the support of the Navy. As soon as a ship was proposed, the suggestion that we should have a cable was sent from the Bond workshop; but if a cable had been suggested there would no doubt have been a suggestion as to balloons or something else. The proposition would always have been shifted, and therefore I do hope that we may carry the annual contribution rather than the ship.'

‘Now, you have two issues before you. I have given you the issue of the party of Progress, and I say that there is another issue, that of the party which is opposed to us. In my own case I think that I am particularly fortunate, and also in the case of my proposed colleague, Mr. Hill. If we had had one of the farmers resident in the country saying, “I differ from your views; I am prepared to oppose you,” I should have said, “Yes, that is a fair basis on which to fight”; but as it is, I think that we are fortunate in the extraordinary fact that we are opposed by a gentleman who is to be sent down from the Transvaal, and who invites your support, and that we are also opposed by one of those interesting young gentlemen—and I have every respect for the members of the legal profession—who is no doubt very naturally desirous to bring his name before the public. He opposes us on behalf of the Afrikaner Bond, though whether he opposes us owing to the views that the Bond hold in connection with Krugerism, I do not know; but I do know that in the past he was an advocate of free trade, and certainly that is not in accordance with the farming interest as represented by the Bond, and it is certainly not in accordance with the instructions from the Transvaal. I should not have made these personal remarks had I not thought that we have to consider the point, that if this constituency were to elect such representatives, it would be electing some of those people who would be prepared to carry out President Kruger’s programme; but I do not think that the common sense

of this district, however much it may blame me for my conduct, would, as representing a portion of the Cape Colony, accept such a distinct challenge as that which is laid down by the two gentlemen who happen to oppose Mr. Hill and myself at the present moment.'

Having sketched the programme of the Progressive party, Mr. Rhodes referred to the Bond party.

'With regard to my late colleague, Mr. Schreiner, who is so vehement in his condemnation of myself, I cannot help remembering that a short time before all the trouble occurred he was prepared to go to war with President Kruger on the Drifts question, and within twenty-four hours. What do I argue from that? I merely argue that here is a late Prime Minister and a coming Prime Minister, who both of them thought that the condition of the Transvaal was so bad that they were willing to use physical force against the Transvaal. You cannot get out of it; it is before you upon the Drifts question. My late colleague, Mr. Schreiner, who is possibly to become the Prime Minister of this colony, was willing to go for President Kruger on halves with Tommy Atkins within twenty-four hours if he did not climb down on the Drifts question. It is a great mistake to suppose that the matter was to have been left to the late Parliament. An ultimatum was sent, and if President Kruger had not climbed down, there would have been war within twenty-four hours. That was the view of the future Prime Minister of the Afrikaner party. We cannot mince



matters. I am showing to you that the position of the Transvaal was so bad, the conduct of the Transvaal was so bad, that the present leader of the Afrikaner party, the coming Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, was willing to go to war with Kruger within twenty-four hours, because he considered that Kruger's conduct was so bad. I was the other Prime Minister, not the coming but the late, and I also took the view that physical force was necessary. Now I leave this to the consideration of my most extreme opponents. These are hard facts. The late Prime Minister and the coming Prime Minister said that physical force was necessary. Why? Because the position of the interior State was so impossible that for the good of South Africa, unless changes were made, forcible measures had to be used.

‘Now I have been exposed to a great deal of abuse. I have never said a word about it, but I wish to read to you what occurred yesterday or the day before in another district of the colony—in a district called Wodehouse. A gentleman called Dr. Smartt had a passage of arms with a gentleman called Mr. Merriman—a very old friend of mine—who has passed his late political campaign in abuse of myself. Now, Dr. Smartt has evidently got hold of some letters lately, which Mr. Merriman had written at the time of the raid. I have no doubt you have noticed that Mr. Merriman was particularly abusive as to my connection with the late attempt at a revolution in the Transvaal, and you might say justly so. Dr.

Smartt said at Wodehouse that Mr. Merriman had posed as an ultra-Afrikaner, as a friend of the Transvaal, as opposed to the Government which would not work with the Transvaal. He asked Mr. Merriman if, in 1895, he was not in correspondence with a revolutionist in Johannesburg. Let the Afrikaner population consider this. What I say shall go through the length and breadth of the land; if it be untrue I must abide by it. Let the Afrikaner population see who spoke out manfully without truckling sentimentality or race feeling. Did not Mr. Merriman in 1895 write to a prominent revolutionist in some such terms as these, and I challenge him to deny it? Did he not communicate with a prominent revolutionist in Johannesburg, stating that he fully sympathised with them, hoping that they had the horny-handed sons of the soil with them, as revolutions were not made by feather-bed revolutionists, but by men with corns on their hands, and wishing that they might succeed in the struggle, which he considered inevitable. Further, did he not hope that the result would be an English-speaking Republic, which might have far-reaching influence; and also did he not refer to the necessity of not ignoring the Dutch sentiment in the Cape Colony, which, though at the moment hostile to the Transvaal, could be used so cunningly against the revolutionists?

‘I was quite aware of the existence of these letters when I was in the House, but I would not use them. You may say why? Oh, well, it was very amusing you know. There was the coming Prime Minister

on one side, who had been my late colleague, who was willing to shoot President Kruger within twenty-four hours if he did not climb down, and there was my other friend, the representative of Namaqualand, pounding away with the most terrible invective against me, and all the time I was perfectly aware that Mr. Merriman had encouraged the revolutionists in the Transvaal. He hoped that they meant business, and that they would not fail. The only point on which I differed from him was in my desire that it should not be an English-speaking Republic. For if there had been a revolution I think that the rule of the Queen is the best. Mr. Merriman has not denied the authorship of these letters. Many of you have read, I daresay, his tremendous assaults upon myself, and you know the coming Prime Minister's attitude upon the Drifts, and Mr. Merriman's sympathy with the revolutionists in the Transvaal, but the whole programme of the Bond party is to be in touch with President Kruger, and I am sure that they would not agree with Mr. Merriman in his sentiments towards the revolutionists, which meant that he desired that President Kruger should come to grief, for he desired an English Republic. Mr. Merriman did not deny the authorship of these letters, but in reply to Dr. Smartt he said: "He was heartily in favour of the reform movement, and that it was the raid that stopped the movement. The raid was not only wrong in its inception, but it was the deceit and treachery which accompanied it that he objected to, and the raid had put Mr. Kruger back into his

old position, and had rehabilitated him in the civilised world. That was the ~~piece~~ <sup>point</sup> of it, and for that they had to thank Mr. Rhodes.\* He asked if there was one Englishman in the hall who would stand up and say that a man who had cabled a forged letter to England to deceive his fellow-countrymen was worthy of any position of leadership in that country. He utterly denied that he had ever said that Mr. Rhodes should be sent to the breakwater, or that he was a murderer. He did say, however, that Mr. Rhodes was unworthy of the trust of the country."

'That statement with regard to the forged letter refers to myself. It is an absolutely incorrect statement. The only letter that was cabled to England was an open letter which the leaders of the Reform movement at Johannesburg wrote to Dr. Jameson, and when that trouble occurred I was asked about this letter, and I said it should be cabled to England. The date was inserted without my knowledge, but it was stated that this date was put on because it was an open letter to be used if assistance was required. The letter was not a forged one, and as to the date, I know nothing about it. I think it is due to my constituents to make these remarks, because you might otherwise accuse me wrongfully. These are things which I could not do.

'There is one great question before the country. The whole basis of one side in this election is to make the Transvaal paramount, however much the Transvaal may insult Her Majesty. This party say, "We are going to make President Kruger paramount

as against Her Majesty, and we are going to elect as leader that gentleman who has declared that the only solution of the position is physical force against President Kruger." How the elections are going to be conducted now, and upon what consistent basis, I fail to see. What does the position show me? It shows me this, that whatever may have been my faults, the Transvaal situation was an impossible one; impossible, if that which we all desire is to be obtained—the union of South Africa. If you were to ask for a practical solution, I should say the best solution possible would be for myself and President Kruger to meet. President Kruger is relying upon the Cape Colony, or rather the Bond and the Bond leaders, and if he will consider that these leaders were ready to destroy him, and that he is spending his money in this colony, and has sent one gentleman down here, and many other gentlemen into the other parts of the colony, when his system and government is impossible, I think you will say that the real and true solution is that President Kruger and I should compare notes. I am afraid that such a solution is an impossible one, because we are not broad enough, but there is not a man who sits in this room who will not admit that that is the true solution. We all want the union of Africa. I may meet many members of the Bond in various districts of this constituency, and they will tell me that they all have the same thought of the union of South Africa. When I was at my worst, fighting in Matabeleland, I had two contingents consisting purely of Dutch

burghers from the Transvaal, and with them we had one very successful encounter with the natives. We used to sit around the camp-fires discussing the situation, and I remember that one of them was one of Kruger's commandants, and I asked him about the transactions which I had in connection with the attempted revolution in Johannesburg. I said, "What do you think of it?" He said, "We forgive you everything. We know you wanted the union of South Africa." And this man was one of Kruger's burghers who had trekked into our country.

'You would be surprised if you knew the number of President Kruger's burghers who are in this country—I mean Rhodesia. You know that about 18,000 burghers voted when President Kruger was elected, but you will be surprised to learn that I have 1000 of his burghers in my country, or nearly one-eighteenth. You may have seen some whining sort of appeal from General Joubert, saying why don't they return to the Transvaal? Why? Because I have the sweet veld, and there they had the sour veld. I have got President Kruger's burghers, and I am going to keep them. I have got one-eighteenth of his burghers, and if he does not look out I shall have half of them before long. This is the change that is occurring in Africa, and it has been exercising the minds of the Government of the Transvaal. Their burghers are drifting away from them to the north. They find that in the north they are treated on an equal basis with ourselves, and they are pleased to think that a collection of Englishmen should treat them differently

from the way in which ~~the~~ their own President treats Englishmen in the State ~~which~~ they have left.'

Having sketched the progress and expansion of Africa since he was first returned as member for Barkly West, and the necessity for further development, Mr. Rhodes again dwelt on the desirability of a friendly attitude towards Rhodesia on the part of the Cape Colony. He went on :—

'I am not going to be driven out of the country. They have devised all sorts of retreats for me. I believe Mr. Innes' idea for me is a hermit's cell somewhere on the Zambesi, but I have not the slightest intention of being driven out. I am going to continue to take a share in public affairs. I believe that the people want me to do that. I believe, with all humility, that I have a good conception of the questions of the country, and that it would be a mean thing if, after all the sympathy and sentiment that has been shown to me in my troubles, with due forgiveness for my mistakes, my return were to desert the colony to which I owe so much. There are the gentlemen representing one party, who desire my annihilation, and there are others who desire for me a sort of retirement. I differ from them. There is a continual reference to my political retirement. The question is not before us, for I have no intention of retiring, and if this special little party would attend to the votes of their followers numbering five or six, they would not have the record of last year of nearly ruining our position by the vote of no confidence in which they supported the Bond, and this year of anni-

hilitating all progressive measures by a vote of no confidence. If they would look at home and see that principles, rather than persons, weighed, they would do more good as Independents than by continually discussing the position of Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes has not said anything. He has simply said that he intends to remain in the Cape Colony to help and work with the Progressive party. He has no intention of retiring, and they had better think of their principles rather than of their men, or rather of the men who at present are in the Cape Parliament. I have never said a word. I simply took my seat in Parliament and heard what the leader of the members of the Independent party had to say as to the exact position which I should take, or as to the exact spot to which I should retire; but I simply say that that is my business, and that they would do far better, if they attempted earnestly to maintain their principles and to carry progressive measures, than by making speeches for progressive measures and neutralising them by personal votes. If that Independent party had done its duty during last session we should still be sitting in session, and we should be carrying many of those progressive measures which the Independents say are their principal objects; but after the experience of the last few years, I am gradually coming to the conclusion that with them principles are nothing as compared with personalities, and I think that it is the duty of constituencies to see that the Independents give the most distinct pledges that they will vote for measures as against personal feeling.'



Proceeding, Mr. Rhodes told those present that they had to consider and choose between one side, a combination of Krugerism and Hofmeyrism, which meant that one nationality only had special claims for parliamentary representation, and the other side, his own, which advocated progress and the true interests of the country.

On 4th August 1898 Mr. Rhodes addressed a meeting at Longlands in his own constituency in the following words :—

‘ It is unnecessary for me to thank you for the greeting which you have given me, as I am to a certain extent part of yourselves or your production, for you have made me your member for the last seventeen years, and I am now seeking your suffrages for the fourth time. All the principal acts of my life have been performed since I became a Member of Parliament, returned by your suffrages. Matters have changed a good deal on the river diggings. I notice that the alluvial ground is gradually working out, and that there is a great difficulty for the people to obtain ground for work. I have had the matter submitted to me. Many of you desire to work the land on the Vaal River estate, opposite to the place in which I am speaking. I am not personally interested in the estate, but I believe, without in any way committing myself, that those who are interested in the estate are willing to enable the diggers to work there, if the Government will give satisfactory terms. All I can say is that I will do my best in the matter.’

Having briefly sketched the Progressive programme, Mr. Rhodes went on to say—

‘ One of the questions which you have to consider is whether you will have friendly relations with the new land in the north, with which I am connected. My great object with regard to the North is that it should work harmoniously with the Cape Colony in the matter of the admission of produce, and that it should be open and free to all. In the North we have no race question. The country is open to all. There every one has equal privileges ; we never hear there of a race question. It is only down here that you appear to be troubled with that question. Perhaps many of you do not understand what a great influence you can have upon the future questions of this country. I will explain to you. Why, here in this district you have a number of diggers of both races ; they work most harmoniously together, and I happen to be their representative. Now, you have to decide the point for the future, whether there has to be a race question or not, and there is a great opportunity for those who are not—if I may put it so—of my own race, but who are of the other race, and who are resident here, to exercise their votes. It is a perfectly easy proceeding for them simply to say they will have nothing to do with me, that they will vote against me, but if they do, they will fight on the race position, and that will be a terrible mistake. You may perfectly well blame me for some of my acts, but you may equally well take a broad view, and say, “ No, the time has arrived for us to let the grass grow on some things of the

past to which we object, and we shall now place on record that there is no advantage to be gained from keeping alive this continual race feeling that is so much talked of amongst politicians in Cape Town."

'Of course, you may very fairly say, "Oh well, this gentleman is trying to win our votes, but he has a perfectly safe seat; he is practically returned for Namaqualand." However that may be, I still have the belief that there are a large number of the Dutch who, while not quite agreeing with the whole of my conduct, will record their votes for me. They weigh the points against me and for me in a very broad way. They say the country is extending into the far interior, and the man who is their representative has an immense deal to do with that new territory. They find that their people are treated on an equality with others in the North, that the laws are the same for all, that all have perfectly equal rights, and that they have equal chances with the people of other races. In the North, out of a population of ten thousand white people, we have at least one thousand burghers of the Transvaal and people of the Free State and Dutch people of the Cape Colony. It happens from the constitution of the charter that the Government is purely personal, but lately we have taken a further step: we have taken the first step towards representative government, and I hope to have another self-governing state in Africa, on the lines which I have sketched to you, on perfect equality of rights, that there shall be no preference given to a man whether he happens to have been born here, or

whether he comes from Holland, or whether he happens to have been born in Birmingham or Germany. We have a new country, which needs development, and we want everybody. We cannot afford to divide on race lines. That is simply an impossibility. Why have I taken this as a special point of my speech to-night? Because I notice that you who are present are representatives of both races; I see this, and so I am putting my case fairly before you.

‘I may perhaps put to you another point. The politicians tell you, or certain papers tell you, that there will be a division of the two races in this election. I hope there will be nothing of the kind. There is an immense union of feeling between the two races; but I will admit that the politicians for their own purposes are trying to make it a race question, and my unfortunate name is being continually dragged in. As I have already pointed out, it would have been easy for me to have been returned at the head of the poll for Namaqualand, and it may be asked why do I worry or bother with this constituency. My answer is, that I wish to show that, whatever may have been my mistakes, I still keep the strong support of a large section of the Dutch people, that I have a broad idea as to the union of Africa, and that I have not altered my ideas in the least about the equality of the races, and that I am prepared to meet Dutch audiences equally with English. I know perfectly well the state of the voters’ roll. I know that there is a majority for me of English and natives, if they are brought up to the

poll, supposing that the whole of the Dutch vote against me, but I do not want that. I want, by talking to you and listening to the questions which you put to me, to show that I still have a large section of the Dutch electors in my favour. Then I shall be able to state in the House of Assembly, when I am being accused of stirring up race hatred, "Take the voters' roll of Griqualand West: I have not only the English and the natives for me, but I have also the regard and consideration of a large section of the Dutch people." If this were so, I could work with greater effect for what we all desire. We want to work together with the North for the development of the country; even my greatest opponents would admit that. I mean by this that even the old voortrekkers would say, "It really is an admirable thing, this development into the far interior." They would say, "This man has made this development, has developed the north, where equal rights were given to all; where there is no protection as against the products of the Cape Colony."

Having dealt with the Bulawayo agreement, Mr. Rhodes proceeded to deal with the criticism that had been levelled against the value of Rhodesia—

'Perhaps the best argument against this adverse criticism is the fact that Mozelikatze did not stop until he reached Bulawayo; he passed through many countries, and then settled down in Matabeleland, and why? Because it was a good country; he saw that it was the best country that he had arrived at. Any farmer, in asking me about a country, would ask if

there were many natives, and if I replied "Yes," the farmer would say that it was a good country. The natives have always taken the best land. Whatever feeling you may have against me, I would like to relate a capital story of the member for Piquetberg. Mr. de Waal's people were abusing him for having anything to do with me. He said, "You know that Rhodes has taken a country twice as big as the Cape of Good Hope, and we shall get that; so far as he is concerned, he will only get six feet by four." Really, that is the best answer I have ever heard. Whatever your personal feelings may be regarding me, you will get the country, and I shall only get six feet by four; and you should not be foolish enough, because of your feelings about me, to allow your people to lose the advantages of going into that country and sending their products there. I wish to show you the advantages to be gained by keeping in touch with the new country. As I have pointed out to you, at the present moment I have nearly one thousand of Kruger's burghers resident in that country; they are most admirable citizens, and they are most admirable fighters against the natives. If the Transvaal burghers are willing to reside there, I do not think that the Cape Colonists should have any diffidence about going there too. I am putting these points to a mixed community of English and Dutch, and the real proposition is this—if you bury the past, we can work together for the development and union of South Africa. We must let the grass grow over the past sometimes. I do not think

that any of you have thought how great an opportunity you have of sharing in that development and union.

‘ Now, if you would just consider for one moment, I would point out that this territory of the Cape Colony has about one hundred thousand voters ; in the northern territory there are about ten thousand white males ; in the Transvaal there are, according to a careful estimate, seventy thousand to eighty thousand of the new population, and eighteen thousand male adults of the old, but if you add the women and children as regards the old population, you will have to multiply the total by four. There will then be about seventy thousand of the old population, but the distinction that you must make is this—the new population consists almost entirely of males and the old population are men with wives and families. Thus you will see that, supposing that the new population have equal rights with the old population as regards votes, there will be about one hundred thousand voters. On this basis, taking the Cape Colony, the North, and the Transvaal, there will be two hundred and ten thousand voters. Then Natal has a white population of forty thousand, about one in four of whom were voters. With Natal and the Free State, the latter representing about fifteen thousand voters, you will have a total of about two hundred and thirty-five thousand or two hundred and forty thousand voters. Now, do you see the problem ? It is a very interesting one. If you get these people together,

they will have about two hundred and twenty thousand voters of both sides, and I am sure a margin in favour of a united South Africa. I do not care where you take me. On this point you may take me to the most extreme Bond district where there is a very great feeling against me, and I will sit down quietly and say, "What is your objection to the union of Africa?" They will reply, "That union is the chief meaning of our Bond rules"; that is to say, the chief object of the white people who first came to this country.

'Now, I would say on my side, What is the object of the white races, which include many Uitlanders in the Transvaal and elsewhere? I would say that they would vote for a union of South Africa, of all the states and colonies. The Transvaal, the Free State, the North, Natal, and the Cape Colony should, for simplicity of working, work together on a practical basis—they should be one. Take the question of police defence. You have a huge police force in Cape Colony and in Rhodesia, the Imperial Government has a huge police force in Bechuanaland, the Transvaal has a huge police force in connection with the natives and the troublesome new population, which would be no longer troublesome if they were granted equal rights with the old, and Natal also has a huge police force. Then in regard to railways. All the difficulty about tariffs would disappear if we had unity of action. The present plan of one railway competing against the other would be done away with if we had one system of administration



in South Africa. Then there is the enormous native question. In the North they have one system for the barbarian, in the Cape Colony there is another system, in the Transvaal there is another, in Natal there is another; so that the native very fairly says that he does not know what the white man's law really is. This is the real cause of the trouble with the natives—the trouble which leads to revolt. If we had one general system of administration for the natives, the natives would understand it. One system of administration would also tend toward the saving of expenditure.

'One might pass from these details, perhaps, to a broader thought. In connection with my own work in developing Africa, I will say that this might have been done with the advance of Africa from the south, from Cape Town, if we had been united upon one system at one time. As you are aware, our development might have been lost entirely. One of the foreign powers—Germany—at that time desired to occupy Africa from Damaraland to the east, but I applied my thoughts to the taking of the hinterland. If Germany had succeeded, you would have found the whole of that country taken from you. At any rate, you must put this thought to my credit, that having got the idea I acted upon it, and the country—your hinterland—is now preserved to you. You have got this country—the hinterland—right up to Tanganyika, and you may be perfectly certain that during the next fifty years, the questions between the different states of South Africa will be settled,

because there is no real question to divide them. You have thoroughly kept out the interference of foreign powers; you can deal with your local questions without interference from the world at large. The local differences between the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, and between the English and Dutch—all these differences will pass away. Your good luck has been that your hinterland has been preserved, and you are without the interference of outside powers. Now, having these facts before you, I have sketched to you my thoughts in the matter, and they will show I mean to work for a closer union of the country, and I mean by the country, South Africa. I think that you would agree with me, that if we all could arrive at unanimity with regard to all our questions of administration in all Africa south of the Zambesi, it would be a most admirable and right thing.

‘With reference to the North, I will express the hope that the Colony will do all in its power to bring the North and itself together without in any way showing animosity to the neighbouring state—the Transvaal. Regarding the position in the Transvaal, I may say that the Transvaal must either refuse to take the new people or accept them. If the Transvaal Government allows them to enter the country, it must give them equal rights with the old population. The Transvaal can put this off, but the end is certain—the Transvaal must accept the right system, and no possible organisation can stop it. That is the real proposition before you. Some

might fairly say, "How does this affect the Cape Colony?" Thus. It is not Rhodes that is causing unrest in Africa—it is the Transvaal position that is causing unrest in Africa, and if I were dead to-morrow, the same thing would go on. The same thing must go on until the new people in the Transvaal receive similar privileges with the old—and it is only when you accept the idea of the equality of human beings that you can consider seriously the union of Africa. That is the only possible way of bringing about union. It is hopeless to wish for my removal in order to obtain the union of South Africa. Race feeling will go on until equal rights are given. I have submitted myself to your suffrages, and I am desirous that I should be returned by as large a majority as possible. For any personal advantage? No. I do not think any one could suggest that there is any personal advantage which I could obtain by being returned. I wish to be returned for a bigger idea than personal advantage, and in order that I may be able to say afterwards that I was returned not on race lines, but by a vast majority of my old constituents, Dutch as well as English. \*I would not like to be returned solely by people of my own race, but I want to be able to point out in Parliament that I have the confidence of a large section of the Dutch electors.

'As to the great issue of union, I am of opinion that you may yet get to a closer union if you will really make the question of equal rights and justice to both English and Dutch the basis of your policy.

Surely this thought of union is a better thought than that wretched existing system of separate states wrangling with each other, and holding the view that there is some special merit in being born an Englishman or a Dutchman. I am sure that this thought is a right one. You may say with whom does the decision rest. It does not rest with the Government, but with the will of the people; it does not rest with Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Schreiner, or with the eccentric Mr. Merriman. It rests with none of these. It rests with the people, and I speak to-night feeling that it rests with this constituency as much as with any other portion of the country, because this constituency is composed of English and Dutch, and a large number of natives, and is, consequently, a very fair sample district of the country. In conclusion, I have to say, that if I continue to live, although I know the other wish has been expressed, I have hopes that union may be brought about, for this reason, that should the North become wealthy, the other states, if they are told that the purchase-price is union, will quickly submit to it. I am perfectly certain that Natal, and I think the Cape Colony, would join. I hope that no race feeling will actuate you in the election, but that you will come to a conclusion similar to that which I have expressed, that you will approach the question on the broad basis that I am the exponent of a united South Africa.'

The next speech at this election is a speech made

at Klipdam, August 26, where Mr. Rhodes dealt very trenchantly with Mr. Hofmeyr and his policy, very effectively with the race question, and very instructively with the history of the Northern Expansion.

‘ I met you the other day and you gave me a good reception, and a great deal has happened to me since. I have been through the district for four hundred miles, and attended a great many meetings, at which those present were chiefly Dutch farmers, and they gave me a warm welcome in every place, and now I feel sure that the charge that the Dutch are against me is a wrong charge, and has been invented for party purposes. Whatever may be said about the trouble in the Transvaal, I will only observe that there is certainly something very wrong with the Transvaal. I am told that the Bond party will come in, and all I know is that their two leaders, who are going to be ministers, wished like myself to fight with Kruger, because they thought him wrong and opposed to the peace of Africa. Those are the facts, and none can deny them, and therefore if you find fault with me, you must find fault also with the Bond leaders, whose position in the matter is similar to mine. But at least I can claim in my favour that I have done work for the country. I can point to an asset of two thousand miles of new territory where the laws are the same as in the Cape Colony, and where there are no hostile tariffs against you; and I may say, if you do not go there, your children will go there. And so, when the Bond leaders ask you to

believe that I am the most dreadful man in the whole country, and say that I am against the Dutch, I would ask them, if I were you, what have they done for you or your children except to make race feeling? You should say to them, "You have done nothing except talk politics. You have spent your time in writing in a paper to stir up feeling between us and another white race who must live and work with us, and whose leader has taken a great country which we must govern in common." Now, that is the position, and if you find on reading your papers that I am described as the enemy of the Afrikanders, let me say that my whole life teaches you the contrary, and you should not listen to such lies.

' Whatever may be the result of these elections, I shall pursue the same course as I have done in the past, and you must remember I have got a great piece of Africa. I can work it with you or I can work it against you; and it is for you to choose. I will not change my policy. I must make it all one, and whether you, the fathers, are for me or against me, I know that your children will be with me. Therefore I ask you, when you read those papers of yours which are so bitter against me, just to sit down and think that the man whom they denounce so vehemently has done more for you in a practical way than any one else in Africa. I speak of the Dutch farmer equally with the Englishman, because although, to be frank with you, I am of English descent, and naturally have for my own people the same feeling as the Dutch farmer has for his, there is no reason why we should not work

together for the future, as it has been my endeavour to do in the past. I think it is probable that the Bond may have a majority, and we, the Progressives, shall find ourselves in a minority; but I venture to predict—and I hope you will remember my words—that five years hence I shall have the whole of you with me.

‘Now, my old colleague (Mr. Schreiner), who, we are told, is to be the next Prime Minister, if there is a Bond majority, has been making an address to his constituents at Malmesbury, by whom he has just been returned as member. Well, he has been talking about the perversion of capital, but he has forgotten about the boomerang. You know the boomerang always comes back. I would say frankly that I have given money to be spent on these elections, and I have every right to do it as a citizen of this country; but then we begin to think of the other side, and finding that they too have been spending large sums of money, we wonder where it has come from. We know that neither the leaders of the other party nor their followers are the men to spend thousands on elections, and so we cannot but wonder where the money has come from. Without being in the least libellous, we remember that the president of a neighbouring state has said that he has to spend large sums on secret service in the Cape Colony, and so it seems very natural to suppose that that money has been spent on the elections in this country.

We can take no better case of this probability than that of the man who is opposing myself. We know

that he has come straight from Pretoria. We know that he only comes like the swallow at a certain time of the year, that he has come for the election, and that when the election is over he will take wing again to Pretoria. Those are facts, and the most extreme Bondsmen cannot deny them.

‘Was there ever a greater perversion of capital than the action of the party to which Mr. Schreiner belongs, in using money from a foreign state, a state that is very unfriendly to Her Majesty (and the leaders know it, and Mr. Schreiner knows it), for the purpose of fighting elections in the Cape Colony? Mr. Schreiner and I were colleagues together, and fought this district together, and he did not object to the use of capital. It is only now that we hear about the perversion of capital, and so I gave him a message—“Just drop it.” Just from a philosophical point of view, and thinking over how much money has been spent by his party, and where the money has come from, that is the simple message I would give him; and I think you will agree with me he will be well advised to drop it.

‘The election has been largely fought upon our relations with the Transvaal, and, as I have said before, I do not think Africa will ever come right, whether I am alive or not, until the position of the newcomers in the Transvaal receives consideration, for that question is at the root of all our troubles. Now, for argument’s sake, take the position of the leader of the Bond party. I do not refer to Mr.



Schreiner, because he is simply being used in the same way as Messrs. Merriman and Sauer have been used, and I do not call him a leader. These men are merely servants, and have more or less to do as they are told—the one received his reward in a place, and the other perhaps in his ambitions being served; but you will admit that the policy of the Bond party is really controlled and directed by—well, a gentleman in Camp Street. No, it seems too long a term to use. Let us think of a word, and perhaps, if I tell you a good story, it will help you to find the right one.

‘Once, as you know, Messrs. Merriman, Sauer, and myself were all friends together in the Cabinet, and we used to have a good deal of chaff together. Mr. Merriman had a way of giving nicknames to everybody. I was called the “Young Burgher,” because at a banquet in Johannesburg, at which Mr. Kruger was present, when some one—I think it was the then Minister of Mines—had been talking a great deal about the old burghers, I said, in reply, for my part I was a young burgher. Mr. Sauer’s name was “the Bumbler.” Why he was called “the Bumbler” I hardly know, but I think Mr. Merriman must have invented the name for him because he was so mixed that he did not know his own politics. At all events, he has remained “the Bumbler” down to the present day. But I think the most amusing nickname of all was the one Mr. Merriman fastened on to his present friend, Mr. Hofmeyr. I remember that he always used to say, “How is the mole

to-day?" It struck me as rather a curious invention, so one day I inquired from Mr. Merriman what he meant. "Oh," he explained, "I call him the mole because you never see him, but you know he is somewhere near. There is a little heap of ground thrown up, which tells you he has been there, but you never see him." So I think, for Mr. Merriman's reasons, it is a very good name, much better than "the Gentleman in Camp Street," which is such a long phrase to use; and you cannot reasonably object to it, because the man who bestowed it upon him was Mr. Merriman, and now they work together. There is a good deal of thought in that one word, because if a party have ideas, it should have a leader, and that leader, instead of burrowing underground like the mole, should appear on the surface, so that you may hear the language and arguments with which he is prepared to support his position as the leader of his party. His own followers know that. Take the last session. When we were fighting for redistribution, Mr. Hofmeyr's duty at such a time was clearly to be in the House leading his party; but where was he? He was always to be found in the lavatories and the passages of the House bullying some poor member of his party, because he wanted to vote according to his feelings and not according to Mr. Hofmeyr's orders. I assure you, gentlemen, that a mole as a leader can never win, and that no party will ever succeed if its leaders will not come into the open and argue questions with their opponents. The party will

grow tired of that state of things, and so I have no fear for the future.

‘We may be beaten this time, but we shall surely win in the end. For just look at the forces which are on our side. All the Progressive thought and all the Progressive workers, whether it be the man who wishes to make a railway or the man who seeks to develop a new country in the interior, or even the Afrikaner who wants to go and live there, are with us. I lay stress upon the Afrikaner, because it is his nature to push forward, and he won’t stop. Now, that tendency of the Afrikaner to push into the interior is the history of the country from the beginning until now ; and it is a very curious thing that when, through fear of the Transvaal, the Afrikanders found themselves stopped, an Englishman stepped in and took up their cause ; and, I say to you, it was a very lucky thing there was an Englishman who was not afraid of the Transvaal, and who, in spite of Kruger, went on and obtained the country in the North, and so, in spite of yourselves, secured it as an inheritance for you and your children.

‘That throws me back again into the past, and I will give you the history of a thought. I have been seventeen years your member, and just reflect on what has been done during that period. When I was elected, I went down to the Cape Parliament thinking in my practical way, “I will go and take the North,” and, as you are aware, I had to fight for the North, and do you know who were my greatest enemies ? Why, the very people who were one day

going to live in and occupy the North—the Bond party. The first objection I had to meet came from Mr. Hofmeyr, who said that we did not want to go any farther north, for that was Kruger's inheritance. I pointed out that if it was allowed to be Kruger's inheritance, he would shut our people out, and would set up hostile tariffs against the Colony, and stop the completion of the railway to the North; and I failed to see why we should give up the country to Kruger. "Well," he said, "it will cause trouble," and he opposed my idea; but I told him I meant to have the North, and that was the trouble always between us.

'When I found that I could not make the railway to the North, I got the farmers to agree to give me their land, and then Mr. Hofmeyr tried in the Cape Parliament to get a resolution passed prohibiting any man from making a railway without the consent of Parliament; but the Parliament refused to pass Mr. Hofmeyr's resolution, and, after I had been home and returned, he came to me and asked me what I had been doing. I told him that I had got the money for the railway, and was going to build it. The railway was built to Vryburg, and afterwards extended to Mafeking, and then came fresh trouble. We found that Kruger again wished to go north of us, and one day I discovered that he had just sent to get a concession of the North from Lobengula. I went to the Governor, who was at Grahamstown, and told him the story, and he said that of course he could do nothing. I said, "Oh, but you must do

something." We talked the matter over. I remember it all as though it had happened yesterday, and I thought out an idea that he need not take the North, but he could get Lobengula to say that nobody but the Queen should have the North, if ever he desired to part with the administration. He was agreeable to that idea, and then we sent messengers to Lobengula, and got him to sign a treaty to that effect. Just afterwards, Kruger's agent arrived in the kraal of Lobengula, but he was too late.

'The Governor then told me we must do something, as countries could not be taken on paper and afterwards left alone, so we sent an expedition, and took Mashonaland. As soon as we had taken Mashonaland, troubles came thick upon us. The money subscribed for its development was spent, and at the moment when I required all my faculties, I was unfortunate enough to be thrown from my horse and rendered physically unfit for a considerable period. I was in bed in Cape Town for a long time, and when I came to my senses, I had always to be thinking of the condition of the country, the exhaustion of the funds subscribed for its development, and the reports of the failure of the country. You must remember, that the young people who had gone up there thought that they would pick up gold like gooseberries, and finding it very difficult to get, they lost heart, and began writing to say the country was no good, so there was great trouble; but I felt that by sticking to it, I should pull through, and I did. I was lucky to get Dr. Jameson to go and manage

the country, but whatever deficiency there was in the revenue, I had personally to find. Just as we were getting all right again, down came Lobengula with his impis to kill us all. I remember I was sitting in the House of Assembly when I heard that the impis were round Victoria, and Dr. Jameson telegraphed to me to say that after the impis had been beaten, he intended to follow them up and take Bulawayo. I was busy at the time, and so I replied, telling him to look up a certain chapter in Luke, and the verse which roughly says : "What king goeth to war unless he knoweth he is able to face the odds." Before the House rose I received Jameson's reply, which was this : "I have read Luke, and it is all right."

'Well, as you know, they went in and conquered Lobengula, and on my next visit to the North, I found them in occupation of Bulawayo and of the whole country. After that, perhaps owing to our own fault, we had the trouble with the Transvaal, and as soon as that was over came rinderpest and our native war, which is only just ended. I recall these facts to your memory to show you what a trouble it has been to take a big country. Well, you may say, "You ought not to have gone through all that." But I have got through it, and I never felt better in my life, for I have the satisfaction of knowing that you have got a country fit for white men to live in, three times as big as the Cape, with one railway finished to Bulawayo, and another in course of erection from Beira to Salisbury ; and I have just heard to-day that it is probable Her Majesty will help me to go on from

Bulawayo to Tanganyika, and I think you may say that this is a good asset for yourselves and your children, and a fair result of seventeen years' work as your member.

'So I will put it to you that I am right in saying that my public life is only just beginning. It is not over; it cannot be over. I must go on, and I would say to you that I think my time must be spent in the service of this country. My life is a temporary one, but the country will remain after me; and as I have said, if you do not go there, your children will and must, for we have made this development from the South, and development is nothing new in the history of the country. The old white people came here in 1650; they have been going from the South to the North the whole time. They made mistakes, being human, because they should have worked it as one system, instead of which they set up separate States, separate laws, and hostile tariffs, and there they were wrong. Well, I had the chance of making a new state, and I was determined that there should be no hostile tariffs, the laws should be the same, and the people should have equal rights, to whatever race they might belong; and really that is my policy, and even if, during the next few years, a Bond Ministry is in office, I shall not alter it. I know that they may commence to worry me with their railway tariffs and their customs, and they will be unfriendly to the people of the North, because they will want to please Kruger, but they cannot interfere with the North; and if I find them too troublesome, I shall have to

look for fresh ports and other outlets. I shall do my best to avert any misunderstanding between the North and the Cape Colony, but the fact remains that these wretched politicians may indulge their passions and drive away the Northern trade from the Colony; and if that happens, please remember that I warned you, and that I shall have done my best to avert the quarrel. Of course, they would be satisfied if they could have my head on a charger, but I have no intention to give them my head on a charger. I intend to stop at my work. I shall do my best to develop the North, and do what they may, they shall not drive me away from the South.

‘Well, gentlemen, I have been telling you this story of the North to-night to show you that apart from local work, I have in matters of external policy been doing good work for you during the seventeen years that I have had the honour of representing you in Parliament. I do not blame President Kruger. His idea was to take the whole North and extend his dominion eastward to the German territories, and by means of his port in Delagoa Bay and hostile tariffs to shut out the Cape Colony. He must be very sad and very angry, because I stopped him, and spoilt the idea of his life; but it was the right thing for a Cape Colonist to do, and I have the full appreciation of the Cape Colony, at least of my own people. But this wretched Bond has been led away by its leaders, and places every obstacle in the way of the true policy of the Cape Colony. They tell me race feeling is at the bottom of it. But what can be gained by



race feeling, except for the Colony to be shut in in the South, to let Kruger have the whole of Africa, and to cut the Colony off from free communication with the North? That surely is not good politics. They can do us no harm now in the North. We have got our railways, we have got our people, and our gold is turning out right. The worst that the Bond can do is to drive us to copy Kruger and his hostile tariffs, and to make us say that we will have nothing more to do with the Cape Colony. Now, this is a miserable policy, and I can see what will be the end of it. I can see that the North and the Transvaal, and perhaps Natal, may go together, and the Bond and its politics will be left out in the cold in the South.

‘I often wish, sir, that I had been born one of the country, and knew the Dutch language well, that I might go among the people and explain to them the true position and refute the stories that are circulated to deceive them, because I see very clearly the direction in which we are drifting. First of all, they are dividing us into two camps as two races. Secondly, they are doing everything in their power to estrange the North from the South, and make that country a second Transvaal in so far as you are concerned, because, as you know, the Transvaal would take none of your people and none of your products, and while putting on tariffs against you, were always looking for a port to take away even the trade; while in their administration, the one man who must not ask for a billet is the Cape Afrikaner, since all the officials must be fetched from Holland. Well, that is the

policy of the Bond party; and if they succeed, what will you find? You will find that they have the whole of Africa against them, including even the Transvaal, for the new population must yet get the control, since numbers in the end always win; and the Colony will find itself burdened with a debt of twenty-eight millions on account of railways which lead nowhere, and will have nothing to show but race feeling. Well, you will find that you cannot live on race feeling. It will not give you new lands for your children; it will not feed your people, and will not give you clothes to wear. But when you have made the discovery, it will be too late to talk; the map of Africa will be changed.

'I have given you a picture of the future. It is too late for you now to change votes which have been given, and to a large extent, so far as these elections are concerned, the matter is over. But I think that to-morrow you will return me as your member. I shall go down to the House and fight the cause of the South for the next five years. The only risk is, that with a hostile Ministry in Cape Town, I may not be able to keep the North with you for five years; but I must do my best, and it will rest with the people to aid me in my efforts. If you think that I have been speaking the truth to-night, you must spread the truth among your people all over the country, and if, year after year, you see my words come true, then you must fight more strenuously for a change. The elections will soon be over, and the results will probably be that there will be thirty-eight members

on our side of the House and forty-one on the other. There may be a change of ministers, but neither party will be able to claim a victory. On the one side, call them the Progressives if you like, is all the wealth, commerce, and thought of the country; on the other side you have good men from the Bond, but they have surrendered their private judgment to one man, and I say to you that cannot be right; you must change it. If I knew the language, I would go to the people in the country and I would change it, because I know that I am right; but there is the danger I have pointed out, and we shall have to face it during the next five years. What I am afraid of is that the harm will be done, and it will be too late to repair it; but it rests with the people whether they will wake up to what is being done and the position which our colony is likely to drift into. To-morrow you will have to decide which way you will vote, whether you will throw in your lot with the policy which I have explained to-night, or whether you are going to support a Ministry which takes everything from Pretoria, which will be hostile to the new people of the Transvaal, which will drive the new state in the North away from you, and leave the Colony completely isolated politically and commercially in the south.

‘You may think it makes very little difference whether you vote for me or against me, but I tell you it makes a great deal of difference. If you sent me down to Parliament with a great majority, a majority which must be composed of Dutch as well as English, then I shall be listened to in the House on the lines

on which I have spoken to you to-night. I may then lay claim fairly to represent not only the English but also the Afrikaners, and that will be the best answer I can make to the charge that I have no longer the confidence of the old population of this country. You must give me your confidence, because your hinterland is at stake, and I am the only man who can work the North with the South. Further, I would say to you there is no hope for you if the North is closed against the products of your soil. Look at it practically. This year we conveyed some fifteen thousand tons of your products to the new country, and that is only a beginning that was made—products from the Paarl, Stellenbosch, Malmesbury, and Piquetberg, and also cattle and sheep from those territories. It is true that you have lost most of your cattle from rinderpest, but a great many of you have your sheep left, and every train takes them to the North. Now, will you shut yourselves out from that great market? Why, it is impossible that you can be so insane. But I am sorry to say that the districts of the South, the very districts that have been benefited, have returned members against their own interests and the interests of the North. I have been carrying their products at a loss to the North, and their reply is to return members which are not in sympathy with the new country. I do hope they will think over it, just as I hope you will think over it; but whatever happens, my policy is clear, and it is to work with the Progressives. It would be a wrong thing that the Progressives should be only of the

English race ; but I believe that that is not the case, and that there are a large number of Dutch with us. And there will be many more, because the future will show that the case has been put wrongly to the country. The people have been frightened by the statement that the object we had in view was to set the towns over the country, and have been turned aside from their true interests by race feeling out of sentiment for Kruger. My great anxiety during the next five years will be to keep the Dutch people with us, but it rests with the Afrikaner people themselves to see that we are not divided into two camps. Whatever happens, I shall, let me repeat, carry out my policy, working to keep the North with the South, working to heal the antagonistic feelings which have arisen between the two races, in the earnest hope that even in our own time we may make a union of South and Central Africa.'

On September 3rd Mr. Rhodes addressed a meeting at Vryburg, near the scene of his old struggle to preserve the trade route to the north, the Suez Canal of the interior, as he called it, in 1883. He used very happily an early instance of his lifelong policy of insisting on racial equality, fair play for Dutchmen as for Englishmen under the British flag, to recommend his earnest appeal against fighting the election on racial lines. He gave also the inner history of the making of the Northern Railway. In this speech, as in the speech at Klipdam, he mentions the curious fact that he cannot speak Dutch.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, I am naturally very

glad to be here, because this town of Vryburg is one of my own creations. My memory carries me back fourteen years, and I can remember the late governor coming to me and saying: "Mr. Rhodes, I am afraid Bechuanaland is gone; those freebooters will take the country, and Kruger, of course, is behind it all." Well, I did not accept the view that we were going to lose the whole interior of Africa, and I asked that I might be allowed to go up and look into matters. The governor said, "Oh, you can go up, but I can give you no force to back you up. You must use your own judgment." I replied, "Will you allow me to do what I like?" "Yes," said the governor, "but if you make a mess of it, I shan't back you up." I said, "That is good enough for me." And so I proceeded to this part of the country. I found Van Niekerk with a commando from the Transvaal on the Hartz River. Montsioa was fighting with Mankoroane, and there was a pretty kettle of fish. It seemed to me that the best thing to do was to go into the camp of my opponents, and so I went on a visit to Van Niekerk and De la Rey of the Transvaal. I shall never forget our meeting. When I spoke to De la Rey, his answer was, "Blood must flow," to which I remember making the retort, "No, give me my breakfast, and then we can talk about blood." Well, I stayed with him a week, I became godfather to his grandchild—and we made a settlement. Those who were serving under De la Rey and Van Niekerk got their farms, and I secured the government of the country for Her Majesty the Queen, which I believe was the right

policy, and so both sides were more or less satisfied. Van Niekerk is dead, but he told me that the policy which I had prevented him carrying out was to incorporate this country with the Transvaal Republic.

‘Now, as I have said, the Afrikanders got their land, but I had great trouble with General Warren in getting it for them. I took the view that inasmuch as this was a country which Her Majesty had left untouched, and its people had taken two sides—one side favouring the claims of our Colony, and the other those of the Transvaal—it was only fair, if I succeeded in getting the rule for Her Majesty, that those individuals who had been busying themselves in the country should get the land. Now, in the end all parties were satisfied, and that disposes of one of the principal charges which my opponents make against me. I shall never forget the closing scene of those now almost forgotten negotiations. I have often told the story. It seems as if it were only last night I was sitting on the banks of the Hartz River, discussing the situation with the Bestuur of the Transvaal commando. They fought with me for hours. At last the old man De la Rey said—it was not the one you don’t care for, but another of the same family—“Don’t talk to the youngster; he will give us the land, and we had better take it, but it is no use trying to get the government for the Transvaal, because he will never let us have it. He knows it is the key of South Africa. Now, you had better settle with him, for if you don’t the troops are coming

up, and we shall get neither the government nor the land." And so they got their land, while we kept the government for Cape Colony—that is, for Her Majesty.

'Now, you can understand from that story that I feel a deep interest in this part of the country. Of the old Afrikaners of the days of which I have been speaking, few are left to go against me; but I think those that still survive would tell you that in that judgment I dealt fairly with the question, and if this election were going to be decided by the old Transvaal commandants, I should confidently expect a large majority, for they had no complaint to make. Now, what are the other charges against my policy? I hear many amusing stories of statements made by my opponents. It has been urged against me, I am told, that I want to get a majority for the towns for the purpose of abolishing duties on meat, and then the price of sheep will drop from £1 to 14s., and the farmers will be ruined. Now, any one who reads knows how untrue that is, because we have just arranged a convention with Natal which maintains existing duties, with reduction only on cattle. My own view has always been that the difficulties of agriculture in this country are so great, that we must give some protection to the farmers, and I have never made a speech in a contrary sense. Now, I think the farmers may well say to themselves: "If Rhodes says these things, he means them, and we must take his word for law. But when these young jackanapes come up here and say them, they have no influence, and what's the use



of listening to them?" I am persuaded that, what with the drought, with the locusts and other difficulties with which the farmers have to contend, it is imperative that they should receive help, for you cannot abandon the land to the wildebeeste, and you must keep the farmers on the soil. It is nonsense to suggest that I say these things merely to catch votes, for if you read my speeches, you will find that they are all on the same lines. No man can view the position more fairly than I can, if you think of me as employing ten thousand people, and consider that a reduction in the price of meat would mean an enormous help to the mining industry. But I hold the doctrine that we must live and let live, and even if our party succeeds in obtaining a majority, they will not refuse consideration to the products of the soil. I know that, in all probability, I am now addressing myself to the Afrikanders. We may not get your votes, but at all events, whatever happens, you are on this point quite safe.

'Then I hear of a story circulated by my opponents, that having taken the North—and many of you having ridden transport there know how good a country it is—I am desirous of selling it to the Cape Colony, and that the price I am asking is twenty millions, and in that way I am going to ruin you. Now, let me tell you a secret. We don't propose to sell 'Rhodesia, or put it up to auction. We think it is a much better country than this is; and having got it, we mean to keep it. But I would give you a word of warning to-night, and it is this, if the Bond party

in this colony persists in its policy of Krugerism, and continues to stir up race feeling, the unavoidable result will be that the North will be shut off from you. There is no question of selling the North to the Colony ; the real question is to keep the North from drifting away from you. Now, look at you all here. Where do you come from ? You come from the South, and if you are not going to the North, your children are going there. Now, do you see the wretched folly of the Bond policy of setting the North against the South ? What do you get from the Transvaal ? You get absolutely nothing save hostile tariffs. Then are you wise to set the North against you, and destroy those opportunities for commercial intercourse which promise to prove so beneficial to you ?

‘ Let me give you an illustration of the absurd and mischievous nature of the policy to which I have referred. How did I come here to-day ? I came by the railway, did I not ? Well, are you aware that I had to fight your battle for the railway against the whole weight of the influence of the Afrikaner Bond ? Do you know that the Bond, with characteristic enterprise and foresight, wished the railway to stop at Kimberley, and urged that if it was to go northwards, it should be carried through Transvaal territory to the Zambesi ? You were to be left here out in the desert. Do you know—I would further ask—that I had to go to each farmer and buy from him the right to bring the railway to your doors ? Do you know that Mr. Hofmeyr opposed me, and tried by a resolution in Parliament to checkmate my plans and stop

the railway coming here? Those, at least, are the facts, and I ask you to ponder them over in your minds, because I venture to say, that if there is one place in Africa which should give me a unanimous vote, that place is Vryburg. Surely there is not a member of the Bond within the sound of my voice to-night who is prepared to say that he dislikes the idea of railway communication being brought within half a mile of his home, and if that is so, I beg that he will remember that I obtained his railway for him after a hard battle, in which Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond, and the entire force of the Transvaal influence were arrayed against me.

‘Well, I am sometimes told my ideas are too big. “Yes,” I answer, “they would be too big if I were living on a small island”—say Cyprus or St. Helena—but we must remember that we are living on the fringe of a continent. Our history is only beginning, and therefore big ideas are essential to progress. Moreover, I have learned something from the history of the Dutch, who did a thousand miles before I came here, and I did two thousand; and if I cannot think in a small way, some share of the blame must rest on the Afrikanders, because they too have had big ideas, although they are now gone wrong. Let me put a question direct to the Afrikanders. I would say to them, “You must have new countries, and new countries I have given to you. Is it not a fact that the laws are the same, that the tariffs are not against you, and that those countries are open, free, and unrestricted for you and your children? Are these

the facts? Yes. Then why are you against me?" If you make me the reply, "Oh, but we have to think of the raid," then I would remind you of this, as to two of the leaders under whose banner you are fighting this election, they too tried to make war with Kruger. You know it, you cannot deny it. And what is your complaint, then, against me? You know well how impossible the Kruger position has become; you know there will always be trouble in Africa until it is settled. Why, if the Transvaal were not a Dutch Republic in South Africa, but only a country you read about in books, you would scarcely credit the existence of such a state of affairs as you know to prevail in that neighbouring Republic. You would not believe it possible for a civilised country to exist in which the majority of people are denied instruction for their children in their own language; where those who pay the bulk of the taxation can get no vote; where if even eight of them meet together, as you are meeting in your hundreds here to-night, they would be liable to be cast into gaol, because under the regime of President Kruger, the gathering of eight people is actually a crime; where newspapers are suppressed if they write against the Government of the day, and where even the judges—as you saw the other day in the case of the Chief-Justice, himself an Afrikaner—if they happen to disagree with the President, are promptly swept away.

'Now I repeat, that if you heard that story of any other country, and you told it to your own child, the child would say, "It is impossible; I don't believe,

father, such a country exists," but you know that the picture I have drawn is a true one; and I ask you, when you think over it, do you wonder that I got into trouble—do you wonder that your new Prime Minister who is coming in (Mr. Schreiner) also got into trouble, and also that even your new Commissioner of Public Works, Mr. Merriman, found himself in the same boat? Well, gentlemen, I only wish I were addressing a Bond meeting on this branch of my remarks to-night. I should like to remind them that Mr. Merriman was moved by the seriousness of the Transvaal situation to write many letters to his friends in Johannesburg; and the only fear he ever expressed was, that perhaps after all they did not mean business.

‘How in the name of goodness can the Bond find serious fault with me! I will tell you where my fault lies. I did not go amongst the Bond and talk to them. I know that if I met them, I should convince them, and they would be my supporters. But I do not see the people, and as I do not know their language, their minds have been poisoned against me. But at least even my Bond opponents must admit that I have done good work in obtaining for them this railway and the new country in the north. But I am told that the Bondmen of Vryburg, some whom I see before me, are bent on fighting Kruger's cause. I dare say, if I were to talk to a typical Afrikaner who is going to vote against the Progressives, he would say, "Yes, I admit that you took the back country for us, and that you are quite fair and

make no difference between race and race. Still you are against us." Now let me ask, and I am speaking solely to the Afrikaners, how am I against you? Can you quote me a case? Has any privilege ever been denied an Afrikaner and granted to any other race or class? Surely, if Kruger's burghers have equal rights, and the Free State burghers have equal rights, it is not likely I should deny them to the people of the Cape Colony. I tell you these are all lies, and now I put another aspect of the question. Do you think you are wise in howling against Rhodes in every part of the country, and especially here in Bechuanaland? You may by your folly drive the North to take up a hostile attitude towards you, and what, I ask, do you imagine you are going to gain? I will tell you. You will gain race feeling, you will succeed in setting race against race, but that will not feed you, that will not give you land, that will not secure the future of yourselves or your children. What, then, is it going to do? I will tell you. It is going to starve you all.

'Now, I want you to go home and think, for if there is one quality that characterises the Dutch people more than another, it is their common-sense, and I will tell you why. Because life on a South African farm leaves one a good deal of time for thinking. I say, then, first go home and think whether in what I have said there is not some truth. For what is the position I have laid before you? That there is a huge country stretching behind us, that the Dutch are the people who first settled on the soil, that they form

one of two races which must live together, and that we must take the country right up to Egypt. Therefore, I say, we must work together. It is useless for you to go to your farms and abuse me. You know that I have taken a large piece of Africa for you and for your children. You know that if the two races act together, we can take anything; and you know that this trouble with the Transvaal arose owing to the fault of the ruler of the Transvaal, and if you blame me, you blame equally some of your own rulers, and your future Prime Minister. You know perfectly well that this election is being fought on race feeling, and it is my duty to go amongst you, and point out the folly of the course you have taken. If I were really imbued with race feeling, I could not talk as I have done to-night, but I disdain any such feeling. Many of my friends, since I was a boy of fifteen, in this country have been Dutchmen. I may mention Maasdorp, Scholtz, and many other names. Race feeling I cannot have in me, because my feeling is that the best man must come to the front whatever his race may be. And this is not an electioneering speech, for I am expressing thoughts that are many years old. And what has been troubling me is that I have been taking countries for the South, and that now in this election we should be divided into camps, with the Dutch on one side and the English on the other.

‘Such a state of affairs should not exist. Our business should be to populate these new countries. To-night, six hundred people are listening to my

words in a part of the country where fourteen years ago scarcely a white man was to be seen. I have been through all that ; you are young compared with me ; and what annoys me is that the people who live on the land in the country I was the means of saving for the Cape Colony, and to which I brought the railway despite the opposition of the Bond, that here the people, I am told, are going to vote against my policy. I cannot understand it ; it is an impossible thing. Well, on Monday the Afrikaner electors may record their votes against the candidates whom I am supporting to-night, but my policy will remain the same, for I shall not be turned aside from my purpose by the temporary anger of the Afrikaners against me, knowing, as I do, that five years hence you will all be with me, and for this reason, because my policy is your policy. There is no boundary to the ideas of the Afrikaner population of this country. I have always been the first to take new territories, and what can there be between me and the Afrikaners, who will be the first to go and occupy them ? No, you will be with me again. But in the meantime, I give you a thought to take home with you to-night, namely, that the man who fought against me day in and day out to prevent the extension of the railway from Kimberley, and to divert the trade route to the Transvaal, was your leader, Mr. Hofmeyr. Well, the building of that railway enhanced the value of your farms and facilitated the despatching of your produce to market. Then think over the development of the North, and ask yourselves whether it is



a good policy that you should try to drive out of public life a man who has been largely instrumental in doing work from which you have greatly benefited.

‘ But you tell me I am against the Afrikanders, and if you can prove that statement, I will say not another word. Surely my whole life’s work proves the contrary. Can I say more? Yes, I will say this. Just as I was told that I would be driven out of my district by the Dutch people, and just as three days ago they gave me the greatest majority I have ever had, a majority largely composed of Dutch votes, so I am told now that you are going to record your votes for Mr. Sonnenberg. Well, I believe Mr. Sonnenberg has every Progressive idea that I have. He belongs to a race that is full of progress, and I am sure he thinks the same as I do, only he imagines the majority is the other way. Well, I hope it will be discovered that he has made a great mistake, and that the history of the election of Barkly West will be repeated over again in the constituency of Vryburg. I believe you will dismiss the absurd insinuation that that victory was a bought one, because how can you buy thousands of people? It is nonsense. That, however, is the only reply *Ons Land* ever makes when the Dutch people vote with the Progressives, and I say that it is a disgrace both for the paper to say it and for the Afrikander people to allow them to say it. However, the Afrikander people know it is untrue, and I believe they will say that the very fact that I have committed faults will help me to avoid mistakes in the future, and that they will not refuse to co-operate with me in

the work I have taken in hand. If that is the view, not only of the Afrikaner section of the electorate, but also of the general body of the electors, then I ask them on Monday to support the Progressive candidates, not merely because of their names, but because of the policy that they represent. I would say in conclusion that I have appealed to you to-night in a special way. There are many of you, no doubt, that came to this meeting with your hearts hardened against me, but I venture to assert that there are few of you who will go home to-night, and after thinking over what I have said, will still care to say, "We are against you." Rather will they say—I am speaking to the Afrikanders—"We must forget the past and work with you again in the future, for we are convinced that our main objects—the gradual acquisition of Africa and the union of South Africa—are one and the same."

A vote of confidence in the Progressives, and of thanks to Mr. Rhodes, were passed enthusiastically, the proposer and seconder being farmers, who spoke in Dutch.

Mr. Rhodes, in reply, said he felt they still had another thought about him—that of his connection with the Raid. 'Well, the greatest raider in Africa is President Kruger. Once he raided his own people in the Free State, and twice he raided us in Stellaland and at Tuli—in fact, raiding had been taught in Africa by President Kruger.'

The closeness of the election, when the results were

known in all the constituencies, showed the accuracy of Mr. Rhodes's forecast in the following speech, which was the second made at Vryburg, September 5, 1898. The need of redistribution comes out forcibly in Mr. Rhodes's approximate figures, and the boycotting carried on by the Afrikaner Bond had not, it appeared, intimidated the best of the Dutch from backing their old leader. The prediction of victory for the Progressives on redistribution proved a little premature; but will, no doubt, be realised before long.

‘We have had a great fight, and if we look at the results, we have nothing to be sorry for. I am quite sure about the election here, and I think you will find that the result of the whole elections for the country will be that we shall have thirty-nine with us, and probably forty nominally against us; but if you investigate, you will find that on the result of the registered vote of this country, we shall have about fifty thousand of the electors with us and about thirty-six thousand against us. That being so, you must admit that the Redistribution Bill was to meet a real need, that the people are unfairly represented, and even our opponents admitted by the conclusions they came to that there must be redistribution. If this election had been carried out on the redistribution that they agreed to, we should have won this election with forty-five seats, but we thought it unfair and would not agree to their terms, and so we fought it on the old registration. But even now we are almost a tie as regards members, and as regards voters we have

a vast majority. Besides, in the Upper House, which is not nominated as in other colonies, but is an elected House, we have fourteen against their nine. You will agree that the end is certain. The Progressives must win. Our opponents know it. There are no people more unhappy than our opponents to-night. They know that we have won, and that when we go to the House of Assembly, we have got the country at our backs—the majority of the people in the country—and it is a very pleasant thought to know, that in spite of all the misrepresentations that have been employed by the opposite party, in spite of the wholesale abuse by the members of the Bond, we have had a large number of Dutch with us. Take this community here. There are some here to-night who will tell you privately, “We are with all this thought, we are with this new country in the north, and with all this progress, but we dare not speak our opinion.” But during the next five years they will speak out. Gentlemen, we cannot make this a great country unless we have them with us. It is no use to stretch our imagination to more new countries in the far interior of Africa unless we have the two races with us. If this contest has been fought on race issues, it is still satisfactory; because in spite of the complete system of boycotting that has been going on, the best of the Dutch have risked that to be with us. We are bound to win. The only trouble is that it might be a postponement of five years; but I hope it will not be so. You are representing one of the districts I assisted to create, and there is another two

thousand miles ahead ; and I am going to work the lot together.

‘ You must not think, because I am going up to the North, where the people are all so loyal and where their trouble is that I am away too long, that I have given up the idea of working the two together. There will be no tariffs and no restrictions there to shut you out. My one thought will be to admit every one who wants to come, and give him equal rights. You are all interested in the North. It is a case of sending stock there, or your friends riding transport or working there in agriculture, and I should be supremely mean if I were to evince hostility to the South on this defeat. But it is pleasant to find that many of you are with my thoughts, and are going to fight the same battle. It has fallen to few to be the authors, so to speak, of a huge new country such as that in the north, extending over eight hundred thousand square miles. It is quite enough for the ambition of any man to be able to develop it, but at the same time I cannot abandon the thought that that territory should be worked through the South. I owe everything to the South. Every honour I have received has been gained in the South, and I should be extremely small-minded if I were to go and start a policy of antagonism to the South. I know I have got the people of the Colony with me. Look how the voters recorded their votes in this election, and as regards the numbers, what is the difference between thirty-nine and forty ? Simply two individuals in Aliwal

North. And in the Upper House we have fourteen to nine.

'I say, then, we have the whole country with us. If any man has property, if any man has intelligence, if any man has a thought of progress, he is a Progressive; and we know that our opponents, an enormous number of them, have been stirred up (and for the last time) on the question of race feeling, and in spite of that question being used in the most terrible manner, and every farmer threatened by his neighbour with boycotting, still a large number of the Dutch population have voted with us. We are not beaten to-night. We have won. The battle is over. The Party of Progress must govern South Africa; it will become supreme in Cape Colony; it will have its union with the North; it will have its relations with the Transvaal, which will also have to consider equal rights for every civilised man.'

A speech at Port Elizabeth, made September 17, 1898, gave Mr. Rhodes the opportunity of showing a little genial pride in an art which he does not often practise, though he has made more than one success—the art of phrase-making. The rare felicity of 'unctuous rectitude,' as applied to that self-righteous and censorious attitude so dear to a certain not uncommon type of Englishman, is quite wrongly described by the French as hypocrisy. Mr. Rhodes invented a phrase for a quality that existed, but had before that time defied attempts at nomenclature, and the phrase is illuminating.

'It is about two years ago since I left you, since you

greeted me on the occasion when I came down from the north. I had been in a good deal of trouble, and I had never until then asked your support; but when you felt that I required help, or rather, that my thoughts required help, you came forward as one man and gave me your cordial assistance. You remember that, unknowingly, we then invented a great epigram here. You remember that when you greeted me I told you—and please hear the end of the story—I told you that I was going to meet the unctuous rectitude of my countrymen. Well, you know that great objection was taken to that remark. When I got to Madeira I was met by a number of friends, who said, "Please, Mr. Rhodes, explain that. Say that you said the anxious rectitude of your countrymen." I said, "No; unctuous, and I am going to stick by it." Well, you know the humour of our people. They were absolutely pleased with it. They thought it was justified, and the phrase has become a household word. They feel that some of them are going a little too far in their moral rectitude, and owing to the happy good humour of our people they have adopted that saying which amused them.

'Now, you have a great work before you. You know that we are to decide within a few days the elections of the colony. If we do not get a united party, if the Bond is supreme, you will be under the domination of Krugerism for the next five years. My friend here says something about taking the country, but he must remember that I have the northern territory, and I can go and attend to it; but I am

sorry to say that most of you will have to remain here and be under the domination of that despotism if we do not get a united party. But we have had some good news to-day. The oldest Dutch constituency, what was supposed to be the most extreme Dutch constituency, has by a large majority elected Sir James Sivewright, and he was ticketed by *Ons Land* with the dreadful letter "R.," which I believe has reference to my name, so that that they cannot get out of it to-morrow by saying there is this reason, or that reason, because the head-centre of Afrikanerism in the Cape Colony has had the good sense to return a man who has our Progressive ideas. I think that is a great knock for Krugerism. I do not say that that is a knock for the Dutch, because I believe that the majority of the Dutch are with us.

'I will admit this—that there was one fault or complaint against me—the unfortunate incident in the Transvaal. But when we went into details, it was brought home to us in the clearest light that the coming Prime Minister had felt that the conduct of the Transvaal Government was so helplessly bad that he was prepared to go to war with them with Her Majesty's troops, and that the coming Commissioner for Public Works (Mr. Merriman) had encouraged the people in Johannesburg, not under constitutional rule, as his letter says, to fight the question out—and had expressed the hope that they had corns on their hands. Well, that was the position. Two members of the coming Ministry of the Bond were equally desirous that Kruger should either change or disappear. On



hearing this, the Dutch people naturally said, "Well, then, what are we fighting with Rhodes about? At any rate, Rhodes has given us a new country, where our people can go on equal terms and with equal rights; why should we drive this man out of the country and put in a Bond Ministry, two of the members of which, and two of the Bond leaders, were equally desirous that Kruger should disappear, one stating it openly and the other stating it by means of confidential communications?"

'Now, one of the accusations made against me—and made by many of my friends—is that I have no right to interfere with Port Elizabeth in the present election. I will put to you the case fairly. After considerable thought, I have come to the conclusion that in our politics, with the points before us, there is no room for three parties, that it will take us all our time to beat Krugerism, which I have already described as Afrikanderism, upon the basis of the Transvaal, which simply makes a difference between those who are born here and those who come here. We can see no difference. That is what we are fighting, and we cannot afford to have a third party.

'What is your great desire? Progress, and that you should be properly represented in Parliament for progress. Your desire is that you should have proper representation in your councils, so that you may progress, and lead the Dutch—the Progressive Dutch to go with you. Now let us look at last session. We had the Redistribution Bill, which was carried. As soon as it was carried the leader of the Bond in

the House, Mr. Schreiner, found out that some of the Independents did not like the Government. They said that Sir Gordon Sprigg was this and that Sir James Sivewright was that, and he put forward his motion of "No confidence." He carried his "No confidence," and by what vote? By the vote of the Independents—by the votes of Mr. Hay, Mr. Weiner, Mr. Solomon, Mr. Beard, and Mr. Molteno; in fact, all the Independents except their leader. Just look at the point. You had your proper representation before Parliament, and the bill would have been carried had the Independents not voted against it, and now we are fighting this election over it. And suppose we are beaten, you will be without your proper representation for the next five years, and to whom do you owe this position? To the Independents again. I can respect your Bondmen, and I can fight your Bondmen. I am a Progressive—with the Progressive party—and I am going to fight with them whatever my position may be. But these Independents! I cannot stand them. But I know exactly what is going to happen, and I am going to make my prophecy—I only hope that this one here is not going to be returned.

'Well, this is my prophecy—the number of them is small, and they are going to end in the arms of the Bond. Of course, they will give all sorts of reasons for their attitude. They will say that they are going to hold the balance between the two races; that they are going to avert bloodshed. But how absurd all this is! I have been amongst the Dutch people, and I know

that there is not the slightest desire for bloodshed. All this comes from Camp Street ; that is where all this talk comes from. Why, the country people, the Dutch people, have not the slightest idea of it. They say with regard to the Transvaal—the Progressive Dutch say—they want a change in the conduct of the Transvaal as much as we do. But the Independents are to hold the balance, and I am not at all sure that we will not find that the old gentleman in Camp Street will hold the balance. I have marked them down in that character, and every Independent I place a cross against, meaning that whenever the contest is over we can count him as with the Bond. You have the two parties in the House, and I know that you are all strong in the hope that the Progressive party may win. You need not think that I have indulged in this speech against Independents without due thought. When I look back and see that they nearly wrecked the principle of redistribution ; when I know that they, and especially your member, nearly upset the railway to the north, and kept you out of communication for a whole year, I think I have a right to speak. I am not afraid of the Bond party. Day by day I have gone amongst the Dutchmen in many parts of the colony, and have found that they are with me, and I know full well that I can work with them again. But I know that we have to defeat Krugerism as applied to this country. That is the idea, to keep the power in the hands of a few people subservient to the power of Camp Street, and that is what we are fighting against in this election. And we are going to win.

‘A great deal has been said as to my position, and I can tell you in a few words that I am not going away from the country to which I owe so much. I am going to fight for the principles that your party has adopted, in whatever position I may be. I have a lot of work to do yet. If you will only think of it, we are getting on very nicely with our telegraph through the continent. You may say, “What has that to do with us?” I say everything. Your cable rates will be reduced by half. They have already been reduced owing to fear of the new line, and it is drawing on us. As you know, Sir Herbert Kitchener only started the other day, and we can fancy we see them marching to-night towards Khartoum. We are coming up from the South, and we are going to join him as sure as I am standing here. That is not in the interests only of an imaginative idea; it is in the interests of this country, and, as Mr. Lawley very neatly put it at Bulawayo, what was attempted by Alexander, Cambyses, and Napoleon we practical people are going to finish. That is something better for me to do than to retire to a hermit’s cell, the destination devoutly wished for me by the Independents to-day. And I am going to make the railway to Tanganyika, and that is going to benefit you. You will send up the goods, and we will bring down the millions of labourers and distribute them amongst the mines. At Tanganyika they labour for 2d. a day, and that reminds me of the last time I visited Egypt, when I went to a place below Cairo. In a chat I had with the man in charge of large works he said, “I don’t know what

is going to happen to us ; we can't go on with these irrigation works. Would you believe it, we are paying labour 3d. a day." I said, " I don't know what is coming to Egypt." With such a supply of labour we can work many of those mines which are not payable to-day on account of the heavy charges for labour. This, I may remark, is being used against me by some of the natives. They say Mr. Rhodes is going to make us work for 2d. a day. Now, the only way we can gain this advantage of cheap labour is by extension of the railway lines. You do not know what you have missed. When I went to Beira I was in trouble, and I had been up a great deal. The proposition was, we must have a railway, and in my daily walks through the veldt I discussed the problem—Beira to Bulawayo or Mafeking to Bulawayo? I had the money. On the one hand the distance was 600 miles, and on the other 1250 miles. I decided for Port Elizabeth and the South. I do not say that because there is an election before you, but because it was the thought which came. What decided me was not your vote, not your ideas, but I had made my plans as a youngster that I would have the Cape as the basis for the development of Africa. If I had decided on the Beira route, all connection with the South was over. Look at the map. There are other ports to consider. Strong reasons might be advanced towards an opposite course, but I had made up my mind, and my idea was to develop South Africa from the south. If we get our money for Tanganyika—and of course we will get it—I propose that the line from Salisbury

should be extended and join our line farther in on the Zambesi, so as not to be in competition. It is one of the greatest mistakes for a man to work competing railways; he cannot afford the competition, and will probably be working at a loss. I propose to let the Beira line join farther north, so as not to interfere with the relations of the South.

‘There is the work of the telegraph to do; there is the work of the railway to do; and there is another very big question—an approaching question—the question of union, of South African federation. That federation is very close. By federation I mean that the native question, the laws, and the railways should be together. Local questions should be dealt with by the local States. The solution does not rest with me; it is being discussed to-night. If we could look to-night into the various camps thousands of miles away we would see strong men returning from their mines. They are discussing the richness of their mines. On them depends federation. If that country is rich, the prize of Africa will be the North. If you will not have it, Natal will federate to-morrow; and I can state here that if I am driven away by a Bond Ministry under Hofmeyr management I shall turn my thoughts to Natal. I am determined to have union. Some people may say, “But how about the Transvaal, between the Colony, Natal, and the North?” I do not consider the Transvaal; I am thinking of the next twenty-five years, when the new population must have their proper position. If we get Natal the other States must fall in. Now, you are beginning to

follow my thought. The question is, Will the Cape, by its own conduct, be left out in the cold? The people in the North are not going to have any feeling for a State in the South which is not necessary to them, and which is dominated by the tactics of the Bond. Assume that a Bond Ministry gets the power. In your responsible position I talk to you boldly. I must speak out boldly. I see the danger that is coming. My North is all right. No human being could have better prospects. Eight hundred thousand square miles with a loyal people. You might fairly say, "Why don't you go there?" I will tell you why. I am determined not to leave the South till I see that you are clear of the risk of being dominated by Krugerism. And my picture would not be a complete one if the future held a union of States in the North and the Cape was left out in the cold. Last year we took £600,000 worth of goods, and the bulk of these goods came through Port Elizabeth. I have arranged the railways to the North so that whatever trade we have in the North will have to come through this port. You will admit that East London cannot deal with our trade because that is not the nearest route, and Cape Town is too remote. I have sketched the extension of the line, and, having spent £2,000,000 on the Mafeking-Bulawayo line, I would not be a business man to put another line into competition with it. I wish to earn dividends on that line, so as to get guarantees from Her Majesty to go on to Tanganyika. Thus you will see that it is essentially in the interests of the port to support no Independents.

Now I have put to you practically why I cannot retire from public life. My telegraph will go to the dogs, and my railway will not go to Tanganyika, and the efforts of my public life for the union of South Africa would be done with. I believe, therefore, in dealing with people whose confidence I think I possess, rather than in retiring to the position of meditation which my dearest friends suggest for me. Apart from chaff, I think you can see with these objects before me why I should not retire. It would be paltry on my part, having the opportunity to forward them better, perhaps, than any other man in South Africa, were I to propose to retire. I hope you are with me in the ideas that I have sketched to you to-night, that you will see the whole thing as a picture—a picture that can be worked out; but it can only be worked out if you are thoroughly with me in that idea. Do not spoil the whole thing, when one looks for co-operation, by sending down an Independent. I am not saying this personally, but do not send down to Parliament an Independent whose whole mind is antagonistic to these thoughts. Send down those who will loyally work with these thoughts. The North is asking from you nothing. The North is my thought. Co-operation is my thought—Federalism and the Union of South Africa.

The last of these Election Speeches of 1898 is the speech made in Good Hope Hall to a Cape Town audience, October 25th. The result of an inquiry into charges of Capitalist bribery—the exposure of the accusers—will be noted.



Mr. Rhodes, who met with a tremendous ovation on rising to address the gathering, and a voice, 'Take off your coat,' said—

'There is no one to fight to-night. Now, gentlemen, the last time I met a Cape Town audience was during the Council elections, when we had a great fight, and we won. I met you in the hall close by, and we had a very successful meeting, and I felt that our case had your support. Since then, as far as I am personally concerned, there has been a good deal of work. I had to go home to get my Charter right, and I came back, and we fought another election, and in spite of having no organisation, and in spite of being taken by surprise, we had a tie. And a tie on what question? On the question of the proper representation of the people, because you must remember that the greater covers the less. If you get proper representation of the people, you will get those measures which you, as Progressive people, desire. If we don't have proper representation, we shall not get those measures, and therefore we have to do everything in our power to get a proper Redistribution Bill. Well, the speaker before me told you exactly what the position is, but I will even bore you by labouring the point again. You have a hundred and eight thousand voters in the country. Eighty per cent. voting would be eighty-six thousand. When I say eighty per cent. voting, I mean to say that if you made a careful calculation, and eighty-six thousand had recorded their votes, you would have fifty thousand votes, and the people who

are in charge of this country thirty-six thousand. Well, that is a most anomalous condition. That is a most extraordinary position. But what do those people do who are in power? After they had declared that they would give you a Redistribution Bill; after getting into power and finding that they were in a hopeless minority, so far as the people were concerned, they say they will give no redistribution at all. They wish to keep us in a position which I call an application of Krugerism.

‘I will tell you what I mean by Krugerism. As you know, in the Transvaal the whole of the wealth, the greater portion of the population, practically the whole of the intelligence, is not represented at all, but they are lived upon by foreigners and an ignorant minority. Now, in this country they desire to apply Krugerism in this way. They are perfectly aware that the votes of the majority are for the party of progress, and they say, “We will not allow you to be fairly represented, we will evade it in every possible way, and allow the government of the country to be carried on by a minority, and we will prevent any fair redistribution, so as to prevent the majority having a voice.” This is really Krugerism again in a minor form, and that is what we are fighting. And shall we win? Well, it will depend upon ourselves. Yes, if we keep united in the Cape Parliament, we shall win. But there are always some weak-kneed ones. There are always a number of those who have immense rectitude, who are always finding reasons for not voting with the Progressive party. At present we

are united, but I cannot help throwing back my thoughts to last session, when there was a third party. I will go through a few names. What occurred last session? We had a bill for the better representation of the people, on which hung the whole issue of Africa, and we should have won it. Let us look at the names of the third party and see what they did. There were about six of them. Messrs. Weiner and Beard were two of them. Mr. Beard, just before leaving for England, said, "I voted no confidence because I am perfectly sure that Mr. Schreiner will give us a Redistribution Bill." Now, remember his words. Mr. Schreiner has not given us redistribution, and he does not intend to give us redistribution, except after a year's consideration, when he says he will give you a bill that will not alter the balance of power. That means that his extraordinarily subtle mind will devise a bill which will still keep the thirty-six thousand voters in power, as against the fifty thousand. That was the statement of two of the Independent party, that Mr. Schreiner would give a fair and honest redistribution. Now, let us think of another—Mr. Hay. He went to Victoria East, and all I can tell you about him is that he was proposed and seconded by Bondmen. Mr. Jones came to Port Elizabeth, and I was able to effectually clear him out. Mr. Molteno went to Tembuland, and he stated that Mr. Innes was his leader, but I am glad to say he was not returned, for I am sure he would have given trouble; and last but not least, Mr. Solomon made an attempt with us again in Victoria East.

‘Well, I think you will all agree that he has ended in the arms of the Bond, because he is now the Attorney-General in a Bond ministry. (A voice : “Without a seat.”) Yes ; but remember it was he who wrecked redistribution, and here was a man who represented a Progressive community. He deserted us at the most critical moment, and he lost redistribution to the country, because if he had voted fairly, we would have had redistribution to-day, and our troubles would have been over. We know now that just before he gave his vote, Mr. Schreiner approached him and said, “In case I win I am going to form a ministry, do you think you will be with me?” Mr. Solomon, upon that, voted against all his principles, and wrecked redistribution. We find him now with Mr. Schreiner, but I am told it is a most improper thing in the House to say that that was a bargain, and that he sold himself. I am told that it is a most improper thing to say that that was a bargain, and that he sold himself for thirty pieces of silver.

‘I may be much abused, but I still hold to my opinions. And what is the lesson I have to teach you? It is that you must at elections make your candidates give you pledges, and that you must once for all dismiss in the future having those gentlemen called Independents. You form your thoughts and your ideas, and come to good conclusions on the issues before the country. A gentleman appears with a most upright character and gives you principles, and if he says that he must be independent,

you may be sure that the Independent will eventually land in the arms of your opponents. At any rate, that has been our experience, and I am not at all sure it will not be our experience again. I think it is but fair that we should enjoy the same politics as the old country, where people who come before a constituency have to give certain pledges, and they no more think of being Independent—which means dealing with the opposite side—than of flying. They simply say : We will pledge ourselves to a certain party, and if we choose to differ, we will place ourselves in the hands of our constituents. The whole of our politics now have been ruined by the Independent party, and if you will take my advice, in future, when your candidates stand before you, make them give you distinct pledges to stand to a certain party, and if their consciences will not allow them to stand to the party, make an agreement that they will submit themselves to their constituents. Have no more of these Independent members. When you choose your members, take pledges from them, and if their consciences come in, let them submit themselves to your votes, and you will settle their consciences.

‘Now, I won’t tire you to-night, but you may have noticed in the last few days that in the House there has been a most undesirable time. We have been throwing mud at each other, for you must remember that the party that now is in opposition, and that last session was in power, had rightly to challenge our opponents, who had been for the last twelve months indulging in the following class of statements : that

we were impure, that we were wanting in rectitude, and we had no righteousness, and that we had practically bribed everybody. Well, naturally, when we came down here to the House, we said, "Now, prove your statements; prove that we have bribed some one; prove that we have been guilty of impurity; prove that we have been wanting in rectitude, and that we have been lacking in uprightness." Because you must remember the present Treasurer's favourite theme was, "Righteousness exalteth a nation." What has at any rate been the result of these unpleasant days? Why, if you have read the papers, you have found out that absolutely, in so far as the late ministry is concerned, and their supporters, not a single charge has been maintained. The only small thing that has come out of the whole discussion is that Mr. Merriman, when he was canvassing, used his position with the Mutual to try and get hold of Dr. Smartt's supporters, and that Mr. Schreiner deliberately purchased Mr. Solomon and his principles for a Ministerial berth. Neatly put, that is a summary of the whole of our debates. I am glad it occurred, for many a man in the street, because some of us possess wealth, had a sort of idea there was something in these charges—that there had been a great deal of purchasing and a good deal of improper use of money. You must be glad to hear that these charges have ended in nothing, and they have landed their own party in a most unhappy position.

'Now, having dealt with the issue before us, and the purity of our position as against the position of our

opponents, I would just say a few words as to what we depend upon to get a Progressive majority in Parliament, and a Progressive Ministry. You must remember the whole of the issues of Africa are before you now. You are in an exceedingly pleasant and happy position, in so far as politics are concerned. A hundred years hence the whole of the races and relations of this country will be settled, and you have to assist. We have developed this new state in the North. We are just considering closer relations with Natal. We know the Republics must change on account of the enormous influx of Europeans. I know I have to be awfully careful about the Republics, so as not to hurt any one's feelings. But still we know that these two states are to change very rapidly, and it rests with the Colony at the base, it rests with us here, as to what will be the relations with the other states in South Africa. But when you think that, in addition to that, in the north of Africa the whole thing is changed by the conquest of Khartoum, and that what appeared to be imaginative madness five years ago is absolutely practicable now. And when we know absolutely that we are going to join—I know for myself and the state I represent that we shall join—the matter is beyond dispute. It is the agreement of all. Only the other day, I heard that the telegraph was nearly into Nyassa, that it will be completed to Tanganyika by the end of the year, and then I have only six hundred miles to Uganda, and we know that Kitchener is at Sobat. You see, it is a very little distance, and what you feel is that you

will take a part in the whole work. And then we are opposed by this non-Progressive party who hate any expansion, because they think that it means their annihilation. We must remember that it is not the Dutch people, for this non-Progressive party consists of just a few. It is Camp Street; it is Pretoria. It is not the people, it is not the Dutch people. It is a little coterie who hate expansion, and who wish to keep in their own narrow groove of misrepresentation and libel to maintain their position. Not having the decision to face the people, and not having the courage to face Parliament, they have to do it by subterranean alleys. Gentlemen, we are not fighting the Dutch people, but the coterie, and I believe we shall succeed—and we shall succeed through this expansion that is going on, and which you all share in the satisfaction of working for. As I said just now, you believe now we are going to join from north to south. You hope you will share in that. You believe now thoroughly in federation in South Africa, in the union of the neighbouring states. Now, these are all principles of the Progressive party.

‘I will tell you a good story. It is an interesting story on that question of union from the North. As you are aware, and as I believe, we were very nearly at war with France, I think four years ago; I think it is four years ago. Oh yes, it was a year before the raid—I always date a thing from that. That was at the time that I was made a Privy Councillor. I was staying with Lord Rosebery,



and we were talking about many things. I said, I believed the chief risk to us in the world was through the delay of the people getting up from Uganda, if the French got across and cut in between Khartoum and Uganda; and he said, "All I can say is that if they do that, that is a question I would fight upon." We will follow that story. About a week or a fortnight afterwards, the French ambassador said he would like to see me, and I went and saw him, and he was exceedingly civil, and he got talking upon various questions, and he said, "Now, what do you think is the risk of war in the world?" I said, "I think the risk in the world is your going on to the Nile either from the east or west." And he said, "What would England do?" and I said, "I am sure she would fight." He said, "Why do you think that?" I said, "Because Lord Rosebery told me so two days ago, and he represents the Liberals, and if the Conservatives were in, they would be worse."

'Now, why do I tell you that story? I tell it to show that the French are perfectly well aware that Marchand is not on the Nile without plenty of warning to the French Government. If I, as an outsider, was privileged to know that, and told the French ambassador, you may be sure they were told that by the English Government four years ago. Well, the French people knew that their Government was warned four years ago, that if they went and occupied the Nile between Khartoum and Uganda, England would make it a fighting question. I may

finish my story by saying that I told Lord Rosebery afterwards that I had told the French ambassador this, and he said he was glad. He said, "I am glad you let them know that that was my feeling as the Liberal Prime Minister." Why I mention this to-night is—well (turning to the reporters), sometimes these gentlemen cable—I don't know, every little helps. I am not sure the French people are aware how strongly their Government was informed that the occupation of the Nile would be an unfriendly act to England, how strongly their Government were informed of that four years ago. Sir Edward Grey stated this in the House of Commons six months later, and I say, with all humility, what came to pass. I mention this to show that our Government has not been slack in this matter, but has continually warned the French Government that the occupation of the Nile would be an unfriendly act. In my small way, with this South African development, I have had several very interesting experiences. I remember on one occasion Mr. Gladstone asked to see me, and he was talking about Uganda, and he said, "Fancy being dragged into the centre of Africa, and, do you know, it is all due to these wretched missionaries." He said, "Our burden is too great; as it is, I cannot find the people to govern all our dependencies. We have too much, Mr. Rhodes, to do." He was also good enough to say, "I don't blame you; you never give us any trouble. We have too much of the world, and now these wretched missionaries are dragging me into Uganda." It only

seems the other day when we were in Uganda, and do you know whom we have to thank for it all? Lord Rosebery. He fought the whole Liberal Cabinet on the question, and it was a question either of remaining in Uganda or of parting with Lord Rosebery, and we must always remember that he is one of those Englishmen who must be credited with a portion of the British Empire. I know it is a fact, and the reason he got no credit for it was, as was natural, he has said nothing about it himself, and the other party was too clever to give him the credit for it. And so through accident, you may say, Khartoum has been taken and the valley of the Nile, and we are coming up from the south, and I wish Cape Colony to share in the whole development.

‘Our opponents are opposed to that thought, saying it is all imaginative, and will be no good to us, because all our troubles have come from northern extension. But we recognise now, even in the little details of the telegraph, that it will be a competitor with the cable, and that you will be getting your rates lowered. We recognise now that all our young people are going to the North, and that the enormous development of this city and the enormous increase in the value of city property is due to the value of the interior. And so my opponents are giving up accusing me of simply loose imagination, and are beginning to recognise that they must give fair consideration to the North. Gentlemen, I don't want their consideration. In my time of trial in connection with the development of the North, I got a lot of

abuse from them, because they were under the influence of Pretoria. I don't blame President Kruger. He saw very clearly that the North ought to be developed, but he saw his future was over when I took the North,—as he once said very fairly to myself, "Rhodes, you are putting a ring fence round me, and that is why I am fighting you." That was why he dreaded the North, but the party who are the Government of the Cape Colony have no reason to do mischief to this northern development. They are the party in power. They say they will be well disposed to the North, but in their hearts they are against it. They would welcome with delight the morning paper that told them that the mines had collapsed. My friend the member for Colesberg said the North only contained bamboos and native women, and, as I said the other day in the House, I feel sure he prays earnestly every morning that the hinterland may prove a swamp and that the mines may prove a failure. It is with these people that we have to deal, and whom I have to consider, as the representative of a neighbouring state, because I have been restored to my old position, and I to a certain extent govern the relations of that state with the other states of South Africa. I am naturally desirous of keeping on welding that state together with Cape Colony and Natal, and with the future Government of the Transvaal. All these things are perfectly sure to come. It is as sure as it is that we shall get through to Egypt with the telegraph, and subsequently with the railway.

'It is those thoughts that young men have to work for, it is those thoughts that you must put your members of Parliament in to represent. You are no longer working for imaginative ideas, but practical, and it means the benefit of every one here, that is, at this meeting to-night. We fight in this portion of South Africa for the proper representation of the people. We are the proper representatives of the people, because we know that when those whom we term the Progressives get a majority—we shall have a majority—they will work for this measure, they will work for education, for irrigation, and all the other matters which are necessary for the people. They will work for closer union with the Free State and Natal, and they will work for the development of the civilisation of Africa, and for closer union with the neighbouring states. You have no feeling against the Dutch. I am sure I have none against them, but I determine to fight back to back with the intelligent section of the Dutch population against this terrible Commissie van Toezicht system. It is absolutely the gentleman in Camp Street, and that youngster in the *Ons Land* office, who are running the whole country. It is absolutely so. I have talked with individual members of Parliament who have been returned on this side of the House. They have been terrorised. They are absolute servants. They hate the whole thing, but dare not move against it. It is this terrorism that we are fighting with the Dutch, and we shall overcome it. It is a terrorism initiated from Pretoria. The whole of the

Transvaal is governed by one man, with servants from a foreign state. One must not think that the Hollanders have any influence with President Kruger. They are his servants. They might be immediately dismissed. As to the present Prime Minister, he is merely the servant of President Kruger.

‘I can tell you a good story about the Treasurer too. There was an awful revelation the other day, that during the raid the present Treasurer had encouraged the revolutionists in Johannesburg to rebel, and his only fear was that they did not mean business. He had sketched what he desired—an English republic—and he said that the revolutionists must look out for the Dutch in the Cape Colony. But if there is one thing which the Dutch people detest, it is an English republic. They would rather be under the Queen. So it was the most horrifying letter that could have been written. When I went through my own constituency, I was asked to explain questions connected with the revolution in the Transvaal. I did explain, and I pointed out to them that two of their new ministers were equally culpable; for Mr. Merriman had encouraged the revolution by letter and then damned it when it failed—and Mr. Schreiner was only too desirous to go to war with Kruger by means of the military, and this is a most uncomfortable thing for the people of this country. If we are to fight at all, we would like to fight with our own people, and not introduce a foreign army. Of course, the point in connection with the Drifts is that the matter was not to be left for a meeting of Parliament.

If Kruger had not agreed to our proposals, we should have been at war in twenty-four hours. Mr. Schreiner made a subsequent statement that it was subject to the approval of Parliament. Nothing of the kind. If Paul Kruger had not climbed down, we should have been at war within twenty-four hours. Two of our ministers had fully agreed to make war on Kruger from their different points of view, so that you can quite understand that my constituents, when they knew this, could not make any difference between myself and those two excellent gentlemen whom the Afrikaner party have now elected as their leaders. And if you remove the question of the Jameson Raid and the revolution, naturally the Dutch people will cling to a person who has developed a great deal of Africa, and who is going to develop a great deal more.

‘I am afraid I have tired you, gentlemen, but I have been pointing out to you the need of your Redistribution Bill, the deeper reason of those terrible wranglings that have been going on in Parliament during the last few days, and the scope of the Progressive party, and the object that lies behind it; and I have been showing that the reason why I am anxious for a change is that I am afraid to see a party or ministers in power, whose only politics are that they wish for my head on a charger, and who are therefore most antagonistic to the state which has been created in the North. I will do everything I possibly can for their removal and for a change, because having commenced my life in the Cape Colony, owing to the Cape Colony all my work and my position, it is natural that I should continue

to hold that thought of a big scheme of the federal union of Africa. I know that you have placed in power a party whose whole thought is against the union of Africa, who wish for separation in the same way that Kruger desired separation, because separation means their own combination. Under union the gentleman of Camp Street must disappear, under union the President of the Transvaal must disappear. Our whole politics, whether Bond or Progressive, are subordinate to the ambition of these two men.

‘ Now, we are on the other side. We cannot win—and when I say we, I mean the Progressives—unless we have a majority in Parliament, and that majority is due to us upon our votes. The Cape Colony is different from the Transvaal. The Transvaal is an oligarchy, but in the Cape Colony we have adopted representation by the people, and therefore we should have representation proportionate to our votes. We must have the representation which is due to us on our numbers. We are fifty thousand against thirty-six thousand. We have equality of numbers in the House, and we are told that we are not entitled even to the members that we have got, and that they all got in by corruption, bribery, and immorality, unrighteousness, and impurity. That is what we are told; but we say this, Give us representation proportionate to our votes. This is an English colony. We are entitled to representation on the basis of the franchise passed by our people. Give us a fair representation, and that, gentlemen, is the whole question; and if the people support us earnestly, and if we



don't become separated by the ideas of rectitude which end in pecuniary emoluments, if we do not separate and if we fight as one party, we shall win. We shall get a Progressive majority : we shall get the Progressives in power, Progressives representing the Dutch as well as the English. When we are in power, during the next five years we shall prove whether that new state, Rhodesia, is of great value or otherwise. If of value, we shall federate, and we shall join with Natal ; and we shall deal gently with the other states, so as not to excite their indignation. We shall not relax our efforts, until by our civilisation and the efforts of our people we reach the shores of the Mediterranean.'

## CHAPTER XVII

## THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1899

EARLY in 1899 Mr. Rhodes came over to London, his main purpose being to obtain a guarantee from the Imperial Government to enable him to raise at a moderate rate of interest the money required for the extension of the Bulawayo railway to Tanganyika. He had been negotiating to obtain this guarantee during his visit to London a year before; but the British Government in any question of assuming responsibility or supplying money was, as it has usually been, inclined to procrastinate. Modifications of the proposal found the Government no better prepared to return a definite answer. Week followed week and month grew upon month, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer remained obdurate. It might have been supposed that so powerful a Government, with its great majority in the House, moved unquestionably by a strong Imperialist spirit, would not have hesitated to supply a guarantee, which the proved financial success of the Bulawayo railway made in no way perilous, and which the work of civilisation and development in the most valuable addition to the British Empire, which has been made in the nineteenth century, rendered practically imperative. But the British Government had already got rid of some of its responsibilities by placing the occupation and development of the North on Mr. Rhodes's broad shoulders,

and had good reason to be satisfied with an arrangement by which that enormous expansion of the Empire had been carried out at private expense and by private enterprise, without costing the country a shilling. And so, when the railroad required a few millions to enable it to advance and rescue darkest Africa from savagery by the establishment of British civilisation, it seemed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer very good business not only to refuse to supply the funds, but also to refuse to guarantee one shilling of the expense. The truth is, Mr. Rhodes had spoiled the Government by their experience of his unexampled generosity and public spirit, in doing the work of empire for them at his own and his friends' expense. He expected that the fact that he had carried out, mainly from his private purse, the grand conception of the trans-continental telegraph, the fact that his great Company had for years supported with their funds the Nyasa Protectorate, and supplied the money for the extirpation of the slave-trade in that region, as well as the fact that the vast expansion of the Empire by the addition of Rhodesia had been done at great cost without assistance from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would be accepted as claims for the very limited and inexpensive support of a Government guarantee for the capital required for the railroad, especially as the Uganda railway was being built entirely at the cost of the Imperial Government. But the Treasury view, a very practical if not very generous one, seems to be that Mr. Rhodes can accomplish anything by himself, and that if the responsibility of finding the money for Imperial development, as for Imperial expansion, is left on his shoulders, he will somehow manage to discharge it. The Treasury had to supply the money for the Uganda

railway, because they had no Cecil Rhodes there ; the Tanganyika railway could be left to him. One is forced to admit that the Treasury view was justified, for when, after endless delays, the guarantee was refused, Mr. Rhodes did find the money for the great trans-African railroad to Lake Tanganyika, partly by the loyal support of his friends, partly by the confidence of the public, based on their experience of the unerring accuracy of his predictions of ultimate success in any enterprise he deliberately takes in hand. The arrangements, by which the capital for railway extension was secured, need not be given here, as they are fully explained in Mr. Rhodes's speech to the shareholders of the Chartered Company, on May 2, 1899, which is given verbatim at the end of the next chapter.

It may, however, be observed that the Treasury might have made up their minds promptly, and not kept Mr. Rhodes in England, when the political situation demanded his presence at the Cape to defeat the Kruger campaign there. His detention in England had its compensation in the opportunity of accomplishing other and very important work ; for in the time of waiting his restless energy and his dread of losing any of the limited number of years, which this too short life leaves at his disposal to carry out his vast designs, carried him to Berlin. There he was received by the German emperor in March 1899, and the great English Imperialist discussed and arranged the extension of the trans-continental telegraph and the railway connection through German territory with the one great and broad-minded ruler on the Continent. When two really great men meet, they understand one another. It took months for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to refuse the Imperial guarantee ; it took fewer days

for Mr. Rhodes and the German emperor to make a satisfactory settlement. 'I signed an agreement with his Ministers within three days providing for the right of the telegraph being extended through his territory.' This African trans-continental telegraph was the 'wild-cat' scheme, so unfavourably regarded a short time before, that even the shareholders in Mr. Rhodes's great companies, to whom he appealed for support, would not find a shilling; but the German emperor saw its possibilities at once and gave it his unhesitating support, as he did to the proposed connection of the Rhodesia railway system with the coast through German territory.

Successful at once at Berlin, where one great ruler of men recognised another, being large-minded enough to forget the congratulatory telegram to Pretoria, Mr. Rhodes had been also successful in Egypt, where he settled, in connection with his trans-continental telegraph, a reasonable rate over the Egyptian line; and the connection of Cape Town and Cairo by telegraph is now only a matter of time, and the financial success, as well as the feasibility of the great 'wild-cat' conception, is now assured. The railway is still in the 'wild-cat' stage, but looking at the success of the telegraph, he would be a somewhat short-sighted pessimist who could not perceive that the completion of the second great means of civilising the great dark continent is within the range of completion, probably long before the first decade of the twentieth century is over. Nor was this all.

In London, Mr. Rhodes saw a great deal of Lord Kitchener. They took their early morning rides together. They came to an understanding. Mr. Rhodes, it may be remembered, had done much, supplying, for example, the engines for the new line,

to enable Lord Kitchener to reach Khartoum ; and in his first speech at Cape Town, in July 1899, he hinted at further work together. 'I think before very long you will hear of funds being provided for Lord Kitchener to proceed from Khartoum to Uganda.' In company with Lord Kitchener, again, Mr. Rhodes had the pleasant experience of realising in a practical way what Englishmen, altogether unconnected with South African companies or finance, think of his life-work of devoted service to the Empire.

His magnificent reception at Oxford, where he went to receive the degree of D.C.L. from the University, was all the more noticeable because of the futile opposition of a small band of Little Englanders and cranks. Lord Kitchener was, of course, received with enthusiasm, but Mr. Rhodes's reception utterly eclipsed that of the victorious soldier. Thus Mr. Rhodes's stay in England was an almost uninterrupted triumph, in which the great meeting at Cannon Street in May will not be forgotten, with the speech to the Chartered shareholders, reported in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, the political horizon in South Africa was gradually darkening with the signs of a coming storm, though no one, probably, except Presidents Kruger and Steyn, believed that it would burst as it did in October. Sir Alfred Milner had gone out to the Cape as Governor and High Commissioner in 1897, and had quietly set to work to study the problem of the Transvaal. The facts of President Kruger's misgovernment in the South African Republic have already been briefly set forth. One deliberate fresh breach of the Convention which may be noted—the Act of 1898, to the same effect as the Aliens Expulsion Act of 1896—was merely the expression of the

violent anti-British policy which animated the Volksraad as well as the President, and which had already found expression in their treatment of the Report of the Industrial Commission. The great petition to the Queen, signed by 21,000 British subjects, had been the chief feature in March, and Sir Alfred Milner's view of the situation in May was that 'the internal condition of the Transvaal' was 'a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government.' 'And the right of Great Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment of the Uitlanders is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it.' He considered that the best way to remove 'the bitter hostility to Great Britain which at present dominates its (the Transvaal's) external and internal policy was to secure their political rights for the Uitlanders, which could bring about a gradual improvement in the state of feeling, and establish the Republic on the only firm and safe basis of equality for all the white inhabitants.' At the Bloemfontein Conference, in May 1899, Sir Alfred Milner found President Kruger unwilling to meet the large compromises he offered, and apparently resolved on himself making demands which it was impossible for the Paramount Power to entertain. The attitude of President Kruger made the Bloemfontein Conference end in nothing, and was emphasised by the support which was given to Pretoria by the Afrikaner Bond at the Cape, as well as by the Free State. That attitude was briefly that of the ruler of a sovereign international state, and simply ignored the fact that the South African Republic existed by grace of the British Empire, which, as the Paramount Power in South Africa, could not permit the continuance of the direct rivalry of a hostile state in the Transvaal.

The British Government's claim was equal rights for every white man in South Africa. They gave these equal rights to the Dutch in Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia, and they required the same treatment for the British race in the Transvaal; but, with great moderation, were satisfied if a small instalment was at once conceded, in order that the Boers might gradually become reconciled to full equality in a free Republic instead of the old domination of a narrow oligarchy. President Kruger, whose huge armaments had been going on since the Drifts Ultimatum (1895), had no intention of making concessions, and was only seeking to gain time to complete his preparations. But so utterly impracticable did the idea of a Dutch appeal to the arbitrament of war appear to every South African Imperialist, that the British Government cannot be blamed if they held the same view and considered it absolutely unthinkable that the Transvaal, even with assistance of the Free State, would stake their independence in a war for the supremacy in South Africa. Experience was soon to teach them that the Transvaal, allied with the Free State, was already, as a matter of fact, the paramount military power, and that the long-cherished ambition of an Independent South Africa, that is, of a Boer supremacy, was so deeply and widely felt that the very moderate military preparations made by the British Government to show they were in earnest were entirely inadequate to meet President Kruger's carefully organised invasion.

Mr. Rhodes did not return to the Cape till July 1899, and had meanwhile carefully kept out of the Transvaal discussion. Gustav Krause, in his 'Talks with Cecil Rhodes' in the *Deutsche Revue*, gives a fair idea of his attitude on the Transvaal question. 'I made a mistake there, and that's enough for me. A burnt



child dreads the fire. I keep aloof from the whole Transvaal crisis, so that no one will be able to say, if things go wrong, that Rhodes is in it again.' When Mr. Rhodes arrived at Cape Town, shortly after the middle of July, the situation had become more critical, but still no one, except of course the Boer leaders and their allies, had the least idea that war was approaching, much less that it was inevitable. Mr. Rhodes's political speeches of this period, of which I shall in this chapter give the two chief examples, prove beyond question that he shared the general opinion that 'bluffing,' not fighting, was the meaning of President Kruger's military preparations, and that the Imperial Government had merely to show firmness to obtain the concessions it desired in the interests of the peace and prosperity of all South Africa; for, as Mr. Kotzé (formerly the Transvaal Chief Justice and avowedly hostile to Mr. Rhodes) said in July: 'Until the present oligarchy is transformed into a genuine Republic such as the United States, there will never be the harmony and peace we all long for.'

Mr. Rhodes, who arrived at Cape Town, July 18, 1899, had an unprecedented reception. From every part of South Africa where the British flag flies addresses were presented, not only from the vast region south of the Zambesi, but from as far north as Blantyre. Congratulatory telegrams poured in from Dutchmen of the Paarl whom he had reconciled to the Empire, as well as from representatives of every English-speaking community in South Africa. The reception in the suburbs, if possible, exceeded in magnificence the reception in the town; and at Woodstock and Mowbray, where a team of men took the place of the horses and drew the empire-maker along,

he was obliged to make short speeches. But the great event was the crowded meeting at the Drill Hall that night, when the man of South Africa was to speak for the first time since the development of the Transvaal crisis. Thousands were jammed together till the Drill Hall and the platform were a solid mass of enthusiastic human beings, and this climax of an unparalleled popular demonstration must have deeply touched one who, for all his surface hardness, cares very much at heart for the confidence and appreciation of his fellow-men.

‘Mr. Mayor, Ladies, and Gentlemen,—I have to thank you for the great reception that you have given me here to-night. I recognise what it is for; it is for the work, the idea. We must dismiss the personal. I listened to-night to the various addresses; they carry encouragement towards the completion of a great idea. When the thought came to get through the continent it was a mad thought, it was the idea of a lunatic. That is what they said; but it has grown, and it has advanced, and you greet me here to-night because you see that it has passed from the era of imagination to practical completion. It is now not a question, sir, of the lunacy of the project; it is merely a question of the years that it will take to complete. The only awkward thing is the progress of time. We do get older, and we do become a little hurried in our ideas because of that terrible time. You can conquer anything. You can conquer, if you will allow me to say it, even raids, but time you can never interfere with; and so we have to complete, with all the

rapidity we can, the project that is before us, that is the project of uniting the North and the South of Africa. You have been good enough to ask me how, or rather what success has been achieved. Thanks to the goodness of our people, when the politicians were rather timid, I may tell you that I was fortunate enough to obtain four millions of money to extend the railway from Bulawayo in the direction of Egypt. That sum will carry us to the borders of the German sphere, that is, to Tanganyika. It means four or five years of work, but during these subsequent five years one will not be bothered with pounds, shillings, and pence, because the money is subscribed. Then I hope to get the engineers to proceed with their work with the greatest rapidity possible.

'Then we arrive at the borders of the German territory, and as I notice you have referred in the kindest way to the actions of the German emperor towards myself, I can only tell you that, in my humble opinion, he is a big man. He allowed me to understand that he would be pleased to see me, and I discussed with him the question of passing through his territory by telegraph and railway, and he met me in the fairest way, and gave me, through his Ministers, every assistance. There will be no difficulty with the German territory, and I can only add that I think the German people are very fortunate in having such an emperor, who spends his whole day in efforts for his people. We have the private satisfaction of knowing that he is half an Englishman. Well, sir, you can see we are getting on.

‘And then, sir, I had the good luck to meet Lord Kitchener in London. We met very frequently, and we rode in the morning together. I think horse exercise increases the activity of the brain. And we came to a distinct understanding, and I think you will hear before very long that funds have been provided for Lord Kitchener to proceed from Khartoum to Uganda. I had the opportunity of meeting him on several occasions. We met at Oxford. Talking of Oxford, really one sometimes feels fortunate in having done very wrong, because it brings out the affection and support of one’s people. Some possessed of the most complete rectitude at Oxford thought I was unworthy of receiving the degree that had been awarded to me. Perhaps it was the most fortunate thing that ever happened to me—I mean their opposition. I went to Oxford with the great general on whom the eyes of the world were fixed. I think, sir, I should have been almost nobody if it had not been for this opposition to me. But I can assure you, gentlemen, they gave me a greater reception than Lord Kitchener, and you must remember that they were not mere undergraduates of eighteen, but Masters of Arts, gentlemen with grey beards, because, after the day’s proceedings, the undergraduates numbered 400 and the others numbered 5000. Gentlemen, I mention this because one’s troubles have brought out one’s friends. I did not think for one moment in the times that are past that I should have had a meeting like this. It is because of the past trouble, of the necessity of support, and

because, if you may look at it from this point of view, of the persistency of one's action, that you have forgiven the faults for the greater purpose.

'And, sir, my people have changed. I speak of the English people, with their marvellous common sense, coupled with their powers of imagination—all thoughts of a Little England are over. They are tumbling over each other, Liberals and Conservatives, to show which side are the greatest and most enthusiastic Imperialists. The people have changed, and so do all the parties, just like the Punch and Judy show at a country fair. The people have found out that England is small, and her trade is large, and they have also found out that other people are taking their share of the world, and enforcing hostile tariffs. The people of England are finding out that "trade follows the flag," and they have all become Imperialists. They are not going to part with any territory. And the bygone ideas of nebulous republics are over. The English people intend to retain every inch of land they have got, and perhaps, sir, they intend to secure a few more inches. And so the thought of my country has changed. When I began this business of annexation, both sides were most timid. They would ask one to stop at Kimberley, then they asked one to stop at Khama's country. I remember Lord Salisbury's Chief Secretary imploring me to stop at the Zambesi. Mr. Mayor, excuse me for using the word "I," but unfortunately I have been alone in these efforts. Now, sir, they won't stop anywhere; they have found out that the world

is not quite big enough for British trade and the British flag; and that the operation of even conquering the planets is only something which has yet to be known. I have little doubt about the Colonial people, and in saying so, I cover in the Colonial people the Dutch as well as the English. Notwithstanding my past little temporary difficulty, if we were all to accept equal rights, I feel convinced that we should all be united on the proposition that Africa is not, after all, big enough for us.

‘And, gentlemen, with that comes the development of our own country. If I look back to the time when I ~~was~~ Prime Minister, when I was told that I only ~~thought~~ of things outside of one’s country, I naturally said, as I say now, “Look at the statute-book, the records of Colonial and local legislation, and think of the wealth, the prosperity, and the noble position to which Cape Town itself has attained, and remember now that these results have accrued from the development of the North.” Gentlemen, this country is only just beginning, and I consider that I am only just beginning—my public life has only just begun.

‘I have pointed out to you that we have the money, and we have a plan arranged, and the right to go to Egypt. I think that will take from seven to eight years of one’s life. Can you expect more? What we have to guard against—and I see a representative here from Port Elizabeth—is that with development we do not lose the idea of union. As we take new States, we must not have the North going from us

to fresh ports and fresh outlets. We must try, if possible, to keep the continent together. It is perfectly possible. I must not touch on politics to-night, but if we could only get a united feeling, Africa would be united to Tanganyika. That is number two we have to work for. I personally have to work for my railway to Egypt, and my telegraph to Egypt, and you have to work with me for that greater object, the union of the country. I have often stated it, but if you were to go up in a balloon, how ridiculous it would appear to you to see all these divided States, divided tariffs, divided peoples; the Almighty made them one, and it is our work also to unite them.\* I hope that those who are opposed to us on the existence of a temptation in the wealth of the North will pass to the thought of union. I only wish I had a Johannesburg; if only one had a Johannesburg, one could unite the country to-morrow; and in the present trouble, if some of those who have thoughts different from us would think of the great object of union, all would be right. Then you would have a great commonwealth; then you would have a union of States; then I think, apart from my mother-country, there would be no place in the world that would compete with it. You have the sheep, the wine, the gold, the diamonds, and the health, and a marvellous climate. There is no place in the world to touch this; there is no place to touch it for the beauty of its climate, and the variety of its products, and yet we stupid human mortals are quarrelling over the equality of rights, instead of thinking of the

great country that has been given to us. But I must not wander into politics. I have told you that I have obtained the money to go to the North—money for all work during the next five years, and I hope that from Egypt they will come down to meet us. I look upon the question of the trans-continental telegraph and railway as practically over ; it is now merely a question of time.

‘I am supported, sir, in my work by the reception you have given me to-night. I am supported by the addresses that I have received from every part of the country. I am supported, too, by the telegrams I have received. Would you believe it ? I received to-day one hundred telegrams from the Paarl. There is some terrible conspiracy on. They all come from Dutch names. I should recommend *Ons Land* to inquire into it to-morrow. And, sir, I am told on referring them to a friend of mine, Mr. Faure, that they are Dutch of the very best position in the Paarl. There is something very wrong going on, and the Commissie van Toezigt will have to meet. But it is a fact, sir, that apart from the addresses that you have given me to-day, I have received these telegrams which I mention, and there is also from my own district, lying here on the table, an address signed entirely by Dutch names. That is what we are working for, not only union of the country but union of the races, and, if I may put it, that will come right once the principle of equal rights is accepted—equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi.

‘Once the competition between us is on the basis



of the best man coming to the front, be he a German, or be he a Frenchman, or be he a Russian, or be he a Dutchman, or be he an Englishman, the question is over. I remember some years ago when I was Prime Minister, being present at a meeting at Stellenbosch, and at the college there I saw the young men with their intelligent faces, and I felt that they had nothing to fear from the question of equal rights on an equal basis. I felt that they had nothing to fear. I felt that they had nothing to fear, on account of the domination, and the vigour, and the physical energy of my race. I don't think that they have much to fear if we can only accept that programme, which covers everything. You need not then talk of this law or of that law if you can get the thought impressed into the minds of those who share this country with us that all we want is equal rights; that the Almighty has made this country one, and you cannot make divisions. You can draw imaginary lines, but we are all one, and I would say, sir, it is of no good my trying to go to Egypt, or thinking out thoughts of union if we are not all one. I speak as representing a State which is no longer the despised Rhodesia, a country, as Mr. Van der Walt once put it so well, which only produces native women and whip sticks. It is a gold-producing country, and Africa is going to look to it with the same amount of keen desire as it looks to the Transvaal. It is with those thoughts and those feelings that I speak to-night. You have spoken of getting to Egypt. I say, Yes, that is good. But if I go to Egypt I want

to leave behind me a union of States that shares in that, a union of young men who can give their lives to the development of these unknown countries. They will have their liberty in that union be they of English or be they of Dutch birth. That is what we are aiming at. True, our aim is the development of the Dark Continent, but surely one should have the thought and the desire that this country, of which one thinks so much, the Cape Colony, should have a share in that development. One should think of the development of Cape Colony in the development of those new territories. Do you think there can be any satisfaction in taking those new territories, knowing they will pass only to others, even to those of my race, those from my own country, England? I would like you to share in that development. And so when you congratulate me on doing this work, when you say, "We wish you well," when you say, "We wish you success," I reply, "Share with me the object and the intent that led to it, and we will make this country unite south of the Zambesi." How are we going to do that? It all lies in the adoption of that simple sentence, that we will have equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi.'

The next speech is the much longer, but less carefully reported, speech delivered in the Claremont Hall on Thursday, July 20th, at the meeting assembled to welcome Mr. Rhodes on his return. Mr. Louw having formally presented the address, with a short speech, Mr. Rhodes rose to reply. His remarks upon the Transvaal show how thoroughly

convinced he was, in common with all English-speaking South Africans, and, indeed, with the British Government, that President Kruger would give way and that there would be no war—a conviction based on President Kruger's surrender on the Drifts question in 1895.

‘I thank you for the address you have given me. I have also to thank Mr. Louw for greeting me here. I specially refer to Mr. Louw because our difficulties are very great in South Africa at the present time, and Mr. Louw belongs to that portion of his race who have not bowed down to the terrorism that exists with a large section of their party. I am sorry to say that I have extreme opponents, while there are also moderate men who in their hearts support the true policy of Imperialism; but there are others, like Mr. Louw, who, in spite of coercion and everything that may be brought to bear upon them, have stood all obloquy from a section of their party in order to support what they thought the right thing in the interests of South Africa. We have not only all the inhabitants of the English race on our side, but almost the whole of the coloured community as well, although it happens at present that a large section of another race in this country are strongly opposed to our thoughts and ideas. It is for us to thank those of that race who, after considering the question very carefully, have approved of everything which they think right for the good of South Africa.

‘With reference to the special work as to which you have greeted me, I would point out that there has

been a great change in the opinions of our people at Home. When I first commenced the idea of expansion in Africa, I found myself with few supporters out here. People at Home also, whatever party they belonged to, if they did not show any opposition, were absolutely without enthusiasm. Now all that has changed. I need not go into details of the change, but I would remark that, whatever might have been the rights of the question of confining our great country to the British Isles, and perhaps, a few dependencies that were then possessed, the policy of the world was to shut her out.

'I can tell you a good story on this point. Mr. Gladstone once talked to me upon this very question of expansion, and said to me: "Mr. Rhodes, we have enough; our obligations are too great; but apart from the question of increasing our obligations in every part of the world, what advantage do you see to the English race in the acquisition of fresh territory?" I replied to Mr. Gladstone that the practical reason for the further acquisition of territory was, that every power in the world, including our kinsmen the Americans, as soon as they took new territory, placed hostile tariffs against British goods. I said we must remember Great Britain is a very small island, not nearly the size of France, and she has not that wonderful wine industry, nor has she a continent like the Americans. Great Britain's position depends on her trade, and if we do not take and open up the dependencies of the world which are at present devoted to barbarism, we shall be shut out from the world's trade. For this reason. The question of tariffs is not

with our opponents a question of revenue; they simply wish to put on such tariffs as will absolutely exclude Great Britain from the trade of ~~their~~ dependencies. I remember so well that Mr. Gladstone replied, with his bright intelligence, that he could not believe that; and said that other countries might go temporarily wrong, but surely in the end the principles of free trade would prevail. I said in answer: "Mr. Gladstone, I should like to think so. In logic you are all right, but in practice you will be all wrong. You will find that as each new country is taken up, the possessing Power will put a prohibitive tariff against you. Now England depends upon her working up of raw goods, turning them into the manufactured articles, and distributing them to the world, and if the markets of the world are shut against us, where shall we be?" Mr. Gladstone said he would quite agree with me if he really believed that, for, if in every new country, taken by another Power, hostile tariffs were put against us, it was a poor look-out; but he (Mr. Gladstone) believed in the success of free-trade principles.

'It is needless for me to tell you that free-trade principles have not prevailed; on the contrary, it has been the policy of every Power that had acquired a new dependency to introduce these hostile tariffs. Take, for example, the case of Madagascar. When France took that island there were certain treaties in connection with it which allowed equality of trade. That was allowed on the basis of the island being a protectorate; but as soon as France annexed it, the

French tariff was dead against us. Her Majesty's Prime Minister continuously remonstrated without avail, and rightly so from the French point of view. The French said: "We have been at all the trouble and expense of taking this island, and we want the advantage of possessing it. It is all very well for you English people to talk about equality of trade, but that equality means that we shall not be in it at all. We find that you English are always admirably logical on any point that is in your favour. Practically we could not compete with you. We have spent millions in taking this island, and we mean to have its trade." As I have said before, it is an admirable thing for one cricketing eleven to say to another eleven, "We will play with you on equal terms," when that one knows that it will be absolutely victorious. The opponents, however, require eighteen, and even demand twenty-four, and sometimes will not play at all. And so with the French. They say, "It is an admirable case, but if we place you on an equality with us in Madagascar, we shall have no trade at all. We did not take that island and spend those millions for amusement. We took that island to expand our trade, and the only way we can do that is by putting hostile tariffs against you." You may ask what I mean by that argument—what I am leading to. Well, I think that English public opinion has changed owing to the thought of the workmen. The workmen find that although the Americans are exceedingly fond of them, and are just now exchanging the most brotherly sentiments with them, yet they are shutting out their

goods. The workmen also find that Russia, France, and even Germany locally are doing the same, and the workmen see that if they do not look out they will have no places in the world to trade with at all. And so the workmen have become Imperialist, and the Liberal party are following.

'Now, when we commenced that policy of taking over the North—and you must not give me the sole crédit of it—the thought that guided one in one's ideas was that the world was limited, and that the country to which we all belong should have as much of it as it could possibly get. This was a consideration which affected not only the people at Home, but the people here, including not only English but Dutch. If we are a great people, it is because we are an amalgamation of races. I have found that the strongest point urged by the opponents of territorial expansion is that they say: "You are always talking about the annexation of territories, but what do you do? We helped Canada through all her wars, and gave her self-government, and the first thing they do is to place huge tariffs against us and shut out our goods. Australia has done the same, and every colony to which we give self-government does everything in its power to follow suit." Now, practically, apart from the sentiment of a great Empire, the British are a commercial people, and yet these colonies, having gained all the advantages of self-government, shut out British goods, and made bad clothes and bad boots at the expense of the general community.

Having thought over this matter a great deal, we

have now in the constitution of a new country—namely, Rhodesia—the best reply to the Little Englanders, for that constitution contains a clause that in a territory representing 800,000 square miles of the world's surface the duties on British goods shall not exceed the present Cape tariff. We have a fairly high tariff, but it is for revenue, not for the protection of industries. Having adopted that principle, it is the constitution of the country, and I see no possibility of its being changed. It is a sacred thing, and that is the return to England for the blood and treasure that she may spend on the protection and security of the new country. From the Colonists' point of view we have a fair tariff, if there were an opportunity of development. We have a fair stimulant in the present tariff, and we will not have a tariff so high as to give the people bad articles simply for the promotion of local industry. If you follow that thought, and secure federation, that will be the basis of the tariff system in Africa. With such a system, we could make the best reply to the mother-country, saying: "We do not talk of sentiment to you; we have done a practical thing; we have asked nothing from you in return, but have placed on record in our constitution an upper limit for your goods, which will give you practically the sole trade of our territories." I had a great battle over how the clause should be worded. The late Ministry wished me to put it that the duty on imported goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff, but I said, "No, I will have it 'British'—not 'imported.'" The politics of the next



hundred years are going to be tariffs and nothing else. We are not going to war for the amusement of royal families as in the past, but we mean practical business. The next war may be not with guns and rifles, say with America, but America will have to be told that they must change their tariff or Great Britain will put a tariff against them. The United States would not hold out for twenty-four hours, but would say it was perfectly good business, and would meet us on the tariff basis. With regard to South Africa, the present difficulties are only temporary, but supposing we had put into the Rhodesian constitution only the word "imported," and the mother-country had adopted our policy for the sake of free trade in the world, that constitution would bar it here because the word "imported" covers the world, but the present constitution of Rhodesia—which is the Cinderella of the Cape—contains the word "British."

'The time will come, although probably most of us will be gone, when Her Majesty's Government will say to the world, "We will give you free trade and admit your raw products, but you must admit our manufactures, and until you do so we will not give you equal privileges." I think that is the best reply possible to the Little Englander when he uses the word *cui bono*—to what advantage? I reply, the advantage of the trade of Rhodesia. Great Britain will have a perpetual market for her goods until the constitution of Rhodesia is changed, and you must remember there is one thing which human beings never change, and that is the sacred constitution on which

their country is founded. It was the sacredness of the constitution of Washington which brought about the American War, and which appealed so powerfully to the American citizens. I feel sure that when federation in South Africa is arrived at, this idea of an upper limit for British goods will remain in the constitution of the federated States, and will be their return to the mother-country, for the blood and treasure she has spent in their behalf.

‘I will now relate to you a rather amusing incident. If I have had one persistent opponent in connection with my thoughts of expansion, it is Sir William Harcourt. Just when I was getting my fresh capital Sir William went out of his way to make one of those ponderous speeches which are only equalled by the size of his frame, describing the scheme of a Cape Town-to-Cairo railway as a wild-cat scheme. Well, you know that the line up to Bulawayo is already paying interest upon construction, and also that we have raised from three to four millions, which will take it to Tanganyika; and without running the risk of being accused of repetition, I may add there are very good grounds for supposing that we shall see Lord Kitchener shortly steaming steadily away from Khartoum to Uganda. But, oh, the ironies of fate! Sir William Harcourt had to retire compulsorily from the representation of Derby, being beaten by Mr. Drage, who, I understand, is the chairman of the South African Committee, and who assured me that he defeated Sir William upon the Imperial question, the question that England

meant to solemnly recognise her obligations to retain her colonies, thus encouraging the doctrine of honest expansion. Then Sir William Harcourt had to retire to the delights of Wales. After a happy rest within the precincts of Rome, he returned the other day, not to attack the Budget as a gentleman said, but to visit his constituents, and now came the irony of the situation. After a delightful speech, he visited the ironworks of his principal supporters, a large number of the voters of his division, and was exceedingly pleased with what he saw. But there was one horrid writing on the wall. They were making rails for the line to Cairo. They had an order for about fifty miles, and had lately got an order for another fifty, and he met the wild-cat scheme everywhere. The wages of the workmen, the profits of the owners, the industry that was shown him, all of it was production for this wild-cat scheme. I think that story is an amusing one, and it contains a lesson.

‘I would almost be happy to go and stand for that constituency. I notice that all those gentlemen, with the exception of Mr. Morley, are now declaring that they are not Little Englanders, but people must judge them by their past speeches and not their present or future utterances, because they are only waiting and hoping for a reverse to return to the point. They hoped it might come in China, or in Fashoda, but I do not think they really expect it in the Transvaal.

‘That notion is too ridiculous. I always think that President Kruger must be very proud of himself. I

should feel alarmed if I heard that the Czar was going to Peking, or that the French were moving in Newfoundland or the Niger territories, or were quarrelling over the Fashoda settlement. But when I am told the President of the Transvaal is causing trouble, I cannot really think about it. It is too ridiculous. If you were to tell me that the native chief in Samoa was going to cause trouble to Her Majesty's Government, then I would discuss the proposition that the Transvaal was a danger to the British Empire.

'If you asked me to discuss the position, I would like to take a Boer child and give him a picture of the present Transvaal Government, and I feel sure that child would say to his father, "Father, that doesn't exist in this country. You are not telling me the truth. That might have happened six hundred years ago, but it is impossible now." And that is the judgment of the world. I will repeat something which has struck those in high places more than anything. Consider the small output of the new country of Rhodesia, which has had everything against it, but has every confidence in its administration, and the fact that I have obtained nine millions of money. With the greatest production of gold in the world, a most beautiful climate, a most energetic people producing seventeen millions per annum, my neighbouring friend could not get two millions of money. The whole of the world's money is not in London. There were Berlin and Paris to apply to also; but the financial people felt that the Transvaal system of administration was so bad that they would

not even part with two millions, no matter what terms were offered.

‘Well, we hope it will change. Of course it is going to change. Her Majesty’s Government are determined to have a redress of the Uitlanders’ grievances. The President is doing the usual thing, he is playing up to the Raad. I wish to be quite clear on what I state. I have talked to no Ministers on the subject, and I do not wish it to be inferred that I have spoken to the Cabinet. But I have talked to people in London during the last three months, and I can say that Her Majesty’s Government are determined to have a redress of the Uitlanders’ grievances. The matter throws my recollection back to the Drifts question, when the Drifts were closed against our trade, and you know that if such a thing were allowed, the trade of the Colony would be cut off. You know the story, and I would say this, that there was no one stronger in the Cabinet than the present Prime Minister. The Cape Government having demanded intervention, were asked, were they prepared to give a passage for troops and pay half the expenses of the undertaking, the argument being that it was the affair of the Cape, and not of Great Britain. After considerable discussion the Cabinet decided unanimously that they were prepared to pay half the expenses of introducing British troops, to use violence if necessary. I felt that Mr. Kruger would then give in, and so he did, and I am equally sure that the President is going to give Her Majesty the terms which Her Majesty now demands.

'Some of you may remember the trouble in years past with Bechuanaland, when Kruger desired to cut off the Colony, and to have the centre for himself. Well, with the help of your present member (Mr. F. R. Thompson), who threw his ability and determination into the work, the British authorities were successful. I remember one morning, after one of those horrid night journeys in a Cape cart, I arrived at the camp of the head of the Boer commando on the Hartz River. There I was told there was a good deal of "blood and thunder" talk, and I was asked by the commandant, "Who are you?" I replied, "My name is Cecil Rhodes," and the leader retorted, "Oh, you're the Administrator," and thereafter there were some more threats and the statement "bloed zal vloeien"—blood will flow. I said to him, "Don't talk nonsense; I'm very hungry; come and give me some breakfast." I stopped there a week, and on my departure there was a little function; I became the godfather of the Boer commandant's grandchild. The same sort of thing is going to happen just now.

'Before I leave the subject I will say that there is no. the slightest chance of war, but Her Majesty's Government are going to get the terms which are demanded as being fair and right to the Uitlanders. I will leave that question now, because, as I have said, it is only a temporary trouble in Africa.

'But there is a much more serious question. You have been congratulating me upon my work in the North, and have supported me most admirably during

my time of trouble, when I had to suffer for certain conduct of my own. I have steadily gone on with the work in the North on the basis of equal rights for every class of citizen, and have been trying to obtain as much money for development as I can secure. I have been most fortunate in that, but still, I have to look at the future. You will recognise the enormous changes here, and the prosperity of the country, especially in this place, because the railways of Africa have been made like the palm of my hand, and we propose to continue that policy of extension. But you have to remember that there are ports on the East and West, and that the only certain security for keeping the position in the South is a union of the States of South Africa.

I was a little alarmed when some measures were submitted to the new Council in Rhodesia, at the feeling shown about the fact that Cape products were being treated on a different footing. It was demanded that rates should be imposed against the Cape, just the same as against other countries. I know, without desiring in the least to threaten, that there is a tendency in the North, as there always is with new States, to be independent. And I may say, in this connection, that in the Transvaal there is no love for Jan Hofmeyr; they will use him, but they do not care about him. You have never got one sixpence from the Transvaal. You have indulged in a good deal of sentiment, but got nothing in return. Well, the whole solution for the Cape is a simple one. We are getting far into the interior of Africa, but

there is a time coming in the ordinary course of nature for my disappearance, and you must not let this North drift away from you. On the North depends the Transvaal, because it is surrounded. You need not think about this temporary difficulty in the Transvaal; but I believe that with the great community which has arisen in that State, amounting to about 80,000; knowing the extent of the deep-levels and the distance to which the gold-belts stretch, I may say there will be half a million of people there in course of time. If we are to realise our dream of a South African Union (I can speak frankly now, because the question of the value of the North is settled, and if some of you really believed that it would only produce whip-sticks, we know now that it is rich in gold), one has to consider that the time has arrived for you to work for a solution. I know Natal is ready for it, and I think the people in the North would consider it; although when they had a large output—goodness knew what they would do—people got so uplifted. As to the Transvaal, I believe the new population, if they had their rights, would work for union in Africa. There is a practical point in it. They know that whatever Rhodesia possesses, it will possess the whole labour factor; that north and south of the Zambesi we have native labourers in millions, and labour is the question. We have thus an asset for bargaining with.

‘I am aware that in thinking out this question of Union a charge will be made in relation to the flag question in the neighbouring States. To that I reply,



go and read Mr. Bryce's book on South Africa, and you will find it shown that there have been federations in Europe with different flags. We can federate without bringing up that awful question of the flag. One knows in the end what flag will fly. What does that confederation mean? It means a great future for your children. It means a distribution of thought in your families, between mining, commercial, and political work—all those classes of work which are given to human beings to accomplish. It means that in a great area of territory which compares very favourably with any other portion of the world, you have gold, diamonds, copper, coal, wine, sheep, everything almost you can think of; and you only want a united people for the proper development of that huge extent of country. How is that idea to be brought about? Are the majority of the people south of the Zambesi in favour of it? Most distinctly they are. I wonder if any one has gone into figures. I would not make the charge for one moment that the Dutch are against you. I do not believe that. There is a bold section, like my friend, Mr. Louw, and a few others. These have spoken out their thoughts, and have suffered for it. But even if I were to take it that the whole of the Dutch race was against us, let us count up the States of Africa, and their population, taking it on a basis of males.

We have already 12,000 with us in Matabeleland. It is only a commencement of the mining industry, and it is a simple arithmetical question. If we have 12,000 with a few mines, when we have, say, 200 mines,

we know how many more supporters we shall have for federation. It is fair to state that in the neighbouring State, the Transvaal, the new population represents 80,000, who are deprived of their franchise rights, although most interesting little lads are made burghers; and those Transvaal students, when they come to Stellenbosch, are enabled to vote as British subjects, while at the same time they are burghers of the Transvaal. I may say that the new population are the Progressives of the Transvaal, and I distinctly claim that a large section of the Dutch are also supporters of reform. That gives you 92,000 on your side. Then in Natal, a plucky little colony—there are 40,000 white inhabitants, of which number you are entitled to claim at least 10,000 as Progressives. Coming to the old Cape Colony, we can deal with absolute statistics. The number of voters is 108,000, but a certain number do not vote. After a careful examination of the lists, however, you will find that the Bond received 33,000, while the Progressives received 46,000 votes. That is a fair representation, but I will allow the Dutch one-half. If, therefore, you add 54,000 in the Cape to the 102,000 already estimated in the North, Natal, and the Transvaal, you arrive at the number of Progressives who would probably support union, namely, about 150,000, making allowance for those who do not vote, exclusive of the Free State. It is safe to say that there is an enormous majority in South Africa absolutely in favour of federation.

Then, why does not federation come about in the

usual way? Why are not delegates from Natal, the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and Rhodesia called together to agree to a federal constitution, which, as you know, means that the big questions would be left for settlement to the federal government, full liberty being given to the local governments to dispose of all local questions? Rhodesia is just coming on the scene, but without trespassing on the position of the High Commissioner, I have noticed that the 80,000 in the Transvaal are described in a despatch as helots, who were Spartan slaves. These 80,000 are slaves, to use a John Bull term, and they are our fellow-countrymen and friends from other countries. They cannot vote at all. I repeat that plucky little Natal, with her great ideas of expansion and a mind large in proportion to her size, would fall in with federation. The elections in the Cape have shown that if there was fair representation this colony also would join in a South African Union. As the oldest State, and the parent of all, its duty is to take the lead. It can be maintained without dispute, even from our most extreme opponents, that if the Progressives had proper representation, they would have a majority of members. By an accident they are three or four behind; in one case, that of Aliwal North, Tengo Jabavu's brother making the difference.

'What, then, is it that stops federation? Both sides of the House are quite clear on the black question. I have had some doubts about the Bond, but was delighted when Mr. Van der Walt said that one thing he was hoping for was to see Jabavu sitting

side by side with him in the House. The pure natives in Tembuland voted with the Bond, although the Progressives had declared their programme of equality of rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. By that we mean that any man, provided they can write their names, place of residence and occupation, and that they are workers or possessed of some property, quite irrespective of colour, would be entitled to these rights. But the Bond has gone one better still. They are hungering for Tengo Jabavu in the House, and the Bond gained its present position in the House by the support of the pure native voters. As for the coloured people, I owe them a deep debt of obligation for the work they have done for me in Rhodesia. It was they who, with their corps, stormed the fastnesses of Matabeleland. They did so not once but repeatedly, and I regard them as one of the great sources of prosperity in this country. Changing from the Matoppos to my fruit farms, I have ascertained from Californians, with whom I have discussed the question of labour, that they have nothing in California to equal the coloured man as a labourer. That is my contribution to the position of the coloured men in this country, and I am thankful to take the opportunity of making such a statement. I will add that I do not make that remark to get the coloured votes, because the Progressives have them already. I will also say openly that where Dutch people have a position and a stake in this country, I have noticed in each district I have visited, while they fairly remonstrated with me in

connection with my conduct in the raid, yet broadly on the point of equality of rights in South Africa they were with me.

‘They simply said they would no longer be under the domination of the Bond. I have been under the domination of the Bond myself, and other Ministries will also be under that domination until we carry out that thought of equality. Well, it may be asked, with such a thought, with such an idea, and with such a majority, why is it not carried out? Well, there is one thing that stops the whole question, and that is that the old population has got it into their heads that equality of rights and union means the loss of their political position, and that the—well, I will not say ignorant, but simple, farmer in the country is imbued with the Bond view that to have the Progressives in power means that the old population would become a kind of serfs—helots, as I just now used the word in another connection. My reply is: How can that be where under the British constitution there are equal rights for all, and he who wins is the best man, of whatever race he may be? Take the great city of Cape Town, which chose Mr. Wiener, a German, for years to represent it. There was no thought of race. They never left him, but he left them when his Progressive ideas were changed into those of the Bond. It was not a question of race. It was because he left that equality principle that he lost his seat. Probably Mr. Wiener thought that the other party would be successful. Well, temporarily yes, but not perman-

ently. The question is whether we could not educate these people to the true state of affairs.

'Well, first we must get them to abandon that stupid idea that because somebody came to this country a hundred years ago, his children are in a special position. It is the prevalence of that idea that has disturbed everything. Besides, if you take the case of the Transvaal, the people there who have that idea have only been in the country some fifty years, and surely in that time, not quite a lifetime, they cannot fairly claim special privileges. Still they do, and speak of "ons volk" and "ons land." Well, I take "ons land" to be our land, and I say I am a partner in that, although I am told I am not a partner, and that I am here on sufferance. Well, it will be your duty to change that position. It should also be remembered that this was not the thought of the old people who took this country. It is the thought of some men who have made an oligarchy, and who have prevailed upon their own simple people to think that. It is they who delay this thought of equality, and I will tell you why. It is because two or three men in Pretoria, and one or two in Cape Town, govern the whole country, and they need never appear. I have been told that a gentleman who was before the Mikado in Japan maintained his position by never being seen. I think the system of the Bond party is to govern through an individual who was never heard, at any rate, in their House, where he should have been. And this government by the unseen must pass away as many other

things must pass away. You are here and your party, and you are in a position to do that, but still you are willing that all should have equal rights, and you welcome even your most extreme opponents of the Bond to share in the development of South Africa. You must hold out for equal rights, and let the best men come to the front, independent of race or the accident of birth. Although I was born at Home, it does not stop me from being faithful to this country, and I am doing the best I can for the country which I have adopted as my dwelling-place. Through the whole of our difficulties, there is just this one thought that comes out perfectly clear.

‘We must fight for equal rights, and the practical result will be the federal union of South Africa. With regard to myself, you must not think I am neglecting my duties because you do not see me in the House. I am doing my best, and I carry with me everywhere that thought for the union of South Africa, and I hope that when you have realised that thought, it will not be too late. I have tried hard to secure for the Colony privileges in the North. Now the people there are looking to the ports on the East and the West Coast, and I greatly fear that before this country wakes up to the situation that great inheritance may have passed away from you in the South, and that is what you must work to prevent. The present Ministry, if they could only see it, have an enormous chance before them. I know that I myself, owing to various reasons, am not particularly pleasing to the Bond party, but I see no reason why

others should not take up my work, and that is the union of South Africa. I do not care a jot who wears the peacock's feathers so long as the work is done. Let us get to the practical result—union. Natal is ready, Rhodesia is ready, and even the Republics could federate, as Professor Bryce has pointed out, without loss of dignity so far as the flag is concerned. That is the position I wish to be able to carry out, and that is what must come.'

In conclusion, Mr. Rhodes said : ' You have thanked me enough for my special work, and you have this night greeted me in the kindest way, but I must ask you to do one more thing. Everything in the future depends upon the individual. In the future each of you must work individually for the great thought of Progress, coupled with the thought of the Union of South Africa, for it is not the politician, it is not the Prime Minister, it is not the Governor, nor is it the people at Home that will give us union, but union must be the work of the individuals who make up the people of South Africa.'

To these political speeches I venture to add a short speech by Mr. Rhodes of an entirely different kind, which will, I think, be found interesting as a self-revelation of the deeper nature of the man, of his attitude towards religion and mankind, and of the nature of the thoughts that occupy the hours of solitude of one often described as a selfish cynic. The speech was made on July 29, a few days after the big political speeches, on the occasion of his laying the foundation-stone of a new Presbyterian church at Woodstock.



Mr. Rhodes, after declaring the stone to be 'well and truly laid,' amidst cheers, spoke briefly as follows :—' You have paid me a great compliment by asking me to come and lay this stone. I recognise that it is a tribute from you to that which is a most practical idea of your church, that is, work. You have asked me to come here because you recognise that my life has been work. Of course I must say frankly that I do not happen to belong to your particular sect in religion. We all have many ideals, but I may say that when we come abroad we all broaden. We broaden immensely, and especially in this spot, because we are always looking on that mountain, and there is immense breadth in it. That gives us, whilst we retain our individual dogmas, immense breadth of feeling and consideration for all those who are striving to do good work, and perhaps improve the condition of humanity in general. I remember when the Bishop of Derry was out here, and was staying with me, when the Bishop's daughter was married from my house, how on the Sabbath the Bishop said to me : " I suppose you are coming to hear me at Rondebosch Church?" and I replied, " No, sir, I have got my own chapel." The Bishop said : " Where is it?" and I replied : " It is up the mountain." The Bishop thereupon remarked : " Dear me, dear me, a nice place to have your church." The fact is, if I may take you into my confidence, that I do not care to go to a particular church even on one day in the year when I use my own chapel at all other times. I find that up that mountain one gets thoughts—what you might

term religious thoughts, because they are thoughts for the betterment of humanity, and I believe that is the best description of religion, to work for the betterment of the human beings who surround us. This stone I have laid will subsequently represent a building, and in that building thoughts will be given to the people with the intention of raising their minds and making them better citizens. That is the intention of the laying of this stone. I will challenge any man or woman, however broad their ideas may be, who object to go to church or chapel, to say they would not sometimes be better for an hour or an hour and a half in a church. I believe they would there get some ideas conveyed to them that would make them better human beings. There are those who throughout the world have set themselves the task of elevating their fellow-beings, and have abandoned personal ambition, the accumulation of wealth, perhaps the pursuit of art, and many of those things that are deemed most valuable. What is left to them? They have chosen to do what? To devote their whole mind to make other human beings better, braver, kindlier, more thoughtful, and more unselfish, for which they deserve the praise of all men.'

## CHAPTER XVIII

## THE SUCCESS OF RHODESIA

THAT the success of Rhodesia, in the immediate future, is of great importance to the Chartered Company and its shareholders is sufficiently obvious. What has not been perceived so clearly by the British public is the bearing that assured success will have upon political developments in South Africa. Mr. Rhodes, as we have seen, held from the first, long before any one else perceived it, that the key to the paramount position in South Africa was the possession of the northern territory. The physical conditions on the high and healthy plateau of Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and much of Northern Rhodesia, proclaimed the land to be 'a white man's country,' where the white race could thrive and propagate itself; and the possession of that immense region of about three-quarters of a million of square miles ensured to the British Empire an ultimate preponderance of white population, which would in the end completely outnumber the people of the Republican States, supposing that those states remained outside the region that owned allegiance to the mother-country.

His idea was that the present centrifugal influence of the isolated states (the dangers of which were in vain pointed out as long ago as 1858 by the first great advocate of federal union in South Africa, Sir George

Grey) should be met by the gradual centripetal influence of a customs union and a railway union, as a first step towards an ultimate Federation, in which the weight of Rhodesia, added to the Cape and Natal, would finally determine the federal flag as so ardent an Imperialist desired. The question of the flag he did not look on as immediate, for he did not expect the Republics to surrender their flags at once, but he looked to a future in which there would be a union of the States of South Africa, of the same kind as that of the Dominion of Canada, with perfect self-government, and without abandoning what he called 'the Imperial tie.' The first preparation for this was a customs and railway union of the British states in South Africa, and the next and most important step was the establishment of self-government in Rhodesia, and its federation, as a sister state, with the Cape and Natal.

The immediate success of Rhodesia depends admittedly on its proved value as a gold-producing country. If the gold-reefs of Rhodesia are proved to be payable, a white population will pour in, cattle-ranching and agriculture will flourish to supply the demand of the mining towns that spring up, and further development of yet untapped riches in the regions north of the Zambesi will create a trade of such value that the older colonies will be glad to federate with the new state. This union, if the rapid progress of Rhodesia thus justifies it, may, in the opinion of Mr. Rhodes, take place in the next five years. 'This union,' said Mr. Rhodes, in one of his more recent speeches, 'is perfectly possible in the next five years. On what does it depend? It simply depends on the North proving itself a gold-producing power'; and this union—he refers to the union of the

Cape, Natal, and Rhodesia—will lead to further union. The bulk of the population of the Transvaal being already British, and the proved permanency of the mines making it certain that the British population will increase at least fourfold in a few years' time, 'we have,' he says, 'only to wait, and the Central States will go with us too.' The perception of this fact by President Kruger has probably had much to do with his swift and complete military preparations, and his unhesitating appeal to the arbitrament of war, before such an appeal became utterly impracticable, as it must have become in a few years' time, owing partly to Uitlander immigration, but even more to the steady and increasing emigration of the fighting backbone of the Transvaal, the pastoral Boers, into the rich pastures and spacious uplands of Rhodesia.

The success of Rhodesia, then, as a gold-producing country will have a most important effect upon the immediate political future of South Africa. Mr. Rhodes, though he has always been studiously cautious and guarded in his statements about the value of the gold-reefs, has never concealed the fact that personally he had some belief in them. Of late he has ventured to speak with greater confidence as development work on the reefs progressed and actual crushing began. This will be seen by reference to the two last speeches (those of 1898 and 1899) to the Chartered Company's shareholders, which I give at the end of this chapter.

That there has been some delay in the development of the mining wealth of the country has been due to exceptional causes; but remembering the causes—the rebellion of the Matabele, and the rinderpest, which destroyed the sole means of carriage—that development has really been exceedingly swift. In

the middle of 1893 Lobengula was still ruling in his kraal at Bulawayo, and his savage warriors were spreading desolation and death among the weaker tribes from Lake Ngami in the east to Mashonaland in the west. The Cape railway was still five hundred miles off in 1896, and the cost of carriage by ox-wagon prohibitive. After the rinderpest this cost made profitable mining work an impossibility. For example, before the rinderpest, that is in 1895, the food of a native labourer cost 12s. to 15s. a month, after the rinderpest the increased price of carriage, owing to the extermination of the oxen, raised the cost to nearly 25s. a month, at which rate the best mines could not be worked except at a loss. The arrival of the Cape railroad at Bulawayo removed this difficulty, and mining work was then resumed.

To give the evidence of the value of individual reefs might be invidious, but the result of crushing by the very few stamps as yet at work during twelve months—the first month November 1898, the last October 1899—I take from the monthly report of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, given in full as an appendix at the end of this book. Omitting the penny-weights, it amounts to 67,164 ounces, or roughly speaking somewhere about £250,000. It would be far greater but for the difficulty of obtaining native labour, which is, at last, being dealt with by bringing up natives from the Portuguese territories *viâ* Beira and *viâ* Tete. Ultimately this difficulty will, no doubt, be overcome, as the wants of civilisation develop among the Matabele and the custom grows of looking to manual work as a means of obtaining money to supply them; but for the present labour has to be obtained elsewhere. The continuation of the railway northwards, which Mr. Rhodes has made arrangements to

carry out, fully described in the speech to the shareholders in 1899, will meet this difficulty by bringing within reach of Bulawayo the cheap labour market of Northern Rhodesia. The excellent pastoral and agricultural capabilities of Rhodesia, while offering an attractive field for British colonisation, depend for immediate value on the demand for their produce, which in its turn depends on the growth of population consequent on the success and extension of mining operations. Hence it is plain that if the federation of Rhodesia with the Cape and Natal depends on its proving itself a gold-producing country, the figures I have given show it is in a fair way to do so. The mines at present at work cover a mere hand-breadth of the vast extent of reefs in which rich shoots have been located and traced out, and in a great many cases largely developed.

Before giving the speeches to the shareholders of the Company (1898 and 1899), it may be said that these speeches, considered in their scope and influence and in the enormous and enthusiastic audiences to whom they were addressed, are altogether unique, as speeches made to the shareholders of a commercial enterprise. The fact is that Mr. Rhodes has been fortunate in finding or rather creating an army of thirty thousand shareholders or more, who have faith in him and in the enterprise, who have caught something of his dauntless spirit of confidence in the English race and devotion to the Empire, and who look, somewhat as he does, at the Company as firstly an instrument of Imperial expansion, and secondly, as a sound business proposition, though one which will pay handsomely in the long-run. The shareholders, like other Englishmen, feel instinctively that the maker of Rhodesia, the leader whose magnetism has drawn

them into his projects, is a sort of rough realisation in an individual of the essential characteristics of the race. His personality suggests that ideal of the governing race of the world which combines far-reaching imaginative vision with a practical vision of things as they are, which has a belief in deeds rather than words, and cares little to give verbal expression to ideas that find their easy and only satisfactory expression in action.

The speech of April 21, 1898, is specially interesting because it was made after the re-election of the speaker to his old position on the directorate (to which he had been restored by a unanimous and enthusiastic vote of the shareholders), which he had been obliged to resign in consequence of his connection with the revolutionary movement at Johannesburg and the catastrophe of the Raid. Adversity takes the dross out of a really big nature, and Mr. Rhodes returned a stronger and better man for his time of trial and misfortune. To those to whom he had seemed an incarnation of unscrupulous and irresponsible power, who mistook for brutality his bluntness and the surface cynicism with which he hides his real feelings, the proof of the great qualities of the man, given in his work in the pacification of Matabeleland, was something of a revelation, and all this fuller knowledge and fuller sympathy had come to his supporters since he addressed them in 1895. As he stood up there and looked over that enthusiastic crowd of eager faces, he looked less impassive and more human, more like a modern man like themselves, who had known what failure and suffering mean, than like what he generally resembles, some old Roman emperor born with the single ambition to annex and administer the habitable world, and care-



less alike of the praise or blame of the lesser mortals over whom he dominates.

‘Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, I am rather sorry that I have a bad cold, and therefore I cannot speak as clearly as I might. I have to thank you for re-electing me, but I recognise in connection with that the responsibilities which that fact represents. Her Majesty’s Government has stated that as we have become a commercial company, it has no objection to that course which you have now adopted; and, gentlemen, I feel the confidence you have shown in me by your having elected me, and I know the obligations which the acceptance of that means.

‘It would be only right for me to-day to state to you practically your situation, and I can state it more fairly now after having been nearly eighteen months in the country that you have added to our Empire. I can fairly use the word “you,” because, after all it is very well to have ideas, but I recognise fully and clearly that the success of those ideas is due to, first of all, the eight thousand gentlemen, and now the thirty-five to forty thousand gentlemen, who have from time to time subscribed the capital to carry out those ideas. Now, gentlemen, we must go into a business proposition. There are two matters which we shall have to deal with. First of all, there is the money which you have spent in the development and conquest of that country which you have named after me. Now that money is, roughly, not as Lord Grey said on one occasion, £10,000,000, but

I think I am correct in saying that it is roughly about £6,000,000, with the debenture debt; and the view I take about that money—and I am speaking to two audiences, not only here but to the people in that country—my view is that having adopted the course that that country shall become a self-governing state, just like another state in South Africa, the money spent on the conquest and development of it should, whenever those people become a full self-governing state, become a debenture debt of that country. We must look at these things broadly. The people who are really going to benefit to the most enormous extent by the addition of that new country to civilisation are the people who will come after us, if I may put it fairly, in so far as the settlers are concerned. A new country is very difficult—everything is raw, and you have everything against you. I daresay some of you may have read the accounts of the Governors of Australia when they first annexed it. They said it was hopeless, but it has now four million inhabitants, and a trade, I believe, of about £100,000,000 a year. But following that train of thought, what I mean to put is this—that it would be unfair solely to debit you or the first people of the country with the total cost of its conquest and development from barbarism to civilisation. It is the people who come afterwards who should, in the shape of public debt, repay that, and so I consider that having adopted the course that we shall pass from a chartered administration to a self-governing state, we think that self-governing state, whenever

it chooses to take on itself the full responsibilities of governing itself, must take over the debt which you have incurred in connection with the conquest and development of that country, and I feel sure that they will do it.

‘We have now proceeded to an intermediate stage—what we call a semi-responsible Government. You have given them an elective representation, copying the precedents of Natal and Griqualand West—I am speaking of South Africa—and I suppose many other colonies in other parts of the world. That is the second step from a pure Crown administration. You must remember you must put the charter in the place of the Crown, and at the present moment you have given them an elective representation, but you keep the majority of votes because you are responsible for the expenditure, so that the elective representatives should not vote a large budget beyond your means, and compel you to spend that money. You, therefore, keep a majority of the executive, or chartered representation—for the Crown it would be executive representation—so that every item submitted to the Parliament in the accounts is subject to your veto, and that is only right, because you pay the money, and therefore you have the right to set the tune. So we have come to the second stage, and I will show you the strength of that stage, or the strength of that position. The whole budget will be submitted to a council. There will be four elected representatives and five representing you, and each matter of expenditure will be discussed. What will

be pointed out to them is this, that if they desire to become a full self-governing state, and take over the responsibilities of government, the first thing for them to do is to balance revenue and expenditure. You say to them, "We are short so much at present between the receipts and expenditure; there is a debit against us. The first thing you had better do is to balance that, if you wish to be a self-governing state," and the essence of Englishmen is that they will be a self-governing state. All the trouble in the Transvaal is due to the fact that they are treated as slaves there, and they won't have it. And they will go on agitating until they get their rights. We are the most uncomfortable people in the world—we will insist on our rights, and will never stop until we get them. That is the essence and characteristic of our nation.

‘Well, in reference to this territory which you have annexed, you have given them the first stage—that is, that they shall have a voice in the government of that country and give their views as to expenditure, but until they take full responsibility as to expenditure, you reserve the power of vetoing. The first step for them will be to balance revenue and expenditure, and I think there is little doubt that they will be able to do that. I shall suggest to them, as you have now elected me a director again, that they should join the Customs Union with the Cape Colony. That will give them about £100,000 a year. I propose that they should reduce the police expenditure, because now with two railways in, there is no

occasion for us to have a thousand white police and three hundred native. Why, the Cape Colony, with a million natives in it, has only eight hundred police ; but it is judicious that we should not interfere at the present moment, and that we should leave it to the Council to decide as to the number of police they should use in the country. I feel sure that with that object before them, and taking full responsibility for the government of the country, they will join heartily with us—that is, the elected members—in balancing revenue and expenditure. There are other items. We have not collected the hut tax in Matabeleland. There is the question of an excise as to liquor locally made in South Africa. There are many other questions ; but I may state broadly, having been carefully into it, that in fifteen months I see my way to balance revenue and expenditure.

‘When revenue and expenditure balance, I feel sure that the people of the country will take their full self-government. I have faith in the minerals of the country, and it is a general asset of the country that it can support a large white population. It is not a tropical territory, where the white man cannot live ; it is a territory where white men can live, marry, and bring up white children. That is the great point. I feel sure that those people will, as I have said, then take their full self-government, and that they will readily assent to return to you, in the shape of a debenture debt, that amount which you have expended upon the acquisition and development of the country. That is a point—it is a fair point—and it is

for you to think over it. You can then say fairly that there is an asset in reference to the money we have so willingly and heartily subscribed from time to time for the development of that country, for the settlement of the war, for dealing with the losses of the citizens, and for all those questions which have troubled you from time to time in connection with the turning of a new barbaric territory into a civilised community, or into a civilised territory.

‘Then, after that, I have to consider that those people who have done so much and added that country to our Empire, must be considered in another aspect, and we come to the question of the minerals and your interest in the minerals that are discovered in that territory. I have not lost any faith in the minerals. I have always spoken with extreme caution; I do not want you to gamble in these shares. I feel that you will get a good and fair return for the money you have expended, but I do not wish to see you gamble on the Stock Exchange and put these shares at an enormous price, discounting the future. Buy them as you find that valuable minerals are discovered, but do not go and anticipate. But then some one will say, “You do not believe that there are minerals in the country.” I believe absolutely in the minerals, but it will take time to develop them, and therefore I do not want you to anticipate the future. When I see the returns as they were put to me the other day, and saw that there are sixteen thousand human beings with twenty-five shares and less, it shows me that there is a great

feeling about the development of this affair, apart from the commercial aspect entirely. At the same time, I do not want people to go and gamble in these shares. On the other hand, I do not want to be pessimistic, because I am an optimist, and because I feel sure and have a great belief in the future of the country as a great mineral-producing country.

‘The last year and a half I have been in it has shown me personally a very great deal. I find this huge area—I only know the area south of the Zambesi, but I am told that in the north it is the same—400,000 to 500,000 square miles, and there are now 157,000 claims registered, and that means that human beings have gone out and found in the quartz gold—that is, they have found the quartz impregnated with gold. I know fairly from the past that we could never expect to develop a mineralised quartz country requiring such expenditure until we had the railways in. We have the railways in now, and I know that in May one or two batteries will start, and that by the end of the year we shall have about six started. I cannot believe that all these engineers of high position and great experience can be telling untruths when they all absolutely say that they believe immensely in the different and separate reefs they are dealing with. I cannot help remembering that you were told that the country was a swamp and that no white man could live in it. But white men do live in it. You were also told that the country was hopeless, but there are ten thousand white men in it. I always said that it would be a country

that would make a great return from its minerals. The last thing left for our opponents was to say that there was no gold in the country, but now that they know there is gold, they say that there is no payable gold. They qualify their statement.

‘I admire them ; it is a great battle that is going on in Africa. They want the country to be damned ; and they want it to be a hopeless country. Even in my own country, where I was Prime Minister—that is in the south—there are many who get up every morning and who wish that their Hinterland, instead of being a success, should be a failure ; and every report they can get to the discredit of the country they are delighted with. Fancy your discovering a new territory lying at your back, and a section of you wishing that it might be a hopeless failure ! But such is the bitterness between Imperialism and Republicanism. One section of the people wants to make a Republic in South Africa, and another section wants to make a united South Africa under our flag. You thus see that politics interfere with everything. You have seen these reports ; there are some paid papers which do nothing else but write bad reports about that country which carries my name, and which you have created. They say that if it is a successful north, it means a united South Africa under the English flag ; but if the north is a failure, it means a united South Africa under a republican flag. That permeates every state and every family. Those are the politics of South Africa, and it affects you in every way. You can often know these papers



perfectly well, and you take them up and read about this country which you have created, and everything you read is bad. But that is not so. Compared with the rest of Africa it is a very fine country. You may be sure that Lobengula, who was the greatest chief in South Africa—and who was the greatest native king there—you may be sure that he took the best territory. He went many miles before he settled there, and you may be sure that it was the best country that he had seen. It is a good country, and my faith is that it will be a highly-mineralised and a payable-mineralised country.

‘I am tiring you, I fear, but I do not see you often. I have shown you how I think that revenue and expenditure should be balanced. I have told you about the elective system, and I have told you that when you give them full self-government, I think you may fairly ask them to take over as debt of the country what you have expended over the receipts in occupation and administration. I have stated further, that from my knowledge now, after being fifteen months in that country, I have every faith and belief that it will be a payable gold-producing country.

‘Now we come to the next step. There has been a great deal said about your share in the vendors’ scrip or in the minerals, and that it is an unfair share, and without precedent. It is without precedent, but there are a good many things which are without precedent, although that does not prove that they are wrong. I may again put to you what that share is, and how fair the interest is. The question of the

discovery of minerals underground *qua* quartz reefs lies in three capacities. First of all, the prospector goes out and finds those reefs. He is generally a man with nothing—with a donkey and a pack. In every other country in the world, when he goes and looks for minerals and finds them, the rule or the law is that he is entitled to one claim, on which he will pay a monthly licence, and he very often finds that he has to part with that claim to some one else before the results come to fruition. Now, how have you dealt with that prospector? Instead of letting him have only one claim, you have allowed him to take one block of ten claims, in which you claim the right to one-half interest; and further, you do not charge him any monthly licence until he floats it into a company. I have talked to many prospectors, and they tell me that is a fairer law to them than the ordinary law of Australia or the Transvaal, where you have only the right to mark out one claim, in respect of which you must pay a monthly licence. At the present moment look at the charges. You have 157,000 claims registered. At 10s. a month the community would be paying you £80,000 nearly, or nearly £1,000,000 per annum. They would not stand it, but I wish to show you the alternative. Therefore, I do not think it is unfair that when he marks out his block of ten claims he should give you a half-interest in the vendors' scrip.

‘Now we come to the next stage. The next stage is that the capitalist turns up on the scene, and he buys these claims from the prospector. It is always

the case with a quartz company. A quartz company means machinery, and no man without means can float a company with machinery. The capitalist says, when he steps in, "I do not buy a block of ten claims; I buy an interest in a block of ten claims, and pay accordingly." Therefore he is not hurt. You are following me step by step. The prospector is not hurt; the capitalist is not hurt. Now come finally the real people who work the reefs—that is, the English people, or the French people. It does not matter to them, when it is submitted to them, whether they have to subscribe the working capital against what is termed the vendors' scrip—it does not matter whether they give the whole of it to Mr. Beit or divide it with Mr. Beit and the government of the country. They must say they simply subscribe so much cash against the vendors' scrip that is submitted to them. What I am trying to lead you to is that our charge is not an unfair one. The thing is that it is new. The real secret is that all governments should take an interest in all minerals discovered under the soil, because those minerals are found by accident, and it is the government that makes them valuable by their administration and protection. You will hear over and over again in the world of some man trudging along with his donkey and his pack, and finding something worth a million or two. It would be far better when he made that discovery, that he should give a portion to the government of the country, and you are the government of the country. This interest in the vendors'

scrip is fair, and not an excessive interest for you to claim, and it does not affect the interests of any one.

‘It is often said that you want one-half the gold, that you take one-half the gold. Nothing of the kind. You have the right to half-interest in the vendors’ scrip, as against the working capital that is subscribed; and I have shown you that the prospector receives a return in being charged nothing for licence, and in being allowed to mark out ten claims, whereas under ordinary law he only marks out one claim; that the speculator knows what he is buying and pays accordingly; and that the people who subscribe the working capital on the Stock Exchange are not affected whether the vendors’ scrip belongs to the man who has purchased or whether the vendors’ scrip is divided between the man who has purchased and the government of the country. That is the proposition about your interest, and that you have; and when the government of the country becomes self-governing, I feel sure that they will make no objection to your retaining that interest. It will be a question of bargaining. You will say, “You can have your self-government on these conditions,” and it would be fair. You might give them a certain share in your interest for managing the concern. But I am sketching the thing in detail, so that you may go home and consider it, and I feel sure that when you consider the points I have put to you about your expenditure on administration and your share in vendors’ scrip, you will begin to see that you have not only added an extra province to the Empire,

but you will get a fair return for the money you have so liberally expended.

'We have had one difficulty lately, and it has been this: that in connection with some of the reefs that we have no doubt of as being exceedingly good, the people who floated them and went to the public for working capital asked us very considerably to reduce your interest, because they said that they could not get the money from the public unless your interest was very much reduced. Well, we had to consider that we have to produce gold to convince the public that the country is a payable gold-producing country, and we therefore reduced your interest in many cases in order to get batteries erected, because we had no capital to deal with that question. Now, you will notice by the resolution that is to be submitted that we ask you to give us power from time to time to get some money, so that when a man comes with an utterly unfair proposition we should say, "Very well, we will subscribe a portion of the working capital, but we will not reduce our right in the vendors' scrip." Now, you may say "there will be a great risk. You may go and take every reef submitted to you, and you may get a number of bogus and improper ones." No, I think that will be guarded against in the following manner: We propose to appoint two or three gentlemen to watch your interests as mining engineers, and whenever a reef is submitted, we shall ask from the man submitting it an inspection—not a temporary inspection of twenty-four hours, but probably we shall ask him to give us a month on

that reef. We will drift and inspect, and then we will give our answer on what terms we will float.

‘For instance, we have in many cases taken thirty per cent. of vendors’ scrip when we were entitled to fifty per cent. The vendors’ scrip has been put very low, and gentlemen had to pay for getting the working capital from the English public. When we have a reef submitted, we shall send our engineers down, and if they make a good report—well, there is no difficulty about the working capital. We will subscribe so much, but we must have our fair share. That will give us great strength in dealing with those properties which from time to time are submitted to us. Our engineers will also reject the rubbish. They will return and say to us, “No, this reef is not very promising, and we cannot recommend you to take it. Let them float it in the ordinary way if they can, but we have told them that they must do a great deal more work.” That is why I have recommended the Board to submit this matter to you, asking for capital to deal with these cases that from day to day arise. With many of the companies we have now settled with, we have had to take for you a very much smaller share than we had a right to, because we had no capital to subscribe, and they very justly said that unless they got very good terms they could not get the working capital from the public. Your only risk in trusting us is that we might take up a lot of bogus reefs—well, I will not say bogus reefs, but reefs with a small amount of gold in them, and therefore take up what I may term indifferent

propositions. But I think you may trust our judgment. That is the reason for your being asked for this further working capital.

'Now let us sum up again. I have shown you what I think will be the end of the money you have expended in the development and conquest of the country; I have shown you how you will get your return on that. Secondly, I say that you will retain your share in the vendors' scrip—that is, in the minerals of the country; and it is for you to consider whether a highly mineralised country, representing about eight hundred thousand square miles of the earth's surface, is worth holding an interest in, where your expenditure *qua* administration will be subsequently secured, and the balance represents an interest in that large area of mineralised surface of the earth. Yes, I think it is good enough, but do not go and gamble over the shares. It is a great mistake. You do not know the worry it gives to those who are responsible for your interests. I know exactly what you have subscribed, I know exactly what you have spent, and I feel perfectly certain that in my lifetime I will return good interest on that. But I do hate to read the lists, and see at times that people have gambled these shares up without warranty for it, because it is in the prospective that they have dealt rather than in the present. You will excuse me saying that frankly.

'Now, having dealt with your interest in the vendors' scrip, and the mode in which one proposes to balance revenue and expenditure in connection

with the development of the country, and having pointed out that it is going to become a self-governing state in South Africa, the same as Natal and Cape Colony, and that even when it does become that you will still retain your interest in the vendors' scrip, and probably give the government of the country something for collecting it for you—having pointed out these facts to you, I should like to proceed and show you how marvellously, by your assistance, we have succeeded in development. When we think that that country, in a very little time, will have a thousand miles of railway, and that the railway to Bulawayo, which has been built by the subscription of yourselves and of the outside public, costing about £2,000,000 for six hundred miles, or only about £3000 a mile, is paying now about £12,000 per month, or in excess of the five per cent. interest on its cost by about £40,000, I think you will agree with me it is very satisfactory. I should say £40,000 per annum excess over the five per cent. That is most satisfactory, and it encourages one to further developments. We are not going to ask you in any way to be under obligations for further developments, but I do think that it is a practicable scheme, a possible scheme, and a payable scheme, if the line is extended from Bulawayo to the shores of Lake Tanganyika, and I will explain to you why. You are responsible for the northern part of Rhodesia as well as the southern; you have another four hundred thousand square miles there, and a railway is effective occupation. But I recognise all your obligations, and



I would not ask the charter to subscribe further capital for this. I do, however, think this: the English people have at the present moment received eight hundred thousand square miles of territory in the world for which they have not paid a single shilling. The only thing it has given them is the opportunity to Little Englanders in the House of Commons to indulge in every class of criticism without expense to the country. When you think of the change that has come over English public opinion—that they are beginning to see now that England by itself is a hopeless proposition, and that they have got to keep as much of the world as they can in order to keep their markets for their trade—I think you will agree that they should give us some consideration for the fact that we have taken eight hundred thousand square miles of the world's surface without its being any obligation to them.

‘Now, the proposition I have submitted to Her Majesty’s Government—I submitted it as a director of the Bechuanaland Railway, and not as a director of the Chartered Company—was that they should help us in extending the railway from Bulawayo to Lake Tanganyika, about eight hundred miles, which will cost about £2,000,000. You will say, “In what way did you ask for help?” Oh, in a very moderate way. I said, “You have woke up at last to the fact that England is nothing without the world, and it is the trade of the world that keeps you going. I say that we have cost you nothing, and I do not ask you for anything, but you have exceedingly good credit.”

If I or the Bechuanaland Railway tried to borrow £2,000,000 it would cost us five per cent., but if you go and ask for that amount for us, if you will get up behind our promissory note, it can be discounted at three per cent. instead of five per cent. I want £2,000,000 to get to Lake Tanganyika, and in the one case, if I am correct in my view respecting the question of credit, that will cost £100,000 a year, and in the other case it will cost only £60,000 a year. The charter has its responsibilities for the northern territory, but it could give its guarantee, and you could be behind the chartered guarantee. You would have this proposition before you. First of all, you are responsible under the Berlin treaty for effective occupation, and if the charter went to grief you would have to take the country over. But then there is not the slightest chance of the charter going to grief. First of all, the railway has to come to grief and then the charter, and then you can come in. What I ask is this, let us raise the money *qua* the railway with your credit instead of ours, and if you are still nervous, raise it for a hundred miles at a time, and let each hundred miles satisfy you that it is a paying proposition.

‘ You may ask, “ Why should the English Government do this ? ” Well, I do not know why you should be interfering in all the countries of the world, unless it is because you have woke up to the fact that you cannot live unless you have the trade of the world. All that they would do is that they would give the railway their credit, and we should raise the money

from the outside public on the basis of three per cent. instead of five per cent. Do you think they will do it? I do not know. It depends on the people, because, after all, the House of Commons are merely the representatives of the people. If the people take it up, they will do it. If not, they will not do it. That is the true position. Now, you can see what that means. I do not wish to be thought too imaginative. I am told that my speeches are not commercial but imaginative. Look at the matter. You get the railway to Lake Tanganyika, you have Her Majesty's sanction for the railway to Uganda (it joins on at Tanganyika), and then you have Kitchener coming down from Khartoum. Some will say, "Oh, that is one of your imaginative speeches." But it is not imaginative; it is practical. That gives you Africa—the whole of it. I remember when I spoke to you some time ago, I told you that the telegraph was going to get through, and every one thought that was imaginative. But it is practical, although it is a question now whether the cable will not shut up. A few years ago it was said to be purely imaginative, but it is purely practical now. And so the conquest of Africa by the English nation is a practical question now. We can make the links from the Cape to Tanganyika with the lake, then with the Uganda occupation, and then with Kitchener coming down from Khartoum. There's the thing.

'A gentleman asks about Germany, but if he knew the blue-books he would know, in respect of the bit of territory between Tanganyika and Uganda, that

the Earl of Rosebery arranged with the Congo State that the telegraph should be allowed to go through. So I may say to the hon. gentleman, that for once Germany is not interested in that question. There is another reason—I will repeat it—why the English Government should give their help : because effective occupation under the Berlin treaty is necessary. If there is still that persistent idea in Sir William Harcourt's mind that we must fail, surely he would say, "We are responsible under the Berlin treaty, and if these people before they fail can put a railway into Tanganyika, all the better for us, because that is the only effective occupation that is possible." It is, therefore, not an imaginative, but a practical scheme. It will develop the whole of the northern part of our territory. I do not think that you as the charter are justified in taking it up with our many responsibilities, but it is a case where the English people might say, with care and caution, "We will give our guarantee so that you may raise the money at a lower rate." Even Sir William Harcourt gave us £200,000 for the railway to go from Mafeking to Bulawayo. In this case we do not ask for any money, but for their credit. We say, "Get up behind our promissory note, and the public will discount it at three per cent. instead of five per cent."

'There is another reason why they should give us this help, or give the railway this help. You must remember that I spoke to some of you a long time ago about a point raised very often by the Little Englanders. They said that, after all, the colonies

were no help, because as soon as they got their independence they also put on protective tariffs against us. Now, sir, I hold the theory that England's duty in the world is the administration of new countries, and the working-up of the raw products and their subsequent distribution to the world. Those are her two duties. It was a strong argument in the case of the Little Englanders, giving instances like Victoria and Canada, that as soon as they became self-governing they put protective duties against the mother-country, and that they were really as bad as a foreign nation. There was a great deal in that. But the charter proposed to Her Majesty's Government—and we had nothing to gain in this—that in the constitution of the charter should be put the following clause: "That the duty on British goods should not exceed the then Cape tariff." The reason for using the words "the then Cape tariff" was that one was looking to federalism. It was a low tariff for revenue purposes and not for protection. It was about twelve per cent., but it had not created a single factory—it had a match factory, though, but the only result of that was that when you lighted the matches they burned your fingers.

'Perhaps I am tiring you. Her Majesty's Government said, "We will accept a clause in the constitution that the duty on 'imported' goods shall not exceed the present Cape tariff." I wanted "British." That meant the exclusive trade of our new territories to England for ever, because on equal terms no one can touch or ever will touch you in manufactured

articles. They fought for the word "imported," and I fought for the word "British." That was with the late Liberal Government. Some were in favour of it, but some said they belonged to the old school, that there was a scent of protection in my view, and that they were free traders. I said the day will come when the wars of the world will be tariff wars; that is going to be the future policy of the world. We fought over this clause as to whether the word "British" or "imported" should be put in, and they refused it. Like the Sibylline books, one has come back and tries to sell again, and you will be glad to hear that the new Government have agreed that the duty on "British" goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff. Meantime the Cape tariff has come down to nine per cent. This practically means the trade of that new territory for ever for England, and for this reason. They argued—that is, the Cabinet—with one, that even though that clause was in the constitution it was liable to change. I said, "No, it will never change. Take the constitution of the United States—that which is in the constitution is sacred. No one ever touches it, and if you put that clause into the constitution, it will never be changed." You must remember that protection has been caused by waves. You must remember that when Victoria or Canada went into protection, it was not by a unanimous vote of the people. There was a huge minority of the people against it. But once protection is entered upon, you can never change, because you create

those factories which are dependent on protective rates.

‘And what happens if you take off the protective rate? The people are thrown on the streets, and the Minister is stoned. Well, he says that he is not going to be stoned. Victoria and Canada cannot change their policy of protection, although they are going to give a preference to England against the whole world. I think it far better, that at the starting of this country we should begin on the basis that we are free and open to English goods. Why should we try and make bad goods in a part of the world which is not suited for them, when the best place to make them is the English Isles? They have the coal, the iron, the people are trained, the sea is around them with the shipping of the world, and they are the people to make the goods of the world. But, unfortunately, a fad has arisen because of the separate notion, that whenever you make a country you must make the goods in that country. That is the greatest mistake in the world, for there they would be made at the cost of the people. But the Government cannot change, because any change means England getting the whole of the trade, and that means the poverty and the throwing on the streets of the men who work in the factories in those remote places. You thought a great deal about our fairness and justice in connection with China. You said open ports to all. You thought a great deal about the unfairness of France in putting on their protective tariffs against us; but the French

are perfectly right. They know that on equal terms they cannot make goods against us. They say, "We take these barbaric countries, and we must spend an enormous sum of money in connection with them, and we are not going to do that and then give the plum to the English. We must put on protective duties, and then some of the trade will come to us, because we will be candid enough to say that your workpeople, with their energy, can beat the whole world." That is the reason why the United States and the French Government put on their protective tariffs. That is what you have to learn, and the English workpeople have awakened to the fact that if you are to retain your position and keep your trade, you must maintain your position in the world, and take any balance of it that is left. I am sorry that there is very little that is left, and you have finally, with barbaric nations like China—and there are a few others—to say, "If there is any change in your administration, your country must be open to our goods."

'That is what is going to take place. It is no longer a question of the flag simply, but a question of practical business; and the mechanic has woke up to the fact that unless he keeps the markets of the world he will be starved. The "three acres and a cow" idea has been found to be humbug, and the working man has found out that he must keep the world and the trade of the world if he is to live, and that if the world is shut to him he is done. The Cobden scheme was good, had the world adopted the idea



of working up in the best place in the world the goods for the whole of the world. But other countries would not have it. They said that that meant that England would have the whole trade; and the United States put on its tariffs, France put on its tariffs, and Germany and Russia did the same. Your working man has woke up to that fact, and that is why—if you will remember what I say—the Little Englanders are hopeless and out of it. They know their business, and the whole thing is hopeless, because the rest of the world, apart from us, finding out that they cannot trade against you on equal terms, will shut you out with such protective tariffs, as will make it impossible for you to trade. The working classes have found that out, and when the change comes in the Government, they will take men like Lord Rosebery and Sir E. Grey. I am not a Conservative or a Liberal in this matter, but they are bound to take those leaders who have worked at that fact—not now, but ten years ago—because every one is an Imperialist now, even the Radicals. Why? Because they have found out from the people who vote—from their agents—that they must have this bigger England or they won't get in. Whatever change occurs in our politics, we are all right in our ideas of expansion. What I mean is that it will appeal to the people, this clause in your constitution, that the duty on British goods shall never exceed the present Cape tariff. The word is used meaning thereby that the trade of these eight hundred thousand square miles will be purely British,

and that, sir, will appeal to the people, and it is the people who rule.

‘I have perhaps been talking of politics more than I should, but I will give you a point on that question, and you will see why I have wandered into this. I will show you. I put it to the English people—we have given you eight hundred thousand square miles without a sixpence of cost. I used to be amused by hearing the question put in the House of Commons, “How much did the charter pay for the war?” Everything. Can you see the feeling of dismal anger on the face of the Little Englander when he saw that we paid for everything? I repeat it—Can you see the feeling of dismal anger of the Little Englander when he found that we paid for everything? He wished most heartily that the natives should beat us or that we should come and beg for money, and when he found that neither of these things happened, he went home dismally unhappy. We say to the English people, “We have given you eight hundred thousand square miles for nothing, and a clause in the constitution which will give you the trade of that territory for ever.” As to the idea that that clause will be altered—well, I have referred to the United States constitution to show that nothing will alter it. Now, in return for that, I ask them, “Will you not endorse our promissory note? Won’t you endorse our promissory note to enable us to go to Tanganyika? That means giving you without expense the whole of Africa. Is not that worth having with the new idea among your

people? Your Little England school has gone. Things being limited to the white cliffs of England is over. You must deal with the whole world, and here is a chance of your getting another continent." That is the proposition I have put to Her Majesty's Government, and I hope they will consider it. I think that the two objections to it are, that it is unusual and that Mr. Rhodes is connected with it. But still, sir, we will have a try at it, and as I have pointed out, I do not propose that the charter should give any portion of the money now proposed to be raised to this purpose. We want that money for subscribing to any reefs which appear to be promising; and I do not propose that your finances should be hampered with this other matter. I do think that this railway is a case where the English people might help—not with their money but with their good name—especially as they are responsible for this territory under the Berlin Conference with respect to beneficial and effective occupation.

'There is one other point I might touch on. I get many letters from ladies and gentlemen who are deeply interested in the native question, and the tone in them shows that they have gathered the idea that I myself, in the different positions I have held, am extremely brutal towards the natives. It is one of those "good things" that get started and no one contradicts; and I am supposed to be a sort of "horror" in connection with the natives. But to satisfy their minds, I would only say this, that the best judges of that question are the natives

themselves. I can put on record the removal of the liquor from the natives at Pondoland, in the Kimberley compounds, and in the whole of Rhodesia. I can put on record that when we took Pondoland, I rode through with eight policemen; and I can also put on record, that when you had your trouble with the natives they settled with me. Now, you do not suppose that a "horror" such as I appear to be thought, would have been able to settle with those people, and you do not suppose that I would have trusted my skin among them, unless I felt perfectly sure of how they felt towards me. These are practical facts as against the emotional, and all I can add is, that I have just received—last week—a telegram from the Cape to say that ten thousand Fingoes were going to our territory to settle among us. And with these people everything is personal; they do not think of governments. It is personal to me. Do you suppose that ten thousand of these people would go under me if I had been a brute, a bogey, a horror to these poor people? But it is one of those fads that has been started, and unfortunately Exeter Hall has taken it up; but I am prepared to go with any one from Exeter Hall, and—what is it?—the Aborigines Protection people, and visit the natives of South Africa, and let them say what they think about me. But the practical fact in connection with this matter is, that the natives of Matabeleland settled with me and that the natives of Cape Colony are going to settle under me. Those practical and hard facts are better than

all the statements which are made by irresponsible people.

‘I have very little more to add. I think this—I may repeat it—that the English people have themselves done very well. They have a new territory and a clause that will give them the trade of it for ever. And even I myself have not come out badly. I have had two years of trial, but it has made a better man of me—and you have been good enough to perpetuate me for ever. When we consider the system of Board Schools and the extension of education, it seems to me that one will attain that personal object which is especially an attribute of humanity—that is, that I may last in this world as long as most of the heroes of the past—and I owe that to you. In conclusion I will simply say, without desiring to make any periods, that I consider that my country has done very well, and that I myself have done very well. You have again elected me your director, but the picture would not be complete and the imaginative thought would fail if I did not remember now that I am again responsible for your affairs—that on the lines I have sketched out to you as to the future of the country, and the retention of your interests in the minerals of the country, it will fall to me with my co-directors to make you—and I think long in saying that—a full and ample return for the money you have spent and for the support which you have given us; and I have not the slightest doubt about it.’

The last speech to the shareholders of the Company was made May 2, 1899, and is, like that of

1898, very important for the expression of his full conviction that the payable nature of the Gold Mines had become a certainty. Those of the shareholders who remembered how accurately Mr. Rhodes had predicted, years before the full success came, the success of De Beers and Goldfields, the two great mining corporations that had been built up under his leadership, must have congratulated themselves on the solid grounds there are for trusting that extraordinary range and accuracy of vision which has been the lifelong characteristic of Mr. Rhodes in finance as in politics. His vision both in finance and politics is as a telescope to the eyesight of an ordinary man, and what he alone sees across the intervening years, the world is certain, when it gets near enough, to see too. An admirable financial scheme by which to provide, unhelpt by the timid government, the necessary railway extension in Rhodesia was carefully explained. The fact that his lifelong friend and supporter, Mr. Beit, takes half a million in this scheme, while Mr. Rhodes could only see his way to take £200,000, was the occasion for a few significant words which are all Mr. Rhodes has ever said on the enormous financial sacrifices which the greatest mining financier of his time has made by devoting himself to politics and empire-making. 'I should have liked to take more, but during the last ten years I have devoted my mind to politics, and politics and the accumulation of money do not run together.'

'My Lord Duke, Ladies and Gentlemen, I suppose that the most unhappy thing in the world is for a public man to make a speech, especially the night and day beforehand. The only simile I can think

of would be, perhaps, the night and morning of one of our forefathers just before he went to a State execution. It is awfully pleasant when it is over—I mean the speech. That, sir, is my feeling to-day, as it always is on any occasion of making a public speech, and, perhaps I might put it, especially in this case. I have to give you my ideas about the country in which you have invested so largely. I have to give you my real convictions about that country, and yet, at the same time, I have to guard against encouraging the public to an excessive gambling in the shares of our Company. It is a position of great responsibility, and I trust that you will bear with me—I hope you will do so—when I approach the subject with extreme caution, wishing on the one hand to give you my belief in the country, and as to its future, and at the same time to guard the people of England against an excessive speculation in our shares here. The last time I met you we had just passed through the difficulties of the war, and we had the difficulty as to the cost of administration, and I then told you that I thought that within two years we should balance revenue and expenditure.

‘I think that the forecast of two years will be well borne out. Our council sits, within a fortnight, and our administrator, with his executive, will submit schemes of taxation in order to balance revenue and expenditure. You must remember that we have no taxes in that country; there are no customs—no charges of any kind; and I think that the time has come when the people can make a contribution to

the good government of the country. I think that with the taxes that will be submitted and with the increase of revenue, we may look to my prophecy being fulfilled—that is, within two years. I cannot agree with the fifteen months, but I think that within two years we shall balance revenue and expenditure; that is, two years from the date of my speech, or a year from now. This year, I think, we shall, with our taxes, go far in that direction, but it will be the subsequent meeting of the council that will balance revenue and expenditure. We have an enormous charge for police. Her Majesty's Government insisted, rightly I think, on our having a very large police force. I think that we have nearly twelve hundred white men, costing about £300,000 a year. In comparison with that I think I may mention the Cape Colony, with eight hundred thousand barbarians under their rule, and they have no more than eight hundred police. But we have been through a rebellion, and of course it is thought that there may be another, although you may put out of your mind that idea. Our risk of a native rebellion is over, but I think that Her Majesty's Government is wise in insisting, at least for the present, in maintaining a large body of police. They are the cause, however, of heavy expenditure, but I hope that within a year that expenditure will be considerably reduced.

‘Now, I will give you one item of revenue. Last year the revenue of the mining office of Bulawayo was £10,000, whereas the revenue for the past month was £8000, and every branch of revenue is increasing



in almost the same proportion. Therefore I think it is not an unjust or unwise forecast to say that we shall balance revenue and expenditure within the period stated in my previous speech. You might ask, "What do you think will be the future of the country?" Well, I may say that, as you are aware, we have taken the first step in the direction of self-government. The council will sit in a fortnight, representing the people. Every man in that country has a vote who can write his name and who is in the occupation of a house of the value of £75 or in receipt of wages of £50 a year. In fact, every one can vote who is educated and is not a loafer. If that were the case in a neighbouring state, the unrest in South Africa would cease. That council will sit in a fortnight, and I feel sure that its conduct will meet with the approval of the people. We keep a majority of the votes so long as we are responsible for the expenditure, but the people of the country, through their elected representatives, will state their grievances to the council, we retaining the control of the expenditure so long as we are responsible.

'You might ask me about the future, and I repeat again that I think that the country will have a great white population, and I believe that it will pass from semi-responsible government (that is the present position) to full responsible government. But, as I said before, I think that when that state governs itself, it will have to repay to the charter shareholders (and I take the opportunity of again stating this), in debentures probably, your full expenditure on war, public

works, and everything connected with the occupation of the country and its present administration. You may ask, "Where will your interests be preserved?" I think you will then still retain your interest in the vendors' scrip, that is, in the mining undertakings, probably giving something to the government of the country for relieving you of the cost of administration. I have to look after the interests of my shareholders. You have been a loyal body, and it will be my duty in the future to see that in the final settlement your interests are respected. I think this is a wise opportunity, just before the meeting of our council, to state to you one's thoughts as to the future position of the country and the future position of the population when they take full charge of the administration of the country; I think it wise to state that it is my duty to safeguard your interests as shareholders, and to see that in the final settlement there is nothing you may complain of.

'Now, you might ask me what I think about the future of the country—as to the products of its soil and the products of its mines. I will deal briefly with the question of the soil. I think it is a fair average district in South Africa; I think it will compare well with the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and the Cape Colony. It is specially gifted for the rearing of cattle—it is a peculiarly good country for cattle. We have fortunately lately got over the plague of the rinderpest, for which we have also discovered a cure; and the country is refilling with stock, and the young fellows who went to the war

and fought for the possession of the country are settling down on their farms and especially attending to pastoral pursuits. But, you may say, and very fairly, in that lies not the real wealth of the country. No, not the present wealth, I agree; and I will turn from the pastoral position, having shown you that it is good soil and good country for white men to live in, and it is a place where many of your children will make their homes.

‘But we must pass to what is the real asset of the country—its mineral wealth, and I am sure you will be glad to hear from me what I think about the future probabilities in connection with the mineral wealth of that country. And you must remember, in connection with this matter, that I have been exceedingly careful in the past; I have invariably said that it was a highly mineralised country. I think, if you would turn back to my speeches, you would see that that was the invariable statement which I made; but I would not go further, because I would not have you feel too much encouraged as to the mineral wealth until I was sure myself on this matter. But now I will go a step further, and will say that I think it is not only a highly mineralised country, but that it will be a highly payable country in connection with its minerals. I have been convinced almost against the most extreme caution. We had the marvellous products of the Rand, and one could hardly believe that nature would be so prolific in Africa south of the Zambesi, and would repeat its enormous payable mineral deposits in our country as

well as in the Transvaal. But I can tell you now that I have no doubt about it. I have no doubt about the payable nature of our mines, but what appals one is the enormous number of them. I have asked the secretary to compile some notes from the records of the office, and if I do not tire you, I will read them. These are the reports received at the office, and the results, after careful inquiry, with regard to a very few of the mines.

‘On the 30th of September last, you had one hundred and thirty thousand claims registered in Rhodesia. You must remember that every one who registers does so only if he has found that the quartz has gold in it, because he is liable to certain obligations. He is liable to sink shafts or cut drifts in those mines, or pay fines for non-working. No one, therefore, would be so foolish as to register a claim unless he was satisfied that the quartz reefs are mineralised—that is, that gold is contained in the quartz. Well, the number of claims registered in Rhodesia on September 30th last was, as I have said, one hundred and thirty thousand. That is something gigantic, but you must remember that it is spread over a country from four hundred to five hundred miles long; and as far as the mineralised area goes, we know now, of a width of two hundred miles. The whole of it is full of old workings. Who the people were who worked there we know not; whether the Phœnicians succeeded by the Arabians, and subsequently by the Portuguese, is still doubtful, but the fact remains that the whole country is full of old workings. We had at first the

doubt that these old workings would prove on investigation to represent at the depth to which they had gone, the limit of the ore, but our trials have shown that the limit of the depth was due to the falling in of the sides, and that practically the ancients who discovered the reefs were driven out by the water. The caps of the reefs are gone, but the reefs remain below equally rich.

‘Now, I thought I would take a few of the companies that are being worked. There are only four, I think, with batteries at present. The delay in getting them has been through the lack of railway communication and through the war. These drawbacks are now over, and you may say that the country has only just commenced; but I will take a few of the companies. I will take five of them, representing five hundred and sixty claims, whose market value, capitalised now, is £4,600,000. There is the Slekuwe, with an issued capital of £300,000 and a present value of £900,000; there is the Bonsor, with an issued capital of £220,000, of which the present value is £770,000; the West Nicholson has an issued capital of £210,000, its present value being £1,155,000; the Geelong has an issued capital of £200,000, and its present value is £900,000; and the Globe and Phoenix issued £175,000, the present value of which is £875,000. That makes a total present value of £4,600,000. Many of you may say that that is due to market gambling; but we must now go on, and examine into the intrinsic returns of these companies.

'The crushing returns of those companies without cyanide plant has been an average of  $11\frac{1}{2}$  dwts. to the ton. The average of the Rand (I do not say this in any way to make detrimental comparisons, for we all know the wealth of the Rand), including cyanide, is 9.85 dwts. The result of our reefs that are crushing gives  $11\frac{1}{2}$  dwts. on the average. You may ask me, What difference does the cyanide make? It makes a difference of from 4 to 5 dwts. We have had the ore assayed for us and treated on the Rand, and it gives an average equal to the Rand reefs; and we may calculate on 4 or 5 dwts. more with cyanide, while the cost of treatment by cyanide is about 1 dwt. per ton. You may thus add to the  $11\frac{1}{2}$  dwts. an extra profit of 4 dwts. when using the cyanide process. That would be 14s. at 3s. 6d. the dwt., but say 10s.; and you can add on to the result I have mentioned 10s. a ton at least. I do not mention these reefs to enhance them above those of other companies, but simply because these are crushing, and I must take them in order to give a statement to our shareholders of what these reefs have done. I cannot help mentioning another case; the Geelong is also crushing. I could hardly believe the statement of those connected with it that they were stoping a breadth of 15 feet. Those who are connected with gold mining know what an enormous breadth that is to stope. They are stoping 15 feet, and they have won from 13,000 tons (so it is no pocket crushing, no crushing of selection) 7600 ozs. of gold, and they have not treated the tailings with

cyanide, so they can expect that extra amount of 4 dwts. per ton when they apply the cyanide to the tailings. It is an enormous return. However, the point is the breadth of the reef. The ordinary reef dealt with is from 1 foot 10 inches to 2 feet or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet, but when you deal with a reef 15 feet broad—if you take the whole of it, as they state they do—it is a gigantic proposition. I am not unduly expounding any reef, but am simply speaking of reefs that have been crushing. The same remark applies to the West Nicholson, which has not crushed. It has a breadth of from 40 to 47 feet, and will, it is said, average 10 dwts., but that has to be proved. But at any rate, without proof, I am justified in stating to you something about the confidence of the people connected with these reefs.

They came and asked for a railway, and I felt that the Chartered Company had done enough about railways, so I said, "If you want a railway, you had better build it yourself." After a great deal of discussion—I do not know whether it was exactly proper—I said to one of the representatives, "Remember the story of the young man in the Bible." Our Lord appealed to his wealth to prove the correctness of his views and his belief, and the young man failed him; but in this case, when I appealed, I offered to the holders of those reefs the right to buy £300,000 worth of our shares, which they had given us as vendors' scrip in their reef. At what price? you will ask. I will tell you. At the price you see in the market—£4 to

£5; and the representatives of these companies purchased from you those shares at £4 to £5 to the extent of £300,000, with which money we propose to build the railway for them. I think that that is the most absolute test you can possibly have—that those who are best acquainted with the size of their reefs, the quality of their reefs, the extent of their reefs, bought from the Chartered Company, to have a railway built to their mines, £300,000 in vendors' scrip which you possessed (you know that we take from each company a certain amount of vendors' scrip) on the basis of £4 to £5. I hope that you will not object to our spending that money and fulfilling our obligation, and building them a railway, because I may state to you that one of the reefs in which we parted with thirty thousand shares at £5 a share is going to be amalgamated with another block, and they are going to give us sixty thousand shares in the amalgamation, which I hope will reach the same price. Therefore, although we part with a little, there is a great deal more coming.

‘I do not wish to exaggerate the position, but you have the following proposition to weigh: There are about five hundred and sixty claims being worked, representing a value in the market of £4,600,000, and we have sold, for public development, a few of our shares, and realised £300,000 for them. That is the proposition which you as shareholders have to consider; and therefore I think I am justified in saying that we have advanced to a stage when we may say that we have not only a highly mineralised



country, but a great many payable propositions, and that we are only on the verge of them. You must remember that the claims selected to be worked are not claims selected after tremendously careful investigations, but it just happened that these companies marked out these properties and devoted their attention to them. They obtained their capital in Europe, or London rather — because everything comes from London—and they devoted themselves to these reefs, not because there were not many others, but because they happened to be the ones they selected ; and there is a huge balance of reefs to be tested and prospected. But they have found out that these old workings—they were all old workings, I believe—are not worthless, and that they had been left by the ancients because the sides had fallen in or because they had been driven out by water. We have this huge balance to deal with, and our start has been a very successful one ; and I cannot help believing that we shall hold our own with the best gold-producing states of the world.

‘I think that I am justified in making that statement, and I make it after very careful thought, after very close inquiry, and after being personally thoroughly convinced. And you must remember my statements in the past, when I have often been almost tempted to say encouraging words about the condition of the mineralisation of the country, but when, nevertheless, I have always simply said to you that it is highly mineralised, and said no more. You must therefore give the more weight to the man who,

with full responsibility, and after careful thought, says he considers that the country possesses many very powerful propositions, and propositions of a very high class. I have no doubt of the future of the country as a gold-producing state, and I say these words, knowing the full responsibility of my statement.

‘Now, having dealt with the products of the soil and the prospects of the mineral products of the country, you would no doubt like to hear a few words from me about the development. We have been most successful really in so far as our development by telegraph goes. I think that every small town and village possesses a telegraph; and in connection with that project, in which I am personally interested, namely, the extension of the telegraph through Africa, I think you would like to learn that it is proceeding with the greatest success. I may mention this because in one way you are practically interested, although, believe me, not beyond your own territory, because we must deal with all your undertakings connected with your country, and not plunge you into any scheme outside your area. But it happens that this project of the Trans-continental Telegraph passes through your territories, and you have taken an interest in that telegraph simply to the limits of your state. Beyond that, naturally, you should not invest, but it gives you a certain interest in that line.

‘You will be glad to learn that when I proceeded the other day to Egypt, I was able to settle in connection with that line a reasonable rate. What I felt was that if I waited until our line reached the

Egyptian boundary—I will not say for a moment that they would blackmail us, but I have found that my own countrymen are particularly good at a bargain, especially if you find that they are the sole people to be dealt with. I therefore thought it was wise, long before we reached the Egyptian boundary, that I should find out what they would charge us and I think a fair and reasonable settlement has been made. They agreed to charge me 2½d. a word, which I think will give them a very handsome return, because it will be an extra amount of revenue accruing to their telegraph funds, which they would not otherwise receive. Still, I think that we can fairly pay that when you think that the charge for telegraphic correspondence from Africa is represented by the sum of five shillings a word. But in addition to arranging the tariff to be charged by Egypt, there was another point—how to get there; and owing to our not having had sufficient foresight in reference to the development of Africa, several other nations have intervened during the period we have been thinking over the question. But I was fortunate enough, through the kindness of the German people, and owing to the character of the German emperor, who, whatever might have been his feelings in the past as to certain little incidents, which resulted very unsatisfactorily to myself, and which he deemed it right to censure, still is a broad-minded man. Therefore, when it came to the question of the development of Africa, and when I appealed to him in connection with the portion of Africa which is under his rule, he met

one with a breadth of mind which was admirable, and afforded one every help to carry out one's plan, while duly safeguarding the interests of his people. I signed an agreement with his ministers within three days, providing for the right of the telegraph being extended throughout his territory ; and though at the end of forty years the line passes into the possession of the Germans, still they are willing to maintain our through line at actual cost. It was a most just bargain on their part, because the conduct of Europe is to levy blackmail in connection with every telegraph that passes through it, ably assisted by those of our own people who have invested their money in telegraphs.

'You may have noticed that Mr. Henniker Heaton has moved for a committee in the House of Commons on this question, and you would be simply appalled at the telegraph charges which exist in the world. They are made entirely by those gentlemen who are connected with telegraphs, and they amount to an enormous sum. Frequently, the through telegraphs are charged at three times the rate that the local telegraphs charge in the country through which the through telegraph passes. Thus this enormous monopoly has risen up, and I am glad to see that some of our friends in the House of Commons are turning their attention to it. But in connection with the agreement I have mentioned, the German emperor charged nothing for this through telegraph excepting the cost of the maintenance of the line. Well, I think that that is satisfactory, when you

think that a few years ago this telegraph through Africa was considered a "wild-cat" scheme. It is no "wild-cat" scheme nowadays. If it were, I am sure that the German emperor would not have lent himself to it. The question, however, is, How soon will it be completed? and I am sorry to say that I think it will be three years. Still, I do not think that you can properly describe a scheme like this, which will change the whole telegraphing cost in Africa, as a "wild-cat" scheme; and I believe that it will be completed within three years. But I wish to point out to you that you will share in the result of that from a mercantile point of view, while the limit of demand on you for having a share in it, as far as construction goes, will be confined to that portion of it which relates to your own territory. The same will be the result of the railways which I hope will some day reach Cairo; you will only be called upon to the extent of your own territory.

'Now we will come, sir, to the railway question. As you know, we have in the past constructed a line to Bulawayo from Vryburg, costing us about £2,000,000. That was guaranteed by the charter. We also made an effort to construct a railway from the coast at Beira to Umtali, unguaranteed by the charter, and then we formed the Mashonaland Railway Company, which has constructed a line from Umtali to Salisbury. When I say "has constructed," I may mention that the railway reached Salisbury yesterday. I received a telegram dated last night as follows: "First engine arrived Salisbury station this

morning. We are now loading goods in Beira for Salisbury direct, and are prepared to carry any class of machinery and goods from the coast. The time occupied for passenger trains from Beira to Salisbury will be thirty hours." Nine years ago only barbarians inhabited that country, and now it is a question of thirty hours from Beira to Salisbury, leaving out any reference to the Bulawayo line. While on that subject, I should like to mention a point which may have troubled some of you who may be investors in that line. I see by the newspapers that Mr. Ellis asked in the House of Commons whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer's attention had been called to a statement made in the press of the 29th April (he is so anxious for your interests) that the debentures of the Mashonaland Railway had been refused a quotation on the Stock Exchange, in consequence of the British South Africa Company not having performed the covenant entered into when they were issued. Of course, that is an indirect charge that we have misled the public. That is the present position of the Little Englanders; they are just like wasps. Having prayed every night that the charter should be ruined, and that our Imperial expansion should be a failure, they are gradually getting assured that our efforts are going to succeed, and so they make wasp stings, this being one of them.

'I will give you the reply to this question. The Chancellor of the Exchequer naturally said that he knew nothing about it, but the reply is as follows:

To obtain a quotation in the House of Commons—I mean the Stock Exchange—as to a railway, you require to have the land vested in the railway. Now, we had a contract with the Mashonaland Railway Company to build a line to Salisbury, but of course you would not vest the land until they had completed their contract. Therefore, as soon as we get their certificate, we shall vest the land in them, when you may possibly get a Stock Exchange quotation. Before that, however, the Stock Exchange would not give a quotation, because we could not vest the land in the Railway Company. I think you will agree with me that it is a businesslike proposition. Of course, the money to build the railway subscribed by the Mashonaland Company's shareholders is placed in the hands of trustees; but many of you who are interested in these shares may have said, "Why have we not got a quotation from the Stock Exchange?" Well, I have explained to you how that is, and that you will get a quotation as soon as the engineer gives a certificate that the line has been properly made. This is just one of many points that might be mentioned in connection with the Little Englanders. They are a small party, and I think that they will have to look out at the next election, because the change in England is this—that be a man a Liberal or be he a Tory, they are at one on the question of England's expansion, her duties to her colonies, and the benefit of expansion for the mother-country.

‘ Having dealt with the Mashonaland Railway, and

having informed you that the railway reached Salisbury yesterday, I will tell you why we asked for further money to widen the railway from Beira to Umtali. We found that with a 2-feet gauge we could only run engines carrying four trucks, and therefore it took eight engines to carry what one engine might carry on a 3-feet 6-inch gauge. An engine on the 3-feet 6-inch gauge can draw a hundred and sixty tons, while an engine on a 2-feet gauge can only draw twenty tons, so that each engine, driver, and guard represents as to capacity one-eighth of an ordinary train. Now, if you follow me, you will see how gigantic the difference is. It necessitates twenty-four men instead of three. With the 2-feet gauge the engine also runs very much slower, and it necessitates two days instead of one. That means forty-eight men instead of three; but, with the severe climate in the low country, it means a hundred human beings, practically, instead of three. You can therefore see the difference in cost, totally apart from the fact that eight engines burn a great deal more fuel than one, and so on in proportion. I speak now as chairman of the Mashonaland Railway Company, but that railway issue is guaranteed by the charter. We undertook the responsibility of making the issue to change the gauge. The amount was £900,000, and you will be pleased to hear that the confidence of the public was such that they subscribed £2,400,000. I may point out to you that the charter only guarantees the interest for twenty-two years, so that it is not considered as good a security as it would be



if it were a perpetual guarantee by the charter. I think that that is a satisfactory statement. That is Railway No. 1.

‘Now we will take Railway No. 2, and that is what we will call our friends’ railway, the Gwanda Railway. You know how that is going to be built. The money has been found by the sale of a certain number of shares we held, but we have still a great many more shares in companies having properties in that district. The railway will be a hundred miles long, and will cost £300,000, which has been found by gentlemen who are interested in the Gwanda district by their re-purchase of shares which they gave to us as vendors’ scrip. That is Railway No. 2.

‘There is another railway, and we will call it No. 3. We found extensive coal-fields close to the Victoria Falls. The coal is of tremendous width, and, from assays, it is extraordinarily good; and there is a group of men in the city who, I think, are prepared to raise £300,000, and build a narrow-gauge railway for about a hundred and seventy miles to these coal-fields. They will then be within a very short distance of the Victoria Falls. I mention that as the imaginative or the sentimental side of this line, but the practical point is that it will be done without any guarantee from the charter. Now we must proceed to Railway No. 4.

‘Railway No. 4 is what we will call the extension from Bulawayo to the boundaries of our territory. You may have heard a great deal about that, for the press has dealt with this railway on many occasions.

The form in which I thought that that railway might be built was by means of an Imperial guarantee. It was not very much to ask. You may remember that the Uganda Railway is being built entirely by Imperial expenditure, but all we asked was that they should guarantee our promissory note, so as to enable us to raise the money at three per cent. instead of five per cent.

‘I will not enter into what the Imperial Government should or should not have done, but after considerable correspondence, I was informed by the Treasury just before I went to Egypt that they did not see their way to do this. I may say that I was encouraged to make this application by letters that passed between myself and the Government a year ago, but I think, probably, with the many responsibilities they have, with the great difficulties of government and a salutary fear of the Little England party, they did not see their way to risk an application to the House of Commons. I did not receive an absolute negative from the Government as a Cabinet, but I did from the Treasury just before I went to Egypt. On my return I submitted another plan on your behalf; that was, that if they would not undertake a guarantee for the northern extension, they might at least guarantee the line built from Vryburg to Bulawayo; but last week I received a reply to this effect, that while being willing to undertake that guarantee, the conditions were such that, after consultation with the directors of the Chartered Company and the directors of the Bechuanaland Railway Company, they did not see their way to accede to it.

We were therefore faced with the position that the line which one has most at heart, and really the line that is, I think, best in the interests of the country (for it is of no use holding Northern Rhodesia unless you develop it), would seem to be postponed to the Greek kalends. But, fortunately, and after a great deal of consideration and discussion with our directors, we came to the conclusion that we would still build the line to the limits of your territory.

‘I will explain how it is going to be done. I asked for £900,000 to extend the railway in the direction of the Zambesi. We will now come to the way the Board dealt with the proposition. We had received a blank refusal as to that, but we thought it was most essential that we should go on with the development of our own territory. The idea of going to Egypt may come in the future, though it may seem imaginative now, but we have to look to the development of your territory as a practical point. The first step we took, therefore, was that we went to every one of the companies who hold claims, and we received most satisfactory support from them, as they have subscribed for from £450,000 to £500,000 for the extension of the railway on the basis of three per cent. That will carry us for a hundred and fifty miles. I can say that, because although I think the best course to pursue would be by public tender, still one of the old contractors has offered to build this line—equal to the Cape line—from Bulawayo to the Globe and Phoenix, a hundred and fifty miles, for £3200 per mile, or in all £480,000.

‘We may therefore say that our railway is complete for a hundred and fifty miles north of Bulawayo; but still that will leave seven hundred and fifty miles more to do in our own territory, from the Globe and Phoenix to the boundary of your territory, which is coterminous with the German emperor’s. How are those seven hundred and fifty miles to be built? I am going to submit to you a plan, and you must not be in the least alarmed, because you will find, supposing that you feel not justified in supporting it by a contribution, that I can get the money on the same basis. Now, I will mention the plan. We must remember that there are seven hundred and fifty miles of line to lay. It is not an unknown country to us. We have had flying surveys, and the whole track has been traversed to Tanganyika, and I am justified in stating that I believe that line can be built for £4000 per mile, or £3,000,000 for the seven hundred and fifty miles. We have an offer to build the first hundred and fifty miles—a portion of the nine hundred—for £480,000, which is £3200 per mile.

‘Now, how are we going to get that money—the £3,000,000? The proposition agreed to by the directors is as follows: We propose to raise £3,000,000 at four per cent. When I say “we,” I mean the Bechuanaland Railway Company, but it will have to be guaranteed by the Charter, so the Charter will do it; but that £3,000,000 is not required for four or five years, because we cannot build more than two hundred miles a year. We

are still nine hundred miles away from the boundaries of our territory, so it is fair to suppose that it will take us from four to four-and-a-half years to build that railway. We have received from the gold companies sufficient to construct a hundred and fifty miles, and the balance represents £3,000,000 more. We propose to issue that amount, but as it will take five years to spend it, there is not the slightest occasion why the money should lie at the Bank of England at two per cent. We therefore propose to ask for £600,000 a year in five equal instalments, spreading it over four to five years. The first instalment will be paid now, and the second a year hence—two payments would come in the first year. It therefore means that £600,000 a year will have to be paid by those desirous to contribute to the line. Well, you may say, surely no one will do that? But we must go on. The person paying it will receive four per cent., and to put an amount that will make it clear to you, we will say that a person taking £100 of debentures would pay up £20, on which he would receive four per cent., his remaining payments being spread over four years, in five equal instalments. You may ask, Do you propose to give anything else? Yes, we propose to do this: You are aware that we hold six hundred and twenty-five thousand unissued shares of the Charter. The shareholders are continually writing asking us what we are going to do with them. We are not anxious to put them on the market, but at the same time I think the shareholders would like to

know the future of those shares. We require nothing for administration, because I may tell you that at this moment we possess £2,000,000. That is for administration and the development of mining, but in each case where we have subscribed to support a mining development, I may say that the public have taken up the shares, so we have not been called upon to contribute practically anything, and, as I have said, we still possess £2,000,000. We therefore do not require any further money for administration, so that any money which is paid up for this railway would be simply lying in the Bank of England. We consider that we only require £600,000 per annum for the next four years, and we propose to allot to those who take these debentures at four per cent. the unissued six hundred and twenty-five thousand shares of the Charter. We propose to give the first offer of these shares to the shareholders in the Chartered Company.'

A SHAREHOLDER: 'At par?'

Mr. RHODES: 'No, at £5 a share, and when we offer him those shares at £5, we give him two years in which to exercise his option upon them. Those shares therefore are sealed to the railway; they are not hanging over the market. Any one taking a debenture will know that the least he will receive is four per cent., which I believe is better than is given by a Government investment here. He will also have his speculation in the option in these shares left with us at £5 a share for two years, which we can either exchange for his debenture or he may retain his debenture and also take the shares. We

leave it at his option. Let me go back to my illustration. A person taking £100 obligation would pay up now £20, and will have the option for two years on twenty shares at £5. He would gradually pay up during the next four or five years for his debenture. During the next two years he may either exchange his debenture for shares or he may keep the debenture and also take the shares. Supposing, with the development of the country, and if these reefs give the results promised, the shares go to a very much higher price—and, I think, they will—I think that he will then exercise his option, and take the shares. If the market does not justify that price for the shares, he has always his four per cent., which he can look upon as trust-money, as perfectly good security, and at a higher rate of interest than is ordinarily paid on English trust-money securities. In order to perfect that debenture, we give, and the Chartered Company give, a guarantee in perpetuity, both as to interest and principal, and I think that we are justified in doing that, because it is to construct a railway to the boundaries of our territory.

‘The difficulty that arose on a previous occasion, and very rightly, was that you objected to any underwriting, or any offer of underwriting, to the outside public before the option was given to the Charter shareholders. We, therefore, had to face this difficulty. We wanted to make a certainty of this undertaking, which is a wise and good one, because after all you pay four per cent. for a railway, and are selling your

shares at £5, and I do not think that any one could do better finance than that. We had to make an offer to you of the whole thing, and also to arrange, if you did not think the offer good enough to take the new shares, the unissued shares, that the plan should be no failure. That was a difficult position, but the directors felt sure that you would be displeased if we paid any large sum for underwriting. You know what underwriting is—to make a certainty of a thing you give a body of gentlemen a certain option for making perfectly sure of a financial undertaking. I saw that the danger would be to pay any heavy sum for underwriting, and yet at the same time we could not offer this proposition to any outsiders before it was first offered to the shareholders of this Company.

‘The proposition is to obtain £3,000,000, spread over four years at four per cent. Well, you will be glad to learn that, after consultation, Mr. Beit offered to take £500,000 upon this basis, and with this sole obligation, that if you chose to reject it, he would take the same terms without charge, and without any different terms from those offered to the body of shareholders. Well, now, that was a commencement; and then I thought over the question, and I thought I saw my way to taking £200,000, making £700,000. That would be on the same terms as Mr. Beit. I can claim no thanks for this, because I have the amusement of extending the railway. If I may put it so, that is where I come in. I should have liked to take more, but during the



last ten years I have devoted my mind to politics, and politics and the accumulation of money do not run together. At any rate, there is a guarantee of £700,000, and on what basis? On the basis that it is only to be used if you will not take the offer yourselves. That is the position. If you take the £3,000,000, then my £200,000 and Mr. Beit's £500,000 will not be called upon; but, supposing you decline the whole thing, there is £700,000 more to go towards building the railway to the boundary of your territory on the basis of four per cent., and an option beyond the present market price of £1 a share on the unissued six hundred and twenty-five thousand shares, and at the same time the whole of these shares are kept off the market for two years. We do not require any more money, because we have £2,000,000 in hand for the good administration of your country. As I have also said, I believe that we shall balance revenue and expenditure within two years from the date of my last speech.

'When we got up to this £7,000,000 which I have mentioned, a very extraordinary thing happened. Some of our friends in the City came to me and said that they must look at this matter in a business way, and they offered to subscribe £500,000, supposing that the shareholders declined to take this offer from the Company. All that they asked was, that in case you took up the whole of it, we should give them an option on twenty-five thousand shares at £5. Again the thought came, that if I deprived the shareholders of even twenty-five thousand shares there would be

trouble, so I considered it was the right thing for the Bechuanaland Railway Company to do this, because you are extending their line to the boundaries of your territory. It is true that you have two thousand shares out of the six thousand shares of that railway, but you have not a majority of the shares. We accepted this offer, therefore, of this group of gentlemen in the City, who, I think, looked at it in a business way, but still they had also the feeling that they did not want us to be beaten. There was a certain public spirit in them, at any rate, and they agreed to take up this £500,000.

‘What is our present position? That if you do not take up one single shilling of this £3,000,000 spread over four years, with the option of these six hundred and twenty-five thousand shares at £5, we have a sum of £1,200,000 guaranteed on the same basis by people other than the shareholders of the Company themselves, and I think that, as shareholders, you will say, even if you do not subscribe, well, we could not do better than that. We actually get the railway built to the boundary of our territory for four per cent., and the only “plum” is that those who build it can take the balance of our shares at £5 a share—that is, at £1 a share more than the price on the market now, and £2, 10s. a share more than they were when you subscribed for them the other day. Now, it is open to you to choose; but I wish you to understand that if, after quiet judgment and considering the matter, you desire to take no further obligation,

and you decline this offer, I have got for you, for the extension of the railway to the limits of your territory, the sum of £1,200,000, as well as the £500,000 from the owners of gold mines in the neighbourhood of Gwelo. That is £1,700,000 in all, which will build five hundred miles of railway. If, on the other hand, the shareholders take this offer, we shall have the money secured to build our railway to the boundary of our territory, and I think no one can assault our finance. The relaying of the Mashonaland Railway is at five per cent., but your guarantee of interest is only for twenty-two years; the Gwanda Railway is to be made by those who have faith in their own mines—you are not called upon for a penny; and, with respect to this extension to the Zambesi and Tanganyika, it will cost you a guarantee of four per cent. I think that this is uncommonly good finance. The only five per cent. guarantee left is the Bechuanaland Railway. We had hoped, as it went through a Crown colony, that the Crown might have seen their way to reduce our interest, but the obligations of the Empire are enormous, and we could not get them to do this; and I think that we must be only too pleased that when the Government failed us, the commercial instincts of the City have seen us through. Even in connection with the Bechuanaland Railway Company we have not lost sight of your interests. You possess in that company, as I have already told you, two thousand shares—that is, one-third of the capital of that company. Their capital is only six thousand

shares, and we have got them to agree, in return for the development of their railway to Tanganyika, and the guarantee given by the Charter, to increase our shares from two thousand to four thousand, which should practically give us the control of that line.

‘We propose to change the name of the line from the Bechuanaland Railway Company to the Rhodesia Railways, Limited ; and if, without calling on you to go further than beyond the limit of your territory, we have the good fortune to get that railway through Africa, it will be done through your own creation—namely, Rhodesia, and therefore we propose to call this the Rhodesia Railway ; and the line will be carried through at no cost to the shareholders beyond their own territory. I think that this is a very fair statement as to the railway work which your directors have succeeded in doing during the last seven weeks. It was rather a blow, I can assure you, to come back and get a refusal from Her Majesty’s Government, who had in the past held out hopes, and to feel that we might have to stop all our railway undertakings ; but within the last seven weeks we have really raised £900,000 for the Beira Railway, £300,000 for the Gwanda, probably £300,000 for the line to Victoria Falls—to the coal-fields, and £3,600,000 for the Tanganyika Railway.’ I say £3,600,000, supposing that the balance of this is taken, but at any rate, for certain to-day £1,200,000 of that £3,600,000 is taken ; and I have not the slightest doubt that if the shareholders do not see their way to subscribe for the balance of that sum—or for that sum—we shall get

that sum from the outside market without paying any heavy amount for it.

'Now those are good financial transactions. But an extraordinary thing is that a minister, who probably had a very fair chance of being Prime Minister of England—I refer to Sir William Harcourt—should have described this as a "wild-cat" scheme. A "wild-cat" scheme, and that was only a year ago when he said that it was not acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. He said, "I am sure it will not be accepted by Her Majesty's Government, or by the House of Commons, or by the English people." But there he made a mistake, for it has been accepted by the English people. Fancy a gentleman in that position having to eat the whole of his words within one year. I own that he was safe as regards the House of Commons, but he had forgotten about the English people, who are determined to have this policy of expansion, and who are determined to support it. That is what the House of Commons has to wake up to—that is, if the existing members are to keep their present position. But, at any rate, there are the facts. The "wild-cat" scheme is practically settled, and settled within a year of the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the occasion when he forgot all his principles and gave us (I will say this in his defence) £20,000 a year with which to start this "wild-cat" scheme. It was a Liberal Ministry, and he was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he gave us this subsidy in aid when we started our railway for South Africa; and

I am afraid he has had rather a sorry time about it ever since. I saw the other day an amusing picture of himself and Mr. Morley, as representing Little England. It was in the *Westminster Gazette*, and the picture depicted them on a mountain "out in the cold"—and I am sure that Mr. Morley would be gibing him for demoralising us by giving us this £20,000 per annum to start with a commencement of this "wild-cat" scheme. But the whole point is that their policy was Little England, and that has failed, and the country, whatever party may be in power, will insist on the support of Imperial expansion. On what basis? On the basis of taking care of our trade, having discovered that every new country taken by a foreign power puts protective duties on their goods. That is why the English people have given us their hearty support in connection with this undertaking, and one recognises most fully the difference caused by the flag, and by the good government that follows that flag.

'I am not going into politics, but look at this picture. There is a neighbouring state to us producing £17,000,000 of gold per annum, and what has it been doing? It has been running round every Bourse in Europe for a couple of years to borrow £2,000,000, and what is the result? That it cannot do it. It is causing unrest in Africa, and it will do so until those people whom they have invited to develop the wealth of that country share in the civil rights. There is a picture for you; there is a picture for the people of England. Side by side of us you

have a state showing this result. But what have we, a small new state, done? We have obtained during the last seven weeks, including the funds necessary for administration which you gave us shortly before that, nearly £10,000,000—while our friends adjoining us are producing £17,000,000 per annum and cannot get £2,000,000 anywhere. You might say that it was sentiment with us, but it is not sentiment which carries the Berlin and Paris Bourses—it is practical common sense with them; and until our friends have changed their system, they will not get any European money.

‘I have little more to add; but there is an unpleasant fact that I think it would be only right for me to mention. As you know, I have often addressed you on the political question, and I have said in simple language, that the duty of our people is to occupy and administer new territories, and to work up their wealth—to work up the raw products by manufacturing them, and then distribute them throughout the world. I think that we have adopted this principle; at any rate, we see that we have obligations not only in England, but also in every part of the world. We have not lost our knack of administration. I can remember talking with Mr. Gladstone on this, and talking with him about the various countries which have been annexed. I can remember what he said to me: “My fear is that we have not the people to administer them.” I replied, “There is no fear about that. If you will only take the countries, you will have the people capable of administration.” That was

brought home to me only the other day. I went to Egypt, and saw there eight millions of people governed by one man, Lord Cromer. Be it civil administration, be it defence, be it irrigation, be it justice, he has to attend to all, and in connection with all is equally competent. You read your histories of your Rameses, of your Memnon, and many others, but you forget that there is a simple Englishman there greater than them all. This shows that we have not lost our capacity for administering new countries, especially if they are occupied by what are called the subject races—the black and yellow. We have also not lost the knack of distribution. Our mercantile fleet is better than ever.

‘I wish now to say something on the working-up of the raw material and the distribution of it throughout the world. What is the use of taking up new countries if you know that everything connected with them may be worked-up and distributed by some one else? I have the spirit and feeling that my own countrymen should do this. I want these things to be done by my own people. You may ask me what I am pointing at. I am finding in the colony from where I come an enormous increase of manufactured articles from other parts of the world; but I believe that that label “Made in Germany” is rather a recommendation now than otherwise. I see these manufactured products coming from other countries increasing more and more, however; and I say these words with no hostility to other countries, but simply as a warning to our own people. Whatever may be



our feelings with regard to free trade, we are fond of it, because we believe that on the basis of free trade we shall acquire nearly the whole of the trade, and I am wishing to warn you that such appears to be not the case. We have got to wake up and consider our position in this matter, and in connection with it I can give you a practical illustration.

‘You may have read a great deal about the Atbara bridge, which had to be ordered in America. It may be said—and quite truly—that there was not a bridge ready in England, and that this bridge was ready in America, and that, therefore, it was a chance transaction. But then the other day we gave an order for two hundred and fifty miles of rails for the extension from Bulawayo. We had a large number of tenders, and the lowest tender, you will be sorry to hear, was from an American, Mr. Carnegie; but fortunately the tender was not in order, and we were able to give the work to our own people. But fancy that an American was able to compete with us, having his workshops some four hundred miles from the sea, where he rolls his iron, and the ore has to be taken from further up country; and yet he was able to tender and compete with us for delivery at Port Elizabeth at a very considerable price below any English tender.

‘I wish to put this case, and I say that what we have got to attend to is the question of working-up the raw material into the manufactured article. This is a subject worthy of thought and consideration. I want to know why this tender for these two hundred

and fifty miles of rails should have been sent in by an American at a price far lower than by English manufacturers. There must be some reason for it. I may be told that it is a question of workmen and strikes, but it may be the fault of the capitalist. I am afraid that it is rather a habit nowadays, when a little wealth is accumulated, for the heir to disregard his father's business, and very often to spend his days in idleness between Piccadilly and the south of France. It is quite a question with me whether the cessation from business when a little wealth is accumulated does not affect the character of the business, and whether if it proceeded from father to son, with minds devoted to the workshop, there would not be better results. At all events, there are the facts, and it is a matter worthy of consideration whether our people should not carefully look into the point why they are being beaten in the open markets of the world. I have given you an instance of this, and I think this case of the two hundred and fifty miles of rails is a very important one—one worthy of thought. The reason may be the superior education and discipline of the Germans or the individuality of the Americans. (A voice: "Improved machinery.") I do not know, but what I say is that I think it is worthy of consideration. It is as important as a London Municipal Council Bill or an Old Age Pension Bill—and it is a thought which I should like to give through you to the English people. I have seen a great deal written upon this subject, and I have given my contribution to it. This two hundred

and fifty miles of rails ought almost to have been placed on the American market, and it was only owing to a flaw in the tender that we were able to give the order to an English manufacturer.

'I have little more to add. I have pointed out the position of your administration. I have told you that in connection with our finances we have £2,000,000 to provide for that administration if required, and also to employ in the development of the mining industry. We have also raised from £5,000,000 to £6,000,000 in connection with railway enterprise, and I know that, with reference to mining developments, £2,000,000 to £3,000,000 has been raised on the Stock Exchange. Therefore you have the fact, that during the last two months our Company has obtained, through the confidence of the public, nearly £10,000,000, and I have no doubt about a successful return being obtained for the money laid out. In connection with these railway extensions to the boundaries of our territory, I would point out this, that whatever may be the criticisms upon that finance, you have the fact that a practical set of business men have subscribed, for that undertaking, £1,200,000, showing thereby their confidence in our scheme, their absolute confidence in the country, and that they feel the necessity of the development of the railway system to the utmost limits of your possessions.'

## CHAPTER XIX

## THE FINANCIAL SPEECHES

A COLLECTION of Mr. Rhodes's speeches would be incomplete without specimens of the purely financial speeches. Finance is, of course, so important a part of modern politics, that finance enters pretty largely into many of his political speeches. In the speeches to the shareholders of the Chartered Company it might be said that one had already given sufficient examples of the financial type. But, as has been shown, the primary object of the British South Africa Company was not financial but political; it was to be an instrument in the expansion of the Empire, and was besides to perform the governing duties of Empire delegated to it by the British Government, which could not afford to undertake them. How admirably it has performed these duties the history of its administration has shown. Its object as a financial enterprise has always been postponed to the higher purpose of its creation, the greatening of the British Empire, and the shareholders have felt so deeply the influence of the strong Imperialist who captains them that they have been willing to wait till the full discharge of its Imperial duties allows the attainment of that ultimate financial success, the foundations of which have been solidly laid by one of the most far-sighted and unerring financial intellects of our time. Mr. Rhodes's empire-making has been

necessarily based so largely on finance that his purely financial achievements have special interest and significance. 'In the work of mining finance at Kimberley his powers were first developed and his eminence as a man of affairs first shown. Finance was the field in which his energy found its first exercise, and the long struggle to carry out his far-sighted scheme of the amalgamation of the diamond-mines was the school in which he learned to know men and how to deal with men, and also to distinguish between what is practical in human affairs and what is theoretical in human ideas. The hard experience of years of Kimberley finance forced the imaginative dreamer, with his grand idea of Imperial expansion and his devotion to British freedom and British institutions, to temper his own thought with the knowledge of the world as it is, and to become at last the most practical, as he was naturally the most imaginative, of modern statesmen.

The first decisive step in his big scheme of diamond-mine amalgamation was the amalgamation of interests in the De Beers mine, which was gradually acquired by the company whose operations were directed by Mr. Rhodes; but the further amalgamation of interests by the acquisition of the great rival mine, the Kimberley, and most of the lesser mines was not accomplished till 1888. The earlier work had needed great patience and untiring labour during many years; but the later work completed in April 1888 involved the facing of even more serious risks, and the victory over more resolute and formidable opponents. In the words of Lord Randolph Churchill, 'It was this great work, accomplished in the teeth of unheard-of difficulties, and almost insurmountable opposition, representing the conciliation and unification of almost

innumerable jarring and conflicting interests, which revealed to South Africa that it possessed a public man of the first order.'

In 1887 Mr. Rhodes had completed the amalgamation in the De Beers mine, and was inclined to rest awhile from his labours, when he was faced by the imminence of a suicidal contest with the only other important mine, the Kimberley, which had to captain it and direct its operations the keen Jewish brains of Mr. Barnato and his group. This danger was based on the fact that the system of underground working had been by this time so greatly improved that it had become possible for the Kimberley mine alone to turn out twenty thousand loads a day of diamond-bearing blue, containing an amount of diamonds far in excess of the world's capacity of absorption. Mr. Rhodes at once set to work to acquire a controlling interest in the Kimberley, and had bought out one company, the French, when he found that the controlling influences of the Kimberley mine had decided to run it against De Beers, a cut-throat competition which would have reduced the price of diamonds to a level at which all profit would have disappeared. How Mr. Rhodes dealt with a very difficult situation and came out from it victorious is best told by himself in his long and powerful speech at the special meeting of De Beers shareholders at Kimberley, March 31, 1888.

This speech is here given in full, together with some short speeches which followed. These throw light on Mr. Rhodes's way of regarding the struggle, and also on the support by which he was enabled to conquer the difficulties of the situation, the support of the same staunch friend who was afterwards to aid him so effectually in the northern expansion, and finally in his scheme of railway extension in Rhodesia.

‘Gentlemen, in putting this resolution to the meeting, I might state that when I said to you last year that we had completed amalgamation in De Beers mine we really thought that we might rest from our labours. We had the whole of De Beers mine under our control; there were a few interests left, but we felt so perfectly sure that we should obtain them that we said to you, the shareholders of the De Beers Mining Company, “The De Beers mine is amalgamated and our labours are done.” We had what we believed to be the best paying mine of all the diamond mines—we firmly believed this, other statements to the contrary—and we felt as your Board that we were perfectly satisfied with the results of our labours.

‘But a change came over the scene. We obtained new engineers and new managers, who pointed out to us a fact of which we had never thought, for they showed us that by a system of underground working there was practically no limit to our production. Our engineers (some of them the first in the world) stated that they could give us 8000, 10,000, 12,000, even 15,000 loads a day, and we felt we were only just beginning diamond mining again. For the same engineers who told us this, also informed us that Kimberley mine could yield the same result, could put out almost the same number of loads. It was a simple question of sinking shafts, continuing tiers of galleries one after the other—what might be called constructing one house under another—and the capacity of the output was practically unlimited. Well, as I have said, we felt that

we had to begin our diamond mining again. What had we to face? One of two things. Either an arrangement with Kimberley mine, or the control of Kimberley mine; otherwise, so far as I was concerned, I should have sold my shares and gone home. I do not want, gentlemen, to enter into a long statement of what we did. But we approached the controlling powers in Kimberley mine in every possible way that you could conceive. I valued De Beers mine at a great deal higher figure than they valued it; but I was willing to give way in everything, to accept market rates in order that we might obtain an amalgamation which meant control, which meant the saving of our industry. Gentlemen, I was met simply with smiles and the most obdurate statements, I was met by the judgment of the gentlemen at the street corner, who would never reason with me, never discuss details as to the value of the Kimberley mine, but contented themselves by reiterating, "Kimberley mine! Why, it is worth three times what De Beers is worth." Whenever I approached the question I was met with this solid, obdurate wall. What had we to choose between? Between the ruin of the diamond industry or the control of the Kimberley mine. As I have said, I approached the managing direction of the Kimberley mine in every way and form. At that time I may mention that I proposed to the controlling influence in Kimberley, as our variances were so extreme, that we should buy the balance of the mine—the outside properties, the French and the West End—on joint account, but



here again I was met with the same solid wall, and the only thing left was to purchase the control. You know the story of my getting on board the steamer at Cape Town, going home, and buying the French company within twenty-four hours, and the excitement caused thereby. But it was only the beginning of the matter. When we had bought it and placed a value on the French company, immediately the controlling spirits of Kimberley mine declared it was worth more, and competed against us; the process had to be gone over again, and some one had to hurry back across the water, and once more deal with exactly the same facts. But to make a long story short; by fair discussion—and I say so whatever outsiders may contend—by fair discussion I was able to settle with the Kimberley Central, in so far as the French company was concerned, and the settlement finally obtained by me was in a great measure due to the action of Mr. Barnato. But I only succeeded by using the following arguments: I told them, You can go and offer £300,000 more than we do for the French, but we will offer another £300,000 on that; you can go on and bid for the benefit of the French shareholders *ad infinitum*, because (I said to them) we shall have it in the end, as we consider it is of vital importance to us that we should obtain the control of the Kimberley mine. Well, we considered, and obtained an interest which represented a fifth of the control of Kimberley, but as soon as that was settled another point arose.

‘No sooner had we got the French company than the controlling influences of Kimberley mine decided that

it was a wise thing to take the Kimberley mine home, put it under English capitalists in £1 shares on the London Stock Exchange, and run it against De Beers. That was the scheme the Kimberley control or direction put forward. Just think of it. They were to run Kimberley against De Beers. In the face of the fact that we both had engineers who stated that Kimberley mine alone could yield an output of 20,000 loads per diem, and De Beers could produce another 20,000 or 40,000 as the case might be, yet they would take Kimberley mine home, put it on the Stock Exchange, and run it against De Beers. What would have been the result to your shares? I say that to-day they would have been below par. I want to explain to you that in the past it was all right, for Nature helped you. The reef fell in and stopped an unlimited output. But now, with the underground system, it is merely a question of sinking shafts. As I have said, the output from Kimberley mine can be 20,000 loads a day, and if such is the case, then you can have an output of 40,000 loads a day from De Beers mine, which is double the size of Kimberley. Yet those gentlemen controlling Kimberley mine were prepared to pursue that course. Well, this faced us. We now had the French, a fifth holding in the mine, and what were we to do to prevent this policy being adopted? We had to do one of two things, either amalgamate or by purchase obtain the control of the Kimberley mine. I offered the Kimberley direction market rates—five to four; that is, that Kimberley should obtain £2,500,000 and De Beers £2,000,000

in scrip ; or rather, as we held £500,000 in Kimberley mine, De Beers should obtain £2,500,000—the £500,000 representing the French in Kimberley—and the Kimberley Central should obtain £2,000,000. But I am only thankful I can tell the De Beers shareholders to-day that this proposal was rejected *in toto*. I want the De Beers shareholders to understand that they would have been perfectly right had they summoned me before them and repudiated my action if such an arrangement had been accepted. But I was nervous about the Kimberley mine being taken home to form a separate existence, so I gave way, and offered what I thought was twice the value of the property. Then I had to face this ; I had to listen to the discussions of the “corner” and their statements that Kimberley mine was worth three of ours ; and we had also been placed in this position, that they would not settle with us in any way or form.

‘All we possessed was a fifth, but a fifth is a beginning ; and after a good deal of consideration, in which I must say Mr. Beit, of the firm of Messrs. Porges & Co., was of the most material assistance, we decided one morning that we would buy a sufficient number of Kimberley Centrals to give us control. That was a big undertaking, and meant two or three millions of money. But we said : “If we only have the pluck to undertake it we must succeed. Don't let us go to the shareholders. If we fail they can only make us personally liable.” I said at first, “Where's the money to come from?” But Mr. Beit only said, “Oh ! we will get the money if we only can buy the shares.”

Without going into all the details, or claiming any credit, I want to show you the risks we have been through. You may have heard, gentlemen, of the quack surgeon who had acquired some celebrity in the operation of cutting for stone. When he was shown the different arteries which might be cut whilst performing so delicate an operation, he was so frightened that he never again operated. In the same manner, gentlemen, in your speculations in De Beers shares, you do not know the risks you have been through. It was not until we decided to buy a controlling interest in Kimberley mine that we were safe. We had seen that the object of the controlling power in Kimberley was to take that mine home, give it a separate existence, place it under big capitalists, and run it against De Beers, and we had to fight that—Mr. Beit and I. I really do not know where the money came from, but our proposals had the entire support of our Board, and fortunately we have a wealthy Board. Well, gentlemen, we bought one million pounds' worth of Central shares. We bought wherever we could, and I am thankful to say that our bankers and friends gave us the money. And while on this part of the subject I must refer personally to Messrs. Barnato Brothers. Mr. Barnato fought me tooth and nail. Wherever and whenever I bought shares he bought also, until finally we bought together. I always found that he was buying against me because he was infiltrated with this notion, that the Kimberley mine was worth two of De Beers. But a very fortunate thing

occurred. As we bought shares we were strengthened by the thought that we had a united directorate, and an enthusiastic body of shareholders who were always increasing their holdings. I am glad to say that my opponent, on the other hand, found that as he bought up shares he was buying from his principal—his largest shareholders. These are facts which cannot be denied, and I mention them because I want to put it to you how we won the battle. I went on making offers, but still he said, "No, we consider Kimberley is worth three of De Beers." When I came back from the gold-fields I met Mr. Barnato again. I said to him, "Well, how are we getting on now?" He replied, "Why, you've bought a million pounds' worth of Centrals." I said, "Yes, and we'll buy another million pounds' worth. And now," I said further to him, "I'll tell you what you will find out presently, and that is you'll be left alone in the Central Company." I told him we would make him one last offer, we would give him market rates for Centrals *versus* De Beers. "And (he asked) if I don't take it what will happen?" I said to him, "Here you have your leading shareholders patting you on the back and backing you up, but selling out round the corner all the time." These are facts, I can assure you, although Mr. Barnato may shake his head and smile. Gentlemen, I wish to explain all these matters, for it is better that they should be known to the public at once than that they should leak out in an imperfect and possibly inaccurate form afterwards. Well, Mr. Barnato settled

the matter at last. He yielded finally, getting the current rate of shares on the day we settled. The liquidation accounts will prove that he only got the current price of shares in so far as De Beers are concerned. But a most extraordinary thing has happened. Some people objected even to my giving Mr. Barnato this price, and they asked why I did it. Why I did it, gentlemen, was to get control of the Kimberley mine. Putting it roughly, the settlement we obtained gave us a little over 11,000 shares out of 17,800 in the Kimberley mine. I consider that means control of the Kimberley mine, because in the trust-deed of the Central Company, no change can be made without half the capital being present, and no resolution can be carried unless two-thirds of the capital declare in favour of it. I repeat, therefore, that settlement gave us the control of the Kimberley mine; and I wish to say to those who happen to be Central shareholders that they must dismiss from their minds the idea that it is our desire in any way to unreasonably oppress the balance of the Central shareholders. We have secured control of the Kimberley mine for a certain reason; for we do not desire, after living in this country for sixteen years and raising the diamond industry to its present position, that the direction of Kimberley mine should have the power to choose to ruin the whole industry. That is a plain and candid statement. Our engineer's information to us, I again repeat, is that it is possible for the Kimberley mine alone to produce twice the diamonds that the world

will take under any ill-regulated management that would or might have occurred. That risk, gentlemen, is dismissed, for we have the control of the Kimberley mine, and we do not intend that such a thing shall occur. In reference to the balance of shareholders to whom I have alluded, I say to them—you still remain shareholders of the Kimberley Central Company, and I wish to assure you again that there is no desire on our part to do what might be termed an American "corner." But we recognise that the majority of shareholders are with us. It is true that we have two-thirds of the shares, and the balance is one-third, and it is to our advantage and to theirs that Kimberley mine should be made as profitable as it possibly can, with due regard to the control of the production.

'Now, gentlemen, you might think it would be a wise course on my part to refrain from stating what I think the balance of the Kimberley mine is worth compared with De Beers. But it is, I think, far better that I should state what I think it is worth, so that shareholders can go home and discuss and consider my statements, challenging my figures, and preparing either to accept or reject my proposals. At any rate it removes any doubt from their minds as to what my opinion is, and they will see that they have been thoroughly wrong if they entertained a belief that we in any way intended to oppress them; they will rather be convinced that we mean to work the mine fairly. I will premise my remarks by telling you that only the other day

a large shareholder wrote out to one of my friends and said, "I hear you have settled the Kimberley Central on a basis of two De Beers shares for one Central;" and he added, "May God forgive you, but I never can." Well, I will tell you what I think about it. If you will listen to what I call the "talk of the corner," and will not listen to the reason of figures and results, but rather to people who will simply tell you that Kimberley mine is worth three De Beers, it is useless for me to speak. But I will make you a statement about figures and values which you can criticise as you may, and say I am perfectly wrong, but it will represent what I think about it. We have lately worked on a system of figures published regularly in the public press, certified by the Secretaries, and verified by a Committee investigating the different companies. From these figures we find that Kimberley mine during the last three months has produced a little over a carat per load. Bear in mind I am referring to the Central Company, and this statement has been issued by the public press after all forms necessary for proper verification have been observed. The work of De Beers mine has also been regularly published, and shows production equal to a carat and a quarter. I will own that the Kimberley men say a certain amount of shale is mixed with their blue, so that on the whole we in De Beers have been producing per load about as much as the Kimberley Central. Now I want to point out to old shareholders in the Central the fallacy that has made them arrive at that estimate



of the value of Kimberley mine as compared with De Beers. They have often thought of the yield of the Barnato Block, and a little section in the Standard Block, but they have never thought what the one hundred and fifty claims averaged. They never thought of putting down two carats a load for these smaller portions, and then reducing the average by the three-quarters of a carat per load yield of the South-East, the Rose Innes, and portions of the Central. But when you begin to work them out on each block, and on an average, you begin to see that the mine which yields you a carat and a quarter per load is a mine that yields you a very high rate indeed. I claim, therefore, that it should be remembered that we in De Beers had not the benefit of these special advertisements of the Barnato, the British, and those little blocks which existed in Kimberley. When we appeared as one Company in De Beers mine we had merged into it every block and holding in the mine, and we therefore claim that an average production of a carat and a quarter is as high a yield as that of Kimberley. The engineers will tell you, as I tell you, that writing off one West End against another (I am afraid these figures are rather dry, but I would like them to go forth to the public), Kimberley has no actual superiority over De Beers as to production. Kimberley mine has one hundred and thirty-seven claims being worked in the good ground; De Beers is working two hundred and eighty-five; and these two statements I will submit to any Board of Engineers. We will take one step further. The capital of Kim-

berley Central is £1,429,000. Taking what we have received from the Central, and what we have issued for the French, they are pretty well on a par. Putting it roughly in figures, Kimberley has received in the estimation of the market capital to the extent of two millions of scrip at par. De Beers has a capital, short of what is issued for the French, of £2,009,620. Therefore, taking things in a rough way, you may say that the capital issued to Kimberley and the capital issued for De Beers are to-day about equal. I will tell you what I think about the value. I think, if I can sustain the position that De Beers has two hundred and eighty-five workable claims giving a carat and a quarter per load, and Kimberley has only one hundred and thirty-seven claims giving a carat and a quarter (and I make that statement subject to the decision of arbitration), then I say that De Beers is worth two of Kimberley. That is a question for subsequent discussion; it is my statement, that is all. And if I may go still one step further, I will tell you that the day will come when a Kimberley share will be worth £35 and a De Beers share will be worth £70. Do not criticise me hastily; do not be angry, but rather thank me for making so frank a statement. Verify that statement by facts; and if it be true that Kimberley is only working one hundred and thirty-seven claims to De Beers two hundred and eighty-five, if it be true that the capitals of the two mines are two millions sterling each, and the yield per load about equal, I hope you will frankly admit these truths. Remember it is my statement;

and if you ask me to say what I think the Kimberley Central is worth intrinsically as against De Beers, I say that instead of adopting the statement of our friend, who was afraid we had settled on the basis of one Central against two De Beers, I believe the day will come when one De Beers will be worth two Centrals, for the following reason. I have been arguing with you on intrinsic facts. You have got to add to these facts our position, that we have two-thirds of the control of Kimberley mine; and this other important consideration, that we have the control of portions of Dutoitspan and Bultfontein mines; we are the leading contingent. These are facts which have got to be weighed. Perhaps some of you are displeased with me that I should have referred to them, but it is far better to make these statements public. Criticise them in the press, maintain that I am wrong in my figures, but don't ask me to accept the statements of the gentlemen who say that Kimberley is worth three De Beers, and who won't argue on the basis of facts. Well, gentlemen, I have dealt with a very important aspect of the question. If you ask me for advice, I say, if you are a Central shareholder, go out of this room and copy the example of that large shareholder in the Central who sold round the corner.

Let us pass from this part of the subject to the regulation of the industry after we settle with Kimberley mine, and we shall settle with it whether we obtain the balance of the shares or not. My proposition to obtain the balance, I may say in passing, will be either

by purchase or the issue of De Beers ; but whether we settle with them or not, it will take some time. That time, gentlemen, will help us with another factor, namely, the poorer mines ; we have to deal with the fact of the poorer mines. I read a very good story the other day describing a class of mine which is very common in the mining world. "This mine," the writer says, "is just one of those mines that are too rich to leave and too poor to pay." I thought a good deal over that in connection with our poorer mines. If I said anything about them, more especially Dutoitspan, and in lesser degree Bultfontein, they would be described by me as too poor to pay and too rich to leave. They have to be considered as a producing factor, but as a paying factor they are nowhere. I think I am somewhat justified in my statement. There is nothing so extraordinary in mining as this. You go on year after year holding scrip that never pays, but you think something better will happen. It is your idea. True enough, it has not paid this year, but next year who knows what might turn up. So it goes on year after year ; and you get older and older, but you hold on to the hope that a change for the better will occur, and that some day your mine will pay. I will at once say, gentlemen, that as far as the amalgamation of the diamond industry is concerned, it is not going to assist the poorer mines. I want just to clear the clouds a little. Although we bought an interest in Bultfontein and Dutoitspan, it was not with any idea that they would give us a satisfactory return.

We purchased those interests for the following reason: During the short time I was at home last year there was one thing I noticed, and that was this—Whenever a good thing was brought out, fifty bad things were sure to follow. I saw perfectly well that as soon as the successful purchase of the French was effected through the agency of the house of Rothschild, some active minds from home would put Dutoitspan and Bultfontein together, and float them on a confiding English public at a number of millions—I would be afraid to mention the amount. Well, the only way I saw out of that difficulty was to take such an interest in these poorer mines that we should render such a thing impossible. The view I took was this: A certain number of the investing public might be induced to put their money into some such scheme as I have hinted at; they would be sure to lose that money, and discredit would thus be thrown on the whole diamond industry. I can support that statement with reference to Dutoitspan. I must deal with it very frankly. I have no doubt I am treading on the toes of a lot of my friends, but still I have got to fight the battle for De Beers; I have also a public duty to state what I think about it. If my statements are wrong, you can challenge them; but in my opinion a great deal has been lost in the past by not being franker on this and other questions affecting the diamond industry. I challenge any gentleman interested in Dutoitspan to tell me what he thinks about it. If he tells the truth, he will say it has been a delusion and a snare; he has

never had a dividend, and things are getting worse and worse. Since 1881 companies have been formed in Dutoitspan mine, and I do not believe that for four or five years they ever paid a dividend at all. They had a capital, not of one or two millions, but of three millions sterling, and yet no dividend. In the returns of the Protection Board it is true they do appear, but they make so bad a show that it would be better if they did not appear at all. As far as I can remember, they showed a miserable return of £30,000 per annum on a capital of about three millions! I may add that I think it was last year on a capital of £3,455,000, of the market value of £2,500,000, the declared dividends amounted to 38,000 sovereigns, and a great portion of these dividends was due to the marvellous genius of my friend Mr. Nind. Because, if you strike the Griqualand West out, what is left in Dutoitspan from a dividend-bearing point of view? I will leave that to the gentlemen in the market; I think they will tell me nothing at all is left. What I want to impress upon the gentlemen here is that Dutoitspan from a dividend-producing point of view is worth nothing. From a diamond-producing point of view we are prepared to deal with it. It may be said, "Well, we have bought in Dutoitspan on the strength of getting De Beers scrip for our holdings." Why, gentlemen, do you think I would be fool enough to give English Consols for Turkish bonds? The terms as regards Dutoitspan will be as follows: They can go on their own wicked way, if you like to call it so,

piling up debt, allowing reef to fall into them, for that beautiful period has arrived in the history of their mining industry when the reef begins to fall. We could not deal with it with a carat and a half in Kimberley or a carat and a quarter in De Beers, and how can you deal with the reef in Dutoitspan when the production is only at the rate of a fifth of a carat per load? Dutoitspan has arrived at the end of its history, and the end of its history is that the reef is going to flow steadily and gradually into it. Just take the history of perhaps the most "swagger" Dutoitspan company — that is the Anglo-African. Take it, think of it; six years' existence and never a dividend. Its claims 400 feet deep, and the reef 400 feet high, and I hear the directors are going to pay a dividend of one per cent. on a million of capital! And yet, gentlemen, that dividend will probably be its last, or very nearly its last. These are facts you cannot get away from. We all know they are facts, and although we may not like it, it is nevertheless time that they were frankly and fully stated. Dutoitspan has never paid a dividend of any importance compared to the value placed upon it. Its salvation rests in one thing: we are prepared to give it a lease because it is a producing factor; and I would point out to the shareholders in Dutoitspan mine, that even if they get a four per cent. lease on the present prices they will be getting something, but by the present system they get nothing. Take the *Compagnie Française*; take away the financial genius of Mr. Nind as applied to the Griqualand West, and consider

such concerns as the British United, what do they produce? Does that late formation of the Gordon with the Central Dorstfontein give you anything? Gentlemen, the ship may have been repainted, but the timbers are still rotten, and reconstruction is without avail. You know it, all of you, and what I wish to do this afternoon is to point out to English shareholders that Dutoitspan, except under a lease from us, cannot succeed, because the time has arrived for the falling of the reef. In its best days, and without reef falls, it has never paid; how then can it pay in the future? These are my views about Dutoitspan. But there is prejudice coming in the way.

‘I can tell you rather an amusing story. Some little time ago the estimable gentleman who governs the London and South African Exploration Company came on our Board—I refer to Mr. Posno—I think he is chairman of the company I have named, and also of about ten or a dozen Dutoitspan companies. His usual statement relative to these mining companies has been that no dividend could be declared; that they must borrow some more money for new work; but he waits on, and trusts in amalgamation. But just see what custom does. He came to our Company, and only remained with us six months. You see we paid regular dividends, and it was too much for him—he resigned!

‘Now, there is one other mine I would say something about—that is Bultfontein mine. I would describe that as a mine that is on the margin of cultivation. What I mean is, that if present prices continue, and the reef



remains up, it can pay something ; but if diamonds fall, and the reef falls, it will pay nothing. Dutoitspan I dismiss from the category, for even with the reef up, and diamonds at a good price, the experience of the past six years proves that it cannot pay. But in reference to Bultfontein, I repeat, with the reef remaining up and a fair price for diamonds obtainable, it can yield a return. And I must say there is no man who has more effectually kept up the value of Bultfontein than the gentleman who manages the Bultfontein Mining Company. I refer to Mr. Davis. He is a gentleman who spends his whole life in the interests of that company ; his whole thoughts are concentrated upon it, and he is so loyal to his charge that I think the public sometimes estimate it as a little above its intrinsic value. But without going into personal details, I wish to put this fact before you. If Bultfontein yields one third of a carat to the load, and the reef does not fall, you get a return, because its diamonds sell for about the same rate as ours—on the basis of £1 per carat. Well, you get a return of about 6s. 6d. per load, and if you work at a cost of 4s. 6d. per load, there is a profit of 2s. These are facts which I am putting before you. But then look at the future ; how dreadful it is ! I think at any rate I can appeal to you on this basis. If the reef has fallen in Kimberley, in spite of an expenditure of two and a half millions sterling ; if we cannot deal with reef falls in De Beers, after being burned to the extent of £500,000 in the attempt to deal with them ; and if the reef is beginning to give serious trouble in

Dutoitspan, has Nature made any difference in Bultfontein? Has Nature made some extraordinary change in that mine by which it will be peculiarly favoured? No, gentlemen; the same thing that occurred with us must occur with them. And then what takes place? Directly you have the reef falling, the profit goes. You cannot undertake an underground system, because an underground system costs 8s., and at £1 per carat you have a distinct loss. At £1 per carat the richer mines can make a higher profit than anything you can conceive they have done in the past. What chance is there of an underground system? None. Have you ever gone and looked at the reef work in Bultfontein mine? It reminds me vividly of a mountain pass, with a scarped road which just shows you the reflection of the huge mass that remains behind. That is Bultfontein mine. If you look at it with an unprejudiced eye and a fair mind, you will see the work that has been done; but it reminds me of a mountain pass with a little tiny road scraping its way up, and the huge mass of the mountain in reflection. That is what reef work means as far as Bultfontein mine is concerned. What is to be its future? Simply this: if it does not accept a lease from us, that reef must fall. You may create debentures, establish reserve funds, alter names, but Nature interferes with your work, and the period must come when the reef begins to fall, and fall increasingly. And I can speak the more sensitively on this point, because my shareholders must again ask me, Why did you go and take an interest in the Consolidated? I say

again, we riddled Bultfontein mine to prevent formation at home. I consider the Consolidated a good property ; for two or three years it will be very good ; it will be able to pay its sixteen per cent., and I do not think the rate at which it was floated excessive. We are prepared at any moment when the reef falls to give it a lease ; but if it does not take a lease, there is a limit to its existence. Any one who has been digging for years sees that you might ask me about the balance of Bultfontein mine, and all I have to say is, it is not worth asking about. Take King and Propper, with the reef 300 feet high, and the others all hopeless contingents and the reef bound to fall. There is nothing more painful to contemplate than the struggle to effect impossibilities, or a second Hercules striving in vain to clean out the Augean stables. Those gears will go on working ; the reef will fall into the claims, bad ground will also fall, but the shareholders will still continue hoping against hope. I own, I say, that that mine is on the margin of cultivation ; and if the reef keeps up, and diamonds remain at a fair price, it will pay a dividend ; but if diamonds fall—collapse ! Take the point if diamonds fall. I should like to make an announcement. Probably you have never thought out this fact. It has been generally supposed that if the richer mines agreed to lower the price of diamonds, they would, to use a vulgar phrase, “cut off their nose to spite their face” ; that is, although they rendered the poorer mines non-payable, they could pay no dividends themselves. If you will listen to my figures, I think I will prove to you that even an enormous fall in the price

of diamonds would not affect the richer mines so far as their dividend-paying capacity is concerned. It is not very possible for De Beers to make a much larger output until September, by which time I hope the poorer mines will have come to reason. I wish to put before you figures, in order to show you, as I have said, that an enormous fall in the price of diamonds will not affect our dividends. Take the fact that we produce with Kimberley 9000 loads a day. Now, you will allow me a carat and a quarter per load; that will give me 11,000 carats. Take the price which at Dutoitspan would simply mean collapse, and at Bultfontein also—fourteen shillings per carat. Now at fourteen shillings per carat, producing 9000 loads per diem, yielding 11,000 carats, only claiming a carat and a quarter per load, we should obtain £7700 per diem, which would cost us eight shillings per load (our return of the cost of work), not counting savings that may occur in the future; the cost would therefore be £3600 per diem, and we should therefore make a daily profit of £4000, or £1,200,000 per annum of our three hundred working days. That would yield a larger dividend than we are actually paying at present. What I want to show you is that the poorer mines, if they heard us, and do not assist in the regulation of production, would simply collapse if diamonds went down to fourteen shillings, whereas we can work at fourteen shillings and still pay our present dividends. I want you to think it over; see if my statements are correct or incorrect; see if we can work at fourteen shillings per

carat and continue to pay dividends. My proposition to shareholders in the poorer mines is, "Go home and think it over, and then induce your directors to take a lease." That lease will be a preference charge on the whole of our property, and will be as good to you as debentures. And you will get more out of that lease as shareholders than ever you got as shareholders without a lease. That, gentlemen, is the second position as to the poorer mines. It will take some time; for there are always directors in these companies who have little interests that have to be settled. I do not know if they will take it at once. But I have the satisfaction of knowing and of saying that we have got a considerable control in these poorer mines. Remember always that we are working from a De Beers point of view. I hope no gentleman will be annoyed at my statements, for I tell you frankly I am working for De Beers, and they are made by me as a De Beers owner; they are reasonable statements, and cannot be contradicted.

'We have, therefore, as I have explained, the poorer mines to deal with, and it might be asked, Is there anything left? Well, I don't think there is. There are some "sports" in the market; there are some outside mines. Gentlemen, they were once to me what I might call spectres of the night. I have been through the excitements of their discovery so often that I cannot describe them in any other way than by saying they are just like marionettes in the Punch and Judy show. They come up at regular intervals; they have periodical marvellous wash-ups—mind you, I am

not reflecting on the directors—but you must remember that any shareholder can ride out and “chuck” in fifty carats without either manager or director or anybody else knowing anything about it. I have been through it all for six years—I shall not mention names, for if I mentioned one of them I should be challenged in the street. But apart from these arguments, I will point out this fact to you. This industry has not been situated in a country like Australia. It is not a country where one man is the owner of a hundred miles square of land, perhaps with just two or three white overseers to look over it. This is a country split up into three thousand morgen farms, with the little herd-boy wandering with his sheep over every acre, sitting down playing with the pebbles on the kopjes, and told by his master to look out for pretty stones. It has been most marvellously prospected. What has been the result? I can state the result without fear of contradiction. I was up here in 1871 when all these mines were opened; for though I am perhaps younger than most of you, I began very early. Within about six weeks these mines, as well as Koffyfontein and Jagersfontein, and even that wretched mine of my good friend Mr. Paton, who lives on the Hartz River, called Jantje's Kopje, were all found together. Though we have been for twenty years fossicking, prospecting, and sinking, we have never found anything fresh. I therefore draw a fair conclusion that in diamond mines the diamonds were thrown to the top, and with the denudation caused by the rain they were exposed to view;

glittering on the surface—there were a few more on the surface than you find underneath. Any way, I have this fact in my favour, that nothing has been found in them since the first development of our diamond mines. I must not leave out two of them — Klipfontein and Koffyfontein. Doubtless some gentlemen will feel antagonistic at my mentioning them in this connection ; but I ask you, What can eightpence per load do ? It is true the Klipfontein gentlemen were excessively indignant with me when I mentioned it disparagingly at our last special meeting, but we find now they have suspended operations and are sinking a shaft. That is re-construction—or re-painting, if you like. Whenever you find gentlemen suspending operations and searching for more payable ground, you may know that something is up. I am sorry to say that two of my directors are on it. I suppose they have lost their money, but they are sinking a shaft in the hope of finding it again. Just let me give you a case, only for your information, and I ask you not to throw your money away. Look at Koffyfontein, floated with a capital of £250,000—why not half-a-million, for it always sounds better ? Well, its yield is about eightpence per load, and I ask how can you make it pay ? What shall we have ? Why, the parsons, the orphans, and the widows going into it, machinery erected, returns published that so many feet deeper it will pay. Then will come the inevitable collapse, liquidation, the final winding up ; but it will break out again at some future date ; the whole thing will make its appearance once more just like

the marionettes in a Punch and Judy show. I have shown you that the real essence of the case is this. If you have two rich mines giving you a carat and a quarter per load, working together in co-operation and not in antagonism—that is the point—and having arrived at the principle of the underground system, not burdened with a continuous fall of reef, the fate of the poorer mines lies in their hands, because singly the richer mines can yield double what the market will take from them, and collectively they can produce four times that amount. I have shown you that even at the low rate of 14s. per carat, which I hope we are not coming to, we can pay to our shareholders dividends that will satisfy them. We have no intention of keeping a huge amount of rich soil uncultivated for the benefit of the poorer land on the margin of cultivation. But the poorer land on the margin of cultivation has to do one of two things—to fight us for a short period or to take our terms.

‘These, gentlemen, are the main facts. It is for you to consider which policy is the wiser. I have stated facts as they exist, and I believe with the control we have in these poorer mines the wiser course will be to do as we propose. What we of De Beers mean to do is simply to exemplify that famous story of Mr. Chamberlain and his screws. He manufactured a certain class of screws, and there were a few others who could make the same kind of screws at a loss, but at a price which would yield him profit. He made them fair offers, and they



accepted his terms rather than work at a loss in competition with him ; and all I hope is that the poorer mines will accept ours. If they do not, there may be a period of antagonism—on the most friendly basis—but we are bound to win, gentlemen, if we get your support as De Beers shareholders. But what I grudge is to throw away on these poorer mines, as I put it before to you, good De Beers scrip, giving them, as it were, English Consols for Turkish bonds. As far as I am concerned, I decline to do it. The summary of the situation is somewhat as follows : We who are your directors possess the whole of De Beers mine. We possess between 10,000 and 11,000 shares out of 17,000 shares of the interest represented in Kimberley mine. We possess further what you might call the controlling interest, including the interest which the Central possesses, in Dutoitspan and Bultfontein. If you accept the new proposition we have made to you, we shall have a capital under £3,100,000, which we do not intend to increase unless we cannot help it. So far as the balance of Kimberley mine is concerned, we shall do one of two things. We shall offer them as they learn experience by time—because time is a marvellous educator—one De Beers share for two Centrals ; that is, £70 for a De Beers, for, of course, they will reach £70—we know that—and £35 for a Central—for we shall buy them at £35. It will occur, and there is no use saying it won't, because that is equal to two to one, seeing that De Beers has an equal capital to that of Kimberley mine, but has double the number of claims

and an equal yield. That is our proposed settlement of the Kimberley question. It will take time; there will perhaps be a little friction at times, but it will all come right in the end. With reference to the second part of the proposition, before I go to it I wish to say that we have incurred a debt, in connection with absorption of Kimberley shares, giving us the controlling influence of about a million sterling, and with our previous debt we shall owe about a million and a half. We had assurances that we should obtain the money at about five per cent., so that it will cost us about £75,000 a year. We hope, gentlemen, to save that by a diminution in the cost of labour, by improved methods of treatment of blue ground on the floors, and by improvement in the mine, such as pumping with Cornish pumps, mechanical haulage, and second pans to our washing machines. In short, I feel I can state without fear of contradiction, that the interest on our debentures will be wiped out by our savings in cost of working. Therefore, gentlemen, in dealing with the capital in which you are interested, you may fairly say that the capital of the four mines will be £3,100,000, if Kimberley does not take our terms, and if it does the capital will be £3,400,000. In the former case our debentures, instead of being a million and a half, will be slightly more. And, thirdly, the poorer mines will be dealt with by a lease, a lease for Dutoitspan and a lease for Bultfontein. This lease, you must remember, will never appear in your capital account. When you are buying a De Beers share you will say, "What is the capital?" and you will find

it £3,400,000. There will be a lease connected with Dutoitspan and Bultfontein, and they will be self-supporting; you will never notice it, because you will get enough out of them when regulation of production is secured to make that lease self-supporting.

'Gentlemen, in putting these proposals before you, I must ask you to judge us by the past, and think whether we shall be successful in the future. Of course, the speech I have made exposes me to endless criticism and contradiction, but I shall not challenge that contradiction under three years or at least two years. If you asked me to challenge it to-morrow, I would say, "Certainly not." Let gentlemen waste time and pen and ink in proving that I am utterly wrong, I am quite willing to wait; for if I could only get into the secret hearts of people, they would be proved to be already admitting to themselves that I am perfectly right. But, of course, there are people who won't admit that openly, because they have a few shares in this, and a few in that, and they say, "We want to make things right before we come in." Now, gentlemen, there is another point I wish to put before you, and that is the point of speculation. A great deal is being said about the enormous rise in De Beers shares—rather beyond their value. I have explained to you that the capital of the four mines is only £3,100,000, or at the outside £3,400,000. I have shown you how we propose to deal with the whole industry, and I have described what might be called our patent. Patents, you know, are so simple that when they are explained to you you cannot help

laughing. Well, it is our patent. You ask, "Is there any chance of a rise?" and you will be told, "Certainly if you have been speculating properly in the past." What has happened lately? You think there has been a rise of De Beers shares. Yes, a nominal rise, but actually there has been no rise in value. Look at the last few days. It is true that De Beers rose from £40 to £47 on a capital of two millions—about £1,400,000; and that the Centrals went down; there was in fact a complete somersault. If you watched the somersault, you would find that De Beers simply took from the Central what they possessed. They have not yet received the profit from the monopoly that is to come. I put my figures thus: Centrals, at £100 per share loss on a capital of £1,785,000—because you must take in what we hold—have lost £1,785,000, and De Beers, with a rise of £7 on two million pounds' worth of shares, have gained only £1,400,000, so that as far as the diamond industry is concerned, it has not received the rise due on the completion of the scheme. But what I wish to put before you by way of counteracting that state of affairs is the patent we profess to possess. I do not think even a strong Central shareholder, or the gentleman who sits there with the flower in his coat and who represents Dutoitspan mine, will blame us if by means of our patent we seek to acquire everything for De Beers, and are likely to succeed. And I think we shall win on that basis, and "to the victors be the spoils." I have explained that our scheme rests on a low capital, and that in dealing with the balance, it

must either be by purchase or a lease. I say again, gentlemen, I think we shall be successful in what we propose to-day.

'I will own to you that we who are your directors have been through rather serious times, and we have done many things that perhaps the strictest judgment of a legal mind would contend were not entirely within the scope of the Trust Deed. If times had been bad, I have no doubt those gentlemen who are pleased that we raised their £10 shares to £46 would have been equally displeased with us. I assure you, gentlemen, I do not wish to take that risk any further. We propose reconstruction, which gives us power to deal with the entire amalgamation of the diamond-mining industry. It rests with you whether you will follow us in the course we desire to pursue. Let me say to those who may dissent, "Think with a certain amount of satisfaction that we have raised your shares from £10 to £46." I do not wish to expatiate on the exertions of the directors or on the fact, which you well know in the market, that we have worked, every one of us, from first to last for the exaltation of De Beers shareholders. If there are any who dissent from the course we are about to pursue, I would ask them to be content with a silent dissent. It is for them to claim the privileges of the arbitration clause if they wish to do so. Those who do not care to follow us in our course of reconstruction can claim from us to be paid out in cash, and that payment in cash means a rise in the par value of the Company from a value

of only about £15 four months ago to a value to-day of £46. I say to those gentlemen, "Take your cash ; retire from following our banner." But if there are those amongst you who recognise that in a very short time we have raised you from £10 to £46, I ask them to have confidence in us, for we intend still to continue with them. If we have their confidence, we think we can even double that price. We ask your confidence and your support to-day. I do think you will agree with us if we say you know perfectly well that on our board we possess such wealth that we might well rest satisfied with our past work. But if we receive your confidence, we are prepared to continue as the directors of your Company, for our ambition is to make it the richest, the greatest, and the most powerful Company the world has ever seen.'

After Mr. Rhodes's long speech, delivered as usual without so much as a note to help him in his figures, and without any regular preparation, a few short speeches followed, which, as they are concerned with Mr. Rhodes, and will be interesting at any rate to financial readers, it may perhaps be permissible to include here.

MR. ROBINOW said :—'After the resolution just passed, the De Beers Company will go into liquidation ; but we should not dissolve without tendering our hearty thanks to the directors—especially to the chairman, but also to the whole board of directors. It is impossible for the shareholders of such a Company as this, after what has been done, and the way the Company has

been managed by the directors, to allow the Company to go into liquidation without passing a vote of confidence and thanks, and to vote them a substantial sum as remuneration for their services. But I think I should meet with the approval of all the gentlemen here and of all the shareholders, if I propose that we especially show our appreciation of the services of the chairman and the gentlemen who have so ably assisted him, if I propose that we should offer them a substantial bonus. I may especially mention the names of Mr. Stow and Mr. Beit, who have always rendered the greatest possible assistance. I propose a bonus of 10,000 guineas to the chairman and 5000 guineas to the board of directors. I think that will meet with the approval of all the shareholders.' (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN (Mr. Rhodes)—'I don't want you to vote on that proposition at all. As far as I am concerned, I do not care about any of these bonuses, and I don't think my co-directors do. We have had enormous work—more work than you can conceive. But we have beaten them all round, and I should not like to think that that was remunerated by the fact that any mere globular sum has been paid. Every man has his own pleasure. My pleasure has been in beating them all round, and I want no sums of money. I am far better pleased by the unanimous vote of thanks you have given me than by any sum of money you could offer me.'

Mr. Rhodes afterwards added that he had been thanked sufficiently, but there was one gentleman

to whom thanks were due perhaps more than to any for the success of the Company, that was Mr. Beit. He could assure them he could not have succeeded so well in his undertakings if it had not been for Mr. Beit; for at the present moment they owed the firm he represented £250,000, which sum Mr. Beit had paid out of his own pocket for Central shares, although he declined to charge either commission or interest. Mr. Beit was inspired with the same loyal feeling to the Company, and he would propose a vote of thanks to him.

The vote was passed amidst applause.

Mr. Beit thanked the chairman for the kind words he had uttered, and the shareholders for the vote they had accorded him. The interest he had shown and the steps he had taken were in a measure of a selfish nature—nothing else but self-preservation. When he saw the necessity and desirability of getting that control in the Kimberley mine, he put his whole heart into it, and after a while it got to be a matter of sport, and then he went into it still more heartily. He must say he had gone as far as he could in forwarding these negotiations. He had done it for his own interest and for the interest of the other shareholders in De Beers; and if they had reached that day to the height of their ambition, he would certainly desire to congratulate himself, as much as the shareholders, on the successful issue of all their efforts.

When the bonus of ten thousand guineas was proposed to Mr. Rhodes he refused it, pointing out that



he had enjoyed the struggle and the victory, and that was enough—he wanted no money; and he afterwards proposed a well-merited vote of thanks to Mr. Beit, whose reply revealed the fact that he (in somewhat the same way as Mr. Rhodes) had thoroughly enjoyed the struggle—an interesting self-revelation of the attitude of two of the foremost financiers and captains of mining industry in the world.

Here I will venture to amplify my account of Mr. Rhodes's action when arranging the terms of the projected amalgamation, since it shows the high Imperial purpose to which all his financial work has been made subservient. The three chief men who controlled the diamond mines, Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Beit of De Beers, and Mr. Barnato of the Kimberley, met one evening to arrange the amalgamation. Each required a concession, but the requirements of two are not of any public interest. The requirement of the chief man of the three, Mr. Rhodes, was different. 'I want,' he said, 'the power to go to the north, and carry out the expansion there, and I think the Company might assist me in the work. I believe everything they give will be returned; but even if it were lost, it is a very fair case for the doctrine of ransom.' A change in the trust-deed to the De Beers Company was what Mr. Rhodes required—a change which would empower him to use the profits of the Company in carrying out his plan for the expansion of the British Empire from North Bechuanaland to Lake Tanganyika.

This concession, in which Mr. Rhodes asked nothing for himself personally, but asked financial support to bring the vast unclaimed regions south and north of the Zambesi under the British flag and under the influence of British civilisation, was naturally

an astounding fancy to the keen money-making mind of Mr. Barnato, to whom it was also most unsatisfactory, for who ever heard of using the profits of a mine to extend and develop an empire. It was clearly not good business; and Mr. Barnato, who was very much amused at such a crazy demand from the daring financier with whom he had fought so hard, and by whom he had been so thoroughly beaten, strongly opposed the concession and advanced a host of obvious arguments against it. Mr. Beit backed Mr. Rhodes, and Mr. Rhodes, determined to win Mr. Barnato's consent, continued the discussion all night. In the morning, Mr. Barnato gave way, saying good-humouredly, 'Some people have a fancy for this thing and some for that; you have a fancy for making an empire. Well, I suppose we must give it to you.' Thus empowered, Mr. Rhodes obtained at a later date that same year the concession from Lobengula, and in the following year founded the Chartered Company, to which, in its days of depression, De Beers lent half-a-million of money, and helped, with the support of Mr. Rhodes's private purse, in tiding the enterprise over the critical period which preceded the present prosperous position of Rhodesia.

It may be noted that De Beers afterwards got back all the money, with a handsome profit for their shareholders, so that this uncommon discharge of the public responsibilities of wealth has enriched the givers.

Mr. Rhodes himself is among millionaires almost an eccentric, as he has never cared for luxury, or show, or—except for the Empire—for accumulation, spending his private fortune so freely for the public good, that, though still wealthy, he has of late years

seriously diminished his possessions. At Kimberley the millionaire head of the diamond industry lived for years in rooms, taking his meals at the club, his personal expenditure being that of a man of very limited means, and the same simplicity of living governs, so far as the hospitalities of a public man will permit, his expenditure now. Thus, his careless simplicity of dress led to his being refused admission at the Kimberley Exhibition some years ago, the doorkeeper being convinced that a man in a well-worn shooting-coat, without a purse or watch, could not possibly be the great financier, and this resolute refusal so much pleased the big man that a handsome present of money afterwards astonished the faithful official.

With no expensive tastes, disliking all ostentation of wealth, and with a supreme contempt for money except as an instrument for public good, or private beneficence, Mr. Rhodes has used his power in finance as one who recognises that not only wealth, but influence over wealth, is a stewardship to be used for the public good. And so, his millionaire friends, and the great mining corporations he has founded, have been led into supporting Imperial expansion, and taught to recognise in some degree the responsibility that attaches to the use of wealth.

Open-handed for the interests of the Empire, he is also, provided that he can really effect his purpose, open-handed to genuine distress. Here is an instance never before recorded. For obvious reasons, names are suppressed. A certain gentleman, in close connection with Mr. Rhodes in a large mining business, induced the employees to invest their savings in the shares of a private gold mine of his own. The mine proved worthless, and it was not very long before the

fact was known. Mr. Rhodes went to a man whom he could depend on, and told him to find out accurately the real loss sustained by each of the employees, and make it good to them, only concealing the name of their benefactor. His gifts for public purposes he does not conceal, considering that the example may be useful to others. In the same way he has openly tried to moralise joint-stock capital in De Beers and other enterprises by using his power over the expenditure to assist the welfare and progress of the community in which the wealth is made. This will be seen in two speeches at annual meetings of the De Beers Company, of which I give reports at the end of this chapter.

The success of Mr. Rhodes as a financier is due to two main qualities, in addition to business ability and industry—far-sightedness in anticipating the future and tenacity in waiting till it comes. To these may be added swiftness in taking in all the bearings of a question, knowledge of human nature, and willingness to make all fair concessions to the interests of others, qualities which make him a master in the difficult art of amalgamating conflicting interests. The most convincing proof of these qualities is to be seen in the work he has accomplished. All his great enterprises, De Beers and Consolidated Goldfields, which are dividend payers, and the Chartered Company, which is on its way to the same position, are proved thoroughly sound and substantial. Of course there was a time when they looked exceedingly dangerous investments, particularly Chartered, but Mr. Rhodes thought differently, and the proved accuracy of his vision in the case of the earlier companies must be very satisfactory to shareholders whose expectations of dividends still wait for realisation. An instance of this

accuracy of financial vision is to be found in the long De Beers speech of 1888 I have given above, where he said that the old De Beers £5 shares would go to £70, a prophecy which has not yet been literally reached, though the present divided shares, as he pointed out in the speech at the De Beers meeting in 1896, have been over £32, which works out at more than £64 for the old undivided share. A study of the two De Beers speeches of 1893 and 1896 will show two things—the cautious and conservative methods of Mr. Rhodes's finance, with its steady provision for the future, and the encouragement not only of the local welfare, as in schools, rifle volunteers, etc., but also of the broader public good, as in the subscription to the Cape Loan, and other acts undertaken for the benefit of the whole community.

It may be observed that the accusation against the De Beers compound system, that it enslaves and demoralises the natives, is absolutely disproved by the facts; for while its primary object is the safeguarding of the diamonds from thievish labourers, its actual effect is to enforce sobriety and promote progress and education, while the accusation of 'truck' is the mere repetition of the complaints of tradesmen who would like the natives to be given up to them to fleece as in Johannesburg. The De Beers workmen are provided with everything practically almost at cost price, and their wages thus accumulate rapidly, and they have a big sum to take at the close of their labours. The experience of this treatment brings natives to Kimberley from every part of South Africa. Moreover, the profits of the so-called 'truck' are not taken by the Company, but have been for years carefully set apart and used locally, and only for the public good.

At the fifth Ordinary General Meeting of the De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited, for the year ending 30th June 1893, Mr. Rhodes, who was in the chair, said :—

‘Gentlemen,—In moving the adoption of the report, I would point out to you that it is, I think, five years since we effected the amalgamation of the mines; and I think that those who are here to-day, if they look back at the history of that amalgamation, will see that the right course has been pursued. You must remember that during the period in question, although we had times of great success, we had also times of depression. We had to encounter the bogey of the annihilation of the industry. Those rumours and fears have proved to be fallacious; for, as I told you the other night, the amount of white labour now employed by the De Beers Consolidated Mines is equal to the amount employed during the most prosperous period of the mining industry. We also receive at Kimberley almost the same tonnage that we received during the most prosperous period of the industry before amalgamation; and we have now got that which we never had before, a regulation of the industry, and the power of demanding from the outside world a fair price for the diamonds we produce. Now, you who were diggers years ago will remember many periods when we had practically to sell our diamonds for what we could get for them, even for considerably less than the cost of production.

‘Gentlemen, in proceeding to the consideration of

the report that has been submitted to you, I will try to deal with it in the simplest language: I mean in language which shall be plain to the ordinary shareholder, who too often gets puzzled by complicated statements in balance-sheets and profit and loss accounts, and really finds it exceedingly difficult to discover what are the obligations of the industry he is connected with, and what has been the real profit for the year. Now, if you look at this balance-sheet for the year ended 30th June 1893, you will find that, including the interest on our investments, we made a profit of £1,692,397, and, to put it very simply, we disposed of that profit in the following manner:—We paid in dividends £987,000, or, roughly, one million of money. We paid off from our obligations £300,000, and we carried forward, roughly, £377,000. That was how our profit was disposed of. But you might very fairly say, "Well, that was six months ago: we would like to know what your present position is." As you are aware, we have had great depression in the diamond market; but, practically, I gather from the Secretary that the Company's position to-day is somewhat as follows:—We have £700,000 in Consols as a reserve fund. We have paid off our obligations, and we have in diamonds a sum of money to pay our dividend up to 31st December. In addition to that, we have on the floors  $3\frac{1}{4}$  million loads of "blue" ground. That is, since the Company was formed we have increased our "blue" reserve from about half a million of loads to  $3\frac{1}{4}$  millions. I shall not

ask you, gentlemen, to consider that quantity on the basis of what it contains in diamonds, and its value from that point of view, but it would represent a very considerable sum of money, nearly four millions sterling. And, at any rate, it is satisfactory to remind you that out of our working expenses we have spent £500,000 in increasing our blue on the floors; we have one dividend in hand, represented by diamonds; and we have a reserve of £700,000 in English Consols. Therefore I think you will admit that our position is very satisfactory. We have also to remind you that we have reduced our debenture obligations by nearly £700,000, and our present position, in so far as our liabilities are concerned, is that we owe £700,000 less than we did when we formed the Consolidated Company; have immensely increased our stock of "blue"; possess a considerable reserve; and although the diamond market has fallen materially, we are still able to pay to you the dividends which we have done in the past, without any inconvenience to the Company.

'On the other hand, we must remember what it costs us, and what are our obligations in connection with this industry. Well, to put it roughly, we still spend in this "deserted spot" £1,200,000 per annum—£100,000 a month; and I would remind you that, in as far as South Africa is concerned, we are spending more than we have done in the past. We are using colonial coal entirely, so that the money expended upon our fuel account is an



extra amount spent in the country. In addition to that, the Company has, in connection with its interest on debentures, and its leased companies in Bultfontein and Dutoitspan, and its sinking fund, an obligation of about £50,000 a month; so that we have, in connection with our obligation and our work of production, to pay out about £150,000 a month. Now, you might fairly ask, what do we get for that? Well, we produce about 200,000 carats a month, for which we are now getting about £270,000 a month, therefore we are making about £120,000 a month. Of course you will perceive at once that if diamonds were to rise again, even somewhat to the rate at which they stood twelve months ago, the profit would be considerably increased.

‘I suppose very few have considered what a difference of 2s. or 3s. per carat means on a production of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million carats a year. And I may add that there are no people more desirous than the diamond buyers that we should get an increased price, simply because thereby they would secure an extra profit on the retailing of the diamonds. The diamond buyers are always satisfied with a certain commission, whether diamonds are 30s., 32s., or 26s. a carat; but I must say they rather prefer the higher price for our production, because in making their calculations, they reckon upon obtaining a certain fair business profit on the distribution of the diamonds. But, gentlemen, what we have suffered from lately has been the unfortunate state of American finance. America took over one-third

of our production; and naturally the collapse of silver-mining, and the general collapse in America, has at once re-acted on the general value of our diamonds. That is why we have to take reduced prices; when we used to get, not very long ago, 32s. and 33s. per carat.

‘Now there are one or two points which I think it would be only right I should deal with. One of these is the charge that is frequently made in home papers, that the resources of the Company are wasted in enterprises other than its legitimate industry. It is far better that that matter should be dealt with rather than ignored. Now, I can give you one or two cases. I think it is nearly a year ago that the Cape Government were very anxious to float a loan. Times were greatly depressed, and I think it was a million sterling that the Government wanted. On consideration of the question, I submitted to the directors of this Company that really if the finances of the Colony were depressed we should also be affected; and if we felt that by assisting in this loan we could do good, without any detriment to our shareholders; then in my judgment that was a right course to pursue. The result was we subscribed in the Cape million loan for £250,000. I saw some very severe remarks on this transaction in the home press. But, gentlemen, just look at the result of that investment. The loan was very successfully floated, and we subscribed at £96, that is, we got £100 bonds for £96. The present position is that, apart from the

question of performing a good public act, I think in so far as our subscription towards the loan is concerned, we have consulted the interests of the shareholders, because we get nothing less than £100. I consider it was a good business transaction, as we have made for the shareholders a profit of £10,000, although that was not the object in view; but in addition to that, we materially assisted the finance of the Colony. I do not think that any shareholder will object to that transaction.

'There is another transaction we will deal with. You must remember that the De Beers Company took a practical interest in the development of the north; the Company took shares in that enterprise. It was not done without the knowledge of the shareholders; and some of you who were present when we changed the trust-deed of the Company were told by the directors that they intended to enlarge their powers, and so no one can say that they took shares in the new Company without the knowledge of the powers that were vested in the directors under the new trust-deed. I had also a hobby that we should, if possible, assist in the development of the country northward. I will not now wander into what has been done in the north, but will deal with the De Beers connection with the matter from its business basis. With reference to the shares we took in the enterprise, they were distributed to shareholders. If they had not received those shares, they probably would have received something in the shape of a dividend, or probably that money would have paid off obliga-

tions. But if you take the average value of those shares, taking the highest periods of success, and the most extreme periods of depression, you will find the average very far beyond the £1 they might have received as a dividend, so that I do not think any shareholder can complain of that transaction.

‘ You might ask, Are there not other heavy obligations to the Chartered Company affecting the De Beers Company? I will deal with this under two heads. It is quite true that the De Beers advanced £100,000 to build the Mafeking Railway; but in connection with that fact, perhaps you are not aware that we changed from using English coal into the burning of wood as fuel. We found that we wanted to extend our area of country in order to secure a constant wood supply, and during the period of one year we saved £60,000 by the use of timber fuel instead of English coal. We thought to extend our area of fuel country to Mafeking, but we found that we could no longer enter into extensive purchases of wood at a profit, for the reason that the Cape Government, seeing that we were using interior wood, reduced the mileage rate per ton on colonial coal from 2d. to 1d. We are now taking colonial coal and taking it, moreover, at a saving, as compared with English coal, of £60,000 per annum. So that, in so far as our advance to the Chartered Company in connection with the construction of the Mafeking Railway is concerned, I say you have received good value for your money, and you have also received debentures for that advance carrying six per cent. per annum.

‘That is one portion of the advance to the Chartered Company, and the balance represents an amount of about £150,000, secured by six per cent. debentures, which, with a settlement of the country—and that, in my judgment, will take place very shortly—will be worth more than par, and which then we shall have a right to realise in order to put to our reserve fund. It cannot be called an extraordinary risk, because it is a first charge not only on the Chartered Company’s territories, but also on the Mafeking line. In addition to this we have nearly a third of the land in the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland that has an annual revenue of £60,000. I must say the most extreme critic cannot maintain this advance was very risky. Moreover, by our action we have saved considerably for the Company on the coal question, the Cape Government having, as I have said, reduced the rate from 2d. to 1d. per ton per mile; and as a sort of commission, wherever the Chartered territories extend, we have had granted to us—as the De Beers Consolidated Mines—a preferential right to any diamonds that may be found, Gentlemen, if I had not held the dual capacity that is so much criticised, the Chartered Company would have been able to sell those rights and privileges at a considerably better price to any outside syndicate. If you think of the preferential right to the whole of the diamonds, the six per cent. debentures, and other advantages which I have named, looking at it from a commercial point of view, I do not think any shareholder can object to the transaction. One other charge brought against

the Company is expressed in a sort of hazy idea that endless advances have been going on out of the De Beers revenue to the Chartered Company. The only other obligation which the Chartered Company will obtain from the De Beers Company is a small advance of £3500 per month, meaning a little sum of £40,000 for one year. Now you know the position with reference to the Chartered Company.

‘But it is also charged against us that we have plunged into horse-breeding, which it was said is surely not one of the duties of De Beers. Let us deal with that. I find that around Kimberley, owing to the enterprise of the community, discoveries of new diamond mines are frequently being made. It is true the mines have not been very successful; still they had been discovered; and I have observed that the Company's shares on such occasions dropped perhaps £1. Very few really think what that means. There are 800,000 shares in the Company, and it meant an alteration to our shareholders to the extent of £800,000. Some gentlemen have gone out to some little place outside of Kimberley, tested the ground, sunk a hole, and come back with marvellous statements about the richness of a new mine. And although nothing came of such discoveries, it struck me, that if we could acquire the country round about Kimberley, it would be a wise and proper course to pursue. Therefore we have secured considerable tracts of country round Kimberley. I also saw distinctly that we could not shut that country up; we

must do something with it. Owing to the small rainfall, cultivation on a large scale is a mistake, and we could not exactly become sheep farmers. But there is one great want in the country, and that is good horses. So the Board resolved to fence in these farms and place mares on them, and we have now most of them stocked. We have bought some of the best stallions in the country, and I can say practically that in two or three years we shall be able to provide ourselves with horses of a very superior quality. We have already from four to five hundred horses, and, meanwhile, we are teaching the country a lesson as to horse-breeding. The individual farmer cannot go to the expense of purchasing costly horses. There is at present a large market in Johannesburg, and we have also hopes of recovering the Indian market. This is an experiment which I think will prove of great value; we have our land usefully occupied instead of being left to waste, and the whole cost—what is it?

'I remember the last time I was up here we had a considerable quantity of diamonds on hand, and for amusement I put an advance of 1s. per carat on the price of those diamonds. Well, I got it. I suppose if I had not been here, and had not been struck with that idea, we might have got 1s. per carat less, so that I may say the horses on our farms were really bought for the Company by the diamond buyers of Kimberley.

'You must also remember that investments like these, while they are not carried out at any great

cost, nor to the detriment of shareholders, help to maintain a cordial feeling with the rest of the Colony. You must never forget—because you can't evade it—that this Company produces half the export of the Colony. We are really half-partners with the Colony. It has been my duty in my position in the Ministry always to avoid reckless expenditure. I have carried out this policy with regard to the Colony, and also with reference to the corporation which I represent; and I have always remembered that we shall have to bear the first burden of a bad financial position in this country. We have to show the people here that we continually feel that while the wealth of the country is drawn thousands of miles away, such a Company as this has great financial responsibility, and, equally with the Colony, has a duty to perform in recognising its obligations. I have pointed out to you that only two or three transactions of the Company are carried out apart from diamond mining, and I think I have shown to you at what little cost to yourselves those transactions are carried out. I think also I shall receive your support as to my position, in helping towards the production of this enormous wealth, the Company being half-partners, so to speak, with the Colony with reference to its exports, remembering that it is our duty not to act to the detriment of shareholders, but at the same time to perform certain public acts in the interests of the country, and remembering also that the prosperity of the country involves our prosperity.

Now, gentlemen, there is another bogey, and in



order to deal with the case, I will put it to you fairly. A very general observation, that I have heard from—we will call him the “Man in the Street,” is that it is a highly improper thing that the directors of the Company should also be diamond buyers. And a second complaint is that it is an utter farce to keep the diamonds in Kimberley when they could be sent home in little parcels so that a large proportion of the local expenditure could be saved, and then the diamonds could be distributed in London with hardly any cost. On the face of it there seems a good deal in both those propositions, and I will deal with them in detail. With regard to the purchase of diamonds by the directors, you must remember that amongst our largest shareholders are those directors who have been for nearly twenty years diamond merchants; and the capital invested by them in this business is very large. We have had to face the point whether we should remove them from the directorate and destroy their interest in the industry; and, if I might so put it, go to the outside world. Well, that would have been a dangerous course to pursue, for the following reason: We were dealing entirely with an article of luxury, and to remove from the industry perhaps a million and a half sterling connected with the distribution of the gems, would be, we found, a very hazardous course to adopt. The whole question appeared to me to resolve itself into this, that we should establish a safeguard. That safeguard is the appointment of a Diamond Committee from amongst the directors, but composed of

directors who have no interest, directly or indirectly, with diamond purchases. I have found on the part of that Committee that they display a tendency rather to consult the wishes of the "outside" buyers than those of the directors who are also diamond merchants. This is human nature, and I repeat there is an inclination on the part of the Committee to consult the wishes of the buyers other than those who are on the Board.

' Now I look back for the last six to eight months ; we thought then we had got control of the diamond market ; and at that period we were consulting to a great extent the outside buyers, the arrangement being that the names of the buyers were written down, and they were taken in turn. What happened? This is what happened : When the price we were obtaining was at its highest, America suddenly collapsed. That was the country, please to remember, which was taking over one-third of our production. I was up here for a few days ; I felt it was coming, and I made the Board realise everything. The representatives of those directors who were diamond buyers did not purchase, but the outside market did. What did we do ? For three months we fought the market. We would not sell. We tried to maintain the price at 34s. a carat. Then what happened ? We had to take a reduced price, because we had overburdened our reserve. As I have explained, we spend £150,000 in working and in paying our obligations, and we were fast getting into that position when we should have no

money and all diamonds, whereas I prefer to have no diamonds and all money. Then a powerful syndicate came forward and met us, offering a price for our stock. In all these matters we consult the Home Board. I telegraphed to the Board in London, they accepted the price offered, and so we got rid of our diamonds, but at a much lower rate. The real cause was that America failed us. There was great financial distress in that country, and they stopped taking our diamonds. And but for the very wealthy men connected with our industry, who have a very large command of capital, we might have been in an awkward corner. So far as the local outside diamond buyers were concerned, it was the wish of the Board to treat them fairly, but it was our policy to maintain the market, and there was a certain point beyond which we could not go.

'The other day, again, when I was at Palapye, on my road to Matabeleland, we found ourselves with a very large amount of diamonds in hand. I ascertained by inquiry that the market had not improved, and after consultation with the Home Board, we again made a sale which relieved our finance, and kept our Consols intact. That, I think, was a wise and proper course to pursue. If I were to speak of the future concerning diamonds, I would prefer a large open market, consisting of many buyers, amongst whom we could retail our parcels. That has been the effort of the Company, and I think we should have succeeded but for the unfortunate crisis which occurred in America. It was, I think, a fortunate thing that

we had so many directors interested in the market, commanding enormous wealth, and willing to take the risk of making huge purchases far beyond the means of local outside buyers. Always remember that our diamonds are sold by a Committee interested neither directly nor indirectly in the diamond trade. They are sold after consultation with the London Board, and that is the true position. The whole case is this, that we are dealing with an article of luxury—it has not the standard that gold has,—and in dealing with it you have to show extraordinary caution, and you have to act promptly. If we had continued to maintain our desire for a very much higher price, we might have found ourselves having great pecuniary obligations, and also bags of diamonds in the bank. One of our objects in conducting the industry of this Company has always been to maintain it in a strong financial position. I think that after the remarks I have made to you, you will agree with me that our position to-day is a good one, and that as far as the “pebbles” are concerned there are plenty more in the ground, and plenty more on the floors.

‘Now, there is another criticism that has been made, and it is this. It has been said, “Surely it is bad finance for you to keep £700,000 in English Consols, and yet you have obligations of four millions sterling on which you pay 5½ per cent. Certainly you should sell these Consols, thereby reducing your obligations.” That may be considered a very fair proposition, but let us follow it out. When a crisis

occurs, the world does not care whether you owe two millions or ~~three~~ millions. The great object, then, is to have gold, so that when there is a check in the diamond market we can go on for four or six months without difficulty. The holding of this gold gives us enormous strength in dealing with the diamond merchant. I can remember in the past, when a check has occurred, that one got very quickly into debt at the bank to the tune of three or four hundred thousand pounds, and the bank began to be anxious. Therefore, with our huge revenue of three and a half millions, it was essential that we should have a reserve, either in cash or an equivalent of cash, to meet any check that might arise in the market; because when we deal with the buyers they know perfectly well that we have this reserve, and they can tell their retail customers at home that there is no chance of forcing the hand of De Beers, seeing that they have £700,000 worth of Consols, and will not sell their diamonds recklessly. I thought it was a wise transaction to purchase those Consols, and it has proved most successful. Let it be remembered that when the last check occurred, it was not the retail buyers who were holding off, but the world. Owing to the financial panic in America, they could not buy then, because they did not possess the means, and it was necessary for us to reef our sails to meet the storm and take a reduced price.

'I have stated our present position, gentlemen. I have shown you that we employ almost the same amount of white labour that was employed before

the amalgamation ; that the direct tonnage of material to the Company is also as great ; ~~and~~ that the industry is controlled in an efficient manner. The country is beginning to see that the discovery of new mines is a disaster instead of a benefit, except, perhaps, to those men who have the happiness of finding them. But if you overfill the market, people will not give you your price for your article of luxury. The community, and certainly the country, is, I think, waking up to these facts.

‘ Now, to run the risk of a charge of recapitulation, I would say I have shown you your present position. You are without debt ; you have diamonds to pay your dividend ; you have a reserve of £700,000, and you have three and a quarter million loads of blue on your floors. I think that is a very satisfactory position. On the other hand, I think you will support the policy your directors have pursued up till ~~now~~—namely, that they have not paid in the past, and I hope they will not in the future pay, dividends up to the extreme amount of the Company’s earning power. You must remember that in connection with our industry we have still obligations of nearly four millions of money, and over and above that we have leased obligations of about £90,000 per annum. As I stated before, the amount of interest, of redemption, and of the leases we pay, comes to nearly £50,000 per month. We certainly make considerably more than we pay out to you as shareholders. But with an industry like this I believe it is better to pay moderate dividends until we

are more free from our obligations. Many of you may sometimes consider that you run certain risks in holding diamond shares; and I agree with you to a limited extent. But I would ask you to think of other industries in which you put your money, even in this country. My invariable experience is, that if those other investments represent a great profit, you have a very uncomfortable feeling when you come to estimate from your books the real interest you obtain from them. Although your De Beers interest is a small one, it is an assured one; and the Company, besides yielding you a profit, pays far more than that profit; it discharges its debts, pays for its machinery, and indeed for everything, out of its earnings, whereas in other parts of the world, machinery, et cetera, is as a rule paid for out of capital.

‘Ours, I think, is a sound and wise basis. There is certainly some risk of new mines being discovered, but are there not many and serious risks connected with other industries? Take, for example, sugar and its competitor beetroot, or take coffee. In Ceylon, out comes a little animal which destroys the coffee crop, to the ruination of the planter. Take also the silver-mining industry, in which so many men have lost their all. The whole point is, that unless you are in English Consols or in gold nuggets, everything has an element of risk. Even your companies on the Rand, although they produce an article whose standard of value will not be changed, have connected with them a certain amount of risk, because they have a limited period of life, when you consider

deep levels, whereas, with regard to the diamond-mining industry, its life is practically unlimited. Therefore I might put it to you that our only risk is the sudden discovery of new mines, which human nature will work recklessly to the detriment of us all. But apart from that, we have a fair prospect of continuing the position we have held in the past, and of paying the dividends which we have hitherto distributed among shareholders.

‘ I think that the directors have conducted this Company since its creation as the Consolidated Mines with care and caution, and we should ask your approval of their conduct. As to our conduct with reference to undertakings other than pure diamond-mining, the undertakings have been, as I have explained to you, very limited, and I cannot do better than repeat the words used—I think it was last year—by the gentleman who presided at the annual meeting of the Company. He said with reference to our actions in connection with the country we live in :—“ We continue to show the same friendly solicitude for the welfare of the country in which our mines are situated, whenever that solicitude, without detriment to shareholders, can be exercised. We ought to be ready at all such times to come forward with such assistance. Such opportunities have occurred in the past, and I have no doubt they will occur again.” Gentlemen, I shall conclude with those words. I ask you to adopt the report and statement of accounts.’

At the eighth Ordinary General Meeting of De



Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited, December 28, 1896, Mr. Rhodes, who was in the chair, spoke as follows; giving, among other interesting information, the exact arrangement as to the Compound profits by the so-called 'truck,' and the exact use made of the whole of it, which is entirely allocated to various useful public purposes:—

'It has fallen to my lot to move the adoption of the report. I feel rather diffident about that. I feel like a boy who goes to school without having prepared his lesson as he should have done. You must take my statement with its defects and the knowledge of the fact that I have been away from Kimberley a very long time, and only returned on Saturday. But the directors of the Company were desirous that I should come here and move the adoption of the report, and so I came, and you must bear with my speech with this explanation. Now, it seems to me that the best way to deal with this report is for me to give you a statement in the shape of answers which the directors gave to the questions I put to them as to what I may call the major points of our concern. I want to make the statement as simple as possible, so that a shareholder not acquainted with the questions, the very minute questions, of the working of this Company can understand it, and so that such shareholders will have a better understanding of the points than shareholders sometimes have when they read those extraordinary profit and loss statements which leave one little wiser than when one began.

‘I find, with regard to the year through which we have passed—that is, the year from June 1895 to June 30, 1896,—we hauled out 2,698,000 loads. I also found that the Company washed during that period 2,597,000 loads, so that you will see we have not exhausted in any way our stock of blue; in fact, there is roughly an increase of 100,000 loads.

‘The next question which I asked was, what has been the yield per load? and I found that out of those 2,597,000 loads you have got a yield of 2,363,000 carats of diamonds, or nearly 91 carats per 100 loads. It has often struck me how enormous is the ability and energy of those people who work mines that give four or five carats to the 100 loads. Supposing the diamonds to be worth 30s. per carat, we are earning £130 to £140 per 100 loads, whilst they are earning £6 or so to their 100 loads. The struggle is between a person earning £130 as against one earning £6 from an equal quantity of ground treated. This is why one sometimes regrets that so much skill and energy are expended upon these outside diamond-mines—I might say are wasted. The constitutions of the men carrying on the work are broken with the worry and anxiety, and usually there is an ultimate loss to the English and French holders of the shares. That is why we have not been so keen in taking up those outside diamond mines. We know that a number of poor mines do exist, and have from time to time been discovered. They have in many cases not been what could be termed swindles or cases in which mines have been

salted; some of them do run a few carats to the hundred loads; but, as I have shown you, for such mines, yielding a few carats a hundred loads, to begin a struggle with people so fortunately placed as we are is hopeless. We have it always in our power to produce double the amount which we do, but we regulate our production by the wants of the world. I think it is one of those cases where a monopoly is judicious and justified by the results.

'Now, having found out so much, it is worth while to see what have been the financial results of our work. If you just look at the balance-sheet, you will find that the difference between what we have earned and what the cost was to earn it is £1,900,000, out of which we have received £1,500,000 in dividends. The rest has been spent in various ways. You will find it very interesting to look at the past history of the Company since it was formed. The Company was formed in 1888, and we then owed £5,000,000, now we owe about £3,700,000. During the intervening period, in addition to dividends, we have bought in Consols, £1,250,000; we have paid for Wesselton mine, £460,000; and we have bought Dutoitspan and a very large portion of Bultfontein mines. For these purchases we did not create fresh capital, though such a course might have been fair and right, but we made them out of earnings. In addition to the two big items, the Consols, which we use as a reserve to steady the market, and Wesselton, which is now our own private property, which we are going to work through some of the old residents

of the place, we have now really completed, if I might so put it, the acquisition of claims in the neighbouring mines. What I mean by this is that with the Kimberley, Bultfontein, Dutoitspan, and De Beers, our list is closed. We have bought the Gordon for £290,000. With regard to this, shareholders must remember that we held of Gordon Debentures £96,000, so that the cost of the New Gordon, which was the last concern of importance, was £194,000. Our reason for purchasing these properties is that we do not desire to have right in the middle of our blocks mines in active working which were continually working into our mines, and so causing disputes and differences. Then it enables us to continue our policy of controlling the output of the mines. The present position as regards control is rather a happy one. Those who work mines outside our group are glad that we maintain the market. It enables them to get a better price than they otherwise would. At the same time, we give to the world as much as the world will take, from our knowledge of the world's requirements month to month.

‘Having dealt with the production and shown you that the yield has been good, the next question you will ask is, What is the difference between your revenue and expenditure? I am happy to say that the difference is £1,900,000 odd. And then you will ask, What have you done with your diamonds? Well, we arranged with a syndicate at home to take from us 200,000 carats a month at 27s. 6d., and that

gave us for the last year what, I think, I may call a handsome profit. The best of dealing with this syndicate is that you know where you are. These people have their ramifications all over the world, and have had for years, and we do not grudge them any extra profit they may make in the distribution of the goods. We have sold our production up to June 30th next, and have given to the syndicate an option up to December 31st next year. Therefore we know that up to June 30th we have sold our diamonds at 27s. 6d., and we have given an option up to December 31st. As I have mentioned the ensuing year, I think it is fair I should make another statement, since it concerns the half-year from June 30th this year to December 31st, that is, the present month. That statement is that for the past half-year, ending this month, we have made a profit of £1,200,000. That is the difference between what it costs to produce our diamonds and what we get. You may ask, How is that arrived at? I will try and show you, and so put it that a shareholder who is not a financial man will understand it. We will take our expenditure first.

'Our present position is that everything we spend in every shape, every item of cost, totals about £100,000 a month. Then, in addition, we have our interest to pay in different companies, our interest on debentures and sinking fund, making £25,000, so that, roughly, you may say De Beers spends £125,000 a month. But, by arrangement with the syndicate, it receives 27s. 6d. per carat for 208,000 carats every month. Now, you may work that out,

and the difference between the £125,000 and what we receive is the profit which we derive. You will say that is not £2,400,000 a year. But we also receive in revenue from Consols £28,000 a year ; from shares in some of those other Companies, £10,000 a year ; farm estates, £10,000 a year ; and from Wesselton we hope to make £60,000 a year. Indeed, we have been told we shall make £120,000 a year, but we think it better to halve these statements, so I say £60,000 a year. So that over and above our profits from the syndicate we have £100,000 a year revenue outside, and that brings us to £2,120,000. You will say, Where is the difference ? The difference is this. The syndicate allows us to produce over and above what we sell them a certain limited quantity. We have at present about 230,000 carats which we have been allowed to produce in that way. We take that at two or three shillings below the market rate for diamonds. We quote a price, in fact, which we can get in the street. In the case of blue, we believe it right to put it at under cost, and it is put down at 1s. 6d. per load ; and perhaps some of you may say, Why do you not put these 230,000 carats at 6s. per carat, which is all they have cost you, instead of 25s. ? Well, I think it is fair, if you have something you can go and sell across the street and get a cheque for within five minutes—I think it is fair to put it at something like its selling price. That is our position since June 30th. For the six months since then our books show a profit of £1,200,000, and the diamond-merchants will be glad to hear that we have no large

accumulation of diamonds on hand. I believe that is a good position, so that you may take it that for the year, on the results of which I am making you an address, we have £1,900,000; and for the six months which do not come into immediate consideration to-day, £1,200,000. I think shareholders will be satisfied with that.

‘Now, there are a few other points that I think it will be wise to deal with. I will deal with them separately. Some three years ago the Board found that there had been some dispute upon the question of whether profits made in the compounds under arrangements sanctioned by Parliament should be used by De Beers. Of course, it was perfectly legal for us to keep that money, but we did not wish to make profits, we wished only to keep the natives from liquor, and prevent them selling our diamonds outside. But as there seemed to be a grievance in the place, and the matter was mentioned in Parliament, I carried with the Board the following resolution, which I will call upon the Acting Secretary to read.’

Mr. Pickering read the resolution as follows:—  
 ‘That the balance realised by the sale of goods in the compounds, after allowing for their cost and all reasonable expenses connected with the sale of the said goods, and the maintenance of the said compounds, shall annually be accurately determined and paid over to the Chairman of the Company, and shall form a fund to be by him held and invested, and from time to time drawn upon and devoted to such useful

public purposes as he in his discretion may determine, subject to such arrangements as he may make and such conditions as he may impose, and that the said Chairman shall state and render to the Company an account showing the position of the said fund, his expenses in connection with administering the same, and the amounts which have been devoted by him to any such purposes as aforesaid.'

'I may say that, having gone into the various transactions, I came to the conclusion that, roughly, £10,000 a year might be claimed as these profits. You must remember there are the wages of the guards and many other expenses in connection with the compounds. I was satisfied with £10,000 a year. Some directors said there was no profit, but we came to a compromise. You had a Kimberley Exhibition, and I always felt it rather a scandal that there was an amount left unpaid. The community had done exceedingly well, and no blame can be laid upon it. Still, there was a deficiency, and some people were not paid their accounts. We paid on that account £2203. Then the Griqualand West Turf Club was also in difficulties, and in connection with that I may say that Mr. Beit and myself paid a certain amount privately, but out of the fund we paid £1200. That saved the stand and the course, and they remain for the place. Then there is the Kimberley Sanatorium. That is a bit of a hobby of mine, and £17,000 has gone for that. Of course, I am speaking of the result of three years—about—£30,000. As I say, the Sanatorium is a bit of a hobby of mine. I have



always thought that Kimberley would be an admirable place for people with chest complaints from home, if only there were sufficient and proper accommodation. The experience of many has been that this climate has been very successful in such complaints, and the doctors all agree that Kimberley is a good place for a sanatorium. Then come a student's expenses at the Public School, £175. Then there is the Undenominational School, £1550 for structural additions and teachers, and so on; Beaconsfield Public School, £400; and the Poor Whites' School building fund, £150. Then there are the Kimberley Rifles, the men now at Phokwani, £1000; Griqualand West Brigade, £1000; School of Mines, for three years, £700; making, I think, in all, £25,378, which leaves me with several thousands in hand. That is the result, and I do not think any shareholder will grudge it when he sees how the money has been spent, and that it has removed a grievance continually mentioned locally and in Parliament. You will remember that we had to sell in the compounds at the same price as outside, otherwise the commercial community said that the natives would buy everything inside the compounds. We have now got before us an application asking for an installation of the electric light at Kimberley Hospital, and I think we should grant it.

'I see there is another point I should have mentioned before. You see in the balance-sheet Bultfontein obligations paid £360,000, and then a little lower down, under the same heading, £146,000, and you

will ask, Are they the same thing? There was a conversion made of the Bultfontein obligations, but the ordinary charge up to date was £146,000 for the sinking fund. That is how these items are apparently repeated. There is another item that I think I will refer to at once. We are always asked, What are your investments? It might be said, There is an item of £423,000. Are you gambling in shares? Well, here is the list. There is £2000 in Western Africa: I don't know what that is. The Consolidated Bultfontein, £20,000; that is to say, when we bought the Consolidated, or rather leased it, we held so many shares. We hold 27,000 shares. They came in various ways; I forget how. Then there is Griqualand West Diamond Mining Company. We have also paid £158,000 of its debentures, but still we hold about 21,000 shares. Here, for instance, you have £103,000 in that Company which will receive interest. Then there are the New Gordon Debentures, six per cent. We had something like £96,000. There we are into another £100,000. And here is another little item: the Indwe Coal Mine, £75,000. The whole of our coal is coming from Indwe, and we save an enormous sum per month by buying it there instead of buying it from home. Then the largest item of all is the British United Diamond Mining Company, £167,000. This matter was discussed two years ago. There are still a few outside shares, but we hold practically ninety-nine hundredths of the Company. That, I think, brings us up to the £423,000 investments in stocks

and shares. I think the finding of the money to assist in making the Indwe railway was what one may call a public act. I only wish that other people undertaking public acts had the same success. Our coal bill will be enormously reduced, and we shall be independent of any supply from home, and I think every shareholder will say that that was a good public act.

'In the same way, as to those much-discussed transactions in connection with the charter, I may tell you in regard to that, that the whole of the money has been repaid to De Beers, which has now no money whatever in that concern; but De Beers has made a profit, and has the right to any diamonds that may be discovered in that territory. It is also the holder of a third share in the Bechuanaland railway, which is now paying. De Beers has been repaid for its expenditure in the charter. It owns a third of that railway; it owns a large block of land; and it has the right to diamonds, which I have mentioned. I do not think any one can complain of that public act. As to any other public act in the future, I am not going to submit any such to you to-day. There is a subject which I have been thinking of, and that is the encouragement of the fruit industry in the Western Province. I think it does require encouragement. We know what fine results are secured in California, with a climate similar to this, and I do not see why we should not make it a success in this country. The people who are engaged in the industry at present

are, many of them, poor and wanting in capital and scientific knowledge, and think they are unable to do anything on a large scale without help. I do not intend to ask anything from shareholders for it: I merely say it is a public act which I think should be borne in mind; and I hope it will be with this, as with some other public acts in the past, that the De Beers shareholder will have the satisfaction of knowing that he has done something for the country, and also had a substantial return.

‘I really do not think there is anything more for me to say. I have given you your position up to June 30th and also up to December 31st of this year—or rather I should say the 28th,—and I have little to add. The only trouble with regard to the industry is that it is becoming a matter of course and uninteresting. It goes like clockwork. There are a huge number of people at work, and with the administration of the local directors everything goes smoothly. The troubles with the two townships as to the reduction of population are over. Those that remain see there is a good steady industry and an element of certainty that was not there in the past; but I will admit that to my mind the industry has not the interest it had in the past, when one had to use one’s mind and brain to bring about that amalgamation, which, although it was received with great bitterness and criticism, is admitted by the world as a whole to have been wise, while those also who are connected with the distribution of these “pebbles” are pleased. During short periods in the

past some of them made huge profits, but their minds were never easy, they never slept quietly, whereas now they are certain. They are grateful for what they get for the labour of distribution, while we on our side know our capital, debts, and cost of working, and judge what is fair for the shareholders. One has made many prophecies in the past on many questions, but when the amalgamation was made I said De Beers would reach £70. Since then we have split our shares, and they reached £32 last year, that is £64, or six points short of my prophecy; but last year we only made a profit of £1,900,000, and I have pointed out that we have made £1,200,000 in the last six months. Whether an inquiring world and the investing public will assist me to publish my prophecy, I do not know; but I shall be glad, when my career with De Beers is closed, if I can say that, with the philanthropic assistance of the outside world, my prophecy has been fulfilled and De Beers have reached £70, that is, £35 now. I move the adoption of the report, in which is one practical point—one I had forgotten. We have agreed to pay £1 per share dividend. We could pay more on the basis of that £1,200,000, but there have been many expenses. I think, however, we shall pay another £1 next June.'

# APPENDIX I

## RETURN OF GOLD PRODUCED IN RHODESIA

TO THE 30TH JUNE 1899

GIVING MONTHLY OUTPUT AND TOTAL OUTPUT TO THE 30TH JUNE 1899, FOR EACH COMPANY

Compiled from Information supplied by the Commissioner of Mines and the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, Bulawayo.

NAME OF COMPANY.	Prior to August 31, 1898.		September, 1898.		October, 1898.		November, 1898.		December, 1898.		January, 1899.		February, 1899.		March, 1899.		April, 1899.		May, 1899.		June, 1899.		Total.		
	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	Tons (gross) crushed.	Yield oz. dw.	
Smaller Companies, Syndicates, and Individuals other than those enumerated below.	...	6,497 14	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,497 14	
Anterior (Marikulu) Gold Mines.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Bosaso Gold Mining Company.	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,340	1,670 15	1,600	1,835 12	3,813	1,944 14	3,337	1,732 10	2,634	1,354 0	1,352	711 15	1,805	812 11	2,261	780 14	21,952	10,865 3	
Consolidated Belingwe Gold Mining Company.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	410	201 11	324	335 3	276	155 6	...	...	1,000	682 0	
Draconer Gold Mining Company.	...	...	...	...	1,866	1,175 0	1,900	1,079 13	1,036	1,167 10	1,946	1,191 8	1,103	1,180 8	1,045	1,185 0	1,070	1,182 0	2,006	1,153 15	1,050	1,439 0	17,598	10,533 17	
Geeking Gold Mining Company.	...	...	2,260	1,407 5	2,200	1,000 0	2,145	1,001 0	2,102	1,153 10	2,132	1,068 0	1,495	1,003 9	2,045	1,263 14	2,396	1,121 0	2,079	1,155 9	1,067	1,061 7	20,006	11,370 5	
Mashonaland Consolidated Development Company. (Tuli Castings)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	339	139 0	222	101 1	...	...	...	...	...	...	541	240 1	
Selkwe Gold Mining Company.	...	...	646	400 0	1,790	1,050 10	1,065	1,477 12	1,832	1,273 12	1,861	1,266 16	1,032	1,153 6	1,320	1,470 7	1,001	1,133 0	1,850	1,307 0	2,110	1,495 4	17,697	12,473 7	
From other sources. (Returns supplied by B.S.A. Coy.)	...	...	...	...	...	50 0	...	...	...	166 0	...	187 17	...	196 16	...	358 9	...	556 0	...	89 9	...	209 13	...	1,814 6	
TATI CONCESSIONS—Premier Tuli Company and Monarch Reef Company (Cynide).	...	6,497 14	...	1,801 5	...	3,493 10	...	5,229 3	...	5,362 4	...	5,788 15	...	5,635 8	...	6,024 2	...	5,137 1	...	4,073 13	...	5,064 16	...	54,023 13	
	...	...	...	2,415	399 5	1,824	419 10	1,080	337 10	1,283	666 15	2,015	582 0	1,961	768 10	2,474	590 0	2,024	618 0	2,235	265 0	2,754	1,039 0	20,354	5,665 10
TOTAL OUTPUT FOR EACH PERIOD.	...	6,497 14	...	2,246 10	...	3,493 10	...	5,266 13	...	6,348 19	...	6,370 15	...	6,421 15	...	6,604 2	...	5,735 1	...	4,073 13	...	6,103 15	...	60,769 3	



# MONTHLY GOLD REPORT

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## APPENDIX II

### RHODESIA CHAMBER OF MINES

### MONTHLY GOLD REPORT

(Published on the 12th of each Month from Official Returns furnished by the Companies)

OCTOBER 1899.

DISTRICT AND COMPANY.	FROM MILL.						
	Tons Milled, 2,000 lb. to the Ton.	No. of Stamps.	Days Milling.	Tons per Stamp per Diem.	Yield of Gold.	Value of Gold.	Per Ton.
GWANDA—					oz. dwts.	£	£ s. d.
Geelong G.M. Co.,	1,881	20	28-00	3-36	941 17	3,414	1 16 4
SELUKWE—							
Selukwe G.M. Co.,	3,870	35	28-00	3-95	2,430 5	8,810	2 5 6
BELINGWE—							
Consolidated Belingwe Development Co.,	176	5	11-00	3-20	101 17	370	2 2 1
BULAWAYO—							
Criterion Development Co.,	438	5	21-87	4-01	271 8	984	2 4 11
FILABUSI—							
Filabusi (Charterland) Gold Fields,	305	5	18-25	3-34	180 9	654	2 2 11
From Other Sources, (Returns supplied by R.S.A. Co., etc.)					350 12	1,271	...
TOTAL,	6,670				4,276 8	15,503	...

		oz. dwts.
Output for September 1898,		2,346 10
“ October		3,913 00
“ November		5,566 13
“ December		6,258 19
“ January 1899,		6,370 15
“ February		6,423 18
“ March		6,614 2
“ April		5,755 1
“ May		4,938 13
“ June		6,103 18
“ July		6,031 7
“ August		3,177 2
“ September		5,653 7
“ October		4,276 8

C. ARNOLD, Secretary.



## APPENDIX III

I HAVE added in this Appendix the most valuable portions of Mr. Rhodes's powerful speech at Kimberley on February 19, 1900. The success of the defence of Kimberley, in which the handful of regular soldiers did well, but the citizen soldiers of the town, who were to the regular troops as eight to one, did better, was very largely due to the presence of Mr. Rhodes, to his foresight and resource, his hard work and personal influence. On the outbreak of the war he went to Kimberley to take his place in the forefront of the conflict, exactly as he had done in the crisis of the Matabele revolt in 1896. He had no opportunity of repeating the achievement of the great Indaba in the Matoppos; but the danger he faced was a very real one; for the besieging Boers, assured by President Kruger and their other leaders that Rhodes was the enemy of their race, would not have hesitated to shoot him—somebody's rifle would have gone off by accident—had they taken the town.

Lord Roberts, in his despatch of March 20, 1900, says: 'I would add that the citizens of Kimberley . . . seem to have rendered valuable assistance. . . . By the active part which he took in raising the Kimberley Light Horse, and in providing horses for all the mounted troops in Kimberley, Mr. Rhodes, in particular, contributed materially to the successful defence of the place.' The commanding officer,

Lieutenant-Colonel Kekewich, testifies, in his despatch of February 15, to the same effect.

The siege was scarcely over when Mr. Rhodes had to address the annual meeting of the De Beers shareholders, not so much the few who were present in Kimberley, as the great mass of absent shareholders, largely composed of French investors, to whom he had to account for the heavy expenditure De Beers had undertaken during the siege under the direction of himself as life-governor and head of the Company. His desire to justify the large sums of money spent on the defence of the town led to the much-criticised statement that 'we (the De Beers Company) have this satisfaction, that we have done our best to preserve that which is the best commercial asset in the world, the protection of Her Majesty's flag.' This passage has been misunderstood, and misrepresented to mean that Mr. Rhodes regarded the British flag as nothing but a commercial asset. Such an interpretation is obviously unfair, for, when it is remembered that his words were addressed to the shareholders, who were largely foreigners and chiefly French, it is plain that this was no occasion for 'spread-eagle' language, but for such an appeal to the self-interest of the owners of the shares as would show them that the expenditure was really wise even for their financial interests. No doubt this was not the main reason that had weighed with Mr. Rhodes, whose first object had been to hold the most important town in the Colony against the invader, for its fall would have been the signal to thousands of Dutch colonists to rise and throw in their lot with the victors. But he knew that the one telling argument to foreign shareholders was this, that the protection of Her Majesty's flag does really represent

a better security, and therefore an enhanced value, for all property, as has been proved in Egypt, where the French have learned this fact from the great and steady increase in the price of Egyptian bonds, directly due to the protection of Her Majesty's flag and the security for the best government in the world which that flag unfailingly brings.

Apart from this passage the speech is a notable one, containing three main divisions, which I give in full: first, the contrast between the imaginative and the unimaginative shareholder, with its characteristic recognition of the obligations of capital; secondly, the account of the causes of the war and the prospects for the future; and thirdly, the sketch of the siege and of the achievements of the citizen soldiers of Kimberley, a sketch which will appeal to all Englishmen, and especially to those who see in those achievements a strong argument against the thoroughly un-English system of conscription.

#### I.—THE IMAGINATIVE AND THE UNIMAGINATIVE SHAREHOLDER.

‘You will have noticed in the report a few observations dealing with our various transactions with the Chartered Company, and in that connection I should like to put before you in simple language your present position. Shareholders may be divided into two classes—those who are imaginative and those who are certainly unimaginative. To the latter class the fact of our connection with the Chartered Company has been for many years past a great trial. Human beings are very interesting. There are those of the unimaginative type who pass their whole lives in filling

money bags, and when they are called upon, perhaps more hurriedly than they desire, to retire from this world, what they leave behind is often dissipated by their offspring on wine, women, and horses. Of these purely unimaginative gentlemen, whose sole concern is the accumulation of wealth, I have a large number as my shareholders, and I now state for their consolation that the transactions with the Chartered Company are closed, and closed satisfactorily. The De Beers Company possesses no shares, it does not even hold a railway debenture in the Charter—every sixpence that you have advanced has been repaid in full, and in addition you have received a great profit. The connection that remains is that the whole of the diamonds in the interior of Africa, wherever the Charter exists, now belong to the De Beers Company, who have practically acquired those rights without any payment. And so I trust that my unimaginative shareholder will not continue to nag me about the transactions between De Beers and the Charter, of which I was the author, and which were rendered possible by that change in the trust-deed which enabled us, instead of dealing exclusively with diamonds, to embark upon other undertakings in various parts of the world, and which was devised in order that the De Beers Company might lend its assistance to the work of Northern extension. We have also, I am glad to say, the imaginative shareholder. To him I would say: "It is pleasant for you to consider that undertakings which were embarked upon in the spirit of what I may call the doctrine of

ransom have turned out so successfully. Had they failed I feel sure I should never have heard a word of reproach from you as to this trifle that we spent out of our great wealth to assist the work of opening up the North. We have now got the country developed far, far into the centre of Africa, largely through the means supplied by this commercial Company." If I might go further and venture to draw a picture of the future, I would say that any one visiting these mines one hundred years hence, though he saw merely some disused pits, would, if he pushed his travels further into the interior, recognise the renewal of their life in the great European civilisation of the far North, and perhaps he would feel a glow of satisfaction at the thought that the immense riches which have been taken out of the soil have not been devoted merely to the decoration of the female sex. And so, for my part, when the policy of this corporation is challenged, I always feel that it is no small thing to be able to say that it has devoted its wealth to other things besides the expansion of luxury.

## II.—THE WAR.

'I might conclude briefly, and ask you to pass to the ordinary routine business, but we cannot forget that during the past four months we have not been miners: we have been warriors, fighting for the preservation of our homes and property. We are a purely commercial Company, unconnected with politics, but certainly there are strong reasons for referring to the war which is now raging in South Africa, because

during the period I have mentioned, every one of our workmen, and those of our directors who were here, have all been dealing with the science of war under various able individuals placed here by the military department. And the puzzle has always been why this war arose. If you were to read what they term the Republican papers—of course, they are not Republican at all, because the Governments which they represent are in reality oligarchies—you would really believe that our country desired to seize the neighbouring Republics. Yet, if we go into the history of the past, what do we find? We find that the gentleman who was once President of the Orange Free State, and who is now Kruger's State Secretary (Mr. Reitz), boldly stated to his close friend, Mr. Theo. Schreiner, a brother of the present Premier of the Cape Colony, so far back as seventeen years ago, that the one aim and object of the party to which he belonged was to turn England out of Africa. We will follow that train of thought. I remember very well indeed, when I went to Bloemfontein on the opening of the railway to that place, that I was approached by Mr. Borckenhagen, who, pleased for the moment by some speech I had made, invited me to throw in my lot with what he termed the Afrikander party. I have told the story before, but it is worth repeating. I asked him what he meant. He told me that the Afrikander party was working for an independent South Africa, and they would take me in their arms if I would join them. I replied that I was neither a knave nor a fool. I should be a

knave to leave my own people, and a fool to join his, because I should be hated by my own people, and despised by his. Mr. Borckenhagen was, you remember, the closest personal friend of President Reitz, and, therefore, in close touch with the conspiracy which has existed for the last twenty years. Poor Borckenhagen has passed to another world, and President Reitz is now State Secretary at Pretoria. The impudence of the statement, that England was desirous to seize the Transvaal for its gold, is shown by these facts which I have dwelt upon, and which are vouched for by the brother of the present Cape Prime Minister, and universally believed, viz. that years and years ago Mr. Reitz avowed that the one aim and ambition of his life was to drive England out of Africa. What did we find when this war broke out? We found that the two Republics had obtained artillery of the very highest class, and immense stores of ammunition, and we know that if England had been involved in European complications, the consequences for her would have been most serious. Therefore the boot is on the other leg. This was not a conspiracy on the part of England to seize the neighbouring Republics, but it has been a long, long conspiracy of the neighbouring Republics to seize British South Africa. They call themselves R<sup>e</sup>publics. They are not Republics. Each Government consists of a small political gang. They humbug the poor Dutch people by appealing to their patriotism, and they divide the spoils among their coteries. And it is these gangs who were going to turn the British Government out

of South Africa, and prepared for it by dinning it into the ears of the misguided people that their independence was threatened. I should like to ask, what are these Republics? The Americans have found them out. They all came here, one after another, talking about their opinion that Republicanism in South Africa was the best thing. But they have found out that no such thing as Republicanism exists. How can a Republic be said to exist in a country where every newcomer, every South African of British descent, is treated as a helot or slave, and rights of citizenship are vested solely in persons of Dutch birth? The poor, simple people, who hand their souls over to the King who happens to be ruling in Pretoria, Bloemfontein, or Cape Town, have been deceived, and they have appealed successfully to the worst prejudices of those poor farmers with whom I have worked in the past, and with whom I shall be able to work in the future. Well, gentlemen, I venture to predict that the day of reckoning is coming between the Dutch farmer and these people who have misled him. What is Pretoria Government? Simply President Kruger and a gang of Hollander placemen, steeped in corruption, and the whole Government is consequently rotten. The people have no voice. Even the Dutch people have no voice. They have been deluded into the belief that their independence was threatened, and all the time this old gentleman was piling up armaments to threaten the flag of Her Majesty in South Africa; and it is quite a question whether, if he had threatened it during European



complications, he might not have been successful for a considerable time. And what of the Government of the Free State? They were left alone; we did them no harm. But, gentlemen—and really it is the most amusing story in the world—that State has been plunged into war at the will of two individuals. We had here a rather indifferent attorney called Fischer, who left us and retired to Bloemfontein. There he became a member of the Raad, but he left it in a fit of temper, and I suppose he thought in his retirement that he could bring himself again before the public if he upset the existing order of things. And so he and that bucolic President Steyn have plunged his State into war. And their people are going to reckon with them, not with us. Presently they will ask, “What was the fight about?” and “Where was our President?” I noticed the other day that President Steyn had been to Pretoria, and Kruger sent him back with a message. He said, “I am so old I cannot lead my burghers, but tell them if I were not so old I should be leading them.” This message was greeted with great enthusiasm, but, curiously enough, no one saw the humour of it. The humour was this: Why was not Steyn leading his burghers? He is a great, fat, hearty man of forty, and quite physically capable of going into the field, but he preferred to stay in Bloemfontein, or make trips to Pretoria; and I have not heard of Mr. Fischer, ex-attorney of Kimberley, leading the burghers either. I suppose both are now hiding in Bloemfontein, or packing their traps for Pretoria. Well, I suggested to President

Steyn that he should finish the balance of the war by leading his own burghers instead of wasting his time in those passionate denunciations of England which invariably finish up with some religious cant and appeal to the Almighty. I will tell President Steyn that if the Almighty looked down upon this part of the world, He would ask him why the Republics treated all these white people as slaves, why the Government of Pretoria was corrupt, and why it was not possible to share the government of that big country with the people who came to settle there from other lands? The Dutch politicians claim the right of priority, but what does it amount to? So far as those Republics are concerned, it does not extend back beyond my personal life; it is not the right of priority which belongs to old countries like Portugal, Italy, or some of the old empires of Europe. The Transvaal and the Free State have barely existed one generation, and therefore when you talk about priority, such right as it gives belongs to the native, and to speak of "Ons Land" on the basis of a temporary occupation dating back twenty-five or thirty years before the arrival of the Uitlander, is insolent presumption. That is the reply to make to this wretched nonsense about "Ons Land" and priority of occupation, because the contention will be over with the recognition of equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. That principle for which we have been so long striving is the crux of the present struggle; and my own belief is that when the war is over, a large number

of Dutch farmers in this country will throw in their lot with us on this basis, that neither shall claim any right of preference over the other. We have no feeling against them. We have lived with them, shot with them, visited with them, and we find—owing, I suppose it is, to the race affinity—there is not much between us. But they have been misled by these gangs at Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and even Cape Town; and I say that now they have not to settle with us the Uitlander, they have got to settle with those who have used them for their own base and immoral purposes—I speak warmly because I have been through it all. I might add a few words on our experiences of the past few months. I have to tell the shareholders in Europe that we have for the last four months devoted the energies of our Company to the defence of the town.

### III.—THE DEFENCE OF KIMBERLEY.

‘The first question that cropped up when I arrived was whether, with regard to our 2000 workmen, upon whom were 4000 dependent women and children, we should adopt what, I suppose, is usual in other parts, the half-pay system.’ I and my fellow-directors looked at it broadly, and we came to the conclusion that with the troubles and trials coming upon us, it would be very small-minded on our part to put our employees on what I may call board wages, and the result was our people received their usual

pay, only instead of digging diamonds they were fighting Boers. I feel sure that the European shareholders will not cavil with us for adopting that view. In many ways afterwards we learned the strength of a great corporation, for we were able by the means readily at our disposal to materially assist the defence of the place. We were able to make a searchlight to keep the Boers at a distance. When the water-supply was cut off, we pumped water from our own mines; when they raided the mules, and the sanitation of Kimberley was brought to a standstill in consequence, we were able to place others at the disposal of the municipality; when we saw your defence was deficient in regard to mounted men, we were able to buy 800 horses and to assist the military authorities in creating a mounted force. We also called upon De Beers workmen to form a corps themselves. They responded most nobly to the request. Then we dealt with another difficulty. Owing to the town being shut up, 3000 to 4000 people were out of work. It came home to us at once that these people could not starve, and as they could not get away, the sensible thing was to employ them on public works. Perhaps in the future the roads we have created will be pleasant to you; at the same time, by adopting that course, we saved the citizens from the danger of their houses being robbed in search of food by a desperate and starving population.

I must now say a few words regarding our late chief engineer, Mr. George Labram, who, with his fellow-

workers, came to the assistance of the defence of this town, first manufacturing shells for the military authorities when they were deficient in ammunition for their small guns—shells which answered most satisfactorily—and afterwards, as you are aware, constructing here, right in the centre of Africa, a gun throwing a 30-pound projectile, which I am told is equal in all essentials to anything turned out by Woolwich or Krupp's. We know the results. We were able to compete with our opponents, and the town felt perfect confidence, because at length we had a piece of ordnance far, far better than the guns which had been brought against us up to that time. It is sad to think that the man to whose genius all this was due should have been singled out as the victim of the tragic occurrence which so shortly afterwards took place; that the one man in the town to whom we owed everything, and upon whom we relied, should have been taken from us, out of a population of from 45,000 to 50,000 persons. I am correct in this estimate of the number of inhabitants, because the last census of the military authorities, after the departure of the natives from the compounds, showed over 45,000 people. Yet this one man, upon whom we were all so dependent, and whose mechanical genius had achieved this remarkable result, was snatched from our midst, and on the surface it would appear that the reward of his labours was this dreadful calamity that put an end to his career. But his record will remain, and we shall never forget that in our direst moments he worked for us night and day,

and that his wonderful skill in utilising the resources here obtainable, produced something which is, I believe, without precedent in the history of warfare.

‘You have, therefore, the position, so far as this Company is concerned, that we did our duty by this community, a community to a great extent made up of our own people, and our own workmen. I believe the population of Kimberley includes 14,000 to 15,000 whites. Our workmen number 2000, their women and children another 4000; so that we represent almost half the white population and most of the property in this place. And when we are thanked for our services, as we have been by the Mayor and Town Council, I am bound to reply: We were helping ourselves; we did our duty by the place, and we are pleased that our exertions have met with the approbation of the members of the community other than our own employees. We merely did our duty. I believe, however, that by our assistance we have materially helped to maintain the defence of this town.

‘And when we consider this matter of the defence of Kimberley, it really is not a bad record. You must remember that it was a defence practically sustained by citizen soldiers. Our garrison consisted of about 4500 men of all arms, and when we consider that out of this number the military authorities contributed about 500 men—to whom we express our most cordial thanks—I think the fact will be recognised that it is the brunt of the work that has fallen upon our citizen soldiers. Our poets have lately been exercising their talents on military

themes, and I would offer a suggestion to Mr. Rudyard Kipling that he should devote his thoughts to a lay of the Citizen Soldier. I think we made a fair defence. We do not claim to have performed exceptional deeds of heroism, but for four weary months the citizen members of the defence force have sat on those heaps, and day in, day out, they have cheerfully carried out the obligations which they undertook. Then if you turn to those citizens who joined our mounted forces, you will find that theirs, too, is not a bad record, even from a military point of view. In three short weeks, out of an effective force of 700 men, there were nearly 120 who now lie in your graveyard, or who are severely or slightly wounded. The work they did during the earlier portion of the siege was, as you are aware, materially assisted by the bravery of their leader, the late Major Scott-Turner. I read the account of the fight in which he was killed, and I could not believe my eyes. I suppose it was owing to what is termed the military censorship, but I read in the *Times* that there had been a "reconnaissance in force," during which Major Scott-Turner had lost his life. What are the real facts? On the Saturday, as you remember, he took a redoubt, with forty men under his command, and came back with thirty Boer prisoners. On the Tuesday he found that the redoubt had been again occupied by the Boers, and he again attempted to take that redoubt, this time with seventy men. In so doing he lost his life, and of the seventy men he took with him only twenty got back unscathed—there

were fifty killed or wounded. Very few people know these facts, and I take this opportunity of placing it on record that seventy citizen soldiers of Kimberley went to take that position, and that out of that number there were only twenty who were able to creep away alive, or unwounded, after nightfall. That is the true statement of what took place, and I think it may go forth to the world without in any way prejudicially affecting the military situation. I should mention that a deep debt of gratitude is due to the Cape Police, who have done such yeoman service. I look upon them as part of the citizen soldiers, as they are all men of this country who have taken to police duty rather than to farming or pursuits in the town. Well, we went on, and finally we had the big gun brought against us. We will not make a long story of that. We all know how unpleasant it was to be shelled all day by a gun throwing a 100-pound shell, and which, I am given to understand by military men, is one of the most perfect pieces of artillery that has been made. I think we were right to put the women and children down the mines. But, let me say, there was no thought of surrender. We had a meeting. I, as chairman of this Company, the Mayor, and some of the leading citizens, met together, and we sent word to the military authorities that we considered that the situation was serious. But we never talked of surrender. We knew that we could keep the women and children down the mines and could hold our own, but we felt that the relief of Kimberley was not only the personal



relief of ourselves, but would change the whole military position, and that the right thing to do was to strike from the western border for Bloemfontein and Pretoria. The results have proved the correctness of that view; to-day the whole situation is different, and we feel sure that before long order will be restored throughout this country. Our thanks are due, then, to our citizen soldiers, and they are especially due to General French, who made that brilliant ride and relieved us, cleared the Boers around Kimberley, and then, barely stopping a day here, got back to Modder River to help Lord Kitchener in those further operations which are still going on. We thank our military assistants in the defence, but we insist upon it that the defence has been a defence by citizen soldiers. In conclusion, let me say how thankful we are that the War Office at home has at last sent us Lords Roberts and Kitchener, for we, as simple civilians, not versed in military tactics, only know that since their arrival a complete alteration has taken place; and finally, I would submit to you this thought, that when we look back upon the troubles we have gone through, and especially all that has been suffered by the women and children, we have this satisfaction, that we have done our best to preserve that 'which is the best commercial asset in the world, the protection of Her Majesty's flag.'

## APPENDIX IV

THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. RHODES  
AND PARNELL ON THE GIFT OF £10,000  
TO THE IRISH PARTY

ON his way to the Cape, in the autumn of 1887, Mr. Rhodes had as a fellow-passenger one of the Parnellite members, Mr. Swift MacNeill. The two had frequent conversations on the question of Home Rule for Ireland, with regard to which Mr. Rhodes had formed definite and independent views. He wished, as he frankly admitted to Parnell the following year, to use the Irish question as the stalking-horse for a scheme of Imperial Federation. That was his primary and absorbing object, and the question of Home Rule for Ireland was chiefly interesting as furnishing an excellent opportunity for advancing his own special question, Imperial Federation, by opening the door to a practical scheme which would gradually weld together the Colonies and the mother-country in a close and vital union.

As regarded Irish Home Rule, his attitude was that of a Colonial Imperialist. Like most of our colonists, he had been convinced by personal observation and experience of the advantages to the Empire of perfect colonial self-government without abandoning the Imperial tie. He was certain that the gift of responsible government to the colonies, and the abandonment by Downing Street of all

attempt to interfere in their internal affairs, had removed the one real danger to Imperial unity; for, where there is no interference in colonial affairs, the desire for independence cannot develop, cannot even arise, while the greatness of the mother-country will continue to exercise its centripetal attraction, so long as the mother-country keeps true to her great past. He considered that, self-government having so greatly strengthened the Empire in the Colonies, there would be no danger in some carefully devised measure of Home Rule for Ireland which might remove Irish discontent, conciliate Irish sentiment, and thus make the union real and effective. Against the one great danger that such a measure might have a separatist tendency, he was thoroughly on his guard; and at once detected and condemned this separatist tendency in Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886. The exclusion of the Irish members in that Bill he considered a step in the direction of pure separation, and the acquiescence of the Irish members in this exclusion seemed to him to give good grounds for the common belief that they were really working for complete separation from England. From this point of view Mr. Rhodes told Mr. Swift MacNeill that while he was in sympathy with Ireland's desire for self-government, the actual Bill of 1886 seemed to him open to the gravest objections. Mr. Swift MacNeill, who was very anxious to win the approval and support of an influential colonial politician to the Home Rule policy, assured Mr. Rhodes that there was really no such separatist intention, that the Irish members had merely accepted Mr. Gladstone's measure as it stood, and that they would support the retention of Irish representation if a suitable scheme was brought forward. Mr. Swift MacNeill in due course returned

to Ireland and acted as the intermediary between Mr. Rhodes and Parnell. From Avondale he wrote to assure Mr. Rhodes in South Africa of the correctness of Parnell's attitude and his willingness to satisfy Mr. Rhodes's requirements.

On Mr. Rhodes's return to London later in 1888, a meeting was arranged by Mr. Swift MacNeill, and Parnell called on Mr. Rhodes at his rooms in the Westminster Palace Hotel. Parnell had himself in 1886 been in favour of the exclusion of the Irish members; but the result of what he had heard from Mr. Swift MacNeill of Mr. Rhodes's requirements, and his intention, if they were granted, of giving substantial financial aid to the party funds, had led him to consider carefully the criticisms of Mr. Rhodes on the Bill of 1886, and his conversations with Mr. Rhodes himself completed his conversion, so that he came round completely to Mr. Rhodes's views of the question, and agreed to accept his main condition. That main condition was the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, which had been the battle-ground in the Home Rule Bill of 1886, when Mr. Gladstone had insisted on their exclusion, and Mr. Chamberlain had left the Ministry on that very point of difference. Parnell, while he agreed to the retention of the Irish members at Westminster—that is, abandoned the separatist feature of the Bill of 1886—would not agree to Mr. Rhodes's proposal that the Irish representation should be made proportionate to Ireland's Imperial contribution, because this concession would have greatly reduced Irish representation, that is, the number of his followers. Until he got all he wanted, including control of police and judiciary, he could not (he said) afford to consent to any reduction of his strength at Westminster. He agreed,

however, readily enough to accept and support the insertion of a permissive colonial clause in any future Home Rule Bill—that is, a clause giving permission to any colony to claim representation at Westminster proportionate to its contribution to Imperial purposes to Army, Navy, and Diplomatic service. This permissive clause, on which Mr. Rhodes insisted very strongly, Parnell did not agree to propose himself; but said, ‘If any member in committee will propose a permissive clause for colonial representation at Westminster in proportion to a colony’s Imperial contribution, I will accept it.’ Mr. Rhodes having thus obtained the greater part of his conditions in his personal discussions of the question with Parnell, proceeded to formally set forth in a letter the conditions and terms on which he would contribute £10,000 to the funds of the Irish party. The original draft of the first letter, which I give in this Appendix, was submitted to Parnell, and certain omissions which were pressed by the Irish leader as matters of expediency were agreed to by Mr. Rhodes. I have given within brackets the words omitted from the original draft. The three letters are the formal statement of the agreement between Mr. Rhodes and Parnell, and set forth unmistakably the purpose of the gift of £10,000. It may be remembered that at that time not only had the Charter not been applied for, not been thought of; but even the mineral concession from Lobengula had not been obtained, so that not the most shadowy claim to what is now Rhodesia had then any existence. There was thus no possible idea of securing the support of the Irish party to the Charter, but there was the plain compact that Parnell should support Imperial Federation as a corollary to Home Rule; and Parnell, whose vision for essential facts resembled

that of Mr. Rhodes, was so deeply impressed by the great colonist's arguments, that he made it known through the press that he believed that Home Rule for Ireland would lead to Imperial Federation, which the Irish party were prepared to support.

## NO. I.

WESTMINSTER PALACE HOTEL, LONDON, S.W.,  
*June 19, 1888.*

DEAR SIR,—On my way to the Cape last autumn I had the opportunity of frequent conversations with Mr. Swift MacNeill upon the subject of Home Rule for Ireland. I then told him that I had long had a sympathy with the Irish demand for self-government, but that there were certain portions of Mr. Gladstone's bill which appeared open to the gravest objections. The exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster seemed rightly to be considered, both in England and the Colonies, as a step in the direction of pure separation, while the tribute clauses were on the face of them degrading to Ireland, by placing it in the position of a conquered province, and were opposed to the first principles of constitutional government by sanctioning taxation without representation. It has been frequently stated that the hearty acquiescence of the Irish members in these proposals gave good grounds for believing that they were really working for complete separation from England. Mr. MacNeill assured me that this was not the case; that naturally the first object of the Irish members was to obtain self-government for Ireland; and that when this, their main object, was secured, it did not become

them to criticise or cavil at the terms of the grant made to them. Moreover, he said he believed that the Irish members were only too anxious to support Irish representation at Westminster, should a suitable scheme containing the necessary provisions be brought forward.

<sup>1</sup>[Lord Rosebery, in his recent speech at Inverness, has suggested a possible solution. He there proposes a reduced Irish representation at Westminster; this representation could be based upon the amount of the Irish contribution to the Imperial revenue.

And though it seems illogical that Irish members should vote on English local matters, still, taking into consideration the large indirect contribution that Ireland would make in connection with trade and commerce, and that the English people are not prepared at present to accept any vital change of their constitution, it would appear more workable that this reduced number of Irish members should speak and vote even on purely English local questions, than that at doubtful intervals they should be called upon to withdraw into an outside lobby.]

With [some such] safeguards, and they must be effective safeguards, for the maintenance of Imperial unity, I am of opinion that the Home Rule granted should be a reality and not a sham.

If the Irish are to be conciliated and benefited by the grant of self-government, they should be trusted and trusted entirely.

<sup>1</sup> The portions of this letter enclosed in brackets are the omissions made by Parnell from the original draft submitted to him. The words italicised were omitted in favour of mere verbal alterations.

Otherwise the application of popular institutions to Ireland must be deemed impracticable, and the only alternative is the administration of the country as a Crown colony, which plan in the present state of public opinion is totally impossible.

My experience in the Cape Colony leads me to believe that the Ulster question is one which would soon settle itself.

Since the Colonial Office has allowed questions at the Cape to be settled by the Cape Parliament, not only has the attachment to the Imperial tie been immeasurably strengthened, but the Dutch, who form the majority of the population, have shown a greatly increased consideration for the sentiments of the English members of the community.

It seems only reasonable to suppose that in an Irish Parliament similar consideration would be given to the sentiments of that portion of the inhabitants which is at present out of sympathy with the national movement.

I will frankly add that my interest in the Irish question has been heightened by the fact that in it I see the possibility of the commencement of changes which will eventually mould and weld together all parts of the British Empire.

The English are a conservative people, and like to move slowly and, as it were, experimentally. At present there can be no doubt that the time of Parliament is overcrowded with the discussion of trivial and local affairs.

Imperial matters have to stand their chance of a



hearing alongside of railway and tram bills. Evidently it must be a function of modern legislation to delegate an enormous number of questions which now occupy the time of Parliament to District Councils or local bodies.

Mr. Chamberlain recognised this fact in his Radical programme of 1885, and the need daily grows more urgent. Now the removal of Irish affairs to an Irish Legislature [*Council*] would be a practical experimental step in the direction of lessening the burden upon the central deliberative and legislative machine.

But side by side with the tendency of decentralisation for local affairs, there is growing up a feeling for the necessity of greater union in Imperial matters. The primary tie which binds our Empire together is the national one of self-defence. The Colonies are already commencing to co-operate with and contribute to the mother-country for this purpose.

But if they are to contribute permanently and beneficially, they will have to be represented in the Imperial Parliament, where the disposition of their contributions must be decided upon.

I do not think that it can be denied that the presence of two or three Australian members in the House would in recent years have prevented much misunderstanding upon such questions as the New Hebrides, New Guinea, and Chinese Immigration. Now an [reduced] Irish representation at Westminster [with numbers proportionate to Ireland's Imperial contribution] would, without making any vital change in the English constitution, furnish a

precedent by which the self-governing Colonies could from time to time, as they expressed a desire to contribute to Imperial expenditure, be incorporated with the Imperial Legislature. You will perhaps say that I am making the Irish question a stalking-horse for a scheme of Imperial Federation, but if so, I am at least placing Ireland in the forefront of the battle.

The question is, moreover, one in which I take a deep interest, and I shall be obliged if you can tell [*assure*] me that Mr. MacNeill is not mistaken in the impression he conveyed to me, and that you and your party would be prepared to give your hearty support and approval to a Home Rule Bill containing provisions for the continuance of Irish representation at Westminster. Such a declaration would afford great satisfaction to myself and others, and would enable us to give our full and active support to your cause and your party.

[I shall be happy to contribute to the funds of the party to the extent of £10,000. I am also, under the circumstances, authorised to offer to you a further sum of £1000 from Mr. John Morrogh, an Irish resident at Kimberley, South Africa.]—Yours faithfully,  
C. J. RHODES.

No. II.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, *June 23, '88.*

DEAR SIR,—I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 20th inst., which confirms the very interesting account given me at Avondale last January by Mr. Swift MacNeill as to his interviews and

conversations with you on the subject of Home Rule for Ireland.

I may say at once and frankly that I think you have correctly judged the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster to have been a defect in the Home Rule measure of 1886, and further, that this proposed exclusion may have given some colour to the accusations so freely made against the Bill, that it had a separatist tendency. I say this while strongly asserting and believing that the measure itself was accepted by the Irish people without any afterthought of the kind, and with an earnest desire to work it out in the same spirit in which it was offered, a spirit of cordial goodwill and trust, a desire to let bygones be bygones, and a determination to accept it as a final and satisfactory settlement of the long-standing dispute and trouble between Great Britain and Ireland.

I am very glad to find that you consider the measure of Home Rule to be granted to Ireland should be thoroughgoing, and should give her complete control over her own affairs without reservation, and I cordially agree with your opinion that there should be at the same time effective safeguards for the maintenance of Imperial Unity.

Your conclusion as to the only alternative for Home Rule is also entirely my own, for I have long felt that the continuance of the present semi-constitutional system is quite impracticable.

But to return to the question of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, my own views

upon the point, the probabilities of the future, and the bearing of this subject upon the question of Imperial Federation. My own feeling upon the matter is that if Mr. Gladstone includes in his next Home Rule measure provisions for such retention, we should cheerfully concur in them, and accept them with goodwill and good faith, with the intention of taking our share in the Imperial partnership. I believe also that in the event stated, this will be the case, and that the Irish people will cheerfully accept the duties and responsibilities assigned to them, and will justly value the position given them in the Imperial system.

I am convinced that it would be the highest statesmanship on Mr. Gladstone's part to devise a feasible plan for the continued presence of the Irish members here, and from my observation of public events and opinion since 1885, I am sure that Mr. Gladstone is fully alive to the importance of the matter, and that there can be no doubt that the next measure of autonomy for Ireland will contain the provisions which you rightly deem of such moment. It does not come so much within my province to express a full opinion upon the question of Imperial Federation, but I quite agree with you that the continued Irish representation at Westminster will immensely facilitate such a step, while the contrary provision in the Bill of '86 would have been a bar. Undoubtedly this is a matter which should be dealt with in accordance with the opinion of the Colonies themselves, and if they should desire to share in the cost of Imperial matters, as certainly they now do in the responsibility, and should express

a wish for representation at Westminster, I quite think it should be accorded to them, and that public opinion in these islands would unanimously concur in the necessary constitutional modifications.—I am, dear sir, yours truly,

CHARLES STEWART PARNELL.

C. J. RHODES, Esq.

No. III.

WESTMINSTER PALACE HOTEL,  
LONDON, *June 24, 1888.*

DEAR MR. PARNELL,—I have to thank you for your letter of the 23rd inst., the contents of which have given me great pleasure.

I feel sure that your cordial approval of the retention of Irish representation at Westminster will gain you support in many quarters from which it has hitherto been withheld.

As a proof of my deep and sincere interest in the question, and as I believe that the action of the Irish party on the basis which you have stated will lead not to disintegration but really to a closer union of the Empire, making it an Empire in reality and not in name only, I am happy to offer a contribution to the extent of £10,000 to the funds of your party. I am also authorised to offer you a further sum of £1000 from Mr. John Morrogh, an Irish resident in Kimberley, South Africa.—Believe me, yours faithfully,

C. J. RHODES.

P.S.—I herewith inclose a cheque for £5000 as my first instalment.

Mr. Rhodes's correspondence with Parnell did not end here. In November 1889 Parnell was asked to Hawarden to confer with Mr. Gladstone as to the main features of the next Home Rule Bill, in the event of the success of the Liberals at the next general election. Three months after he wrote spontaneously to Mr. Rhodes in South Africa to say that the retention of the Irish members at Westminster was to be a part of the Bill; but that Mr. Gladstone insisted on reducing the representation in order to conciliate English public opinion.

A somewhat fuller account of this letter may be interesting, as it shows that Parnell had felt strongly the depth and intensity of Mr. Rhodes's desire to help on Imperial Federation. On November 29, 1890, Parnell, entering on his struggle against English dictation to the Irish party, published in the press his manifesto to the people of Ireland, in which he gave an account of Gladstone's intentions in a future Home Rule Bill as set forth at the conference with him at Hawarden. The accuracy of Parnell's account was strongly denied by Gladstone: 'I deny that I made the statements that his memory has ascribed to me, or anything substantially representing them, either on the retention of the Irish members or on the settlement of the land or agrarian difficulty, or on the control of the constabulary, or on the appointment of the judiciary.' Parnell's reply to Gladstone's denial was made in a speech at Limerick on January 11, 1891, in the course of which he read portions of his own letter to Mr. Rhodes, sent nine months before to South Africa, which, after Gladstone's denial, Parnell wrote for and obtained from Mr. Rhodes. This letter contained a remarkable confirmation of three main points in Parnell's manifesto—Gladstone's

intentions with regard to the constabulary, with regard to the judicial body, and with regard to the reduction of Irish representation. The strength of this confirmation lies in the fact that at the time Parnell wrote this letter to Mr. Rhodes, the Irish leader and the English Liberal chief were allies, and Parnell had no possible reason for misrepresenting Gladstone to Mr. Rhodes. The letter cannot be found; but these extracts are taken from the *Times* report of Parnell's speech (Jan. 12, 1891), which differs in no way materially from the report in the *Freeman's Journal* of the same date. Parnell, in the course of his speech, said: 'I will just read some passages which relate to these matters in my letter to Mr. Rhodes. "March, 1890. Private. Dear Mr. Rhodes,"—then there is some introductory matter which does not bear upon the present question—"I had been thinking of writing you for some time past, as I thought you might like to hear some of the views entertained by the Liberal leaders upon certain points as I learnt them at Hawarden. Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have been considering very fully the direct question of the retention of the Irish members, and there appeared to be three alternatives"—this was the question in which Mr. Rhodes was interested—"(1) the retention of all Irish members for all purposes; (2) the retention of all Irish members for Imperial purposes; (3) the retention of a reduced number (34) for all purposes. Mr. Gladstone told me that the conclusion at which he and his colleagues had unanimously arrived was overwhelmingly in favour of the last alternative—viz. the reduction of the number of Irish members to 34, but that it had been agreed that no public reference should be made to their views on this point, and that

the matter should remain perfectly private and confidential. I represented to him that I could not yet express my concurrence in the proposed reduction in view of the unsatisfactory state in which the question connected with the constabulary and the judicial body had been left." And then I go on to say, "With a reduced Irish representation it might easily happen that a Conservative Government might come in, and, with the constabulary and judicial authority under their control, might treat us as badly as they are doing now. From this point of view a reduced representation would be dangerous"; and then I go on to discuss certain alternative methods in which this difficulty might be got over. But as the question is no longer a question of reduced representation, but a question of something being made clear in the Bill itself—that the questions of the constabulary and of the judicial body and the land question shall be placed upon a satisfactory basis—it is not necessary for me to go into that portion, and then I conclude, "Yours very truly, Charles Stewart Parnell." Now here is what Mr. Gladstone says: "Not to one of my suggestions did Mr. Parnell offer serious objection." If I did not offer objection to Mr. Gladstone, why did I offer objection to Mr. Cecil Rhodes? I wrote to Mr. Rhodes "that I could not yet express my concurrence in the proposed reduction, in view of the unsatisfactory state in which questions connected with the constabulary and the judicial body had been left." I did not write this letter to Mr. Rhodes in view of this controversy. It was written nine months before the controversy. I object to three points in this letter to Mr. Rhodes. I object to the reduction of the Irish members, and I object to the unsettled state in which the question connected with the constabulary and the judicial body had been left.'



Parnell, as we have seen, wrote to Mr. Rhodes for this letter, and read it, to show that nine months before the controversy he had sent to Mr. Rhodes this account of Gladstone's suggestions, and his own objections to them, and the reasons for his objections. The evidence might have been strengthened, if he had pointed out the passages omitted at his request from Mr. Rhodes's first letter to him—the passages, I mean, enclosed in brackets in the reprint of the letter in this Appendix.

At a later date, March 1, 1891, when entering on his last desperate struggle against the power of the Roman Catholic Church, put forth to support the seceders on the pretext of the O'Shea exposure, Parnell, with his back to the wall, forced to rely on the support of the hillside men, the old stalwarts of Fenianism, began a speech at a great meeting at Navan in these words: 'Men of royal Meath, perhaps some day or other in the long distant future some one may arise who may have the privilege of addressing you as men of Republican Meath. Of that future I know nothing and shall predict nothing here.' (My report is taken from the *Freeman's Journal* of March 2, 1891.) Mr. Rhodes, on reading the speech, wrote to expostulate with Parnell from the standpoint of his old agreement of 1888 for the loyal maintenance of Imperial unity in any measure of Home Rule for Ireland. So strongly had Parnell felt Mr. Rhodes's Imperialist influence, and so sincere was he and so anxious to prove the sincerity of the pledges he had given Mr. Rhodes that the Home Rule movement did not aim at separation, that he at once wrote in reply to regret the words he had used, and to say he had gone further than he intended, the words in question being in fact contradicted by

other passages of the same speech, *e.g.*, 'We are willing . . . to show that the existence of Irish autonomy is compatible with Imperial prosperity and progress.' Parnell, who would never have made this admission to an enemy, felt that Mr. Rhodes had treated him as a friend and had trusted his assurances, and hastened to explain that he had not forgotten them, though, in his endeavour to rally the hillside men to his banner, he had used the kind of language which appealed to them. Mr. Rhodes assured Mr. Barry O'Brien that he found Parnell the most reasonable and moderate of men, and certainly his conversion to Imperial Federation, with Home Rule as a part of it, is as remarkable as Mr. Rhodes's conversion of Mr. Schnadhorst to his policy of Imperial expansion. The letter was, unfortunately, burned in the great fire that destroyed Mr. Rhodes's house, Groote Schuur. Parnell was a man of his word, and had he lived and remained the leader of a united party, the Home Rule Bill of 1893 would have contained Mr. Rhodes's permissive clause. It did include his chief requirement, the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, and, as Mr. Rhodes had desired, in reduced numbers.

The originality and value of Mr. Rhodes's plan of colonial representation at Westminster was, of course, that it was to be permissive and optional, and in proportion to Imperial contribution; for colonial representation itself is not unknown in Europe.

There was, for instance, in Spain a most remarkable gift of colonial representation in return for voluntary contribution to Imperial purposes when, in 1809, the Spanish Colonies, at that time of vast extent and importance, rallied to the mother-country in its struggle with Napoleon, and sent nearly three

millions sterling in that one year, in return for which contribution to Imperial purposes the Central Junta at Seville declared the Colonies entitled to representation in the Cortes. This reform no doubt proved a fiasco, as the wave of Liberalism soon spent itself, and the thirty colonial deputies at Cadiz were nothing but a name; but the admission of the principle at such a date and in such surroundings is at least interesting. There are, of course, existing examples of colonial representation in the Parliament of the mother-country which may be remembered. In Portugal, for instance, deputies from the Colonies sit in the Cortes; and in France, if Algeria, where each department returns a senator and two deputies to the National Assembly, be excepted, as not strictly speaking a colony, there are to be found in the Senate one senator, and in the Chamber of Deputies two deputies, representing Martinique, and the same representation severally for Réunion and Guadeloupe, with a senator and a deputy for French India and a deputy each for Senegal, Cochin-China, and Guiana.

To return to Mr. Rhodes's conditions with Parnell. The second of these conditions, the permissive colonial clause, to which he obtained Parnell's promise of support in committee, with a view to thus introducing the thin end of the wedge of what he regarded as the only possible foundation of any future Imperial Federation, is far the most important at the present time. In it lies as in a nutshell the kernel of any workable scheme for the federation of the British Colonies with the mother-country. It contains the first essential of success, namely, that every step towards closer union should come from the colonists themselves. According to Mr. Rhodes's clause, which was permissive and optional, any colony

was to be able to send members to the House of Commons at Westminster, if it desired to do so, the choice and the mode of choice of the members being left to itself, the only condition being that the members it might send should be limited to a number proportionate to the colony's contribution to the normal expenditure for Imperial purposes, that is, for the Army, the Navy, and the Diplomatic service. This proportionate representation would satisfy the people of the mother-country, who would naturally object to colonial representation without, or out of proportion to, colonial contribution, while it would satisfy the Colonies by enabling them to increase their representation by increasing their contribution, as their increase in wealth and importance made this desirable.


If it be objected that two or three members from a colony would have no effect at Westminster, the answer is that their opinion would be listened to as the opinion of the colony, and their power of influence would be very much greater than that of an Agent-General buried in Downing Street, who is consulted privately, and cannot explain the wishes of the colony directly to the House. As to the difficulty a colony would have in finding a few members to represent it at Westminster without payment, that would be easily got over, there being always enough wealthy colonists to undertake that honourable position from public spirit and the ambition of representing their country in the mother of Parliaments. The wisdom of Mr. Rhodes's plan, the plan of a colonial statesman, was that he simply proposed to leave the Colonies an open door by which, if they were so minded, they might enter and take their place in the ancient Council-chamber of the nation at Westminster. The value of colonial representation at Westminster is

obvious, when one remembers the many questions that arise from time to time on which the opinion and needs of the people of each particular colony might profitably be made known by its own members. To take Australia, for example—there have been in the past such questions as Chinese Immigration, the New Hebrides, New Guinea, etc., and to-day there is the question of clause 74 in the Australian Commonwealth Bill concerning the right of appeal to the Privy Council. Able as the delegates are, how much more satisfactory it would be to have members from Australia on the floor of the House to explain what the colonists desire and why they desire it! The speeches of such members would be on their own subjects accepted as the evidence of experts, and would have weight accordingly.

That Imperial Federation is in the air is certain, and that it may be expected to take shape in the early future is, at least, very probable. The trend of progress is wholly in the direction of some such federation as Mr. Rhodes set forth in 1888, and still confidently advocates. Any intelligent reading of events suggests the belief that local questions will gradually go more and more to county councils and such local government organisation; and we shall wake up one day to find nothing but Imperial questions left to occupy the Parliament at Westminster.

The merit of Mr. Rhodes's plan for Imperial Federation lies in the fact that it would work gradually, and that it would be satisfactory to the Colonies, as being permissive and optional, leaving, that is, the choice to them, while it would be satisfactory to the mother-country as making representation proportionate to contribution. That Lord Rosebery, our

most gifted speaker as well as the most valuable perhaps of our statesmen, if he could be persuaded to return to active political life, still shares Mr. Rhodes's views of Federation seems to be indicated not only by his Inverness speech in 1888, but by his speech at the National Liberal Club on the occasion of the banquet to the Australian delegates as lately as May 2, 1900. 'Are these Parliaments,' he said, 'all to remain mere scattered local bodies without any union except the august symbol of the Crown, or is a centripetal movement from the outer Britain to the inner Britain, which we see daily taking place, to have a wider and a closer application yet?' And he decided exactly in the spirit of Mr. Rhodes's plan of permissive and optional representation. 'However,' he said, 'it may come, it will not come by legislative schemes, but by voluntary and spontaneous effort.' 'Voluntary and spontaneous'—that is exactly the distinguishing characteristic of Mr. Rhodes's idea for Imperial Federation, set forth twelve years ago, an idea which found its first convert in Parnell; and however the details may differ, it seems probable that the same distinguishing characteristics will be found in any plan of Imperial Federation in the future.













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